The port of Bristol in the second half of the eighteenth century: An examination of the organisational structure of the port pertaining to the management and operation of its shipping with special reference to ships trading with the West Indies and America. by MacMillan, John Gilbert
 1 
The port of Bristol in the second half of the eighteenth 
century: An examination of the organisational structure of 
the port pertaining to the management and operation of 
its shipping with special reference to ships trading with 
the 
West Indies and America. 
 
Volume 1 of 2. 
 
Submitted by John Gilbert MacMillan 
to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in History 
in August 2015. 
 
This thesis is available for library use on the understanding that it is 
copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be 
published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified 
and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of 
a degree by this or any other university. 
 
 
Signature………………………………… 
 
 2 
Abstract. 
 
In comparison to the amount of research that has been carried out on Royal Navy 
affairs and its ports and dockyards, few studies have been done on the day to day 
operations of merchant shipping and civilian ports, especially in the eighteenth 
century. This thesis attempts to partly redress this by examining at depth the 
workings of the Port of Bristol and its shipping in this period, using contemporary 
records where they have survived and a system of cross-referencing where they 
have not. 
 
The physical structure and amenities of the port were subject to close examination, 
not only to establish whether they were suitable for their purpose, but to observe 
the effectiveness of the systems that were in place regarding their use. Similarly, 
the deposition of shipping in the port was scrutinised to establish whether or not it 
contributed to the recognised problem of congestion at the port. The reality was 
that the facilities and systems put in place by the managers of the port, the Society 
of Merchant Venturers, were mainly effective but they could not overcome the 
adverse conditions set by the port having one of the highest ranges of tide in the 
world. 
 
However, there was another factor and that was the perspectives of the users of 
the port, the shipowners and merchants of the city. It was established that Bristol 
shipowners still adhered to the traditional system of owning ships as an element of 
a merchant’s business interests rather than in their own right, and this meant that 
there was little flexibility in both ways of working and the areas ships traded to, with 
the result that the facilities of the port were subjected to seasonal inundations 
contributing to congestion. The management of the ships involved in the most 
important trade of the port, the West Indian, was examined and they and their 
crews were far from being used to their full potential. In effect the conservative 
attitude to trade of the Bristol merchant was exacerbating the fundamental 
environmental problem of the port, its unmanageable tides.  
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The port of Bristol in the second half of the eighteenth century: 
An examination of the organisational structure of the port 
pertaining to the management and operation of its shipping with 
special reference to ships trading with the West Indies and 
America. 
 
Introduction. 
 
An inequality affecting maritime history.  
 
Compared to the massive library of publications regarding the history and 
organisation of the Royal Navy, there are few dealing with the everyday 
management of merchant ships, at least before the age of steam; indeed Basil 
Lubbock has been credited with being the earliest historian of the nineteenth 
century merchant sailing ship yet his first publication was in 1902.1 A factor in the 
attractiveness of naval research must be the abundance of surviving 
documentation, which is not the case for merchant shipping unless they were 
official papers deposited in government annals. The survival of mercantile records 
depended entirely on the whims of shipping companies who generally destroyed 
them when they closed down. Even when these documents are available there is a 
scarcity of detail because ships’ masters kept administration to a minimum.2  
 
Mercantile trade and economics has been well researched and the results 
published, but data for this is readily available from official records. However there 
has been little interest in investigating the mechanics of preparing, dispatching and 
sending goods from one port to another and this must affect research in general 
as, for example, an inefficient port system would certainly affect imports or exports. 
Again, this is difficult to assess because published information on the history of 
                                                 
1 Michael Leek, ‘A Reappraisal of the Life and Work of Basil Lubbock’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 100 (2014), 
p. 445; Basil Lubbock, Round the Horn Before the Mast, (London, 1902). 
2 See below in Chapter 2. 
 12 
commercial ports, although more readily available, generally lacks technical details 
of their day to day practices.3 
 
Justification for writing the thesis.  
 
This thesis was produced as a contribution to an area of maritime history that has 
been under researched, that is merchant shipping and commercial ports at their 
basic operational levels. Research at this level not only brings to light working 
practices, but also can complement or contradict conclusions reached by other 
disciplines such as political or economic history which target their investigations at 
what might be called a more complex echelon.  
 
The port of Bristol was chosen as no study had been made of its basic operations 
in the eighteenth century, although its trade had been thoroughly examined by 
scholars. There were two main aims.  
 
 To produce a detailed description of the workings of the port and its shipping 
operations. 
 To use this data to determine whether towards the end of the eighteenth 
century changes could have been made at operational levels to slow the 
port’s relative decline compared to others.4 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The publications consulted for the writing of this thesis are as follows. J. Broodbank, History of the Port of 
London (London, 1921); R. Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry (London, 1962); C. M. Frazer 
and K. Emsley, Tyneside (Newton Abbot, 1973); J. Gutherie,. The River Tyne: Its History and Resources 
(Newcastle, 1880); F. E. Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey: the Development of a Port, 1700-1970 (Newton 
Abbot, 1971); Gordon Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, (London, 1972); Gordon Jackson, The History 
and Archaeology of Ports (Tadworth, 1983); S. Middlebrook, Newcastle Upon Tyne: Its Growth and 
Achievement (Newcastle, 1950); S. Mountfield, Western Gateway: A History of the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Board (Liverpool, 1975); C. Northcote Parkinson, The Rise of the Port of Liverpool (Liverpool, 
1952); J. Pudney, London’s Docks (London, 1975); John, Riddell, The Clyde: The Making of a River 
(Edinburgh, 2000). Those dealing with the port of Bristol are listed in the bibliography and noted throughout 
the text.   
4 Minchinton believed it had gone from second in importance at the beginning of the century to eighth at the 
end. W. E. Minchinton, ed., The Trade of Bristol in the Eighteenth Century (Bristol Record Society, 20, 
1957), p. ix.  
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Questions to be answered in this thesis. 
 
From perusing the main publications on the subject of the port,6 and additional 
knowledge from past research, the basic questions that were required to be 
answered by this thesis can be listed as follows. 
 
1. The Society of Merchant Venturers, in effect, managed the port and its river. 
How effective were their methods? 
2. Was the structure of the port and its amenities suitable for its shipping? 
There was known to be congestion but was this simply due to the size of 
ships and trade increasing?  
3. Ships at Bristol were mainly owned by merchants. How efficient was this 
arrangement, was there any sign of change, and what was their contribution 
to the efficient running of the port?  
4. Bristol was an inland port on a river influenced by the third highest tidal 
range in the world. In practical and economic terms, what was the effect of 
this on shipowning and trade? 
 
 
                                                 
6 Paul Elkin, ‘Aspects of the Recent Development of the Port of Bristol’, in Waterfront Archaeology: 3rd 
International Conference on Waterfront Archaeology, Bristol, (1988),  27-35; Grahame Farr, Somerset 
Harbours (London, 1954); John Latimer, The Annals of Bristol in the Eighteenth Century (Bristol, 1893; 
reprinted Bath, 1970 edition); John Latimer, The History of the Society of Merchant Venturers of the City of 
Bristol, with Some Account of the Anterior Merchants’ Guild, (Bristol, 1903); John Lord, and Jem Southam, 
The Floating Harbour: A Landscape History of Bristol City Dock (Bristol, 1983); C. M. MacInnes, Bristol: A 
Gateway of Empire (Newton Abbot, 1968); Patrick McGrath, ‘The Merchant Venturers and Bristol Shipping 
in the Early Seventeenth Century’, The Mariner’s Mirror , 36 (1950) 69-71; Patrick McGrath, ed., Bristol in 
the Eighteenth Century (Newton Abbot, 1972); Patrick McGrath, The Merchant Venturers of Bristol: A 
History of the Society of Merchant Venturers of the City of Bristol from its Origin to the Present Day (Bristol, 
1975); W. Matthews, The New History, Survey and Description of the City and Suburbs of Bristol, or 
Complete Guide and Bristol Directory for the Year, 1793-94 (Bristol, 1794); W. E. Minchinton, ‘Bristol – 
Metropolis of the West in the Eighteenth Century’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, 4 
(1954), 69-89; W. E. Minchinton, ed., The Trade of Bristol in the Eighteenth Century (Bristol Record Society, 
20, 1957); W. E. Minchinton, ed., Politics and the Port of Bristol in the Eighteenth Century (Bristol Record 
Society, 23, 1963); W. E. Minchinton, ‘The Port of Bristol in the Eighteenth Century’ in McGrath, Patrick, 
ed., Bristol in the Eighteenth Century (Newton Abbot, 1972) pp. 127-160; Kenneth Morgan, Bristol and the 
Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1993); Kenneth Morgan, ‘The Economic Development 
of Bristol, 1700-1850’ in M. Dresser and P Ollerenshaw, eds., The Making of Modern Bristol (Tiverton, 
1996); Anthony J. Parker, ‘A Maritime Cultural Landscape: The Port of Bristol in the Middle Ages’, 
International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 28 (1999), 323-342; Charles Wells, A Short History of the 
Port of Bristol (Bristol, 1909); Alan F. Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes of the 18th 
Century’, Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucester Archaeological Society 81 (1962). 
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The material used to answer the questions posed above.  
 
As can be seen above, copious numbers of books and articles have been written 
about the history of the port and its trade but only one short study contains an 
overview of port operations during the eighteenth century and, unfortunately, this 
work lacks source references.7 
 
However this deficiency was compensated for by Kenneth Morgan’s Bristol and the 
Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century, a book more concerned with economic 
history than the everyday operation of the port, but having a very detailed appendix 
listing and describing the primary sources available, and also a prolific 
bibliography. These provided the foundation for this study and the text itself was 
referred to regularly when matters arose dealing with Bristol’s economic history.8 
 
The port’s facilities and management systems. 
 
There are no contemporary documents or publications describing these specifically 
and therefore to construct a model, data had to be obtained by cross-referencing 
primary documents. The principal papers were contained in the archives of the 
Society of Merchant Venturers (known henceforth as the ‘Society’) which has been 
housed in the Bristol Record Office since 2005. The key documents were the 
Merchants’ Hall Books of Proceedings, with their Indexes,9 as they provided the 
chronological list of events to which all other documents, letters and accounts 
could be referred. Without these books it would have been difficult to make sense 
of bundles of documents, which although catalogued, were not usually numbered 
or stored in chronological order.10 This is not a criticism as many of these 
                                                 
7 Minchinton, ‘Port of Bristol’, pp. 127-160. 
8 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade.  
9 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/8-13 Merchants’ Hall Book of Proceedings, 1752-1797; and BRO: SMV/2/1/2/2-5 Index 
to Hall Books, 1733-1762. The information contained in these was almost identical, but the proceedings had 
the benefit of showing which members were in attendance, whilst the great advantage of  the index was that 
the author had taken his information from the proceedings and subdivided it under the headings, Navigation 
of the river, Haven Master, Ballast Master and Pilots; Champions Dock; Wharfage, Cranes and Quays; Trade 
and Public Affairs. 
10 BRO: SMV/7/1/6/4 Complaints against pilots,1784-92; BRO: SMV/7/1/6/5 Letters from the Haven Master 
about pilots; BRO: SMV/7/1/6/7 Orders relating to towmen; BRO: SMV/7/1/2/1 Papers re the quays and 
 15 
documents did not have chronological identification and after the transfer the whole 
archive was excellently catalogued. When it was at Merchants’ Hall research was 
more difficult even though a guide had been published.11 
 
In the Society’s archive, there are copious amounts of material available on many 
topics to the extent that careful selection of documents was necessary otherwise 
the area under discussion could be overloaded. For example, there was a whole 
section dedicated to the building and running of the Merchants’ Dock – generally 
referred to in the contemporary documents as Champion’s Dock – which was so 
extensive that it provided not only data for the text of the thesis,12  but also allowed 
an appendix to be written on dock building methods in the eighteenth century. This 
dock is important because the extent of information available not only allows the 
operational systems to be examined, but also gives some insight into the 
philosophy behind the decision making process of the Society. It had been built to 
be both an asset to the port and profitable, but writers are in general agreement 
that neither happened and blame the Society for mismanagement and high fees. 
Having investigated the mass of documents the conclusion is that the former could 
not be sustained and the latter, though a symptom, was not the prime factor. The 
main problems were the reluctance of the shipowners to change their habits and, 
most important, the tidal effects of the river which were impossible to overcome.13  
 
Some documents in the archive presented difficulties; for example the Muster 
Rolls, used for crew analysis.14 The original rolls, as handed in by the ships’ 
masters, were preserved by being pasted into a book on the day that payment was 
made, possibly months after the discharge of the crew, so when tracing ships the 
whole book had to be painstakingly searched, sometimes from year to year. An 
                                                                                                                                                     
nuisances, 1751-1784; BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2 Miscellaneous papers re cranes, 1769-1792; BRO: SMV/7/1/4/19 
Haven Master’s correspondence. 
11 Elisabeth Ralph, Guide to the Archives of the Society of Merchant Venturers of Bristol (Bristol, 1988). 
12 BRO: SMV/7/1/3 The Merchants’ Dock. 
13 McGrath says that there were a multitude of problems and his conclusion is that it is impossible to quantify 
loss. McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, pp.155-157; Minchinton believed that revenue from the project 
was too low and so the dock was neglected. Minchinton, ‘Port of Bristol’, p. 140; Wells believes that too 
much money was spent by the Society that it could not afford. Wells, Short History of the Port of Bristol, p. 
26.  
14 BRO: SMV/9/3/1 Ships’ Muster Rolls, 1748-1795. 
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index had been kept from the beginning in 1747 which saved time as it 
chronologically listed the payment date giving the name of the ship, but 
unfortunately it ended in 1787.15  The Muster Rolls also suffered from slipshod 
recording of crew details by the ships’ masters, which will be dealt with below.  
 
However, the point of this example is that there are copious amounts of material 
available in this archive and in order not to be diverted from the thesis argument, 
the researcher found that it was impossible to retrieve every document even if it 
looked useful. Apart from the above, the documents were easily decipherable and 
any minor failings will be discussed in the text.  
 
Shipping. 
 
The investigation into the ownership and trading patterns of ships, and the 
dynamics of their movements through the port and overseas, was more 
complicated as no single archive had all the records necessary and so data could 
only be obtained after making a systematic analysis of tabulated information 
obtained from ships’ account books, customs documents, shipowners’ letters, 
newspapers and sundry academic studies belonging principally to two archives, 
the Bristol Record Office and the Bristol Reference Library. The former had two 
principal sets of documents, the papers of Samuel Munckley,16 and the records of 
the Bright family,17 both shipowners and merchants. Contained in them were ships’ 
account books vital to this research as they noted payments made during voyages 
to the West Indies, together with the master’s instructions and letters to overseas 
agents. This information allowed templates to be created from which the complex 
workings of shipowning companies could be construed. 
 
Two account books in particular, one from each owner, were exceedingly useful 
because by chance they covered all the voyages of two West Indian ships built and 
                                                 
15 BRO: SMV/9/2/1/13 Thomas Rothley’s Account Book, 1747-1787. The title of this book could cause 
confusion to other researchers as it appears to have nothing to do with the Muster Rolls so the staff were 
informed.  
16 BRO: AC/MU Papers of Samuel Munckley, ship owner and merchant of Bristol, 1720-1802. 
17 BRO: 11168 Records of the Bright family. 
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sold in the same years, and thus allowed comparisons to be made regarding the 
two companies’ working practices.18  Five other account books were available from 
the Bright family papers,19 and both merchants’ archives contained bills of lading, 
letters and diverse documents concerning these and other ships. There was also a 
microfilm of account books and other material contained in the William L. Clements 
Library in the USA.20  
 
Complementing and corroborating this information was shipping data available 
from the Bristol Reference Library, in particular the account book for another two of 
Brights’ ships, which on examination turned out not to be an account book, but a 
treasure trove of detailed receipts, accounts, letters, wage and cargo books from 
two voyages made during the same period.21 In the ordinary account books, the 
entries show lump sums paid for services or to suppliers, but in this book the bills 
to these people were itemised. This meant that any period spent in port could be 
analysed, in particular its refit and supply of material and provisions in Bristol and 
the West Indies.  
 
Two other important sets of documents were kept at the Bristol Reference Library 
which were used copiously when dealing with ship movements and trade. The 
Bristol Presentments, printed bills of entry, were available for some of the years 
covered by the thesis and gave dates, cargoes, trading areas and merchants.22 
Unfortunately these had details of foreign-going ships only. A complete run of the 
series ‘Lloyd’s Register of Shipping’ gave particulars of ownership, trading  area 
and ship statistics, but again only for foreign-going ships.23 The other source 
                                                 
18 BRO: 12162 Shipping Account Book of the Snow Fanny, 1777-1791; BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for 
the Triton, 1777-90. 
19 BRO: 39654/1 Voyage Accounts for the Ruby, 1758-1763; 39654/2 Voyage Accounts for the Swift, 1759-
60; Sally, 1767-72; Nevis Planter 1770-75; 39654/4 Voyage Accounts for the Druid, 1790-91. 
20 BRO: Microfilm FX/20. Bristol Shipping Account books courtesy of William L. Clements Library, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, USA. 
21 BRL: 21258 Account Book of the Sybil and Success, 1779-86. 
22 BRL: BL9 24795 Bristol Presentments, Imports and Exports, 1770 onwards with a break between 1781-
1790. 
23 BRL: AR Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1778, 1787 and 1792. (Green binding. Gregg International 
Reprints). 
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contained in this repository was newspapers, used both for general information and 
ship movements.24  
 
The above is not a comprehensive list of all documents utilized in the research, 
and some could be employed in both port or ship investigations. The Society’s 
Wharfage Books, for example were used to examine merchants’ imports or exports 
as well as arrival dates and tonnages.25  
  
Method of research. 
 
Much of this research was aimed at collecting contemporary information on ship 
and port operations at a level where if any data had been recorded at all, it was 
liable to have been discarded shortly afterwards, and so the only way this could be 
retrieved was by cross-referencing a number of sources and analysing the 
tabulated results. This generated substantial amounts of data which could not be 
accommodated in the main body of work but is recorded separately in Volume 2, 
General Appendices, to verify the author’s arguments. 
 
Because of the sheer volume of data available from the above repositories, it was 
not feasible to add from other archives. The West India Papers of the Pinney 
Family collection at the University of Bristol26 were examined, and while there was 
information that could corroborate that of the Bristol Record Office, it was 
analogous and to include it in the research would be superfluous as well as time 
consuming. Another important resource at this university, The House of Commons 
Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century, were initially used but then became 
difficult to obtain.27   
 
                                                 
24 The two main newspapers consulted were, BRL: BL7H1 and BL8G Felix Farley’s Bristol Journal; and 
BRL: BL9F. Bristol Mercury and Universal Advertiser. 
25 BRO: SMV/7/1/1 Wharfage books for Bristol, 1654-1861. 
26 University of Bristol Information Services: GB 3 DM 41 The West Indies Collection, 1653-1998.  
27 S. Lambert, ed., House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century (Delaware, 1976). This 
collection contains important material for any scholar of the slave trade but the library at Bristol University 
has now confined it to store making it difficult to refer to it volume by volume.  
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The National Archives were visited on several occasions to examine various 
documents. The papers of James Rogers, a merchant in the slave trade with the 
largest fleet at Bristol, were given a cursory examination, but the sheer size of the 
archive was daunting and it was not feasible to do more than an initial exploration – 
see Chapter 2.28   The Bristol Port Books were studied in an attempt to fill in the 
gap in the Bristol Presentments between 1781 and 1789, but the writing was 
almost indecipherable and where legible they were difficult to use.29 The missing 
information was largely found from other documentation. The Mediterranean 
Passes, Colonial Papers and Naval Officer’s Returns were checked but again, the 
information taken from them simply corroborated that available at Bristol.30 
 
The Caird Library at the National Maritime Museum provided the logbook of the 
African Queen from which the technical details of her departure from Bristol were 
taken and proved particularly useful. The disbursement book of the Barum, a collier 
sailing out of Bristol confirmed the system of coastal disbursements were similar to 
that of foreign ships, but unfortunately the period was beyond that of this thesis.31 A 
card index created by Graham Farr with details of every ship he had investigated 
proved useful in that it again corroborated information taken at Bristol.32  
 
The final archive to be considered was the Bright Family Papers at the University 
of Melbourne, Australia. There is no doubt that this would contain valuable 
information for the thesis but it is beyond the resources of the author to visit it at 
this time. However, Kenneth Morgan’s The Bright – Meyler Papers reproduces a 
good proportion of the correspondence stored there from 1732 onward and from 
this material for this thesis has been extracted.33 Unfortunately a paucity of 
                                                 
28 National Archives: C 107/1-15 James Rogers Papers. 
29 Kenneth Morgan confirms this. Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade , p. 227; National Archives: 
E190/1238/3 Customer Overseas Outwards, 1788-1789; E190/1238/4 Customer Overseas Outwards, 1788-
1789; E190/1238/5 Customer Overseas inwards, 1788-1789. 
30 National Archives: ADM7/110-112 Register of Passes, 1790-1795: CO 142/21-23. Shipping Returns 
Jamaica, 1783-1806.  
31 NMM: Log/M/64 Logbook of the Africa Queen, 1790; NMM: AMS 38/2 Details of disbursement of the 
ship Barum, 1810-1812. 
32 NMM: MSS/83/136 Uncatalogued. Grahame Farr. Card index for vessels entering the Port of Bristol 
33 Kenneth Morgan ed., The Bright – Meyler Papers: A Bristol-West India Connection 1732-1837 (Oxford, 
2007). 
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correspondence between the years of 1780-1815 meant that Morgan reproduced 
few letters from this time, the main timescale of this thesis.34  
 
The layout of the thesis and the development of the argument. 
 
The thesis is divided into an introductory chapter and then four independent 
chapters, each concentrating on specific aspects of port or shipping operations. 
Their purpose is twofold, that is to examine the technical details of maritime and 
port operations, and to answer the questions posed above. Each section of a 
chapter has an introduction and a conclusion and a fifth chapter has been included 
to record overall conclusions.  
 
Introductory Chapter. 
 
This chapter has been included to examine the technical and logistical obstacles to 
shipping as experienced by other major ports in the country during the period of the 
thesis and the actions taken to overcome them. It has been compiled entirely from 
secondary sources as to have carried out research to the depth of the main 
chapters would have meant attendance at the associated archives of each port, 
which was way beyond the limits of this work.  
 
It does, however, provide a source of information from which to compare the 
problems experienced by Bristol with other ports, and it will be argued later that at 
these places, after overcoming political objections, the solutions were relatively 
straightforward to implement. In Bristol’s case, the success was only partial and 
obstacles to shipping due to actual river itself were never fully conquered, a new 
port having to be built at its mouth towards the end of the nineteenth century.   
 
Although outwardly there were some similarities in the predicaments experienced 
by the various ports, they were not the same, and the limitation to this chapter is 
that it was awkward comparing the primary research sources used in this thesis 
                                                 
34 Morgan ed., Bright – Meyler Papers, p. 13. 
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with its secondary data. For example, costs must have varied according to supply 
and demand for labour and materials, and whilst this is detailed in the thesis for the 
two major improvements carried out at Bristol, it is not possible to compare like for 
like without having similar research for each port available. And, as stated in the 
justification for writing this thesis, there is a paucity of such research.  
 
Chapter 1. 
 
The purpose of the chapter is to portray the environmental, geographical and 
structural elements of the port together with the facilities provided to service 
shipping, and with this information as a backdrop, to describe operational systems 
and evaluate their management. It is divided into three sections, each one 
investigating a segment of the port that more or less operated independently, 
although part of the whole. In the first section, it is argued that Hungroad at the 
mouth of the river was actually a transit port rather than simply an anchorage, and 
could have been more effectively used had the Society provided more resources. 
The second deals with Merchants’ Dock and its attached shipbuilding facilities and 
reached the conclusion that this floating dock was a sound conception which could 
have been an asset to the port had it not been defeated by the tidal conditions of 
the river. This will be a theme throughout the thesis. Lastly, the operations of the 
main part of the port, the city quays (the collective term used in this thesis for Quay 
Head, Broad Quay and Narrow Quay on the east bank of the Frome, the historical 
berths for shipping along the north side of the Avon called the Backs, and the 
Grove, built in the latter part of the century) are described at depth as an example 
of the way an eighteenth-century port worked, one of the main aims of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 2.  
 
The first section of this chapter examines how the Bristol shipowners organised 
their ships and trade routes in order to provide an infrastructure from which 
research into other shipping matters can be developed later in the thesis. It also 
considers the extent to which changes were taking place nationally to the 
traditional rationale of ships being bought to further the trading purposes of a 
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merchant, or a group of merchants, to that of owning ships to provide an income 
from the vessels themselves from freight charges or chartering. One author holds 
the belief that two methods of shipowning, the traditional and what he calls 
professional or specialised, were being used at the end of the century – albeit that 
the latter was mainly a nineteenth century phenomenon – and sets out criteria to 
differentiate between them – see Appendix 2.001.35 When considering the 
efficiency of ship operations at Bristol, it was important to assess where its 
shipowners were on the continuum between traditional and specialised shipowning 
because the continued use of what might be seen as outdated procedures could 
be a factor contributing to the relative loss of status of the port. The method used 
was to draw conclusions from the analysis of tabulated data36 and this produced 
strong indications that shipowners were maintaining their long-established 
traditions. It will be demonstrated in Chapter 4 that apart from this being a less 
effective way of working, it could be contributing to the problem of congestion.  
 
When investigating ship operations, a complete picture cannot be obtained without 
taking into consideration the people working the ships, so the second section of 
this chapter is devoted to the question of crewing and pay. It had to be split into 
two parts, foreign-going and coastal shipping, as there were considerable 
differences between the procedures of each although the boundaries were not 
absolute. Crewing was a complicated subject to research and involved copious 
amounts of cross-referencing and tabulations, so it was decided to include a 
general introduction to the section with a detailed description of the material and 
methods used as part of the ongoing argument. 
 
The conclusions were that considerable differences existed between foreign-going 
ships in time of war and peace, the former increasing the shipowner’s costs, whilst 
in peacetime wages and conditions reverted to long established practices, an 
indication that traditional methods were maintained. As far as adding to the general 
information available on crewing, no signs of allegiance of crewman to company 
                                                 
35 S. P. Ville, English Shipowning during the Industrial Revolution: Michael Henley and Son, London 
Shipowners 1770-1800 (Manchester, 1987), pp. 2-5. 
36 The main source was from the Bristol Reference Library. Lloyd’s Register, 1792; Bristol Presentments, 
Import and Export, 1792; FFBJ, 1791 and 1792. 
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except for some officers was found, but on the whole the seaman was fairly treated 
and indeed it was he who took advantage of the owner in times of war. Regarding 
coastal shipping, the men appeared to be part of an informed pool of manpower 
who had no allegiance to any owner but picked up ships as suited their wants. 
There appeared to be a small number who worked both at sea and ashore.  
 
Chapter 3. 
 
This chapter deals with the passage of West India ships through the port39 and the 
administration systems of the three main port agencies, the Society, Corporation 
and Customs. These are discussed at depth to facilitate an understanding of the 
complicated rules by which the port was run and the need for every shipowner and 
merchant to tailor his business practices to suit. Once established these became 
the norm and hardened the inertial attitude against change.  
 
It is the aim of this chapter to describe the actual usage of the port facilities and the 
costs incurred during a ship’s passage throughout. The first section outlines the 
technicalities of movement and illustrates the extra costs to the shipowners of 
overcoming the tidal river as well as the processes involved. The second describes 
in detail the administrative systems, whilst the third concentrates on the dual roles 
of merchant and shipowner and the rationale behind the decisions taken whilst a 
ship progresses through the harbour. The last section considers the economics 
and effectiveness of organising West Indian voyages along traditional lines by 
breaking them down and using actual data from account books to analyse each 
component part. The results were briefly compared to those that might have been 
achieved if the same ships had been run according to the ways of professional 
shipowning put forward by Ville.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 These are the only ships where account books detailing costs and ways of operating survived. 
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Chapter 4. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections, the first deals with the problems of 
overcrowding at the port and its effect on cargo handling and distribution, the 
second demonstrates the consequences of the tides on the movement of shipping, 
and the third brings together the first two sections – and information from 
throughout the thesis – to show that at Bristol there were environmental conditions 
that were particularly difficult to overcome.   
 
Overcrowding, or congestion, generally points to a lack of berthing space or cargo 
handling facilities, but it can also be caused by unproductive work practices. 
Section 1 looks at the extent of the problem and then analyses the port’s shipping, 
trade by trade, to establish if at least part of the cause lay with any specific group 
of ships.41 Data was obtained, and by using again the method of tabulation, cross-
referencing and analysis, unforeseen results were obtained.42  Overcrowding was 
not only due to the late eighteenth-century increase in size of ships and cargo 
handling times,43 but to the merchants’ insistence on maintaining business habits 
that inevitably meant peak periods of congestion during the year. 
 
The effect on the port due to the building of Merchants’ dock was measured using 
the same method and it became obvious that the facility was underused.44 Finally, 
the work practices of Guppy, Armstrong and Co.,45 relative newcomers to the port, 
were analysed because this company was involved in many of the activities of the 
traditional merchant shipowner, but without actually owning ships. It proved that 
new methods could work at Bristol. 
  
                                                 
41 The trade areas were taken from Richard Bright’s document, BRO: 11168/3/l Tonnages of ships into 
Bristol. 
42 Obtained from the Bristol Presentments, 1792; Lloyd’s Register, 1792; All tonnage data from BRO: 
SMV/7/1/1/78 Wharfage Book, 1792-93; FFBJ, 1792; David Richardson, ed., Bristol, Africa and the 
Eighteenth-Century Slave Trade to America, Vol. 4. 
43 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 31. 
44 The same sources as before were used plus BRO: SMV/7/1/3/13 Dock Master’s Day Book, 1795-1799; and 
BRO: SMV/7/1/3/14 Dock Master’s Ledger, 1796-1799. 
45 Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794: Guppy, Armstrong and Co., Iron mongers and cutlers, the Back.  
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However, the principal cause of congestion is brought out in Section 2, and that 
was the impossibility of overcoming the effect of the tidal river. In this section a tide 
table was constructed for July, 1792, which showed the daily heights of tide 
(Appendix 4.030) and this in turn was referenced to all parts of the harbour 
(Appendix 4.031). Having this information and knowing the draughts and likely 
position of most ships in the harbour that month, the unalterable problems caused 
by the tidal conditions could be illustrated and it became obvious that there was no 
real alternative but to float all or part of the harbour.  
 
Carrying on from the first two sections, the concept of floating harbour is dealt with 
in the third, where although it is agreed that vital improvements were held up in the 
eighteenth century by obscurantists, it is argued that their basic postulations were 
correct and as proof shows that the plan adopted in the nineteenth century, which 
had not been seriously considered in the eighteenth, was the only viable solution to 
the complex problems previously encountered. This was established by analysing 
the environmental conditions at Bristol, and the ensuing data was also used to 
compare the problems faced by this port with others nationwide. The conclusion 
was that Bristol had severe disadvantages in this sphere that were never fully 
resolved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
Introductory Chapter 
 
The work carried out on port improvements at other British 
ports to meet increased shipping at the end of the eighteenth 
century. 
 
Introduction. 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to produce a detailed description of the 
organisational structure of the port of Bristol and the management of its shipping, 
taking into consideration the adverse physical conditions brought about by its 
exceptionally high tidal range. A secondary purpose is to use data derived from this 
to make a general analysis of the efficiency of the port to see if at operational 
levels changes could have been made which might have assisted in slowing down 
the relative decline of the port. This has been examined thoroughly at political and 
economic levels and it is not intended to dispute these findings, but to consider the 
matter from the narrower viewpoint of physical and geographical restraints, port 
structure, facilities and organisational systems. Before doing so, however, it is of 
some use to reflect on the state of affairs at the end of the eighteenth century at 
the other major ports of Great Britain, London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Hull and 
Newcastle. These will be referred to when necessary within the thesis. 
 
The secondary sources used to compile this chapter provided information on the 
eighteenth-century geographical and geophysical complications associated with 
these ports and their effect on shipping and trade. They were particularly 
informative as to the actual techniques used by the authorities at each port to 
overcome problems such as providing safe harbours, access to them, and dealing 
with congestion. In some ports  finance and political resolve solved their difficulties, 
but in others success came only after a great deal of disagreement and discord. 
Again, the volumes consulted were enlightening about the procedures involved and 
the positive effect on trade but, unfortunately, they gave very few facts regarding 
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the day to day operational systems that evolved from the improvements. Some 
clues regarding the berthing facilities at Liverpool, London and Hull were revealed, 
but none whatever as to how the ships used them or what other amenities were 
available. Warehousing was mentioned, but there was no detail as to whether 
goods were laded by cranes or manhandled, how porterage was organised, nor 
what facilities available for refit and supply.  
 
London  
 
London had been the principal port of England since Roman times due to her 
easily defensible position sixty miles from the sea, and was in an excellent position 
to trade as physically she faced the major rivers of north Europe. Her other assets 
were that as world-wide markets developed she was geographically at the hub of 
the trade routes to the Mediterranean, the American colonies, the West Indies, 
Africa and the East Indies and, indeed, had a monopoly of trade with the latter. 
Being a capital city gave its merchants a major advantage as they had access to 
the centre of power, and because of a growing population, a huge coastal trade 
developed especially in fundamentals such as coal. The fact that after the collapse 
of the cloth trade due to the fall of Antwerp in the sixteenth century, London 
immediately found new products and new markets, is evidence of the skill of her 
merchants and also of her geographical advantages.1 
 
The Thames was a fine, wide, navigable, tidal river from its mouth to the Pool at 
London, with good depth of water.2 The Pool, Upper, Middle and Lower, was the 
mooring space for London’s shipping, extending from London Bridge down to 
Horseferry Tier, Limehouse Reach and Deptford Reach, although the lower ones 
were used only for East Indiamen and naval vessels.3 The spring tides rose about 
18 to 20 feet and neap 12-14 feet, with flow of about five hours and ebbing seven. 
There were mooring tiers and chains on both sides of the river able to take about 
                                                 
1 See J. Broodbank, History of the Port of London (London, 1921); Gordon Jackson, The History and 
Archaeology of Ports (Tadworth, 1983); J. Pudney, London’s Docks (London, 1975). 
2 Broodbank, History of the Port of London, p. 5. 
3 C. Northcote, Parkinson, ‘The Seaports: London’ in C. Northcote Parkinson, ed., The Trade Winds (London, 
1948), pp. 49-58, p. 51. 
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800 foreign going ships.4 The Legal Quay servicing this stretch of water measured 
1419 feet5 but was not increased during the eighteenth century, and there was 
another 2800 feet of Sufferance Quay on the south side of the river and 790 feet 
on the north. This was totally inadequate for the discharge of cargo as commerce 
had increased by a factor of 4 by the end of the century. For example, some 1775 
vessels were anchored or moored in the space for 574. The Pool was so filled with 
shipping that a small boat could not get across the river. Ships were discharged by 
lighter and John Pudney says that by the end of the century there were 3500 river 
craft.  
 
The congestion extended to the quay itself as the warehouses could not cope with 
the discharged goods and further, the roads leading to them were clogged with 
heavy traffic.6 This was especially so when the seasonal goods such as sugar from 
the West Indies arrived. On the river the problem was exacerbated by the system 
of allocating moorings. Short stay coasters were placed near London Bridge, 
European traders next, then colliers around Wapping and the large foreign going 
ships and West Indiamen in Limehouse Reach. This led to the daily influx of 
coasters trying to pass through the bigger ships and the lighters servicing them and 
resulted in damage both to goods and to the shipping itself.7  
 
Congestion on both land and river was the breeding ground for organised crime. 
Petty crime is normal at any port, but at London the vulnerability of individual ships 
and lighters hidden amongst clusters of others led to the formation of dangerous 
gangs of thieves.8 Patrick Colquhoun, a London magistrate and one of the 
founders of the Thames River Police, wrote a treatise in 17969 in which he detailed 
the types of gangs operating on the Thames and also the criminal behaviour of 
people who should have been protecting the vessels. He estimated that the value 
                                                 
4 W. J., Two plans of the London-Dock with some observations respecting the river immediately connected 
with Docks in General and of the improvement of navigations (London, 1794) pp. 2-3. 
5 That of Bristol was already 4000 feet. Pudney, London’s Docks, p. 14. 
6 Pudney, London’s Docks, pp. 17-18. 
7 Jackson, History and Archaeology of Ports, p. 54-55.  
8 Broodbank, History of the Port of London, p. 83. 
9 Patrick Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis: Containing a Detail of the Various Crimes 
and Misdemeanours by which Public and Private Property and Security Are, at Present, Injured and 
Endangered, and Suggesting Remedies for Their Prevention (London, 1796). 
 29 
of floating property in the port was £75 million and it was contained in nearly 8000 
vessels within a space of four miles below and two miles above London Bridge and 
the cost of theft to merchants in 1797 he puts at £506,000. This includes the 
purloining of goods left on the quays for want of warehousing or means of 
removal.10 
 
This treatise attracted the attention of the West Indian merchants who were 
suffering considerable losses - sugar ships could lose half a ton a day each - but 
whereas Colquhoun believed in better policing, they demanded the port’s structure 
be changed by building wet docks. They had seen the success of this at 
Liverpool.11 It was very much against the vested interests of the private owners of 
the legal quays, wharfingers, warehousemen, lighter men and indeed the City 
Corporation and so it took time to get the necessary legislation through 
Parliament.12  Parliament began considering the various schemes in 1796 and 
although the City put forward a proposal of its own, it was obvious that the only 
way forward was to use private enterprise. The West India Dock Act of 1799, and 
the London Dock Act of 1800 allowed the wet docks to be built by private 
enterprise and the West India Dock Company and London Dock Company, 
representing the North American and European trades respectively was the 
result.13 Which was entered would depend on the origin of a ship’s goods. 
 
The West India Dock was opened in 1802 and the London Dock in 1805 and 
although these dates are beyond the brief of this thesis, their physical creation is 
relevant. The former was built on the Isle of Dogs with two basins, one for loading 
and the other discharge. There were entrances to the Thames on both sides of the 
island and multi-storied warehouses joined by massive 20 feet walls formed the 
perimeter to the basins. All workers within the dock belonged to the company, the 
port porters and watermen being excluded, and only one officer per ship was 
allowed to remain. After twenty years of trading, customs officials gave evidence 
                                                 
10 Pudney, London’s Docks, pp. 18-21. 
11 Jackson, History and Archaeology of Ports, p. 56. 
12 Broodbank, History of the Port of London, p. 88; Pudney, London’s Docks, p. 25.  
13 Jackson, History and Archaeology of Ports, p. 57. 
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that large scale plunder had entirely stopped although petty thefts continued.14 The 
London Dock Company dug a single basin surrounded by high walls at Wapping 
and added vaulted warehouses for the bonded trade, but security was less 
conspicuous than at its rivals. Although they had their own workforce, merchants, 
customers and crews of ships could go as they pleased.15 
 
Liverpool 
 
The geographic location of Liverpool gave it a number of advantages in the 
eighteenth century. Being on the Atlantic coast it had direct, reasonably safe routes 
to the Americas, the West Indies and the Newfoundland fisheries, and Ireland was 
easily accessible either for local trade or as a staging post for outward-bound 
ships. Its hinterland was rich in natural assets that could either be used in 
indigenous industry or exported. Communications with the surrounding areas were 
difficult but steps were being taken to build roads and canals. Its main imports of 
sugar, tobacco and later cotton were ideal for stimulating industry and for re-export, 
and its involvement in the slave trade not only brought huge profits but boosted the 
West Indian as well.   
 
However, the physical attributes of Liverpool left much to be desired. At the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, its entrance from the Atlantic was a turbulent 
river estuary with high tides, treacherous sandbanks and shifting channels, and the 
port itself was positioned on the Pool, a curving inlet from the River Mersey.16 As 
there were no quays, vessels had to anchor and to transfer cargo to and from 
lighters, with the only alternative being to use the equally dangerous foreshore. 
Liverpool’s trade had been increasing and by 1688 it had acquired a Custom 
House and by 1699 outstripped Chester becoming a head port in its own right. 
Imports of tobacco and sugar from across the Atlantic had grown, as had the 
export of salt and coal, and the limitations of the port by the end of this century 
were becoming obvious. New merchants arrived at Liverpool anxious to exploit its 
                                                 
14 Pudney, London’s Docks, p. 34. 
15 Ibid., p. 43. 
16 Francis E. Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey: the Development of a Port, 1700-1970 (Newton Abbot, 1971), 
p.1. 
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commercial opportunities and introduced a new commercial vitality to the 
community, but they saw that congestion at the Pool was limiting growth and this 
led to the construction of Liverpool’s first wet dock.  
 
Liverpool had two important assets, one being that it was not an ancient port with 
embedded structures needing adaption and fixed prejudices to overcome, and the 
other that there was almost unlimited ground for expansion. This was owned by a 
forward-thinking Corporation who had taken a long lease on a considerable 
amount of wasteland and, most importantly, this included the right to enclose land 
on the foreshore. Thus, when it came to land for dock building, it was already in the 
Corporation’s hands and also they were in a position to borrow money to finance 
the ventures.17     
 
Thomas Steers, the resident engineer at the Howland Dock on the Thames was 
bought in in 1709 and he decided to exploit the natural features of the Pool by 
building within its tidal area rather than by excavating. The result was a rectangular 
dock of some 4 acres with gates and an octagonal tidal entrance basin which 
together with warehousing and ancillary works cost the Corporation about 
£50,000.18 It was not an easy construction due to the shore being covered at high 
tide and took longer than estimated leading to difficulties with funding due to the 
Corporation’s borrowing being limited by law. Eventually it was opened in 1715 and 
finished in 1720. Longmore says that it was ‘through the enterprise and tenacity of 
the Corporation’ that Liverpool achieved its first dock and the country’s first 
commercial dock .19  
 
An unforeseen problem was that as trade developed there was no safe place 
where ships could lie before and after entering the dock, so its octagonal entrance 
became congested leading to an Act of Parliament in 1738 allowing a four acre 
tidal basin to be dug outside it in 1743, and opposite another four acre wet dock 
                                                 
17 Jane Longmore, ‘Liverpool Corporation as Landowners and Dock Builders, 1709-1835’ in C. W. Chalkin 
and J. R. Wordie eds., Town and Countryside: The English Landowner in the National Economy, 1660-1860 
(London, 1989), pp. 117-120. 
18 Jackson, History and Archaeology of Ports p. 47. 
19 Longmore, ‘Liverpool Corporation as Landowners and Dock Builders, 1709-1835’, pp. 121-122. 
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ten years later. The important point about the last was that this time lessons had 
been learned and shoreline was reclaimed from the river to build this dock.20 As 
dock duties were increasing steadily, the Corporation was confident to proceed 
with the scheme and by 1754 there were eighteen acres of docks and basins, trade 
was flourishing and Liverpool had entered the ranks of the major British ports.21 
 
The Corporation were ‘Dock Trustees’ and encouraged lessees to embank and 
enclose as much of the foreshore as possible which resulted in a number of 
shipbuilders taking up land and, of course, without these facilities the port could not 
have grown. However, by the 1760’s more wet dock space was needed and by the 
end of the century four had been built. Duke’s was a small dock but it is of special 
interest as it was privately owned and built to serve the inland waterways. It 
serviced barges and was connected to the Bridgewater Canal.22 The other three 
were constructed along the same lines as the Old Dock, that is with dry entry 
basins, but in these cases it was from reclaimed land. One of the great assets of 
the Liverpool docks was the proximity, less than half a mile, to the town itself. The 
last two docks also had two new graving docks attached to their dry basin. 
Altogether the four docks cost the Corporation a total of £91,000.23 
 
Liverpool’s trade expanded rapidly throughout the eighteenth century due to the 
efforts of professional businessmen whose aim was to make money, and who 
actively joined the Corporation to voice the port’s economic demands. The African 
and West Indian trades brought in wealth, and with it a growth in capital 
investment, banking, and due to the vagaries of the African trade, insurance 
brokering.24 Mercantile interests became the primary sources of wealth and by 
1800 the town had become a commercial rather than industrial centre. The 
opposition to the slave trade caused merchants and shipowners to develop new 
markets world-wide which were fundamental to Liverpool’s strength and prosperity 
                                                 
20 Jackson, History and Archaeology of Ports, p. 48.  
21 Longmore, ‘Liverpool Corporation as Landowners and Dock Builders, 1709-1835’, p. 125. 
22 Jackson, History and Archaeology of Ports, p. 48; Nancy Ritchie-Noakes, Liverpool’s Historic Waterfront: 
The World’s First Mercantile Dock System (London, 1984) p. 31. 
23 D. Swan, ‘The Pace and Progress of Port Investment in England,’ Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and 
Social Research, 12 (1960). p. 36. 
24 Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey: the Development of a Port, 1700-1970, pp. 16-18. 
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in the nineteenth century. Kenneth Morgan compares the business abilities of the 
Liverpool merchants favourably to those of Bristol, believing Liverpool to have 
created better access to her hinterland as they had had the prescience to heavily 
invest in it. They were also quicker to divert to other trade goods when the need 
arose and to enter the re-export business.25  
 
As far as the organisation of the port is concerned, there is little information 
available in secondary sources. Until the second dock was built, the Old Dock was 
open to all trades and congestion occurred due to mixing disparate ships whose 
turn-around times were set by individual seasonal fluctuations in trade, and in war 
time the influx of ships arriving in convoys. However the dock was successful and 
warehouses were built but by the end of the century it had become too small and 
the quays too narrow. Also, sewage had become a problem. The second dock, 
Salthouse, concentrated on the Irish trade and to a lesser extent on salt export. 
Georges Dock took vessels trading with West Africa, North America and the West 
Indies, and Kings Dock dealt with the tobacco trade, having a warehouse on site.26 
 
Hull. 
 
The port of Hull, or to give it its full name, Kingston upon Hull, was situated on the 
west bank of the River Hull where it flowed into the River Humber and in the early 
part of the eighteenth century it formed a good, natural harbour about three 
quarters of a mile long. Compared to other ports it was unusual in that its facilities 
were not continuous quays but individual wharves – staiths in local parlance – 
belonging to merchants living along its High Street which ran parallel to the river. 
Although it was possible to trade without one – some were owned by wharfingers 
and there were a few built by the corporation – the system did not encourage 
expansion of trade. Furthermore, the lack of public quays meant that there were no 
legal quays and customs officers struggled as ships had to be dealt with 
individually. New quays were needed but the owners of the wharves insisted on 
them being built alongside the High Street staiths and under their control, whilst the 
                                                 
25 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century, p. 220.  
26 Longmore, ‘Liverpool Corporation as Landowners and Dock Builders, 1709-1835’, pp. 22, 26, 28, 39-40. 
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other merchants called for them to be under public ownership. So visiting ships had 
to wait outside at anchor until berths became available in the haven and once 
inside suffered damage as there was little room for manoeuvre. By the middle of 
the century the increase of trade meant ships suffered long delays while waiting for 
discharge and lading facilities to become free, and light ships added to the chaos 
as they could not moor anywhere else.27 
 
At a town meeting in 1756, it was decided that the harbour could not handle its 
shipping and so a ‘Committee for the whole Town’ was formed to take the matter 
forward. The conclusion they came to was that the port had sufficient facilities for 
loading and discharging, but it could not handle light ships and so a proposal was 
made that a wet dock be built on the bank of the Humber along the same lines as 
those constructed at Liverpool.28 This did not suit Customs as they would be left in 
the same position, that is without a Legal Quay. So a long political argument 
developed as to where and what type of facilities would be built. Gordon Jackson 
says that at one stage Customs unashamedly blackmailed the local authorities by 
threatening to move to another port on the Humber if Hull did not agree to a Legal 
Quay, but as an inducement offered a subsidy of £15,000 and a grant of Crown 
land. In 1773 it was this pressure that brought in legislation29 allowing a 
commercial dock deep enough to take loaded vessels to be built, which meant a 
Legal Quay could be established.30 
 
Once the building of the dock had been agreed, the question of financing came in. 
The Corporation had intended to fund it themselves, possibly with help from Trinity 
House, but the reality was that they simply did not have the money. In the end a 
decision was made to finance it privately and under the same Act, the ‘Dock 
Company of Kingston upon Hull’ came into being with the right to collect dock 
                                                 
27 Gordon Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1972), pp. 234-237. 
28 Ibid., p. 238. 
29 14 George III, c. 56. An Act for making and establishing publick Quays or Wharfs at Kingston upon Hull 
for the better securing of His Majesty's Revenues of Customs and for the Benefit of Commerce in the Port of 
Kingston upon Hull; for making a Bason or Dock with Reservoirs, Sluices, Roads, and other Works, and for 
the Accommodation of Vessels using the said Port; and for appropriating certain Lands belonging to His 
Majesty and for applying certain Sums of Money out of his Majesty's Customs of the said Port for these 
Purposes; and for establishing other necessary Regulations within the Town and Port of Kingston upon Hull. 
30 Jackson, History and Archaeology of Ports p. 49. 
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duties levied on all ships coming into the port and, using this as security, the capital 
for the dock was easily raised. Initially it was seen to be under the authority of the 
Corporation and Trinity House but in the end was controlled by a coterie of local 
merchants who were concerned for the wellbeing of the port. It was a financial 
success and eventually the expenditure on the dock was £64,588 with land an 
extra £8,741.31  
 
The new rectangular dock was the largest yet constructed in the country, capable 
of taking 100 ships or more and situated on the west bank of the Hull River, north 
of the haven and entered by a single gate. The quaysides were wide leaving room 
for porters to work and the south side was denoted a Legal Quay and was longer 
than that at London. However the warehousing provided was insufficient which led 
to the problem of the use of lighters and carts to take goods to the warehouses on 
the High Street which added to the congestion.32  A further problem was that 
foreign going ships preferred the dock to the haven and coastal traffic built up 
there. This led to the need for another dock but, again, arguments developed as to 
who was responsible for building it. It was not in the interests of the Dock Company 
to do this and time after time when it was believed a compromise had been 
reached, negotiations failed. The second dock was not opened until 1809. 
 
Glasgow. 
 
Glasgow developed from a small village near the River Clyde to being a royal 
burgh with a cathedral by the late twelfth century. A substantial stone bridge was 
built over the river in about 1350 and this encouraged trade to the extent that it 
became the market town for the west of Scotland lowlands. It had little access to 
the sea as the Clyde, due to shoals, was unsuitable for other than small boats and 
sandbanks blocked the way to its open estuary ten miles downriver. However, the 
Glasgow merchants were pioneering and bought ships able to trade with Ireland 
and the continent even though Dumbarton, 14 miles away on the north side of the 
estuary, was its nearest port. Cargoes had to be unloaded there and brought to the 
                                                 
31 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 246-248. 
32 Ibid., p. 246. 
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town by packhorse, the only other alternative being to tranship them at open roads 
into very small boats. The problem for the merchants was that they had deep water 
access to the Atlantic less than twenty miles away, but in the seventeenth century 
when trade was increasing, they had no easy way of reaching there. After trying to 
remove shoals and failing, the only solution was for Glasgow to buy land at one of 
the bays already used for transhipment and to build a port there.33 At the beginning 
of the eighteenth century Port Glasgow had been constructed for a sum of £944 
and all Clyde trade from the royal burghs had to pass through there as had all 
ships owned at Glasgow. 
 
After union with England in 1707, Glasgow’s trade in tobacco from the American 
colonies and the West Indies increased and by 1716 Port Glasgow was the primary 
customs port of the Clyde although the newly built port of Greenock, a few miles 
downstream, was a strong rival. Tobacco was stored locally before distribution but 
unfortunately neither Port Glasgow nor Greenock had enough warehousing and so 
some had to be transported to Glasgow and so the roads deteriorated through 
constant use. Matters became worse by 1750 as Port Glasgow was silting up and 
Greenock, nearer to the sea, was taking trade away. The merchants and city 
fathers at Glasgow were forced to reconsider the possibility of deepening the Clyde 
to allow shipping to reach the town itself, although at that time there were few 
facilities to handle it at the Broomielaw, the cargo handling area near the bridge.  
 
Engineers were brought in but it was a complex problem to solve. The River Clyde 
was normally slow moving – hence the silt – but it was prone to periodic flooding. 
The original engineers believed the solution was to build a lock which would raise 
the depth of water sufficiently for coasters to reach Glasgow. A Lock Bill was 
therefore passed in 1759 and construction begun but it failed in 1762 as the ground 
could not take the stonework, nor the scouring and siltation from the river flow. 
Another engineer, John Golborne was brought in and his suggestion was to train 
the river, that is to alter its natural flow and by doing so deepen it. He believed that 
                                                 
33
 John Riddell, The Clyde: The Making of a River (Edinburgh, 2000), pp. 6-10.  
 
 
 37 
with the passage of time the Clyde had widened due to the soft material on the 
banks being washed away quicker than the hard bottom, so it was proposed that 
projecting jetties and dykes would be built which would artificially narrow the river 
and so increase the force of the flow. Where necessary the bottom could be 
dredged. Parliamentary approval was given in 1770 and dues were to be imposed 
on all shipping depending on how far they travelled on the river. The condition was 
made that the depth of the river would be increased to at least 7 feet at neap tides. 
The lord provost, magistrates and council of Glasgow became ‘Statutory Trustees 
of the Clyde’ and responsible for the enlargement of the quay at the Broomielaw. 
The work was carried out but even by the turn of the century, the port at Glasgow 
could only take coasters and small boats up to 100 tons. Transhipment at 
Greenock and Port Glasgow was still a necessity.  
 
The problem of silting at Port Glasgow had been partially resolved by John 
Golborne diverting  the course of a stream through the harbour in 1772, but there 
was another problem in that much of Glasgow’s tobacco was re-exported to the 
continent and rather than send it by the dangerous sea routes, it was taken 
overland to the east coast ports of Leith, Aberdeen and Newcastle. Unfortunately 
the roads suffered in a similar way to those from the Clyde estuary to Glasgow. It 
was decided that a canal had to be built from Bowling on the estuary to the River 
Carron at Grangemouth and this was to include a spur ending at a new inland port, 
Port Dundas, about a mile from the Broomielaw, where a quay was built with its 
own granaries, sheds and crane. It was finished in 1790 and it was its success that 
led to Glasgow becoming an independent customs port and not the trade upriver to 
the Broomielaw.  
  
Newcastle. 
 
Newcastle was situated nine miles upstream from the mouth of the River Tyne and 
its greatest commercial asset, and indeed that of the entire area, was coal. It 
showed itself in outcroppings, but with massive reserves underground, and the 
produce of the Tyneside pits – the earliest in the country – could readily be 
 38 
exported as the river gave access to the North Sea, ideally positioned for trade with 
the Baltic and northern Europe.34 By the end of the seventeenth century coalfields 
were developed with the yield being both exported and locally employed in the 
production of salt, which was itself shipped out and used in the fishing industry. 
Coal was also needed for glass making, the materials for which were brought in as 
ballast on colliers and the products similarly taken away for distribution. With the 
opening up of the Baltic to trade, Newcastle began to import shipbuilding materials 
and colliers were described as being ‘built on Tyneside from Baltic timber, their 
sails made from Baltic flax and their seams caulked with Baltic resin’.35  
 
The problem with the Tyne was that it was a shallow, slow moving river depositing 
silt throughout it length and this caused navigational problems which were not even 
begun to be rectified until the second half of the nineteenth century. Jackson infers 
the Tyne did not need improvement up until the middle of the nineteenth century 
and quotes its historian, James Guthrie; ‘the capabilities of the river in its 
unimproved state, a natural dock, as it was called, were great for the class of 
vessel in use’.36 However, on closer inspection it is evident that Guthrie was, 
tongue in cheek, parroting one of the excuses that Newcastle Corporation was 
making to condone its neglect of the river and that Guthrie himself actually argued 
the opposite.37 In reality, as a report by a consultant engineer in 1816 noted, the 
Tyne was in worse condition than in 1723, unable to accept shipping of any size 
due to shoals, sandbanks and a sand-bar across its mouth.38 In the late eighteenth 
century it was also described as a ‘cursed horse pond’ and traders were 
complaining to the Corporation about being unable to get into the river due to silt, 
but the latter did nothing.39 
 
Monopolies controlled trade on the Tyne, with an oligarchy of wealthy locals 
dominating the municipal offices and monopolising the sale of coal until the end of 
                                                 
34 S. Middlebrook, Newcastle Upon Tyne: Its Growth and Achievement (Newcastle, 1950) p. 4; C.M. Frazer 
and K. Emsley, Tyneside (Newton Abbot, 1973) p. 24 
35 Frazer and Emsley, Tyneside, p.85. 
36 Jackson, History and Archaeology of Ports, p. 33. 
37 James Guthrie, The River Tyne: Its History and Resources (Newcastle, 1880) pp. 62-63. 
38 Ibid., p. 122. 
39 Susie Brackenborough, ‘Pound Foolish Penny Wise System: The Role of Accounting in the Improvement 
of the River Tyne’, The Accounting Historians Journal, Volume 30.1 (2003) p. 50 
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the eighteenth century. The Corporation of Newcastle had secured the 
conservancy of the river in the seventeenth and considered they had the right to 
use river taxes for the general benefit of Newcastle, despite the fact that there were 
three flourishing towns on the river, North Shields, South Shields, and Gateshead, 
all contributing but receiving nothing back in terms of improvements.40 The 
Corporation were in a position of power because the committee responsible for the 
making decisions regarding the river, the ‘River Jury’, were their own placemen, 
made up of lay people with little knowledge of the river who enforced the belief of 
the Corporation that any benefits were not cost effective.41 Part of the problem was 
that engineers brought in to assess the situation had high technical skills but little 
local knowledge and tended to apply inflated London prices which alarmed the 
prudent Corporation.42 
 
As a result of this, trade did not increase at Newcastle until the second part of the 
nineteenth century and a number of ports, Gateshead, North and South Shields, 
and  Tynemouth, suffered also. There were two Admiralty enquiries in 1849 begun 
by a parliamentary bill being deposited by the people of Shields which ended with 
control of the river being taken from Newcastle Corporation and put under a trust 
called the Tyne Improvement Commission. It had been found that the income from 
the river from 1809 to 1849 was £957,973 out of which only £397,719 had been 
used for the river, and that included administration, ballast and suchlike. The rest 
had been appropriated for the use of Newcastle alone.43   
 
Conclusions. 
 
By the late eighteenth century, all of these ports were in the process of overcoming 
practical difficulties faced by their shipping, whether geophysical or structural. 
Ships bound for London and Hull had relatively easy access to their ports but a 
lack of berths caused congestion. Liverpool had faced hazardous environmental 
                                                 
40 Guthrie, River Tyne: Its History and Resources, p. 5; William Tomlinson, North Eastern Railway  (Newton 
Abbot 1967) p. 210.  
41 Susie Brackenborough, ‘Pound Foolish Penny Wise System’, p. 49. 
42 Ibid., p. 51. 
43 Ibid., p. 68. 
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conditions at the beginning of the century and was in the process of overcoming it 
by building wet docks. At Glasgow and Newcastle there was a lack of navigable 
water and the former had set up a transit port and built a canal to partially rectify 
the problem, but more had to be done. It was well into the nineteenth century 
before Newcastle even began to overcome its problems.  
 
Political arguments, economic issues and quarrels over private property occurred 
at all of these ports but to provide an analysis of these would be beyond the theme 
of the thesis. What is clear from the information provided above is that where there 
was local government support, even though it had to evolve, ports began to 
improve. Liverpool was the prime example of success because their corporation 
worked assiduously for the benefit of the port. Glasgow and Hull corporations were 
supportive but their financial circumstances were limited and eventually the latter 
had to relinquish control of their dock to a private company. A lack of local 
government support at London meant that the finance for building docks had to be 
entirely private but their merchants had the means. It did have the positive effect 
that they could build as they wished and as a result one of their main problems, the 
massive losses due to organised crime, could be targeted and brought into the 
realm of petty theft whilst congestion, the principal obstacle to the port’s 
effectiveness, was brought under control by customised dock construction. All of 
these port improvements needed parliamentary approval, but once a plan had 
been accepted locally it generally passed into law and contained favourable 
financial provisions. 
 
The one major port not dealt with in this chapter was Bristol. Like the ports detailed 
above it had a geophysical problem, in its case caused by an extremely fast 
flowing tidal river, which affected the effectiveness of cargo handling and indeed 
the port structures themselves. This theme is dealt with during the course of the 
thesis with the  information attained being brought together in Chapter 4, Section 3, 
where it is analysed, applied to the known environmental factors, and the actions of 
the port authorities considered and compared to the ports described above in this 
chapter.  
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Chapter 1. 
 
The structure and facilities of the port of Bristol. 
 
Section 1. The amenities of the river. 
 
Introduction. 
 
To enable the geography of the region to be understood a series of maps will be 
used throughout the chapter. Illustration 1.001 shows the Severn Estuary and the 
River Avon1 whilst Illustration 1.002,2 depicts the river from its mouth to the City of 
Bristol. Illustration 1.003 covers the river as it passes through the City including the 
city quays.3 Section 1 deals with the river between Holes Mouth and the bend of 
the river at Rownham Meads, and in particular with Pill, Hungroad and the 
surrounding area (Illustration 1.004).4 Hungroad is generally referred to as an 
‘inner anchorage’ for ships using the port of Bristol, but the author intends to refute 
this and to establish that it was actually a transit port5 working in a similar fashion 
to those developed elsewhere to assist with difficult river conditions.6 It is important 
to make this distinction for although Hungroad undoubtedly played a vital role in 
the functioning of the port as a whole, the author can find no definitive work 
                                                 
1 An extract from MacKenzie senior’s chart of the St. George’s and Bristol Channels, 1775. In Adrian James 
Webb, Maritime Surveys, Charts and Sailing Directions of the Somerset Coast, circa 1350-1824 (Somerset 
Record Society, 97, 2014); Referred to as the Bristol Channel but denoted as the Severn Estuary in this thesis. 
2 Bristol Museum, Map 769, ‘A Plan of Somerset’, B. Donn, 1769. 
3 Matthew’s Plan of Bristol, 1794. Matthew’s new and correct plan of the city and suburbs of Bristol 
including the Hotwells and Clifton and the new buildings down to the year 1794. In Matthew’s, Bristol 
Directory, 1794. 
4 A section of Bristol Museum, Map 769, ‘A Plan of Somerset’, B. Donn, 1769. 
5 Robert Allen, ed., The New Penguin English Dictionary (London, 2001). Describes an anchorage as ‘A 
place where boats and ships are anchored or can anchor’; http://www.transportation-dictionary.org/Shipping -
Dictionary/. The Shipping Dictionary defines a transit port as being one where goods received are merely en 
route and from which they have to be transferred and dispatched to their ultimate destination by coasters, 
barge and so on. Also called a transhipment port.  
6 See Introductory Chapter for examples of Port Glasgow for the Port of Glasgow. Riddell, The Clyde: The 
Making of a River, p. 9-10; South Shields for the Tyne. Gordon Jackson, The History and Archaeology of 
Ports (Tadworth, 1983) p.85; Brockweir for the upper Wye. Colin Green, Severn Traders (Lydney, 1999) 
p.109. 
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detailing its operations although there are generalised allusions to it.7 References 
to the pilots and watermen of Pill are too numerous to list and at least two books 
have been written on this subject,8 with the result that attention may have been 
diverted away from the function of the area as a whole.  
 
To emphasise that Hungroad had the structure of a port, it will be shown that 
visiting ships were berthed at permanent moorings, albeit anchors could be used 
for additional safety, and also that it had its own facilities; namely a customs house, 
slipways, repair yards, chapel and also its own supply of fresh water and fuel. As 
many as thirty ships could be using the port at one time with passengers alighting, 
goods being discharged into coasters, barges and lighters; some to re-export to 
destinations other than Bristol. There is also evidence that two commodities were 
directly exported; timber from local woods, and gunpowder from the nearby powder 
magazine which had its own wharf and crane. However, the river conditions were 
such that goods from the latter establishment could only have been loaded into 
small coasters or dispatched via lighters into larger ships. It also stored powder 
from incoming vessels.9 The port had its own regulations and the key figure in its 
operations was its Haven Master, one of whom was noteworthy enough to have a 
monument in Shirehampton churchyard on which was inscribed the title ‘Haven 
Master of Hungroad, Port of Bristol’.10  
 
The argument will be made that this port merits investigation due to the unique way 
in which it was administered by the Society to whom the Corporation had 
delegated the conservancy of the river. Any other port or harbour of this 
significance would have its own workforce to manoeuvre shipping and control 
cargo operations, but the only direct employees were the Haven Master and one 
deputy and as will be shown, the former’s duties also involved oversight of the rest 
                                                 
7 It is described as ‘the deep water anchorage in the Avon a little below Bristol’ in McGrath, , The Merchant 
Venturers of Bristol, p. 138; Minchinton also describes it as an anchorage though allowing that there were 
discharging facilities. Minchinton, ‘The Port of Bristol’ p.138. 
8 J. Rich, The Bristol Pilots (Pill, 1996); P. J. Stuckley, The Sailing Pilots of the Bristol Channel (Bristol, 
1999. 
9 Brenda J. Buchanan, ‘The Technology of Gunpowder Making in the Eighteenth Century: Evidence from the 
Bristol Region’ Transactions of the Newcomen Society, 67 (1996) p. 139: R.A. Buchanan, and N. Cossons, 
The Industrial Archaeology of the Bristol Region (Newton Abbot, 1969) p. 38.  
10 J. W. Damer Powell, Bristol Privateers and Ships of War (Bristol, 1930) p. 248. 
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of the river as far as the city quays. The Society’s expectation was that he could 
coerce any pilot or waterman on the river whenever he needed assistance11 but 
one author maintains that this was unreasonable as ‘an atmosphere of non-
cooperation prevailed’ and that the merchants were deliberately using the Haven 
Master as a buffer between them and the ‘closed shop’ of cantankerous mariners 
at Pill.12  
 
The river between Hungroad and the city quays required continuous management 
to clear it of natural obstacles, the rubble from quarries and the ever increasing 
industrial debris deposited along its entire length.13 Again, the responsibility for this 
fell upon the Haven Master, as did enforcing the regulations regarding shipping 
movements. It will be generally argued in the thesis that insurmountable river 
conditions were a factor in the relative decline of the port of Bristol towards the end 
of the century, but in this section the possibility is examined that if more resources 
on a day by day basis had been made available to the Haven Master by the 
Society, then the inexorable downturn might have been slowed as more ships 
would have been encouraged to use Hungroad and to make the passage 
upstream.  
 
The environment of the Severn Estuary and River Avon.  
 
Ships using the port of Bristol in the eighteenth century were challenged by river 
conditions unlike any other port in the country. Although having similar estuarial 
circumstances to Liverpool, sandbanks, shifting channels and strong tides, the 
nature of the latter’s foreshore and its proximity to the city meant wet docks could 
                                                 
11. The Haven Master’s right to call for assistance was included in the pilot’s contract and seventeenth century 
pilots could be disciplined for using watermen who had defied the former. An example of this in practice is 
set out in a letter from J. Shaw, Haven Master, to the Hall 5 June 1792, read by them 23 June 1792, where 
after an accident Shaw says that ‘the men employed by the pilots thinks that they are not under any command 
of the Haven Master’ and ending with him saying that the pilots should be ordered not to employ any man 
who was not obedient to him. Printed out in Rich, Bristol Pilots. p. 86-88: This letter was read to the Standing 
Committee on 23 June 1792 but there is no indication of action being taken. SMV/2/1/2/5. Index 5. 23 June 
1792. 
12 Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 42. 
13 In 1783 the difficulties had reached such a level that the Society petitioned and obtained an Act of 
Parliament; 11 and 12 William III c. 23: An Act for the better preserving the navigation of the River Avon 
and Frome and for cleansing, paving and in lighting the streets of the City of Bristol. 
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be built so that on arrival ships could be berthed safely and continuously worked. 
Conversely, the River Thames provided relatively easy access to London, as did 
the Humber to Hull, whilst at Glasgow and Newcastle the problem was not the 
power of their rivers but the antithesis, their slow flowing rivers could not remove 
silt and so left shallow water able only to float small vessels.14 The methods used 
to overcome the environmental obstacles at these two ports is detailed in the 
introductory chapter, but the additional problem facing Bristol was that although 
ships bound for the port could reach the relative safety of the lower regions of its 
river after negotiating the estuary, they then faced a second obstacle, the rigours of 
a torturous passage up a fast flowing, winding waterway controlled by tides which 
left its harbour dry for most of the day. As will be shown below, this problem could 
not be alleviated in the eighteenth century, and indeed was never fully overcome, 
which necessitated the building of a new port at the river’s mouth.  
 
Bristol was situated at the conjunction of two rivers, the Frome and the Avon, 
neither of which was fast flowing except in times of flood when massive amounts of 
water could be produced; but their combined output flowed into the Severn Estuary 
which had the highest range of tide of any major navigable river in the world. The 
height of tide at the mouth of the Avon was 13-14m at spring tides and although 
upstream it was reduced, there was still a rise of 7m at Bristol.15 When the tide 
turned, the combination of ebb tide and the flow of the river itself carved out a 
narrow channel with a series of bends and a steeply sloping trench between the 
banks; dangerous, as it was completely covered at high water.16 
 
The River Severn itself is the longest river in Britain, and although its flow is not 
particularly rapid at its mouth it carries massive amounts of silt into its estuary, as 
do its tributaries the Avon and the Wye, creating constantly shifting sandbanks 
which makes  navigation difficult and forced ships to use pilots from at least the 
fifteenth century. There are few natural anchorages to provide shelter and winds 
                                                 
14 See Introductory Chapter 
15 At London the spring rise was less than 2m. See Introductory Chapter. 
16 Elkin, ‘Aspects of the Port of Bristol’, p. 29: Parker., ‘A Maritime Cultural Landscape’ p. 323. 
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which would be seen as moderate in other areas act against the fast running tides 
over shallow water creating rough seas, again adding to the navigational problems.  
 
The above is a general description of the environmental conditions which today 
have been largely overcome by powered vessels, but the author sailed a small 
yacht for fifteen years out of Crockern and Chapel Pill, the latter situated at the end 
of Hungroad, and so can empathise with the problems faced by eighteenth-century 
vessels. Firstly, the range of tide limits even a small boat’s ability to float to about 
two hours on either side of a high spring tide and at neaps it may remain aground. 
This reduces a boat’s manoeuvrability time even within its own moorings, and 
certainly short departures must be timed accurately as there is no shelter if the 
ebbing tide is misjudged. Similarly when a boat’s tender is used the tides have to 
be calculated to ensure there is enough water to return to shore. 
 
Also, silt builds up rapidly with slipways needing to be cleared week by week and 
again the author has experience of work-parties organised several times per year 
to excavate  mooring areas, repair chains and trim tree branches which at low tide 
are 70 ft above but snare masts at high. These have to be held according to the 
times of the tides ignoring weather conditions, and so in winter they can be 
particularly miserable affairs. The mud is not easily moved and so is shovelled into 
the path of the next tide, an operation called ‘throwing’ in the eighteenth century 
when it had to be done regularly throughout the haven. Labouring at this on a daily 
basis must have been a pitiless employment in those days. The silt has no 
particular use, although sand is collected in the estuary, but being lifeless it has the 
asset that vessels lying in it do not require any form of anti-fouling. 
 
The estuary itself has few natural shelters, the shoreline being generally rocky 
covered by a thin layer of silt. The tides can reach 5 knots making it impossible for 
sailing vessels to navigate against it although it becomes an asset when it turns 
provided that one understands the geography of the channels. However, when a 
useful tide such as this turns and the wind is in the opposite direction, the progress 
of a vessel becomes particularly unpleasant. In the eighteenth century these 
conditions must have at least obstructed the unloading of vessels at the mouth of 
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the river and stopped small boats servicing the ships. Fog is not generally a 
problem in the estuary, but if a boat strays outside of the channels the depth of 
water – easily seen on a modern echo-sounder – rises and falls at a speed that a 
sailor could never keep pace with by heaving a lead line. This was the 
environmental back-drop facing the port authorities in the centuries before the 
advent of steam. 
 
The Haven Master.  
 
In 1700 the Society procured an Act of Parliament allowing them to draw up new 
port regulations.17 The importance of this act was that it allowed them to bring in 
new port officers and clearly define rules and regulations for the principal officer, 
the Haven Master, which established a basic arrangement that was more or less 
adhered to for the rest of the century.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to detail the history of the Society and its raison 
d’être,18 but it must be noted that it was an organisation whose members did not 
join to gain financially – indeed during most of the eighteenth century it had to 
borrow money19 – but because it gave them prestige and the power to influence 
major decisions concerning the port and city. So saying its General Meetings, 
which should have included all members, were poorly attended and at times were 
unable to form a quorum. This was important, because its executive, the Standing 
Committee (henceforth referred to as the ‘Committee’) consisting of the Master, 
two Wardens, Treasurer and 10 Assistants directed all its affairs including the port 
although their decisions had to be ratified at the General Meetings. As the ultimate 
responsibility for the preservation of the Rivers Avon and Frome lay with the 
Corporation,20 some matters had then to be fully debated at the Quarter 
                                                 
17 11 and 12 William III c. 23: An Act for the better preserving the navigation of the River Avon and Frome 
and for cleansing, paving and inlighting the streets of the City of Bristol. 
18 See McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol; Patrick McGrath, ‘The Society of Merchant Venturers and 
the Port of Bristol in the 17th Century’ TBGAS, 72 (1953); Latimer, History of the Society of Merchant 
Venturers. 
19 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 115. 
20 11 and 12 William III cap 23. Act for the better preserving the navigation of the rivers Avon and Frome and 
for the cleaning, paving and enlightening of the streets of the city of Bristol, 1756. 
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Sessions.21 The activities of the Committee, which generally met at least 
fortnightly, will be examined throughout this chapter. This hierarchy controlled the 
Haven Master whose job it was to ensure the river was fit for navigation on a daily 
basis.  
 
In terms of pay, he was clearly the most important officer but the opinions of Bristol  
scholars differ over his actual duties. Patrick McGrath sees him as having authority 
for both the river and the city quays,22 but the last was split administratively into the 
Quay and Backs, the former coming under the jurisdiction of the newly engaged 
Quay Warden with responsibility for all operations around the Quay and St 
Augustine’s Back,23 and the latter the Water Bailiff accountable for the Bristol Back, 
Redcliffe Back and the banks of the Avon.24 Minchinton says that this official was 
given control of mooring ships in the river and harbour by the Act of 1700 25 and 
had the two other officials as his assistants. However, in a report to the Committee 
in 1797 it appears clear that by that time at least, he had no jurisdiction over those 
officers’ territories.26 There was one other new post created in 1701, that of the 
Ballast Master, which complicates matters as it was on occasion combined with 
that of the Haven Master.  
 
The Port of Hungroad. 
 
Hungroad was not simply an anchorage, but in reality a transhipment port, 
indispensable because of the tidal conditions. Many ports had roadsteads where 
ships reported to customs or anchored to await a berth – Bristol had Kingroad as 
described below in Chapter 3 – but few had their main resources so far inland and 
                                                 
21 For example. McGrath says that whilst the Corporation were normally willing to leave pilotage in the 
Society’s care, it occasionally exerted its authority. McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, pp. 166-167. 
22 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 161. 
23 BRO: AC/JS/53/27 Rules and orders of the Quarter Sessions to be observed by the Quay Warden. His 
duties will be dealt with below in Section 2.  
24 Minchinton, ‘The Port of Bristol’, p. 141: See Chapter 1 Section 2 for maps and details of the operations at 
these locations. 
25 Minchinton, ed., Politics and the Port of Bristol, p. 200. 
26 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/13 Merchants’ Hall Book of Proceedings (Henceforth referred to as Hall Book) 13 1797 
– 1807, 30 January 1797. Duties of the Haven Master; See Appendix 1.001 for his responsibilities. 
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accessible only by navigation up a fast flowing, dangerous river.27 This will be 
detailed below but first it is necessary to argue the case for designating Hungroad 
as a port in its own right by detailing its amenities.  
 
Describing the ‘anchorage’ as a port is not mere conjecture on the part of the 
author because as early as 1551 the ‘Ordinance for Hungroad’ was issued clearly 
stating that Hungroad was a port.28  The contemporary Illustrations (1.001 and 
1.004) illustrate its main features which, discounting the outer roadstead Kingroad 
and the secondary sea anchorage at Holes Mouth, were the village at Crockern 
Pill, Hungroad, Chapel Pill , the river itself and a number of secondary facets which 
will be described later. The original hydrographics are not available and therefore 
the actual moorings at  Hungroad cannot be shown on a chart. The flow of water 
through the port probably did not significantly alter over the centuries so there 
would not be appreciable differences,29 the more important changes being the 
deliberate removal of obstacles by the Society and the shifting of shoals. 
  
The moorings at Hungroad.  
 
Hungroad is a stretch of water bounded by Crockern and Chapel Pills, 
approximately 3850ft in length and on average 300ft wide with the deepest water 
on the Somerset side of the channel where the river bed was gouged out by the 
tidal flow in both directions. The south bank is in the form of a vertical stone face 
behind occasional outcrops of rock and topped by trees, whilst the other side is 
composed entirely of mud and slopes gradually upwards. The ships discharging at 
Hungroad would have been doing so because they were too large for the river, or 
they simply did not want to risk the passage to Bristol. The barges and lighters 
servicing them, together with ships awaiting suitable tidal conditions before 
proceeding upstream, would also congregate in this area and some ships may 
                                                 
27 Burney, W., ed., ‘Falconer’s New Universal Dictionary of the Marine’ (London 1815, re-published 
Chatham Publishing, 2006). Road or roadstead is defined as a ‘place of anchorage at some distance from the 
shore on the sea coast’. This dictionary will be referred to as ‘Falconer’s Dictionary’  henceforth. 
28 BRO: 04272 Ordinances of the Common Council 1505-1667. Ordinance for Hungroad; A proclamation 
devised and made for the preservation and maintenance and also for the good order of the Port of Hungroad. 
1551 – see Appendix 1.003. 
29 See Appendix 4.029 in Chapter 4 for data regarding water level change. 
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have finished their preparations for the next voyage there, depending on the 
availability of berths as undoubtedly priority would be given to those discharging. 
Also, it is said that careening took place, but this would seem unlikely as space 
would have been at a premium and the silt was not conducive to supporting gangs 
of workers. It was not allowed at the berths or near the city quays.  
 
A researcher trying to measure the effectiveness of Hungroad has the problem that 
there are few primary documents giving details of its day to day working or of the 
numbers of ships involved. In 1728, the Society spent £700 on 14 additional 
moorings for ships at Hungroad, but there is no clear indication of the total berths, 
anchor sites or waiting areas.30 To overcome the lack of documentary evidence, 
the author has attempted to put the known facts together to construct a viable 
model of the berthing at Hungroad.  
 
A description of the area is given by John Rich, a retired Bristol Channel Pilot who 
can trace his pilot ancestry back six generations.  
 
Vessels tied by their masts to the rocks in Hungroad had to keep their 
wooden hulls away from the sheer, coarse face of the rocks and by laying 
anchors attached to their ships by long cables across the river into the mud 
of the Shirehampton bank, the vulnerable hulls could avoid damaging 
themselves as those rose and fell on the second highest tidal range in the 
world. These moorings would have been attended continuously once each 
craft was afloat and the vessel’s crew would be employed to slack out the 
lines as the flood tide rose and haul in on them as the ebb fell away. 
Naturally they would have to be slackened off from time to time to allow the 
free passage of other craft proceeding, either further up or down the river. 
Once a vessel was settled on the bottom, literally hung up by chains 
embedded in the rocks made fast to its masts preventing it from falling over 
on its side, the crew could rest and it soon became apparent that it was 
                                                 
30 Minchinton, ‘The Port of Bristol’, pp.138-139: Latimer, History of the Society of Merchant Venturers, p. 
207. 
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during this period that most damage was being done to the cables of craft 
moored in Hungroad.31  
   
It is difficult to question the word of a writer of such experience, but there are some 
anomalies with this model. The distance between Crockern and Chapel Pills was 
3685ft and the average length of the large Baltic ships 100ft, though to leave space 
between them, this must be increased to at least 150ft per ship. This would allow 
berths for a maximum of about 24 ships, although it is unlikely that all areas along 
the cliff face would be suitable due to outlying rocks. If chains were attached to the 
masts, these vessels would have to be near the bank and light chains used as 
otherwise damage could be done to spars or running gear in medium to strong 
winds. If anchors laid in soft mud were all that was retaining ships then they would 
be liable to drag and the flow of tide in either direction would put the ships on the 
rocks.  
 
At a meeting of the Hungroad committee of the Society in 1728, they discussed a 
visit to Hungroad where they had inspected the anchorage and measured the 
depths of water at the various berths. Appendix 1.002 gives the results of their visit 
which makes it clear that there were 14 berths available at that time and they were 
not in line but staggered along the southern bank. This committee also made a 
recommendation for 14 moorings, but do not make it clear if they were new or 
replacing the 14 they inspected. It is likely that they were new moorings. 
 
An estimate being made by this committee for laying down seven stones for 
Hungroad on the Shirehampton side for mooring ships and also of fixing 
seven rings on the Somerset side for the same purpose. For 14 moorings 
the wrought iron may weigh 14 tuns at £32 per tun = £444.0.0. Laying down 
7 stones at £7 each = £49.00. Fixing 7 rings in the rocks on Somerset side 
at £10 each = £70. Other incident charges unforeseen = £3. Total £600. 32 
 
                                                 
31 Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 25. 
32 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/5 Hall Book 5 1723-1733, 29 April 1778. 
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The most likely proposition is that chains were stretched across the river as there 
would be rings on one side where there was solid rock to take them, and heavy 
stones sunk in the mud either on the other or midstream. Taking it that the wrought 
iron refers to chains, then their weight indicates a long chain for each set of 
moorings. However the entry does refer to 14 separate moorings which makes it 
likely that the ships on the Somerset side were discharging whilst those in transit 
took to the mud on the Gloucestershire bank. There is a further reference to the 
stones in 1769 where ‘the Haven Master reported that an ‘eyebolt fixed in one of 
the stones at Hungroad is broken so that three chains in the Norway ships’ berths 
are rendered useless. Ordered that Mr Davis, the carpenter, and Mr Robinson the 
smith do take care of putting the same and all other stones that shall appear to 
want repairations [repair] in proper conditions’.33  
 
John Rich also makes the comment that the ships would have to be continuously 
adjusting the lines as they rose and fell and this would obviously also include the 
mast chain. There is a problem with this presumption, for foreign ships from the 
Baltic would have sufficient crew onboard, but Bristol ships paid off theirs on arrival 
at Kingroad and left them in charge of the pilots34 putting onboard only a 
shipkeeper or watchman. If they were anchoring or berthing at Hungroad then they 
would not have sufficient crew to continuously adjust cables. In modern times, 
chains are strung across the two Pills and boats are attached to them with risers 
allowing them to be left unattended indefinitely, rising and falling with the tide and 
creating their own hollow due to the scouring effect of the water. This would 
certainly have worked in the eighteenth century provided the chains were heavy 
enough and any ship coming to the haven could have moored to them. This was 
how the chains at the quays at Bristol were utilised. 
 
Hungroad would have been heavily congested at times and care would have to be 
taken to avoid a ship fouling anchors and chains. Reporting to the Hall on a serious 
accident in 1784 when a pilot refused to drop anchor when his ship was being 
carried onto moored shipping, the Haven Master refers to the common practice of 
                                                 
33 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall Book 9 1762-1772, 1 April 1779. 
34 See Chapter 3.  
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pilots sending their yawl ahead with men to slacken and then take cables in 
again.35  
 
Considering all the available information, it is most likely that about 28 berths in 
total were ranged on either side of the river, the through traffic awaiting a tide 
taking the Gloucester side of the channel, whilst the very large ‘Norway’ ships 
discharged on the Somerset side where the depth of water was greatest. Chains 
for the discharging berths emanated from rings on the rock face, whereas the 
vessels in transit would fasten to chains embedded in ‘stones’. There was a chain 
boat at Hungroad in 1786 and 179136 as distinct from the process at the quays 
where the pilots’ own boats carried out the work; which suggests conditions were 
such at Hungroad that a specialised boat was required.37  
A number of other anchorages were available in the port area. Holes Mouth was an 
overflow anchorage used by shipping when Hungroad was full, and the Sybil spent 
4 days in 1786 at Hollow Backs38 in the vicinity of the river mouth before moving 
into the river itself.39 It is unlikely that the Haven Master would have had authority 
or the time to supervise these areas. There were four ‘pills’ (creeks) in the area. 
Broad Pill on the Gloucestershire bank, rarely documented except as a 
geographical reference, was used by small craft as an anchorage, though it may 
not have been secure as on one occasion a pilot sought shelter there with 
catastrophic results to the ship he was guiding.40 On the Somerset side there was 
Morgan’s Pill where there were mooring facilities, but again little is said about it in 
                                                 
35 BRO: SMV/7/1/6/4 Complaints against Pilots 1783-1792, 11 September 1784. Bundle of letters from 
Captain Shaw, the Haven Master. Letters unnumbered. Personal notation No. 2. 
36 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success 1779-86. Pilot’s bill for mooring at Hungroad. Paid 5/- 
for the boat and 2 men. p. 81; BRO: SMV/2/1/1/12 Hall Book of Proceedings 12 1789-97, 20/1/91. p103. 
Pilot’s bill for the Diligence at Hungroad. Chain boat 5/-. 
37 Falconer’s Dictionary p. 80. Defines a chain boat as a large boat with a davit over the stern and two 
windlasses, one forward and the other aft. It is unlikely that the chain boat at Hungroad would have been so 
sophisticated but would have had rollers and at least a specialised grapnel.  
38 BRL: 21258 Account books of the Sybil and Success, p. 81. Although this anchorage is named in the Sybil’s 
accounts, it is not shown on any contemporary map seen by the author; Parker researched the name in 1999 
but was unable to find its location. A. J. Parker, ‘A Maritime Cultural Landscape: The Port of Bristol in the 
Middle Ages’, p. 332-333; The author’s conclusion is that it is probably near, or another name for, Holes 
Mouth. 
39 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success, p. 81. 
40 Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 40. 
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the eighteenth century.41 Chapel Pill, originally called Saint Katherine’s Pill will be 
referred to below but again is rarely acknowledged; which is surprising as it could 
certainly have provided an anchorage for more than one ship especially if it had 
been dredged – it now has moorings for about 20 yachts and at one time a jetty 
was built. The final creek, Crockern Pill will be discussed below (Illustrations 1.001 
and 1.004). 
 
Shipping in and through Hungroad. 
 
By collating the data from contemporary documentation, it is possible to construct a 
fairly comprehensive record of shipping moving to and from the port of Bristol but 
none of these documents gives the exact geographical position of where ships 
were berthed across the extended port and therefore there is no record specifically 
stating which ships used Hungroad and which went on to the city quays. 
Minchinton says that ‘almost all the timber ships from the Baltic discharged there 
sending their cargoes to Bristol in rafts or lighters’,42 whilst a broadsheet dated 
1796 reduces the Baltic figure to about half.43 Other moorings would be taken by 
vessels bound for Bristol but wishing to partially discharge to reduce their draught 
and there were others whose owners did not want to risk the passage or to pay the 
extra insurance involved.  
 
Outward bound ships waiting for their last cargoes could take up moorings but 
most owners would avoid the cost of lighters by finishing loading at Bristol where, 
with Merchants’ Dock the exception, there were no daily harbour dues and so no 
incentive to leave the port until it suited the owner. There were some anomalies in 
that ships might take advantage of a spring tide to lie at King or Hung Roads for 
their last remaining cargo and Morgan says that some waited to take aboard 
servants bound for America.44 Hungroad was also used as a transit port by the 
                                                 
41 There had been basic mooring facilities at this pill since at least the seventeenth century. Latimer, History 
of the Society of Merchant Venturers, p.155. 
42 Minchinton, ‘The Port of Bristol’, p. 138. 
43 BRO: 11168/27 An Untitled Broadsheet, 22 March, 1796. 
44 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 125. 
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Navy transferring  timber from the Forest of Dean to ships bound for their 
dockyards.45 
 
All facilities at Hungroad were organised and controlled by the Haven Master, it 
being his duty to ‘direct and order the placing of the anchors and mooring and lying 
of all vessels in all parts of the river’ and similarly to maintain ‘all the chains and 
moorings at Hungroad’ and indeed anything belonging to the Society on the river.46 
His task was increased because for all but minor repairs, he did not have the 
authority to order the work to be done, but had to apply to the Committee for 
permission.47 Similarly, he had to indent for essential stores to the treasurer in 
advance, which meant inevitable delays as for day to day malfunctions he might 
not have the tools, spares or personnel available to redress them.48  For example, 
in June 1786, a pilot came in too early and took away a mooring chain, agreed it 
was his fault and was willing to pay for the repair of the chain, but it was not until 
the following September that the Haven Master could report to the Committee that 
the chain had actually been repaired. Had he had the authority to pay for the 
repair, albeit to collect later from the pilot, the mooring would have been back in 
use earlier.49 This system of accounting may have assisted in keeping down costs 
but this could only be to the detriment of efficiency. 
 
The principal duty of the Haven Master was to control the mass of shipping at 
Hungroad and considering the extent of his other duties,50 a small staff of 
assistants would appear vital to the task, especially as he could not be there 24 
hours per day – though in 1797 it was ordered that he live near Hungroad. 
However, he had one deputy only and indeed was not even granted a boat to carry 
out his work but allowed 1s per day when a ship was moored at Hungroad. 
Considering that the cost of hiring a boat to take a ship’s captain out to his vessel 
                                                 
45 Andrew Whitefield, Mr Hilhouse of Bristol: Shipbuilder for the Navy 1749-1822 (Bristol: Redcliffe Press 
Ltd, 2010) p. 81. 
46 See Appendix 1.001. Duties of the Haven Master. 
47 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall Book 1762-1772, 1 April 1769. 
48 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/10 Hall Book 1772-1782, 27 February 1782. 
49 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/1 Papers re the quays and nuisances 1751-1784, 14 June 1784: SMV/7/1/6/4 Complaints 
against Pilots 1783-1792, 26 September 1784. Letters from the Haven Master to the Society, No. 3. 
50 See Appendix 1.001. 
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at Kingroad was 5s6d and the average pay per day of a waterman without a boat 
was 1s, the allowance was not excessive.51 
 
The Haven Master and his difficulties with the men of Pill. 
 
There was an obvious lack of manpower, but as far as the Society was concerned 
this could be found at the ancient village of Pill situated on Crockern Pill at the 
heart of the port. 52 This village had no industry except some shipbuilding and 
repair yards dating from the late eighteenth century,53 but its raison d’être was, and 
always had been, to provide watermen to service ships trading with Bristol. Almost 
the entire male population was composed of pilots, tow-boatmen (known as 
hobblers)54, and general watermen all of whom considered themselves to be 
independent of Bristol. Indeed there were no direct roads on the Somerset side of 
the river with almost everything not coming by boat being carried by packhorse.55  
 
Hungroad officially became a port by the ‘Ordinance for Hungroad’ issued in 1551 
by the Mayor and Justices (Appendix 1.003), who as commissioners of the 
Admiralty included in it instructions that in all matters pertaining to the anchoring 
and mooring of ships, all owners and mariners using the port should be obedient to 
the Water Bailiff of Bristol and to the pilots of Shirehampton.56 However, during the 
seventeenth century the Corporation gradually delegated responsibility for the 
conservancy of the river to the Society who in 1670 requested the Corporation to 
appoint a Haven Master as they felt administration of the port needed 
                                                 
51 BRL: 21258 Account Book of the Sybil and  Success, 30/7/79, p 118. Pilot’s note: Minchinton, ‘Port of 
Bristol’, p. 139. 
52 There are various spellings; Crockerne, Crewkerne, Crockarm, Crockham, but in this thesis Crockern will 
be used when necessary as it is depicted in that way on Map 1.003, but in general the modern simplification 
of ‘Pill’ for the village itself will be used. 
53 Graham Farr., Shipbuilding in the Port of Bristol (National Maritime Museum monographs and reports 27, 
1977) pp. 19-20.  
54 Elkin draws attention to the fact that the Pill Hobblers Association still exists today to provide quayside 
workers for Avonmouth. Elkin, ‘Aspects of the of the Port of Bristol’ pp. 29-30. 
55 Latimer says that in 1757 the road from Bristol to Pill was a mere horse track but the council had voted to 
make a road between Road from Rownham to Abbots Leigh. If it was built at all it is not shown on Donne’s 
map of 1769. See Illustration 1.002. Latimer, Annals, p. 325. 
56 Author’s italics for emphasis: The Ordinance says ‘the pilots of Shirehampton’ but it was only a hamlet 
with a few cottages. All pilots, hobblers and boatmen were from Pill. Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 12. 
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improvement.57 This reduced the role the pilots were given in the Ordinance and 
almost immediately differences of opinion developed between the new official and 
themselves for, as Rich states: 
 
Here was a person from outside the close-knit community of mariners, 
someone appointed to superintend their river and what was even worse, he 
was to take charge and order them to place their anchors and moor ships. 
Decisions which from time immemorial had been their sole province.  
 
He goes on to say that an atmosphere of non-cooperation followed and believes 
that the Society had covertly appointed the Haven Master to dilute or take the 
blame for any problems arising from the militant attitude of the mariners of Pill.58 As 
will be described below, this tension continued throughout the eighteenth century 
and at times blatant disobedience evolved into actual violence.  
 
One bone of contention was that all progress through the port was governed by 
two marker posts above and below the moored ships, positioned there since the 
early seventeenth century to bar ships’ movements until the tide covered them. 
The post below showed that there was enough water to pass over the ships’ cables 
whilst that above was an indication that the larger ships could leave their mooring 
and proceed upriver to Bristol.59 It was specifically written into the Haven Master’s 
instructions that he prevent these small vessels breaking the rules.  
 
There is nothing in the contemporary documentation to indicate that this was other 
than a simple system applied to all shipping, but it meant that the lowest draught 
trow or coaster would have to wait until there was enough water to float the larger 
ships, which must have been a frustrating experience for masters’ trying to get their 
vessels to Bristol for markets. The eighteenth-century trow drew about three to four 
feet60 whilst a West Indiaman would need between 10 and 15 and the large Baltic 
                                                 
57 McGrath., Merchant Venturers of Bristol, pp. 75-76. 
58 Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 43. 
59 Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 26. 
60 Graham Farr, ‘Severn Navigation and the Trow’, The Mariners Mirror, 32 (1946) p.76. For general 
information see also Richard Barker, ‘A Probable Clinker Built Severn Trow at Lydney’, International 
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vessels more. Any ship over 60 tons also had to have a licence from the Haven 
Master before it could proceed.61  
 
In 1775, the Committee insisted that hatch-lighters obey the poles as they had a 
deeper draught than the regulated trows, and they specifically referred to the 1700 
Quarter Sessions order, showing that regulations and ingrained practices rarely 
changed during the eighteenth century.62 It would not have taken much effort to put 
a post with markers to indicate when the various categories of vessels could pass, 
but that might have meant stationing a guard at Pill during spring tides and as 
previously mentioned, the Haven Master did not have assistants. Instead, the 
Society preferred to rely on informers, paying them one tenth of a 40s fine imposed 
on vessels reported to have crept through early.63 The use of informers went back 
at least to the time of the Ordinance.  
 
A better system should have been put in place because it was a serious problem 
for the Haven Master as transgressions were frequent and any damage to ships or 
the mooring was his responsibility and could cost him his job. This almost occurred 
in 1784 after an accident occurred due to a ship called the Renown running foul of 
the cable of another, the Bernard Anker, causing considerable damage to both, the 
deaths of two men and serious injury to a seaman belonging to another ship. This 
accident serves to illustrate not only the hazards of Hungroad navigation but also 
the vulnerability of the position of Haven Master.64  
 
It appears that there were 11 large ships moored at Hungroad when the collision 
occurred and witnesses say that the pilot, James Gilmore, had his ship too near 
rocks on a following tide and so could not avoid hitting the moored ships. Several 
persons called on him to drop his anchor including the deputy Haven Master, but 
he refused, not wishing to miss the tide. The Bernard Anker, a large Norway ship of 
                                                                                                                                                     
Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 23.3 (1992), 205-8: and M. Nance, ‘Trows Past and Present’, The Mariners 
Mirror, 2 (1912), 201-205.  
61 Minchinton, ‘Port of Bristol’, p. 138. 
62 BRO: SMV2/1/2/4 Index to Hall Books (Henceforth noted as Index) 4, 21 November 1775. 
63 Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 26. 
64 For details of the disaster see. BRO: SMV/7/1/6/4 Complaints against pilots. Single sheet of notes about the 
disaster, 9 July 1784. Letter from Captain Shaw to the Society defending his actions, 11 September 1784: and 
SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 13 September 1784 for details of the action taken by the Society.  
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600 registered tons, had been badly moored but the accident would have occurred 
anyway. The deputy Haven Master, George Culliford, claimed he had ordered the 
slacking of the cables on the Bernard Anker but his statement was contradicted by 
others.  
 
The Committee found that the Haven Master was in dereliction of his duty as his 
orders were to be at Hungroad during every spring tide and he was absent; also he 
should have checked beforehand that the Bernard Anker was properly moored. 
They decided that Culliford had not done his duty as his testimony was flatly 
contradicted by others and that he was not a fit person for the job. The Haven 
Master was retained but his deputy was dismissed even though he had been in 
that position for 17 years.  
 
Most accidents occurring at Hungroad were not of the scale of the above, but 
documents show that the port applied its own rules to ships. John Shaw, Haven 
Master, indicated it was the custom for a pilot approaching the moorings to send 
his yawl ahead to ascertain  where the ship was to anchor and to slacken cables if 
necessary. He further implied that if the pilot did not give warning of his impending 
arrival, a ship with a strong tide behind it would be up to the moorings before 
anything could be done. This means that the Haven Master relied on the pilots and 
did not have men of his own to report back on sighting ships, a seemingly basic 
procedure to modern eyes, and certainly by 1794 there was an arrangement 
whereby pilots would send a letter ahead to Bristol to be left in a box on the Quay 
detailing their needs.65  
 
Communication between the shore and the incoming vessels was made entirely by 
shouting and Shaw claimed that his deputy must have been heard by both the 
Renown and the Barnard Anker because when he was directing shipping he used 
the man to repeat his orders because he had a much stronger voice. Neither of 
them appears to have carried a speaking trumpet although the mate of the Barnard 
Anker did use one to call on the Renown. Signal flags were in use for convoys at 
                                                 
65 BRO: SMV 2/1/2/5 Index 5, 4 October 1794, p. 343. 
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sea and at Bristol, so some system could have been devised for the port, probably 
by putting a flag hoist at the turn of the bend on the Gloucestershire side where it 
could be seen in both directions, but the only mention of any sort of watchtower or 
signals was in 1776 when the Haven Master greeted visitors with ‘13 guns and a 
display of colours from his platform’.66 Again there seems to have been either a 
lack of initiative at this port or else the Society were not providing adequate 
resources and oversight.   
 
However, when the evidence is sifted, it is obvious that this incident occurred 
because the pilot of the Renown was trying to come in with the tide and refused to 
anchor when ordered to by the man in charge, the deputy Haven Master, even 
though his own tow boatmen and colleagues gave the same advice. Shaw claimed 
that Culiford had always been obeyed when carrying out his duties, but as 
mentioned above there was antipathy between ‘outsiders’, especially the man in 
charge of the port, and the pilots and watermen of Pill.  
  
Technically, the Haven Master had the legal right to call for assistance from any 
waterman on the river, but in reality at times he was simply ignored by the 
watermen or indeed abused. In 1792, Shaw complained to the Society that three 
ships came in with the tide on a Sunday when there was no emergency and fouled 
the anchorage. In the same letter he says that ‘the men employed by the pilots 
thinks that they are not under any command of the Haven Master as they are a set 
of very unruly fellows’ and he gives the example of the mooring cable of a vessel 
parting and a towboat he ordered to help refusing, even though he offered to pay 
them. Finally, he asked the Society to make a ruling that tow boatmen who defied 
him could not be employed by the pilots.67 It is an illustration of the antagonism felt 
by the watermen of Pill to the Society that even John Shaw, a famous and 
successful privateer captain, had difficulty in being obeyed.68  
 
                                                 
66 Damer Powell, Bristol Privateers, p. 248. 
67 Rich, Bristol Pilots, pp. 86-88.  
68 For a resume on the career of Captain Shaw, see Damer Powell, Bristol Privateers, pp. 248-249. 
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It appears that throughout the century the Society gave very little practical help to 
the Haven Master leaving him to sort out the problems with the Pill people by 
himself. However, when the Hall was faced with direct defiance or an attack on 
their property or businesses, they would act decisively. On 29 July, 1772, the 
hobblers took strike action and refused to move ships up or down river unless they 
had a rise in wages; and also they wanted to be paid in advance when summoned 
to attend ships at Bristol as often when they arrived to move a ship, it was not 
ready or the weather had deteriorated. They referred to the advance as being paid 
a ‘dotage’. The Society and the Corporation’s joint reaction was to order the pilots 
to move the ships themselves, one at a time, and they suspended two pilots who 
had encouraged the action.69 A comment ‘that the wages now paid them amount to 
more than they would be able to get at any labouring work’ has been scored out on 
this document.  
 
The action appears to have lasted until 31 October when the men gave in ‘humbly’ 
and petitioned for forgiveness for unknowingly breaking the law of the land. The 
first Combination Act was not till 1799, but the law referred to would be the Statute 
of Artificers,70 an early industrial code based on the notion of the universal 
obligation to work.71 The men had asked for a rise to 1s.6d from 1s for the haul 
from Bristol to Hungroad, 2s6d from 2s for Bristol to Kingroad and 6d for a dotage, 
the latter to be paid when they had made the trip up to Bristol to take a ship out 
and it was not ready. It was not the only incident of industrial action that decade for 
in 1778 both pilots and tow boatmen refused to allow vessels to move in the river 
on account of their brethren being pressed. The mayor intervened and the men 
returned to work after a promise from him that the impressed men would be 
released.72 
 
The Haven Master had less power over the watermen than he had with the pilots 
as the latter’s authority to operate, although granted by the Corporation, was in 
                                                 
69 BRO: SMV/7/1/6/7 Orders relating to the Towmen, 1772. Bundle. 
70 5 Eliz c.4. An Act touching divers Orders for Artificers, Labourers, Servants of Husbandry, and 
Apprentices. 
71 W. E. Minchinton, Wage Regulation in pre-industrial England (Newton Abbot: 1972) p. 11.  
72 FFBJ, 4 April 1778. 
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reality given by the Society after an initial investigation by him and it had to be 
renewed annually. Pilots also had to produce a bond of £50 and could lose this or 
be suspended at any time depriving them of their income. However, in spite of 
being suspended some continued to work covertly in the background facing 
prosecution if caught.73 An uneasy relationship existed between authority in the 
form of the Haven Master and the pilots, but they had more to lose than the other 
Pill residents and so for the most part cooperated. Apart from his certificate, each 
pilot had to reside at Pill, (though they generally lived above the village),74 and to 
possess at least a yawl and a towboat, numbered and marked with the owner’s 
name in white letters upon black.75  
 
All the village boats were moored in Crockern Pill, but could be susceptible to 
vandalism even in such a closed community. This brought about an institution 
called the ‘Society of Pilots’ in 1785 which presented the Hall with a set of articles 
stating amongst other things that they would prosecute anyone damaging or 
stealing from their boats even if they were relatives. They also agreed to construct 
moorings where the boats would be safer and charge 1s per annum per boat, 
agreeing to turn adrift any boats that had not paid their dues. A number of fines 
were put in place and they claimed it would be lawful to retrieve these by taking 
and selling the goods and chattels of the guilty party.76 The document appears 
similar to those of some of the guilds that had formed at Bristol but it did not 
impress the Society who saw it as being ‘mischievous’.77    
  
Although the pilots resented authority, they were extremely jealous of their own 
rights and pleading poverty petitioned the Society on occasions to limit the number 
                                                 
73 John Dickens was a pilot who was suspended in 1785 for misconduct but worked taking whatever jobs he 
could until reinstated in 1791 having petitioned the Society and having the backing of other pilots. Rich, 
Bristol Pilots, pp. 67-77. 
74 A pilot, William Griffiths had been suspended and asked the Society if he could live where elsewhere but 
locally whilst waiting to be reinstated. BRO: SMV/7/1/6/5. Letters from the Haven Master about pilots: 
Complaint against a pilot for not having a towboat and being resident at Portishead. BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 
4, 27 February 1782, p. 107. 
75 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/10 Hall Book 10, 1772-1782. March 1773. 
76 Rich, Bristol Pilots, pp. 79-83.  
77 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 165. 
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of branch pilots,78 but the merchants’ only real concern was that enough pilots 
were available for their ships, and so were not generally sympathetic.79 The pilots 
were anxious about interlopers and complained bitterly of the Combe and ‘deputy’ 
pilots appropriating their customers. The former were based at Ilfracombe and 
would board ships bound for Bristol, an action that the Pill pilots strenuously 
objected to, but these men were necessary as weather conditions could stop or 
delay pilot vessels coming down the estuary from the Avon. This was not resolved 
until 1797 when the Society came down on the side of the Pill pilots and directed 
that they would be paid from the moment they boarded incoming vessels.80  
 
The so-called deputy pilots had no official basis and the Pill pilots petitioned the 
Society to have their operations stopped.81 They asked the Society to stop any 
unqualified person from piloting coastal shipping to or from Bristol and to put an 
embargo on their boats as apart from taking their business, they said that if 
deputies arrived onboard a ship before a pilot, they would threaten to throw the 
latter overboard. They also accused the deputies of going onboard simply to crimp, 
that is to entice the crew to leave the ship for better wages elsewhere.82  
 
On the other hand, the deputies’ petition states that they were the watermen of Pill 
who ‘carry up’ small craft, they having served their time with pilots both in the river 
and the channel and had boats ‘before some of the pilots were made’. They said 
that small craft could not afford to pay the pilots’ river charges but when out in the 
channel, the same pilots would not bring them in as they were too small and so 
leave them in dangerous circumstances. The deputies claimed that they only 
charged 2s6d or 3s6d each and the writer of the letter pleads that when a named 
                                                 
78 Rich, Bristol Pilots, pp. 64, 83: BRO: SMV/7/1/6/5 Letters from the Haven Master about pilots, 27 May 
1788, 20 January 1789; A ‘branch’ pilot was simply one who held a licence. Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 36.   
79 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 166. 
80 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/12 Hall Book 12, 12 December 1790. 
81 These petitions were undated and in a bundle of letters SMV/7/1/6/5 dated between 1784-92. However the 
pilots’ mention crimping, which generally only takes place in wartime and therefore they could not be in the 
assigned period. The signatures of the pilots when compared to a list of pilots in Minchinton, ed., Politics and 
the Port of Bristol p. 193-198, dates the documents between 1771 and 1782, probably during the American 
War of Independence.  
82 Crimps ‘Detested agents who trepan seamen by treating, advancing money and suchlike and under liquor 
induce them to sign articles.’ W.H. Smyth, Sailor’s Word Book: An Alphabetical Digest of Nautical Terms 
(London 1867, republished London, 1991) p. 222.  
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ship was in distress in the channel, only the deputy pilot boats went to its 
assistance.  
 
Both petitions seem to have a grain of truth to them and as the deputies probably 
could not afford the mandatory bond, yawl and towboat, it was probably the only 
way that skilled watermen could make a living.83 It is important to note, however,  
that both sets of mariners came from the small community of Pill and probably 
knew each other well, yet there was internal jealousy and strife: however they 
would close ranks when threatened by outsiders.84  
 
To all intents and purposes, the Corporation had delegated responsibility for the 
day to day working of the Pill pilots to the Society who awarded certificates (albeit 
they had to be rubber stamped by the Corporation), heard complaints, disciplined 
pilots and recommended dismissal. McGrath takes a positive view of their efforts,85 
but the author believes that they did this from a distance and the Haven Master 
was left to pick up the pieces with few resources. It was he who had to report any 
misdemeanours; to check that each pilot had the proper equipment; to carry out a 
pre-examination of prospective pilots and to countersign or even adjust their 
notes86 although he was rewarded for the last at 1s per note.87 These duties alone, 
never mind the daily squabbles over shipping, must have created animosity 
between the pilots who regarded themselves as the aristocracy of the port, and, 
from their viewpoint, the placeman of an alien authority.  
 
Other facilities at Hungroad. 
 
The argument that Hungroad was more than just a port has been made above and 
is strengthened when its other facilities are considered. There were no quaysides 
or warehouses, but there was a slipway maintained by the Society since 1611 as 
                                                 
83 No reply to these petitions from the Society has been found. 
84 Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 64.  
85 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p.166. 
86 Minchinton, ‘The Port of Bristol’, p. 135; Rich, Bristol Pilots pp. 53-54. 
87 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/13 Hall Book 13, 30 January 1997. 
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an obligation under the anchorage, and later the wharfage leases.88 In 
contemporary documents it was referred to in the singular and therefore it would be 
the medieval ferry slip between the west side of Crockern Pill and the other bank, 
both sides being cobbled down into the water.89 This would have the dual purpose 
of connecting the two banks and of loading and unloading small items of cargo and 
passengers. The slip would have had to have been cleaned almost daily and for 
this the Society paid the ‘Keeper of the Slip’ £2 per annum in the seventeenth 
century.  
 
Mariners leaving from ships in the port and passengers from small vessels in 
transit, would alight and progress onwards from the Lamplighter’s Hall, a hostelry 
and coaching house near the slipway on the Gloucestershire side.90 The road from 
there to Kingsweston and Bristol had been considerably improved in 1704 and 
made into a turnpike in 1758, which opened out Shirehampton for development.91 
The hostelry was also used by the members of the Committee when examining 
pilots or to make its authority felt, although it might have been more effective, if not 
so comfortable, to have used premises at Pill.92  
 
Church services were held at Shirehampton, part of the incumbency of Westbury, 
for the seamen from Hungroad but it is probable that they had to pay for this 
themselves. Certainly, in the sixteenth century a penny in the pound was deducted 
from their wages.93 In 1756, John Wesley preached to a full audience at Pill, but 
the attendance may have been helped by the  fact that the local press gang had 
orders not to take seamen from religious meetings.94 It is most likely that the 
services for seamen were carried out at Shirehampton but Chapel Pill, originally 
called St. Katherine’s Pill, still had a chapel and could also have been used.  
 
                                                 
88 Leases were granted in 1601,1661,1690,1712, and in 1764 all ancillary dues were accustomed to Wharfage. 
McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 72 
89 Rich says it was said to have been laid by monks in the middle ages. Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 24. 
90 Small ships in ballast or with passengers came no further than Pill. BRO: 11168/27 Untitled broadsheet. 
91 Latimer, Annals, p. 65, 331.  
92 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 166. 
93 J. Latimer,  Sixteenth-Century Bristol (Bristol, 1908) p. 107.  
94 Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 96. 
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As in most small ports there was a customs presence, and they were based in the 
Customs Watch House situated on the upper corner of the River Avon and 
Crockern Pill, built so that it had a vantage point up and down the river.95 Custom’s 
working practices are dealt with in Chapter 3, but at Pill they served Kingroad 
where all foreign shipping had to report. Another duty of the Haven Master, 
established in 1700, was to enforce the fire regulations, but although likely, it is not 
clear whether these were the same as those at the quays, which in 1797 refer to 
‘unseasonable times’ when fires could not be lit, or if the specific hours noted in 
1700 were being observed.96 At Hungroad there would generally be river water 
available for fire-fighting but care had to be taken as it was a crowded anchorage 
and this affected the positioning of yet another of the port’s facilities, the Powder 
Magazine near Shirehampton situated on an isolated bend of the Avon.  
 
This complex was built in 1749 to take powder transferred from the previous 
magazine at Tower Harratz in the city and still exists (Illustration 1.005).97 Situated 
about 700ft from Chapel Pill on the opposite bank, it was situated far enough from 
Hungroad to protect shipping in the event of an explosion, but near enough to 
provide easy access. It consisted of a main magazine to store gunpowder 
transported from mills at Woolley and Littleton for export, and a quayside on which 
there was a crane and a small warehouse.98 Anti-fire regulations forbade the 
carrying of gunpowder to the city quays or indeed anywhere on the river (it had to 
be off the ships within 24 hours of mooring)99 and so it was landed to be retrieved 
on departure. The tidal conditions were such that no large merchantman would try 
to load or unload gunpowder there, especially as there were dangerous rocks 
                                                 
95 Graham Farr, Somerset Harbours, (London, 1954) p. 34.  
96 No fires were permitted on board after six o’clock at night in winter and nine o’clock in the summer except 
on extraordinary occasions with licence from the Haven Master. Patrick McGrath, ‘The Society of Merchant 
Venturers and the Port of Bristol in the 17th Century’ Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucester 
Archaeological Society 72 (1953) p. 126; The wording of the report from the committee is that he is to 
prevent fire being made onboard ships at anchor or moored in any part of the river at unseasonable times. 
SMV/2/1/1/13 Hall Book 13, 30 January 1797. 
97 Brenda J. Buchanan, ‘The African Trade and the Bristol Gunpowder Industry’, Transactions of the Bristol 
and Gloucester Archaeological Society , 118, (2000) pp. 144-145 
98 For details of the local gun powder industry see Jonathan Barry, ed., The Diary of William Dyer: Bristol in 
1762 (Bristol Record Society, 64, 2012). 
99 McGrath, ‘Society of Merchant Venturers in the 17th Century’, p. 126. 
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nearby, so it would be conveyed to and fro in ships’ boats, lighters or small craft 
which could go aground at low water.100 
 
On 2 July, 1765, the Society received a letter detailing a scheme for watering the 
ships at Hungroad from Henry Bright, a Bristol merchant with shipping interests 
who had married Sarah Meyler the daughter of another Bristol merchant in 1746, 
so gaining her father’s country house at Ham Green behind Pill.101 At a general 
meeting of the Hall on 4 July, 1765, it was said that the scheme would be ‘of great 
service to the navigation of this port’ so they referred the matter to the Committee 
and the fact that they also ordered the treasurer to provide finance measures their 
interest.102 The process that followed is detailed in Appendix 1.004 and is an 
example of the Society’s peculiar blend of accepting progressive ideas, but 
tempering their actions with parsimony. It is a theme that will be discussed 
throughout this thesis, as it not only involves the Society but it seems to have been 
institutionalised into the business methods of the time.  
 
The benefits to the port were that by the time the project was finished in November, 
1766, a constant supply of fresh water had been provided, not only for the ships at 
Hungroad, but for Kingroad and the village as well.103 As part of this project it had 
been necessary to construct a slipway next to the Customs House to give access 
to water cocks and this was an additional advantage. However, as shown in the 
appendix, maintenance was a problem for the Haven Master onto whose work load 
had been added the oversight of the water supply line. It took about a year longer 
to construct than it needed due to arguments over costs, and repairs were required 
to maintain the line which could have been avoided if there had been less 
parsimony.   
 
However, in his letters to the Committee detailing the problems he was facing, 
Captain Shaw provides information which reinforces the argument that Hungroad 
was a port. In 1782, he states that damage was caused by ‘carriages that bring 
                                                 
100 Farr, Somerset Harbours, p 32.  
101 Morgan, ed., Bright-Meyler Papers, p. 34-35. 
102 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 4 July 1765, p. 96; SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall Book 9, 1762-1772, 4 July 1765. 
103 Farr, Somerset Harbours, p. 36.  
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down a great weight of timber to be shipped off on the spring tides’,104 confirming 
that as well as gunpowder, local timber was an export.  At Crockern Pill the spring 
tides can rise to the extent of flooding local houses, so it would be easy to load 
boats from the shore or even float wood round to the anchorage where it could be 
handled like any other timber bound for Bristol or around the coast.  
 
Another letter from Shaw105 refers to tanners working locally, a process which 
required bark. It is unlikely that enough could have come from trees felled locally, 
but the Forest of Dean was an exporter and imports would have made up any local 
shortage.106 The source of fresh water was a mill pond and it is likely that this 
serviced a timber mill sawing local timber for export, which strengthens the 
argument that Hungroad, although essentially a transit port, did handle the output 
of local industry. 
 
The Haven Master and the River Avon. 
 
The Haven Master’s fiefdom extended from the mouth of the Avon to Sea Banks at 
Bristol (Illustrations 1.002-1.003) but surprisingly, even though it was within the 
limits of the port, it did not include Kingroad the mandatory first port of call for 
foreign shipping. Within the given area he controlled the river traffic; directed 
shipping to mooring and anchoring positions; policed and reported any breach of 
regulations and had to provide a monthly account of all shipping staying more than 
24 hours. He also supervised the maintenance of navigation aids such as buoys, 
oversaw the upkeep and repair of the various implements and apparatus used on 
the moorings, and kept a note of any changes or obstructions in the river. Later, in 
1797 he was ordered to record those on a chart and this included marking shifting 
sandbanks in the Estuary.107  
 
For the purposes of the thesis, his duties concerning the river can be split into two 
parts, reporting and then dealing with what were called the ‘nuisances on the river’, 
                                                 
104 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 27 February 1782, p. 107. 
105 BRO: SMV/7/1/4/19 Haven Master’s correspondence 1785-1790, 23 February 1790. 
106 Green, Severn Traders, p. 47. 
107 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/13 Hall Book 13, 1797 – 1807, 30 January 1797; See Appendix 1.001. 
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that is man made obstructions; and reporting natural obstacles to navigation such 
as rocks and shoals, and accidental barriers like sunken vessels. The word 
‘reporting’ is used deliberately to emphasise the fact that as at Hungroad he had 
little power to instigate removal operations, centralised control by the Committee 
again being imposed.  
 
The nuisances on the River. 
 
Illicit dumping of industrial material from the area above Bristol Bridge was a 
constant problem as it not only caused problems locally, but the Haven Master had 
to worry about its affect on Hungroad even though it was 7 miles away (Illustrations 
1.002-1.003). Twice per day, the tremendous power of the tidal river could gather 
up debris and deposit it along its length and breadth and, as will be seen below, 
this was not just small semi-submersible items, but stone, rock and other heavy 
materials. A letter from the Haven Master to the Society in 1786 epitomises the 
problem. He includes: 
 
The late fresh (flood water) has brought down a great quantity of broken 
brick, pieces of tiles and other from the works above Bristol Bridge. Part has 
been lodged above the bridge and as far down as the new mud dock. It has 
received the bricks and makes it a very hard bottom for vessels to lie from 
the bridge to the Grove slips. Lucky we had a number of heavy ships 
moored at Hungroad and prevented the berth from filling up.108 
 
The area above the Bristol Bridge was outside his authority, but here he wore his 
other hat, that of Ballast Master, a position created in 1700109 which meant that 
among other tasks, he was to see that the quarries near the river had sufficient 
stanks110 and hedges to prevent stones and rocks going into the river. By 1722 his 
                                                 
108 BRO: SMV/7/1/4/19 Haven Master’s Correspondence 1785-90. Bundle 1/7, 28 October 1786. 
109 Following the same 1700 Act of Parliament, 11 and 12 William III c. 23, as had resulted in the Society 
issuing new instructions to the Haven Master. Initially the position of Ballast Master was a separate 
appointment but it came to be held by the Haven Master.  
110 A sort of coffer dam. Collins English Dictionary (Glasgow, 2005). 
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domain had increased to the river from Hanham Mills to Holes Mouth111 and by 
1797 his instructions were ‘taking care sufficient banks and stanks are made at all 
quarries to prevent stones rolling below the high water mark and to prevent stones, 
rubble, ashes or filth being thrown into the river between Hanham and Crookham 
[Crockern] Pill’.112  
 
With the progress of the industrial revolution, new industries grew along the banks 
of the River Avon in the area above the bridge, and there are regular entries in the 
Hall Books where the Haven Master and other port officers report transgressions of 
the port regulations to the Society. A letter written by Captain Shaw in 1785 
illustrates the general problem and the solutions as seen by him. This letter is 
concerned with two men, Hutchins and Webber, both lime-burners and brick-
makers on the riverside at Avon Street.113 Webber reported Hutchins for building a 
stank on the river bank, and Shaw investigated, but was impressed by the fact that 
it was successfully protecting the river and said that if ‘every landing place were to 
follow the example ….. it would prevent the great quantity of rubble that is brought 
down from the banks which is the reason of not having that depth of water at 
Hungroad; formally there was seventeen feet but now eleven at low water’. 
 
Shaw went on to examine Webber’s landing place and found that the slope there 
meant that stones collected at the half-tide mark, and was informed by Hutchins 
that Webber brings ‘cart loads of rubble stuff’ and leaves it on the bank to roll into 
the river. In his letter Shaw tells the Committee that this sort of thing is a daily 
occurrence and could be stopped if a reward was offered for information that led to 
prosecution, adding for  emphasis, that ‘many of the old lightermen could testify 
that one third [width] of the river is filled up by the works above the bridge’. The 
letter finishes by him reporting that large stones at a disused quarry were a danger 
to shipping and that he will have them broken up and removed if ‘the gentlemen’ 
approve’.114 
 
                                                 
111 Minchinton, ed., Politics and the Port of Bristol, p. 202. 
112 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/13 Hall Book 13, 1797 – 1807. Report of the Committee to the Society, 30/1/97. 
113 Bristol Directory, 1785, pp. 28, 58. 
114 BRO: SMV/7/1/4/19 Haven Master’s Correspondence 1785-90, 11 March 1785. 
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Apart from giving a graphic description of the industrial waste situation, the letter 
again highlights the fact that he could not act on his own, which inevitably caused 
delays. Also, he gets his information second-hand from informants – and indeed 
rewarding them is his solution to the problem – and also it shows that as at 
Hungroad he has no assistants to patrol the riverbanks. There was a suggestion in 
the late 1760’s, that 3 or 4 boats might ply the river every tide to report nuisances 
and they were to be manned by ‘worn out seamen enabled to obtain as 
subsistence without being dead burden on any other charitable institution’.115 There 
is no record of this being put into effect, and it is unlikely the Society would have 
borne the cost. 
 
The precise ballasting of ships was imperative to their safety – indeed it could be 
considered an art – and is a topic regularly taken up by marine and especially 
naval historians.116 However, the actual provision of ballast at merchant ports is not 
well documented because in general it was a fairly ubiquitous proceeding involving 
ships’ loading or unloading of sand, gravel or stone. Iron was not commonly used 
by merchant ships due to cost, and also the heavier items of cargo could be used 
instead, bringing in an income from freight charges. When the Quay Warden 
needed to replace his equipment for weighing lighters in 1786, he recommended 
the use of ‘iron ballast as used in a man of war’ an indication that it was not 
common to Bristol merchant ships.117 
 
The position at Bristol was as usual complicated by its tidal problems and the 
Corporation had found it necessary to have Acts of Parliament passed concerning 
ballast and industrial waste because there was a serious risk that it could 
contribute to the river being blocked.118 As his instructions clearly show, it was the 
                                                 
115 BRO: SMV/7/1/4/5. New Quay Wall at the Grove Bristol 1767-69. No date. This document was among an 
un-numbered batch of papers.  
116 For example, John Harland, Seamanship in the age of sail (London, 1984) p. 49; Brian Lavery, Nelson’s 
Navy (London, 2012) p.71; Brian Lavery, The Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War 1600-1815 
(London, 1987) pp. 186-188.  
117 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 28 August 1786. 
118 11 and 12 William III c. 23: An Act for the better preserving the navigation of the River Avon and Frome 
and for cleansing, paving and inlighting the streets of the City of Bristol; 28 Geo III c. 65. To the hazard, 
hindrance, and obstruction of the navigation of ships and vessels trading to the said city [Bristol]. 
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Ballast Master’s job to address these problems directly, his main purpose being to 
police the river from the city to its mouth (Appendix 1.005).119 
 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the instructions contain the only clues as to the actual 
operations involved and his role. Discharged ballast would be of two types; that 
which was no longer of use and to which he would allocate a dumpling ground; and 
the good ballast as carried by ships sailing light which when no longer needed had 
to be discharged at the ballast wharf where it would be sold on at a maximum price 
of sixpence a ton. Whether or not he paid for this material and where the proceeds 
went is not indicated. He was also empowered to grant permission for ballast to be 
transferred between ships. In reality the  supply of ballast at Bristol was a private 
industry carried on by lightermen, albeit they could only dig it from places indicated 
by him. The ballast wharf is not shown on any maps seen by the author, but it is 
likely to have been either on the Redcliffe Keys or at the western confluence of the 
rivers where the marshes were being filled in. To accommodate the piles of ballast, 
it must have covered a substantial area.  
 
Considering the Society was always on the lookout to make money, a comparison 
between their ballasting operations and those on the Thames does not 
demonstrate enterprise. Trinity House controlled the Thames operations through a 
ballast office and supplied all ships sailing out of the river from 60 marked lighters 
each of 30 tons with a crew of two being permanently employed. Their charge per 
ton in 1794 is not known but by 1815 was 1s3d which would be considerably more 
than at Bristol.120 Albeit the number of ships dealt with on the Thames was much 
greater than at Bristol, a more efficient and profitable operation could have been 
put in place without difficulty. However, the Society’s concern appears to have 
been to use all their resources to keep the river open for navigation rather 
introducing schemes for its development. 
 
                                                 
119 The original list of instructions was sent to the Society by the Town Clerk, Samuel Worrall, along with a 
copy of the ‘Rules and instructions of the Quarter Sessions to be observed by the Ballast Master’ which were 
copied into the Hall Book. BRO: SMV/2/1/1/12 Hall Book 12, 8 January 1794, p. 321, 324; McGrath says 
that this was done because the system was not working properly. McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 
162. 
120 Falconer’s Dictionary, pp. 30, 582. 
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There is nothing in these instructions to indicate that the Ballast Master had 
assistants to help police the river, and yet the sixth paragraph clearly shows that he 
was expected to do so or lose his position and bond. This would have been a 
monumental task for one man alone considering the extent of the river, but when 
his other duties as Haven Master are added on, it seems  impossible. As 
mentioned before, he did have one deputy but he was based at Hungroad. As 
usual the Society relied on informers, but this could never be an efficient method of 
working so there were regular complaints about the state of the river. To avoid 
confusion there will be no specific references to the Ballast Master from this point 
in the thesis as the Haven Master was carrying out both sets of duties. 
 
Natural and man-made obstacles to navigation on the river. 
 
Responsibility for the safe navigation of shipping on the river between the port of 
Hungroad and the city quays lay with the Haven Master and this was a passage 
considered so dangerous that large ships were obliged to take out insurance.121 
Horseshoe Bend to the north of Hungroad, and Seamills Reach, the river from 
there to Seamills; followed by the Avon Gorge at St Vincent’s Rocks gave 
particular problems before the comparative safety of Rownham Meads for 
upstream traffic or Hungroad for downstream was reached (Illustration 1.002). It 
must always be remembered that due to the tides the flow of water in the river 
could reach 5 knots.  
 
Horseshoe Bend was aptly named and a ship being towed upriver from Hungroad 
would be heading north north-east towards it and unless care was taken, a wind 
blowing on her beam as she turned would drive her onto the rocks on the north 
shore; but then she would have to turn immediately and head south-east 
whereupon the same wind would be driving her stern onto the rocks. There was no 
time to run lines ashore so the safe completion of the manoeuvre depended 
entirely on the skill of the pilot and the brute strength of the towboat men. In spite 
                                                 
121 See Chapter 3. 
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of the problems of manoeuvring in high winds faced by the pilots and their 
hobblers, only heavy gales were allowed to disrupt shipping movements.122  
 
Seamills Reach was a relatively safe stretch of water, but it suffered from sudden 
fog and mist and although there were some mooring posts opposite Seamills Dock, 
they could not be used by the larger, loaded ships as the strain of being aground at 
low water on the steep mud banks would damage them.123 The two mile, narrow, 
tortuous channel through the Avon Gorge with its changing, funnelling winds left no 
room for mistakes and made the use of sails to assist the passage dangerous. 
Indeed some ships actually lowered their topmasts. Unfortunately these natural 
hazards were impossible to overcome and indeed even with the event of steam 
propulsion they were a major factor in the later relocation of the port to Avonmouth 
and eventual commercial closure at Bristol. 
 
Nevertheless, there were obstacles that could be dealt with such as dangerous 
ledges, rocks and shoals, and the residue from the quarries along the river all of 
which was the responsibility of the Haven Master. However as has been previously 
mentioned, he was powerless to act on his own accord except on minor matters as 
all executive decisions, especially financial, had to go through the Committee. As 
there is adequate information available regarding their handling of the river 
problems, it is useful at this point to consider whether this way of working was 
effective.  
An examination of the relevant Hall books124 shows that between the years 1763-
1787 the nuisance problem remained unresolved although it was brought up on a 
regular basis, year by year, and on 11 occasions the Committee completed tours of 
inspection to check reports of infringements, usually emanating from the Haven 
Master. Three surveys were presented to the Hall itemising the various offences 
discovered and in the first two, the main miscreants were the quarries and 
glasshouses – although natural obstacles also posed a threat. The last survey also 
                                                 
122 BRO: 11168/6a ii Diary of winds and tides taken at Bristol from 2 March 1792 to 14 March 1793 by 
Captain James Jolly at the request of Richard Bright. This diary will be referred to in detail in Chapter 4 but it 
shows that only in these conditions were ships unable to reach the quays. 
123 Elkin, ‘Aspects of the port of Bristol’, p. 30. 
124 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 20 March 1763; BRO: SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall Book 9, 16 August 1764; BRO: 
SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall Book 9, 24 October 1771; BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 1 July 1783. 
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includes the problems stemming from the quarries, but there had been a massive 
increase in the amount of discarded industrial waste entering the river.125  
 
There is no mention of the Committee taking action in 1764, but by 1771 the extent 
of the problem had increased and the Committee gave ‘notice’ to the various 
offenders but without effect. However the quarry operators renting from the Society 
were ordered to appear before them and forbidden to work until they removed 
stones on the banks opposite their sites. The Committee had more power in these 
cases as they themselves controlled the leasing of the quarries on the 
Gloucestershire side of the river but on the Somerset side control was shared with 
the Corporation, so they could only recommend to the Hall that the annual leases 
were not renewed. Nevertheless, by 1783 the problem had worsened and threats 
of prosecution, or in the case of the quarry owners being turned out of their berths, 
were again being made but there is nothing in the Hall Books to indicate that action 
was taken or the matter resolved.  
 
A letter from the Haven Master in 1785 shows concern about the amount of rubble 
on the banks of the river together with other nuisances; and it is obvious that he 
has no mandate to sort the problem out on his own.126 Similarly in 1786 he 
complained about the debris from the works above the bridge but this time the 
Committee ordered a survey of the river to be carried out by the Haven Master and 
other port officers, together with a member of the Committee.127 They did the 
survey two weeks later and reported exactly one month after the initial order, an 
indication that the usual delays could be overcome. 128   
 
However, the rapid completion of the survey may have been due to a deputation 
from the Corporation attending the Committee with regard to the nuisances and 
asking for a copy of the Wharfage Lease to be produced, no doubt to ascertain 
                                                 
125 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall Book 9, 16 August 1764; BRO: SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall Book 9, 24 October 1771; 
BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11, Hall Book 11, 1 July 1783. See Appendix 1.010. 
126 BRO: SMV/7/1/4/19 Haven Master’s correspondence, 1785-90. 
127 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 20 November 1786.  
128 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 20 December 1786. 
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exactly where the  responsibilities lay.129 The report and the lease was perused at 
the next meeting and a decision made to invite a Corporation deputation to attend 
again,130 which they duly did and a resolution was made to prepare a memorial 
requesting the Corporation, as conservators of the river, to proceed against the 
offenders.131 
 
The memorial had to be sanctioned by a General Meeting and finally be approved 
at the Quarter Sessions. The point is that this complicated and cumbersome 
system was applied to all decisions regarding the river and was in place because 
the Corporation had delegated responsibility to the Society, but retained the right to 
have the final say in decision making. In reality, at the operational end of the 
administration, the Haven Master’s function was only to report transgressions even 
though he had the day to day responsibility for the river. There are fewer entries in 
the Hall Books regarding nuisances after this, but from that time Committee 
meetings were dominated by discussions over floating the quays.132 
 
It may be unfair to project the methods of modern times back to the eighteenth 
century but the easiest way to cope with this problem would have been to send a 
man down the river and back with the tide at least once per week to report 
infringements immediately and then they could have been dealt with on the spot. 
This had been suggested previously but not taken up and there is no evidence that 
the Society owned any small boats. They had purchased lighters during the 
building of the new Mud Dock133 but these must have been sold because the only 
other reference to one was in 1783 when the Society ordered gravel to be 
delivered to assist in building the road to Hotwells ‘using their own lighter’.134 
However, this lighter was loaned out and the borrowers, having initially repaired it, 
wanted to be recompensed for its return but the Society refused.135 It is difficult to 
                                                 
129 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 6 December 1786. 
130 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 20 December 1786. 
131 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 16 January 1787. 
132 The following references show that the problem continued. BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 9 December 1790, 
20 December 1791, 7 February 1791, 14 November 1792.  
133 See Appendix 1.012.  
134 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 7 December 1783. 
135 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2 Miscellaneous papers re-quays, 29 May 1786. This document was difficult to read and 
the outcome is not clear. 
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comprehend how a large port like Bristol could be controlled when its authorities 
did not possess any water craft, but apart from the above the author has found no 
mention of any and if there had been there should at least have been a reference 
to repairs or replacements. 
 
The Society’s administration system was complex and it may be that this was 
partly due to the need to work with the Corporation and the Quarter Sessions, but 
when it came to finance, the amount they spent on the port was their prerogative 
and as will be emphasised throughout this chapter, they were frugal. As far as the 
river was concerned, the removal of rocks, shoals and sunken vessels needed to 
be done as soon as possible, but they tended to remain in place until their removal 
had been put out to tender or somehow circumvented. It was not so much that they 
refused to pay for necessary maintenance, but more that there was a propensity to 
temporise or to cut corners.  
 
For example, in 1778 when the Haven Master reported breaches in the bank at 
Hungroad were endangering the essential work of cattle towing ships,136 the 
Committee agreed that a tender be put out for repairs, but four months later on 
finding out that the repairs would cost £700, they decided that the work should only 
be done on a temporary basis.137 There are other examples but perhaps the 
method used by the Society for the removal of the Ledge Rock in 1773 
demonstrates how devious they could be at avoiding spending money. 
 
Merchants’ Hall Bristol, March 15, 1773.138 
Whereas it appears to this Society that it will be greatly for the benefit of the 
navigation of the river to take away the point of rock called the Ledge Rock, 
notice is hereby given that all persons may dig stones for ballast from the 
said rock gratis and it is ordered that if any person or persons holding a 
quarry of this Society shall from and after the 25th Day of this instant March 
permit any stone to be taken from his or her quarry for ballast he or she will 
                                                 
136 Cattle were used where the ground was too soft for horses to get a firm grip. Rich, Bristol Pilots, p. 65. 
137 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 15 June 1778, p. 104.  
138 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2 Miscellaneous papers re quays, 15 March 1773.  
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be turned out of possession of such quarry and never after be permitted to 
hold a quarry on the river. And for the better carrying the above measure 
into operation a reward of one guinea will be given to any person or persons 
who shall give information to this Society of any breach of the above order 
and prove the same when called upon. 
By order of the Society, S. Worral.  
 
As usual, however, problems developed and within a few weeks the ‘persons who 
provide ballast for ships’ – they appear to have had no collective name – were 
attending the Committee because ships were in want of ballast and they could not 
dig it out due to the hard layer on top. The Master issued temporary exemption 
certificates, but again a ploy was used to save money on the removal of the hard 
layer by diverting workers from Merchants’ Dock to do the work.139 Further 
problems came later when the ballast removers were reprimanded for just 
skimming the top leaving the rock dangerous when covered by the tide.140 Finally 
come winter, they had to stop due to the weather.141 Considering these problems, 
and the fact that the ballast workers were likely to be resentful of their treatment 
and more liable to dump old ballast illegally, it is probable that there were no actual 
savings. 
 
This is not to say that the river was unimproved in the eighteenth century, but there 
is always the suggestion that it was being done cheaply. On  27 September, 1762 
there was a proposal from a Mr Spencer to remove by ‘blast and blow’ rocks near 
the powder magazine; to remove stones from Sea Mills by blast and lighter; to take 
up underwater rocks and carry them by lighter to be dumped near Sea Mills and to 
do the same for Crow Island – total cost £107’.142 There is no note of this being 
accepted in the Hall books, probably due to costs, but an entry on 28 October says 
that a Mr Grey had agreed to break down a rock at the Powder House for £4.4s 
                                                 
139 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/10 Hall book 10, 3 April 1773. 
140 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/10 Hall book 10, 21 July 1773. 
141 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/10 Hall book 10, 15 December 1773. 
142 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/1 Papers re the quays and nuisances, 27 September 1762. 
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and this was accepted.143 However, this was obviously not effective as the Haven 
Master was still complaining about the rocks in this area in 1786. 
 
On another occasion in March 1786, a trow had come onto the same rocks and 
had been ‘righted’ by the Haven Master and watermen at a cost of £3.3s6d, and 
over the next few months the Society sued the owner for this money but did 
nothing about the rock.144 Forcing the owners of sunken vessels to remove them 
on threat of being sued, appears to have been a common practice.145 In 
November, a barge loaded with stones broke its back on these rocks and on this 
occasion the Haven Master did act on his own initiative and immediately sent for a 
barge to put the stones into in case another ‘fresh’ took them down to Hungroad. 
He then asked the Society to consent to the rock being lowered four feet, saying 
that it would not be of great expense and of great benefit to large vessels.146  
However, even after two ships had gone aground the Committee put it back for the 
1786 survey which then went through the process recorded above before they 
finally agreed that the rock be removed in February, 1787.147  
 
Animal propulsion on towpaths could not be used by the larger ships due to the 
topography and so it was mandatory to use towboat men.148 The exceptions were 
at Hungroad and between Hotwells and the city quays where there were open 
spaces. Nevertheless, there were towpaths on the banks which were suitable for 
smaller ships and in 1782 the Haven Master represented to the Committee that a 
path be created on the Somerset side of the river, he having been given 
permission by the various landowners, but the Committee still insisted on an 
investigation by the ‘gentlemen’ who would suggest a scheme and detail its 
expense.149 This was completed that year by Mr Bright and Mr Hilhouse and 
accepted.  
 
                                                 
143 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/2 Index 2, 28 October 1762. 
144 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 14 March 1786, 8 September 1786. 
145 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 21 July 1773.  
146 BRO: SMV/7/1/4/19 Haven Master’s correspondence, 9 November 1786. 
147 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 23 February 1787. 
148 Elkin, ‘Aspects of the port of Bristol’ p. 29. 
149 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 22 September 1782, p. 107. 
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When the towpath on the Gloucestershire side near the Hotwells was constructed 
in 1778, the Committee made it mandatory that any person renting a quarry would 
provide a man to work for six days per year under an overseer appointed by the 
Society; again a creative way of saving money.150 Although the Committee did not 
show much interest in  developing the river, they could spot an opportunity for 
making money and on a general inspection tour of the river in 1783, they decided 
that as it was of ‘considerable expense’ to keep Crockern Pill maintained, they 
should set charges on vessels using it.151 
 
Finally, apart from his aforementioned duties, the Haven Master also had to keep 
in order the mooring posts, buoys and navigational aids on the river and he was 
responsible for checking the estuary between the mouth of the Avon and the 
Holmes, registering shifting sands and changes in direction of the channel. 
Unfortunately there are few references in the Hall books to marking the river, but a 
letter from Shaw to the Committee in 1797 comments on the dangers at Devil’s 
Reach – probably the area between the Avon Gorge and Rownham Meads – 
saying that six chains, marked with a board saying ‘a chain here’ were kept at 
Ledge Point for pilots to ‘stop’ a ship and that a capstan ‘with bars bolted so that no 
one can carry them away’ was available. Bollards, one self-tailing, remain in this 
area to this day. 
 
The same letter points out that just below Nelson’s Point near the mouth of the 
river, there was what he calls a ‘flat’, probably the gently sloping bed of silt called 
the Swash that is there today, on which ships, especially small ships, were 
stranded until dug out or released by spring tides. He suggested that this could be 
avoided by situating two 20ft poles on either side of the river, one with a white top 
and one with a salmon, and at the mouth of the river two more white topped poles 
on either side. He ended his letter by saying that ‘he flatters himself the above 
observations I have laid before their worships will meet with their approbation for 
they will be of great utility and small expense’. That these obviously essential 
                                                 
150 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 28 September 1778, p. 104. 
151 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 1 July 1783. 
 80 
markings were not suggested until very late in the century is an indication that 
buoyage systems were still in their infancy. 
 
The Severn Estuary. 
 
A resolution had been passed by the Committee proposing a lighthouse be placed 
on Flat Holm (Illustration 1.001) as early as 1728, but agreement was not reached 
between the Society, Trinity House, and a private investor until 1737 when it 
became operational.152 It turned out that there were no guarantees on the lease to 
force the lessee to run an efficient service and throughout the rest of the century 
the beacon was simply a coal or wood burning brazier maintained by inefficient 
keepers and disasters continued to happen. Meantime each passing ship was 
forced to pay a toll.153 This was the limit of the area of the estuary kept under 
surveillance by the Haven Master.  
 
There are few references to the work he did there, but buoys were positioned to 
mark the channel and there is a mention of this being done on the English Grounds 
by pilots.154 There is no records that they were paid for this work but it could be that 
this was part of their agreement. The oath they took 1605 ended with ‘You shall 
likewise do and perform any other things appertaining to the office of pilot ……. as 
to the maintenance and preservation of the ports and rivers’.155 Rich says that 
general surveying and laying of sea marks and buoys was the responsibility of the 
pilots156 and a letter from Captain Shaw to the Committee in 1785 confirms that 
pilots could be asked to carry out survey work in the estuary gratis.157 
 
This is an interesting letter as it shows that the channel was not clearly marked and 
so the Haven Master believed it should be properly surveyed. He reminded the 
                                                 
152 For a short history of English lighthouses see Bella Bathurst, The Lighthouse Stevensons (London, 1999) p. 
xvi-xvii. 
153 Latimer, Annals, p. 200; McGrath., Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 167; Minchinton, ed., Politics and 
the Port of Bristol, p. 47. 
154 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/10 Hall Book 10, 29 June 1773. 
155 Rich, Bristol Pilots,  pp. 33-34.  
156 Rich, Bristol Pilots,  pp. 56. 
157 BRO: SMV/7/1/6/5 Letters from the Haven Master about pilots. Not numbered. Self allocated number 4. 
25 March 1785.  
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Committee that a trow was sunk near Lydney due to shifting sands caused by 
prolonged easterly winds and says that the same thing had happened between 
Kingroad and the Holmes. He asked for the sands to be surveyed and suggests 
that for the next 11 spring tides, all 44 pilots take their turn in groups of four to do 
this, the operation taking 5 months. This he strongly advocates as he believes the 
pilots had become careless, but asks that the Committee order it as if he was to do 
so ‘it would have no great a weight as it would have from the Gentlemen of the 
Committee’. This is another example of the difficulties a Haven Master faced in 
supposedly having authority, but no power.  
 
This letter also gives insight into the way he selected men to be recommended to 
the Committee for a pilot’s ‘branch’. Obviously these men would have to have 
knowledge of the river and estuary and the conditions ships would experience, but 
he also wanted them to be skilled at surveying and so before recommending young 
pilots to the Committee, Shaw says that he ‘insists that they are able to make their 
soundings and bearings and turns down those who cannot’.158 Filed with this letter 
is an undated document, possibly compiled from such surveys, giving implicit 
sailing directions from place to place in the Bristol Channel and detailing depths 
and bearings to landmarks. This document shows a sophistication not normally 
associated with the pilots .159  
 
Conclusions. 
 
The maintenance of services and amenities available to shipping on the river and 
estuary was the responsibility of one man, the Haven Master, but he was tightly 
controlled by the  Committee and although he had a deputy there is no indication 
that this man carried out any of the tasks away from Hungroad, nor is there 
mention of any other staff apart from the slip cleaner at Hungroad. As far as the 
Committee were concerned he could call upon the pilots and towboat men at any 
time. They must have known but ignored the fact that he had very little power over 
them and Rich is probably correct when he says that the Committee saw the 
                                                 
158 BRO: SMV/7/1/6/4 Complaints against the pilots, 28 March 1785. 
159 BRO: SMV/7/1/6/5 Letters from the Haven Master about pilots. 
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Haven Master as a buffer between themselves and the unruly Pill.160 This meant 
that he was left to depend on pilots and watermen for information about conditions 
on the estuary and river, something they were unlikely to give if it meant unpaid 
work for themselves. The use of informers seeking reward did not resolve the 
perpetual problem of nuisances.  
 
It is doubtful if Hungroad could have been developed to the extent of Port Glasgow 
and the Tyne ports, which were specifically designed to handle goods bound for 
and from a main commercial centre,161 but there is no doubt that it had all the 
facilities of a small port and could have reduced the pressure on Bristol and 
attracted more shipping, but the administration system of having a Committee 
overseeing all facets of the Society’s business meant that executive decisions were 
delayed; and it is obvious that their actions were governed by cost, and frugality 
was a byword, which led in turn to short-term solutions that had to be resolved 
again at a later date. It is beyond this thesis to establish if they were simply 
following eighteenth-century work practices, but it is inconceivable that in modern 
times such an extensive operation would be under the auspices of one man with so 
little power. Perhaps it was because the income from the river was modest 
compared to that of the city quays that the same effort was not put into it as was to 
the rest of the harbour. History was to prove this short sighted as at the end of the 
next century the new port of Avonmouth was developed and came to eclipse the 
old.  
 
                                                 
160 Rich, Bristol Pilots,  p. 43. 
161 See Introductory Chapter 
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Section 2. The harbour between Rownham Meads and the city quays. 
 
Introduction. 
 
The harbour at Bristol can be said to begin where the river turns at Rownham 
Meads and flows through the city and although its statutory boundary was at 
Hanham about five miles upstream from Bristol Bridge, to all intents and purposes 
it stopped at the bridge as only barge traffic could pass this point. The main cargo 
handling area was at the city quays – which will be described in Section 3 – but the 
river between Rownham Meads and Sea Banks cannot be overlooked (Illustration 
1.006). Measuring slightly over one mile, it was mainly undeveloped on the  
Somerset side although a shipbuilding yard existed between 1778 and 1786 at the 
Rownham Meads end after which the site returned to nature and remained so even 
after the floating dock was built in 1807.162 Indispensable maritime services were 
carried out on the north bank where there was one large floating dock and three 
shipbuilding and repair yards, but there was still a large amount of disused space 
which could have been developed to relieve congestion at the city quays, but quay 
building was expensive. 
 
The Society’s general remit made it responsible for this region and shipping 
movements came under the Haven Master’s authority rather than the officials at 
the city quays. Before detailing the facilities available, it is necessary to look at the 
use of the river itself. Little has been recorded about shipping in this part of the 
harbour, but for any port it was necessary to have an area where ships could moor 
whilst awaiting a berth, cargo or orders, and at this point there was relatively calm 
water due to its depth. There were mooring posts on the Somerset side at 
Rownham Meads and opposite Merchants’ and Limekiln Docks, all known to have 
been sited on the bank to avoid them being washed out rather than embedded in 
                                                 
162 Whitefield, Mr Hilhouse of Bristol, p. 75. 
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the river,163 and as the land did not belong to the Corporation or Society, a fee for 
this had to be paid to the owner.164   
 
Although this may be a minor detail, at spring tides the manoeuvring of large 
vessels in both directions to avoid the smaller trows, lighters, wherries and suchlike 
plying to and between the docks must have been tricky. The mooring of vessels 
would have to be well planned as otherwise they would become obstacles to this 
traffic, hence the need for them to be situated close to the river bank. The Haven 
Master’s instructions refer particularly to the mooring and lying of vessels at 
Rownham and Limekiln Dock an indication that those were the officially designated 
areas. Further confirmation is contained in a report to the Committee that three 
mooring posts had been washed out of the ground on the Somersetshire side of 
the river, two opposite Champions Dock and one opposite Limekiln Dock.165 
Shipping was also known to lie outside the mouth of the Frome on the Sea Banks.  
The priority given to a ship to move upstream was determined by its arrival time at 
the mouth of the river and there must also have been a way of regulating 
downstream traffic as otherwise there would have been chaos, especially at the 
junction of the Frome and Avon. Technically this part of the river was under the 
Haven Master, but he had to be at Hungroad on spring tides so it must have been 
done by quay officials, probably the Quay Warden. His duties will be discussed in 
the next section, but probably flag signals were used as Tombs plan of 1792 shows 
that flags and lamps were to be employed to direct ships out into the river through 
his proposed system of locks (Illustration 1.007).166 By 1824 there was a small 
tower on St Augustine’s Reach for this purpose.167 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
163 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/10 Hall Book 10, 7 January 1773. 
164 A guinea a year was to be paid for the liberty of putting mooring posts in private ground above Rownham 
passage. BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 1 August 1774, p. 104. 
165 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/13 Hall Book 13, 13 January 1797. 
166 Tombs original plan could not be found but ‘A plan of two designs for keeping the ships afloat in the 
harbour of Bristol’ by  Richard Tombs, April 1792, was copied from BRO 41561/57, Minchinton papers, 
which held a photograph of Tombs plan of 1792. 
167 Sheena Stoddart, Bristol before the Camera (Bristol, 2001) p. 56. 
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The Merchants’ Dock complex. 
 
Although no quays were sited on this part of the river, it is of historic importance 
that a large wet-dock was built there for merchant shipping in 1768 at a time when 
few such facilities were available elsewhere.168 In addition two dry-docks had been 
constructed alongside it and these eventually developed into a series of 
interrelated establishments providing shipbuilding and repair as well as extensive 
cargo handling facilities. The initial impetus came from William Champion, a man of 
many talents who was a porcelain, copper and brass manufacturer, merchant and 
shipowner, and who in 1767 produced one of the original plans for floating the 
harbour at Bristol.169 He began building the docks at Rownham Meads in 1765 but 
had gone bankrupt before they were finished due to a dispute with Josiah 
Wedgwood over his porcelain patents. In 1770 he was forced to sell the docks, and 
in what could be seen as a possible conspiracy they were purchased cheaply by a 
member of the Society who in turn sold them on for the same amount.170  
 
The acquisition of Champion’s Dock and associated dock-yards171 by the Society 
provides a bonus for the researcher as it generated a great deal of documentation 
which accumulated as the main dock developed and because the other docks and 
associated grounds were not sold but leased, under which conditions 
improvements and maintenance were ongoing and recorded in the Hall books. An 
analysis of these documents sheds light on the work practices of one of the earliest 
commercial floating docks, its structure and that of its associated shipbuilding and 
repair establishments.  
 
There is some controversy over the original purpose of Champion’s Dock, with Farr 
saying that it was for the safer discharge of cargoes – earlier local wet docks being 
mainly for fitting out ships – and Latimer, Wells and Williams claiming it was for 
                                                 
168 Rotherhide Dock on the Thames was built towards the end of the 17th century and later two others at 
Liverpool. Seamills Dock on the Avon, mentioned above, was another but it had failed.  
169 Alan F. Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes of the 18th Century’ Transactions of the 
Bristol and Gloucester Archaeological Society 81 (1962), 146-148. 
170 Whitefield, Mr Hilhouse of Bristol, pp. 42-43. 
171 The author uses the generic term ‘complex’ as the best way of describing the interrelated establishments in 
that part of the river. Limekiln Dock is included and was later purchased by James Hilhouse. 
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repair and refit.172 However an entry on one of the Committee reports says that the 
dock should be dug deeper ‘to receive loaded ships on the westward side instead 
of light ships for which it was originally intended’.173 This almost certainly means 
that Farr was correct as ships entering a dock for repair would normally be 
unloaded first. Another anomaly is that as distinct from Farr, the same authors and 
others refer to the Floating Dock as the ‘Great Dock’, an understandable error, but 
this term referred to the larger of the two wet docks situated nearby, the smaller 
being known at the time as the ‘Small or Little Dock.174 Several authorities 
including McGrath175 say that the complex then became known as ‘Merchants’ 
Docks’, but in the documentation they are referred to as ‘Champion’s Docks’ or ‘the 
late Mr Champion’s Docks’ and the principal dock, the ‘Floating Dock’.  
 
James Martin Hilhouse, a qualified shipwright with private funds, took the lease to 
the two dry-docks and the grounds around, sub-letting the smaller dock to business 
associates. Eventually he developed his property into the largest shipbuilding and 
repair yard in the harbour and about 1777 built another yard on the Somerset side 
of the Avon at Redclift which he used to build naval vessels. However, by 1787 
business was poor so he dismantled this yard and when he realised he might have 
had to sell the Hotwells establishment, he bought the smaller Limekiln Dock said to 
date from 1626.176 However, the economy recovered and he continued to build and 
repair ships at Hotwells into the next century.177  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine shipbuilding at the port, but repair 
work will be covered in Chapter 4. The importance of these shipyards to this 
chapter is their effect on the river traffic and the fact that the two Hotwells docks, 
being leased, left the Society with certain obligations which will be described 
                                                 
172 Farr, Shipbuilding in the Port of Bristol, p. viii; Latimer, Annals, p. 368; Wells, Short History of the Port of 
Bristol, p. 25; Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes’, p. 145. 
173 BRO: SMV/7/1/3/2 Management Committee Reports on the Floating Dock 1770-1775, 14 January 1771, 
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below. Hilhouse’s establishment took up a considerable area being described in 
1787 as having:  
 
A dock 265 foot in length at the bottom and 44 foot upwards in width at the 
gates and is capable of receiving a fifty gun ship. The yard is very specious 
and there are three slips for launching. A crane for landing timber. Moulding 
lofts, sheds, saw pits. A steam kiln. Smiths shop. A ground for melting pitch 
and tar. Two small tenements for a foreman or workman.178 
 
There was also the smaller dock nearby, named Farr’s dock after one of its 
proprietors,  but the author has no details of how this operated as it was leased 
out, though the likelihood is that it was part of the Hilhouse operation, as was the 
Redclift yard and later the Limekiln Dock. The point is that they themselves would 
generate considerable traffic in this part of the river as most of their material would 
come from the city by boat or lighter as the roads were unsuitable. Timber and deal 
supplies could only be delivered by trow; by lighter from Hungroad; by being towed 
upriver; or floated from around the harbour. Certainly many of the later paintings of 
the port area show timber and planks being manoeuvred by workers adding to the 
obstacles on the river.179   
 
McGrath believed that the rationale behind purchase of the docks was that the 
Society saw them as a profitable investment rather than a disinterested effort to 
improve the port facilities.180 However, as port administrators they had been 
looking for a site for ships to discharge combustibles since they tended to be left on 
the quays constituting a serious fire hazard, and in 1768 had actually contracted for 
a site opposite Cannon’s Marsh on the Somerset side of the river, intending to 
build a wharf and have it made a legal quay. Within a month of buying the docks, 
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the Docks Committee181 reported to the Committee that they had surveyed the 
Floating Dock and recommended it be dug out to accommodate ships discharging 
naval stores and lumber; so it is unfair to say that their purchase was purely 
mercenary. It also diverts attention from the fact that, to their credit, the Society, 
although known for their caution, had decided to undertake a substantial project 
which was innovative for the time.  
 
A floating dock dedicated to handling such goods meant developing a much 
greater working area well beyond the requirements of a simple quayside, and also 
needing specialised storage facilities, but apart from handling goods the Society 
needed to consider the two neighbouring dry-docks with their shipyards. Champion 
had intended to use part of the floating dock to fit out ships built or partially 
repaired at these shipyards, and this arrangement needed to be contemplated 
when planning the new development. Considering that this multifaceted 
commercial dock was the first of its kind and that the two dry-docks themselves 
were far from complete and required improvement, the technical problems 
associated with the project were arguably on a par with the floatation of the entire 
harbour twenty-five years later. The latter, of course, was a mammoth task as far 
as the amount of earth to be excavated and the masonry work to be completed, but 
the facilities on the quays were already in place and systems had evolved for using 
them. 
 
The management committee appear to have been over-optimistic about the time it 
would take to reopen the floating dock and so bring in an income and the 
impression is that little thought was given to its ultimate requirements. Initially, in 
September, 1770, they insisted on men being employed to dig out the dock ‘as 
expeditiously as possible, to hang the outward gates and to build walls’,182 but by 
November caution was being voiced by the Hall, as they could not decide upon the 
                                                 
181 At a General Hall on the 14th June, 1770, the line of management was set up. A small management team of 
four formed a Docks Committee reporting to the Standing Committee whose resolutions were in turn ratified 
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volume of shipping it was to take.183 The argument about dimensions continued, as 
did concern about expense, and by the middle of 1771 they gave up the rush to 
reopen.184 In reality, although plans to flood the dock were made in 1775 and the 
rates of admittance agreed upon, it was not fully enlarged and operational until 
1778.185 In fairness, the Society cannot be accused of vacillating because it was a 
massive undertaking for the period and they simply did not comprehend the extent 
of the project – see Appendix 1.006 for details of the building of the dock and 
surrounding area. 
 
The Society had purchased the Floating Dock with the intention that it would be 
used by ships carrying combustible goods, so in 1776 they obtained an Act of 
Parliament making it compulsory for all ships carrying combustibles to discharge 
them at this dock.186 If a ship’s cargo consisted of two-thirds of these items it was 
forbidden to land them elsewhere – lighters from any ship with this quota also had 
to use the dock – but coastwise traffic could discharge them on the Back and ships 
bound for private quays were exempted. This legislation also allowed them to 
enlarge the dock and build specialised facilities for handling and storing 
combustibles.  
 
Although the Society recorded the dock as being completed in May 1778, work on 
pitching continued and as time passed the dock was further improved. A stoutly 
built custom’s house ‘not exceeding 14 feet squares’ was erected in 1784 after 
customs officers on duty at the dock complained of ‘great inconveniences for the 
sake of a couple of rooms’187 (Illustration 1.008).188 The road to the dock was 
widened and boundary walls built,189 whilst upright railings were erected near the 
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road entrance to the quay, together with gateways to ‘prevent improper things 
being brought there and to secure the goods’.190 Apparently they had a problem 
with theft and illegal dumping.  
 
Regulations covering Merchants’ Dock. 
 
The rules for its use were not published until August, 1778, an indication that it was 
not operational till after that date (Appendix 1.007).191 Those rules make it clear 
that the Society were cognizant with the likely problems with silting if the tide was 
allowed into the dock, and although the use of a chamber allowed ships to enter or 
leave without changing the level of the water in the main dock, it also served the 
purpose of keeping silt out. Ships had to wait there for twelve hours to allow silt to 
settle. Twelve hours notice had to be given before a ship’s arrival in order that the 
gates be prepared for opening – a delay not necessary at the city quays – and if 
the ship was late or did not turn up then they had to pay the same fee for opening 
the gates as charged to ships entering the dock without cargo. Similarly a ship 
leaving had to give notice so that the chamber could be filled twelve hours before.   
 
All vessels entering had to pay weekly dock rates on a daily basis (Appendix 
1.007), but in addition to the usual port duties such as Town Dues and 
Wharfage,192 there was the cost of  porterage, craneage, warehousing and ground 
storage – see Appendix 1.008 for costs of warehousing and ground storage. 
Obviously these increased the Society’s income, but on the other hand vessels 
carrying cargo were allowed in and out free; charges for opening the gates being 
made only to those ships fitting out, lying up or waiting for cargo, but at the turn of 
the century this perquisite was stopped. In all cases, light ships had to give way to 
those with cargo and if necessary to leave the dock if it were full. There were also 
regulations covering the throwing of rubbish or wood chips into the dock and no 
fires onboard ships were permitted. A works surveyor, Solomon Roach, was 
appointed shortly after the dock was purchased and allowed free residence 
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there.193 His title became Dock Master when it opened, he being responsible for all 
functions and rated on a par with the Quay Warden and Water Bailiff.194 He was to 
remain so until his resignation in 1794.195   
 
As lighters would bring enumerated goods from Hungroad, the legislators of the 
1776 Act took the opportunity to regulate all ‘lighters, boats and other vessels 
carrying goods for hire within the port of Bristol’.196 These were to be registered 
with the Quay Warden in a book which was to be made available to any interested 
party and which listed the owners’ names and the crafts’ tonnage. The owners had 
to present their vessels to the Quay Warden, who would note their tonnage when 
half, three-quarters and fully loaded and this information, together with the register 
number, was to be marked white on black on bow and stern. The process was to 
be repeated annually and can be seen as a progressive step by the Society as 
lighters and barges were not registered nationally until 1795 and then only those 
above 13 tons.197 As far as using the dock was concerned, up to two lighters 
entering were to pay 5s for opening the gates and any number above this charged 
2s6d each.198  
 
Problems encountered at the Floating Dock. 
 
The above and Appendix 1.006 describe a well made and appointed wet dock with 
adequate grounds and facilities attached, and in a port where ships were regularly 
damaged due to grounding it should have been successful, yet it was never filled 
with shipping.199 Minchinton says that the Society found it no more profitable than 
Champion had and as revenue fell short of expectations ‘too little was done to keep 
the dock in good order’.200 However, as has been mentioned above, there are 
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copious surviving documents concerning Merchants’ Dock and after analysing 
them the author would argue that the matter was far more complex. The Society 
put a great deal of effort and money, £23,547, into the project in the eight years 
before it was operational,201 and it would be against their principles to lose interest 
and allow this investment to decay within such a short period unless there were 
exceptional circumstances.   
 
The dock had an inauspicious beginning as the American War of Independence 
had started and was to go on for another three years drastically reducing the 
expected timber and naval stores from the North American colonies, and although 
this trade revived afterwards it never reached the pre-war levels.202  This was 
beyond the Society’s control although they did petition parliament concerning the 
American trade in 1774.203  
 
It was within their power, however, to adjust the dues charged for using the dock 
and there is an argument that had they done so, it would have been more 
profitable. A memorial presented to the Society by local merchants and traders ten 
years after the dock opened voiced concern and made suggestions: it gives some 
insight into the efficacy of the port procedures (Appendix 1.009).204  The plaintiffs’ 
main point was that they had been singled out to pay the whole costs of keeping 
the port safe from fire through what they saw as heavy taxes on their goods, which 
they calculated as being 35% on staves and 20% on naval stores. Rather, they 
insisted, a general tax should be in place as the dock could be utilized by all port 
users and they suggested an alternative source of income, that ships for sale or 
unemployed should be made to pay to lie up there, which would incur no further 
expense to the shipowners as the dock fees were equivalent to ship-keepers’ 
wages, they being unnecessary there.   
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The problem with their argument was that the losses they faced were not so much 
to do with the dock dues, which as shown amounted to the same as any other ship 
entering the port, but with having to unload and lay up their cargoes away from the 
traditional market at the city quays. The example attached to the memorial was of a 
ship’s cargo discharged at the dock losing its expected profit if landed and 
marketed at the Quay; but this misses the point that their category of goods were a 
fire hazard and there was general agreement that it was unsafe for them to be lying 
there.205 They saw the distance from their businesses to Merchants’ Dock as 
generating an ‘unreasonable’ tax on their time, although the distance of about a 
mile does not seem extensive. There was, of course, the inevitable haulage fees 
the rates of which were set by the Society.206 Lighterage was an additional 
expense and here the Society again used – or possibly abused – their powers to 
charge half-craneage to a merchant using his own tackle and workforce to transfer 
cargo.207 
 
The craneage fees at the dock were the same as at the quays208 but the Society 
set its own  rates for laying up and warehousing at the dock and they may well 
have been excessive. The author has not found documents enabling a comparison 
to be made of charges at floating dock with the city warehouses, but there were no 
fees for goods left on the quayside, although they were time-limited. One of the 
gentlemen presenting the memorial compared the prices at the dock with those of 
the warehouses in the city and believed they should be halved. There is no 
indication on record that the Committee did other than read this memorial and in 
reality, having spent a great deal of money, the only way they could see any return 
was from storage and dock fees. As part of their efforts to increase income, a 
supplementary charge of 40s was applied in 1782 to vessels entering the dock for 
the sole purpose of repairing upper works.209 
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An important point in the memorial, however, was the claim that high charges were 
turning shipping towards Liverpool, where merchants had the advantage of 
cheaper rates in the new wet docks built at low cost on land already owned by their 
Council.210 This situation was a precursor of the long battle in the nineteenth 
century against the Bristol Dock Company who were saddled with high interest 
rates on money borrowed to finish the floating dock, and so ruined trade by levying 
high port charges. 
 
It is doubtful if at this time a small reduction of fees would have substantially 
increased the volume of shipping using the floating dock because a far more 
serious problem was its propensity to accumulate silt. It was well constructed under 
the scrutiny of James Paty and James Hilhouse, one a renowned engineer and the 
other an experienced shipwright, yet within three years the dock apron and gates 
required repairs211 and ten years after opening it was described in a letter as being 
in a ‘shameful’ state due to silt and a lack of water; the writer ending with the 
comment ‘The Society of Merchants cannot expect to be paid for vessels lying 
afloat if they are really lying in mud’.212  
 
The problem was that although the regulation waiting period was enforced, the 
gates were unable to withstand the unrelenting tides of the Avon and constant 
leakage caused silt to seep into the dock and water to escape which the lower 
tides could not replace. As early as 1781, the Dock Master reported that low water 
levels ‘prevented the Hercules getting out and losing a spring’. He put this down to 
great quantities of chips mixed with mud preventing the gates from shutting, but 
also said that he had warned the captain not to load so deep. This delayed another 
ship because opening the gates again would lose six inches of water trapping the 
Hercules even further.213 She again grounded in 1787, this time due a problem with 
the apron.214 Granted this ship’s draft was 16ft, but the dock had been designed for 
large timber ships. Hilhouse’s dry-dock fared no better and in 1788 he complained 
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that his apron and gates were dangerous to work.215  The apron was found to have 
dropped 3ft and both it and the gates needed substantial repairs, the responsibility 
of the Society.216  
 
Eventually the floating dock was emptied in 1790 and after viewing the 
accumulated mud the Committee ordered it removed, instructing the contractors to 
make three breaches in the walls, use not less than 20 men at each to wheel away 
the mud, and to complete the work in three months. The only mechanical 
assistance was the use of the crane. New gates were installed, but leakage 
problems continued and they had to be repaired in 1791; in 1792 beams were 
sprung in one of the middle pair; and in 1794 the dock had to be emptied again for 
repairs.217 The reality was that contemporary technology could not cope with the 
severe environmental conditions with the result that merchants who might have 
used the safer conditions of the floating dock kept their ships at the quays.  
 
At times the poor state of the dock forced merchants to attempt to land enumerated 
goods at the city quays, but to obtain permission they had to have a certificate 
signed by two Justices of the Peace to confirm they were unable to enter the 
dock218 and after that to obtain authorisation from the Collector of Customs.219 This 
was an anathema to the Society, but under special circumstances they would allow 
unloading at the quays, usually under payment of extra fees. To try to prevent 
underhand activity, pilots were threatened with suspension if they took a ship 
carrying these cargoes anywhere but the dock.220  
 
Documents detailing the day to day operations of the dock survive for the period 
1795-1807 and show that the dock was still working more or less as it had been set 
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up by the original legislation, an indication that the fundamental practices had been 
well thought out.221  
 
Conclusions. 
 
There was sound reasoning behind the Merchants’ Dock project and it was well 
constructed and should have been an asset to the port. However, unforeseen 
circumstances caused profits to fall and in an effort to recoup their expenditure the 
Society probably overcharged. However, the real problem was the tidal river and it 
was beyond the technology of the time to overcome this. The successful dock 
building at Liverpool showed that in a less aggressive environment, profits could be 
made and long term solutions to geographical problems achieved – see 
Introductory Chapter. In the author’s opinion, the Society did their best under the 
circumstances. 
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Section 3. The facilities available to shipping at the city quays. 
 
Introduction.  
 
Although the river with its anchorages was essential to the port and without the 
ship building and repair yards described in Section 2, foreign-going shipping would 
have had difficulty in continuing to trade, the real hub of activity was the city quays 
which were the destinations of the vast majority of shipping using the port. These, 
and their facilities had evolved to meet needs rather than as an entity and to 
understand their use, a knowledge of their development, the way they were 
administered, and the people involved is necessary. 
 
The formation of the city quays. 
 
The harbour had probably been used for centuries before significant developments 
began in the thirteenth century with the course of the River Frome being diverted 
and a trench, about 2400 ft in length, 120ft wide and with an average depth of 18ft, 
being dug to meet the River Avon. At the head of this trench a bridge, later known 
as the Stone Bridge, was constructed and a masonry quay built from there to 
approximately the end of what became known as Broad Quay. Shortly after, the old 
wooden bridge crossing the Avon was replaced by one of stone, similar to that 
across the Thames at London. It is not necessary for this thesis to delve deeply 
into the historical development of the port, although a chronology up to 1793 has 
been provided in Appendix 1.011 and Illustration 1.009. The extent of the walls of 
the Quay and Backs, about 20 feet in height, gradually increased until by 1762 they 
were separated by only about 550 ft of underdeveloped riverbank at the Grove.222 
 
Between 1750-60, the steady rise in trade had increased shipping, creating 
congestion which harmed commerce and caused damage to ships due to their 
close proximity. The Common Council drew attention to this and in 1758 an 
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advertisement was placed in the London newspapers for a surveyor to assess the 
possibility of floating part of the harbour, but the matter was not taken further due 
to costs.223 Negotiations between the Corporation and the Society to enlarge the 
quays took place at this time, but no agreement was reached until in 1764 when 
the Corporation renewed the wharfage agreement with the Society for 99 years 
and included a lease on all property on the quays. In return for this, the Society 
contracted to build a new dock and walls at the Grove to make an unbroken quay 
from the Stone Bridge at Quay Head224 to Bristol Bridge at the end of the Back. 
They also agreed to build a small wharf at St. Augustine’s Back.225 Clearly, the 
agreement benefited the Society, as they gained considerable income for the next 
century from a lease costing a yearly rent of £10 and what was to be a relatively 
small outlay of about £9747227 when compared to the plans being brought forward 
at the time for floating the harbour at a cost of £25,000 - £30,000. 
 
By this agreement the Corporation surrendered its property for a nominal fee but 
financial responsibility for the maintenance of the port as well as the specified 
improvements was the responsibility of the Society under the wharfage lease. At 
this time, fiscal obligations for maintenance and development of other ports still lay 
with their corporations, except in the case of Hull, where a private dock company 
had had to be created to make improvements. In essence the port of Bristol was 
run by a private company, but unlike at Hull where the Corporation tried to impose 
the cost of further improvements on the Dock Company, the wharfage agreement 
meant that any new harbour improvements such as its flotation would have to be 
negotiated anew with all concerned.228  
 
The wharfage agreement is an example of the lengths that the Corporation would 
go to avoid immediate expense, and as will be shown below they were not alone 
because in spite of having had a bargain, the Society itself began the building of 
the new quays by cost cutting. The reality was that the linking of the Quay to the 
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Back would have been imperative whether the entire harbour had been made into 
a floating dock or not, because this part of the harbour had a depth of only one foot 
less than at the deepest part of the Quay and as such was a tremendous asset to 
the congested port.  
 
Linking the Quay to the Back began with the hiring of an engineer, Ferdinando 
Stratford, in 1762 to examine the area while the negotiations for the wharfage deal 
were going on, the purpose being to inform the Society of the extent of its 
responsibilities if it made an agreement. He prepared a plan showing the situation 
on the Grove before 1767 (Illustration 1.010),229 and the engineer Thomas Paty 
was hired to supervise the construction. Appendix 1.012 describes the work done 
at the Grove in detail. The area to be developed lay between the Mud Dock and 
the last market shed and contained 150 feet of quay wall, not a legal quay and so 
without benefit to shipping, and a slipway for the Grove Ferry and the city dung 
wharf.  
 
There were no other facilities there, but in 1757 due to growing congestion, 
permission had been given by the Corporation to remove mud from the area 
between the wall near the Gibb and the Dung Wharf to lay up empty ships, so no 
doubt it was still being used for that in 1767.230 Before starting work, Captain 
Bennett, the Quay Warden, was instructed to find out the identity of the owners of 
junk left there and to obtain an order for its removal indicating it was probably a 
general dumping ground as well.231  
  
The method of mooring at the new dock was the same as used at the old Mud 
Dock, that is the ship was at right angles to the wall rather than alongside, and this 
atypical way of mooring will be discussed below when dealing with the quays as a 
whole. Anchor shanks in the walls and anchors laid in the river behind them 
provided the moorings, and shortly after the laying of the first in 1768 a ship arrived 
to unload timber. The superintendents collected the port dues from these ships and 
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paid them at the customs office, a process that went on as each part of the work 
was completed showing the dock was being used long before it was finished.  
 
Strong foundations for three cranes had been laid down and a shed was built 
which was not marked on any plan although must have been substantial as it 
included a tiled roof. There is no mention of the fate of the dung wharf, but it must 
have been repositioned as the new dock and slipway would have covered its 
original location. Illustration 1.007, by Richard Tombs in 1792, shows two 
indentations between the slipway and the last market shed which were not there 
before the work started. Both of these had cranes added since 1770 and one is 
likely to have been designated as the new dung wharf.232 
 
The work in 1770 completed the city quays and no further major improvements 
were made till the floating harbour was created. In 1793, Shiercliff could report that 
the accommodation at the quays was ‘upwards of a mile in extent, reaching from 
St. Giles’s Bridge to Bristol Bridge, and is all the way embanked by a firm wall 
coped with large hewn stone, from which to the front of the buildings is such a 
considerable breadth, without interruption, as to make it one continued wharf’.233  
 
The allocation of berths to shipping. 
 
When considering where to allocate ships in a harbour, the paramount concern has 
to be the depth of water available, and if there is little variation then facilities can be 
assigned according to the logistics of cargo handling. However the tidal conditions 
at Bristol were such that they controlled the berthing arrangements, the resources 
available, and indeed the design of the quaysides. Illustration 1.011 depicts the city 
quays with cranes predominating in two of the designated areas, Narrow Quay and 
the Grove, whilst at Broad Quay and the Backs, slipways (henceforth written in the 
                                                 
232 This plan was one of the many concocted by individuals with and interest in floating the harbour that was 
never put into effect but its depiction of the basic quays can be taken as being reasonably accurate. 
BRO:41561/57 Minchinton papers. 
233 E. Shiercliff, The Bristol and Hotwell Guide (Bristol, 1793) pp.59-60. 
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shortened version, slips)234 had been cut into the harbour walls. At Narrow Quay, 
the depth of water shallowed from the Gibb until it reached 12ft at the start of 
Broad Quay. Here there was one crane, but after this point slips prevail. This crane 
was the first of eighteen servicing Narrow Quay and the Grove, as in these areas 
the depth of water was suitable for the larger ships whose cargoes were generally 
heavier and required mechanical assistance.  
 
The use of slips on both Broad Quay and the Backs was due to the considerable 
range of tide causing the small, lower draught ships to settle so far down the wall 
that the porters could not manhandle goods on or off them. This was not so much a 
problem for the larger ships as they were higher up the wall and anyway were 
generally at a crane. At Bristol, the slips on the quays were designed to give an 
incline suitable for porterage. This is shown in Illustrations 1.012 and 1.013 which 
show the incline culminating at a suitable point on the wall, level with the average 
height of the ships using them.235   
 
As can be seen from Illustration 1.007, there were slips along the whole length of 
the Backs but the problem with them was that they took up space and it is unlikely 
that they were of the size shown on the plan as this would make movement of 
goods difficult – although this is possible at the Market Sheds where they were part 
of a complex. The slips on Broad Quay and the Backs are shown as having the 
same length, but if Illustration 1.012 is examined, even with artist’s licence, they 
cannot be more than about 15ft in length and it is likely that all would have been 
roughly the same size except for the ferry slips where the incline would have to be 
less to accommodate passengers.  
 
                                                 
234 Slips are defined as ‘a place lying with a gradual descent on the banks of a river or harbour, convenient for 
shipbuilding’, Falconer’s Dictionary, p. 435; BRO: SMV/7/1/4/29 Plan of the Bristol Quays. 
235 These two illustrations are substantially the same but there are important differences. Illustration 1.012 
shows a young black servant dressed in livery talking to a merchant whilst apparently pointing at two well 
dressed ladies. Neatly dressed children play on a seesaw yet it would be unlikely that children other than 
street urchins would be let loose among the filth on a quayside. Illustration 1.013 appears more basic and 
what might have been family figures have been replaced with what appears to be a schoolmaster and pupils. 
Navigational schools were advertised in the newspapers. Conjecture suggests the former was commissioned 
by a merchant and his family was included but there is no evidence available.  
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However, there is some evidence that the ships berthing at the Backs were moored 
bow-on to the quay, with their bowsprits overhanging the quay wall. Certainly that 
was the method of mooring at both Mud Docks236 and when the New Mud Dock 
was being planned, the Committee said ‘that the wall above the Dung Wharf 
should be laid out in slips in the same manner as the Back now is for the 
accommodation of vessels of 130 or 140 tons’.237 This method of berthing is 
indirectly confirmed by a letter to the Society from the Water Bailiff in March, 1791 
after a spate of thefts of cable from ships moored at the Market Sheds. 
 
Herewith the great necessity of having chains fixt in the slips between the 
corn sheds (Market Sheds) at the Back of Bristol the posts being at the top 
of the slips, the vessels that moor there make fast their cables to the post 
the thieves come in the night and cut their cables at the bottom of the slip. 
The vessels goes adrift on the stream and ground on the bank of the said 
River and damage the vessels and cargo. Prayeth that the order may be 
given for the above evil to be remedied.238 
 
It corroborates the notion that the ships were mooring bow-on at least as far as the 
Market Sheds were concerned and probably this continued the length of the Back, 
although some slips had a greater distance between them so there was probably a 
mixture of mooring systems with some ships alongside the two cranes. It is 
unusual for ships to be moored in this way and Paul Elkin has argued that the 
expression ‘ship shape and Bristol fashion’ refers to this and not to the robust build 
of Bristol ships.239 After the harbour was floated in 1809, plans no longer show 
slips on the Back as they were unnecessary in a non-tidal harbour except to assist 
passengers using the ferries. 
 
Whereas the cranes on the quays were numbered in order to ‘more readily find the  
                                                 
236 John Roque, Plan of Bristol 1742; John Plumley and George Ashmead 1828; Thomas Rowbotham, The 
south end of Prince Street, 1826. BMG M2928; P. Malpass and Andy King, Bristol’s Floating Harbour: The 
First 200 Years (Bristol, 2009) p. 21. 
237 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall book 9 Standing Committee of the SMV Meeting, 18 February 1767. 
238 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2. Miscellaneous papers re quays, 1769-92. Papers are not numbered. 
239 Paul Elkin, Images of Maritime Bristol (Derby, 1995) p.14. 
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subjacent vessel’,240 the names of three of the slips denoted their locality on the 
quay whilst the fourth, Barnstaple, was named after a specific port, an indication 
that it serviced ships trading with this port. This method of naming slips after the 
port they served is confirmed in the Bristol directories as the slips at the Backs 
were designated so, and yet there was no difference in water depth from one end 
to the other and therefore no need to segregate shipping.241   
 
Appendix 1.013 was compiled from the berthing locations listed therein for constant 
coasters, and also references to these named sites are to be seen in contemporary 
documents. No map or plan has so far been found with the slipways labelled 
although cranes are sometimes numbered, but it has been possible to transcribe 
the information from this appendix onto Illustration 1.011. On the Narrow Quay and 
the Grove, the deep water was suitable for any large foreign ship, but the gradual 
reduction in depth of the Frome upstream meant that the area from Crane 4 was 
suitable only for smaller ships.    
 
Quay Head has been added to the appendix because it was an integral part of the 
city quays although no mention has been found anywhere that it had cranes or 
slipways. This was the area where trows, barges and other vessels from the ports 
on the Severn and Wye were handled due to them having a particularly low 
draught of about 3-5 ft necessary for river navigation and therefore suitable for this 
part of the quays. No special amenities were necessary for cargo handling as their 
rise and fall alongside the quay wall was relatively small . There was a private slip 
on the west side of the river at St. Augustine’s Reach. 
 
Regarding the rest of the quays below the drawbridge, they were divided into areas 
dedicated to servicing ships plying their trade to specific geographical areas, not 
always dependant on water depth. The large foreign traders had to be berthed in 
the deepest parts of the quays where cranes were available to assist with heavy 
goods, but most coastal shipping was of a size that could have been handled 
anywhere else except near the drawbridge.  
                                                 
240 Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794, p. 35. 
241 Bristol Directory, 1785, pp. 72-75; Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794, pp. 98-100. 
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One of the most important factors of an efficient berthing system is easy access to 
storage areas or markets, especially so in the eighteenth century when roads were 
generally poor and particularly so at Bristol. Goods landed from ships could be 
stored at the merchants’ own warehouses,242 or after 1783 in the Tontine 
Warehouses.243 There was also the Corporation’s Back Warehouse, or, 
alternatively, produce could be sent directly to market.244 An examination of 
Illustration 1.009 shows the Tontine Warehouse at Quay Head and the Back 
Warehouse near Bristol Bridge were separated by about a mile and so should have 
been accessible to ships on the quays. The problem was that these warehouses 
tended to take the bulkier goods and the drays carrying them had to negotiate the 
encumbrances on the quays – they were banned from the city streets. Clutter on 
the quays will be dealt with below, but had it been possible, the Tontine 
Warehouses might have been better built nearer to the Gibb and the foreign 
shipping. However, a quayside evolving over centuries cannot be re-designed and 
both these buildings were probably in the most suitable sites available. This 
difficulty was not experienced at Liverpool where all the docks were newly built on 
open land. As far as the merchants’ warehouses are concerned, the wealthier had 
purpose built premises but others relied on cellars and storerooms in the vicinity of 
the quays attached to domestic buildings.  
 
When maritime scholars consider Bristol in this period, concentration tends to be 
on the foreign-going vessels, especially West Indiamen, but the reality was that in 
1791, 527 foreign vessels used the port whilst 211 coastal vessels left on 416 
occasions. There were 176 Irish ships, 1951 trows and other estuary boats; plus 
unknown numbers of barges and lighters.245 Although the foreign ships would be 
the more difficult to manoeuvre due to size, the majority of the Quay Warden and 
Water Bailiff’s work would be to organise the smaller coasters, especially on 
                                                 
242 In the eighteenth century, the term ‘warehouse’ was generally applied to what in today’s vernacular we 
would term shop as well as its more common use denoting a storage facility.  
243 A tontine was a speculative investment in which the proceeds were eventually divided amongst the 
surviving investors. In this case 195 people invested to complete the warehouses according to this principle. 
244 For the facilities associated with warehouses, see Chapter 4.  
245 BRO 11168 (3) l. Tonnage of ships into Bristol. 
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market days. The location of their berths was therefore a matter of major 
importance. 
 
The main area designated for coasters was the Backs and as shown in Appendix 
1.013, the two ladders and the first four slips were dedicated to vessels from 
Wales. They were denoted by the geographical area from which goods were 
imported rather than the type of merchandise carried, which would allow 
passengers and those interested in specific ships to find them easily and make it 
easier to control the influx of ships on busy market days. These vessels had 
traditionally berthed there, so resources had developed to suit; in particular the 
Welsh Market shed was built in 1776 opposite King Street after the parishioners of 
St. Nicholas complained of the ‘inconveniences caused by the open markets 
(Illustration 1.014). 246  
 
The goods coming in from Wales were varied, some going straight to the market 
on appropriate days,247 but there was easy access from this area to the other 
markets and the Back Warehouse. The Welsh traders did not have all of the Backs 
at this period, there being two slips for coasters from Somerset, possibly situated 
there because of the proximity of the Exchange Market which had an arcade called 
the Somersetshire Market.  However, as there was also a Gloucestershire Market 
in the same place and as vessels from there came in at Quay Head, it is possible 
that ships simply kept to their historical berths throughout the centuries. 
 
The remainder of the Back was taken up by the seven corn sheds with their slips, 
alternatively known as the Market Houses. Allowing for the inaccuracies in the 
maps, they were likely to have been about the same size as the Welsh Market and 
had been built in 1748 to land all types of grain for the distilleries, corn factors, and 
such like. The market there took place every spring tide and the sheds had been 
built to secure the goods from the weather.248 Here, the regular traders from the 
                                                 
246 Latimer, Annals, p. 422. 
247 Mainly foodstuffs. Matthews, Bristol Directory,1794, p. 44. 
248 Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794, pp. 20, 44. 
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Severn and Wye Rivers discharged but they would be open to any vessel carrying 
these commodities. 
 
In a similar fashion to the Back, the slips on the Quay were allocated according to 
incoming geographical area, though only the first was so named, and goods from 
the south and southwest of England predominated. Ships from Scotland and 
Ireland occupied the space nearest the Drawbridge and the first four cranes had 
the trade from London, Liverpool and Cork, probably because these ships were of 
deeper draught and carrying bulkier goods.  
 
There were no large transit sheds in the harbour as were to be installed in the 
nineteenth century, and although the need to shelter goods vulnerable to weather 
conditions had been recognised, there were few on the rest of the quays. A new 
shed had accompanied the building of the Grove in 1770 and there were another 
two, one at the Gibb and the other just east of the Mud Dock shown on Illustrations 
1.007 and 1.010. Also in 1774 the Society approved a proposal with an estimate of 
£100 for erecting a shed for fruit at Crane 1, but although advertised it is not shown 
on any plan.249 Similarly a description of the corn sheds mentions market sheds for 
the same goods at Quay Head but they cannot be found on maps or documents.250 
Considering the magnitude of goods vulnerable to weather that were handled on 
the quays, this is an indication that the authorities lacked vision or were being 
parsimonious and it did lead to complaints.251 A fish market had been held at Quay 
Head in the past, but had been moved to the central area of the city leaving the 
Quay and the Grove without adjacent markets.  The type of goods handled by 
coasters and the markets will be dealt with in Chapter 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
249 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/10 Hall Book 10, 1 March 1773 and 17 November 1774. 
250 Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794, p. 44.  
251 Complaint that goods coming from the north were being damaged for want of sheds to cover them. BRO: 
SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, p. 48. 
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Porters on the quays. 
 
In the second half of the century is not clear who actually carried out the work of 
shipping and landing goods on the quays.252 According to the instructions given to 
the Crane Master, Benjamin Thomas on his appointment in 1772,253  he was to pay 
the ‘porters’ wages, an indication that the men who did this work belonged to ‘The 
Company of Porters of the City of Bristol’, which had come into existence in 1670 
to regulate the porters (stevedores in modern parlance) following complaints about 
their bad behaviour and extortion. After this date, all who wished to work in the 
harbour had to be members and follow its rules, regulations and a schedule of 
work rates, set after agreement between the Common Council, the merchants, and 
the Society.254 The original Ordinance setting up the Company shows that it was 
established along the lines of the other Bristol guilds and companies, with a master 
and wardens, but later it did not appear to have had the same status, possibly 
because the members were unskilled – many having failed in their own crafts 
(Appendix 1.014).255 And, of significant importance to future members, there was 
no absolute right for them to be the sole cargo handlers in the harbour. 
 
In the Ordinance there were various strictures regarding their behaviour, but the 
establishment of set rates for landing, shipping and carrying of goods was an 
important factor in creating stability in the port. These rates were changed three 
times before the final schedule in 1747, but they could be altered for individual 
items on the suggestion of the Society if then ratified by the Council. The system 
was to rate commodities according to type and whether the men were working on 
‘even key’, or at the slips, ladders or cranes; and whether there was the additional 
work of  weighing.256 The porters were initially allocated to four or five areas of the 
quays but eventually they were designated as either Quay or Back porters. 
 
                                                 
252 These were the terms used for loading and unloading in the eighteenth century.  
253 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall Book 9, 11 March 1772. 
254 The dates given are those of the period of the Book but the date of the incorporation of the company was 1 
February, 1670. BRO: 6787 Book of the Porters Company, 1671-1799. 
255 BRO: 39290/FW/LN/37 Papers of F.G. Webb, The Company of Porters, p. 3.` 
256 BRO: 6787 Book of the Porters Company, 1671-1799. 
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It would seem natural that a regulated company set up by the port authorities to 
work on the quays should have a near monopoly, but following a substantial 
increase in the number of cranes after 1740, the matter of who did what becomes 
confused. At that time porters’ petitions were presented to the Corporation 
beseeching them to stop the process of installing new cranes; one stating that ‘60 
poor families would be totally ruined’ though it did include a caveat ‘unless your 
worships will allow your poor petitioners to work the said cranes’.257 The 
predicament for the porters was that when working at the cranes, or on ground 
belonging to the cranes, they received two thirds of their usual rates if the goods 
were weighed and only half if they were not, the rest going to the crane owner.258 
The  petition mentions 60 families, which could mean an equal number of porters, 
but it is probably an exaggeration to gain sympathy because numbers had been 
falling from the original 80 in 1670 to 45 in 1717, and then to 23 in 1786.259 Apart 
from the question of the cranes, the porters’ exclusive right to work ships was 
being challenged. An undated memorandum shows the corn factors at the sheds 
on the Back were using their own men260 and that one individual was also defying 
them by working goods on the Back. Significantly, the Corporation did not support 
the porters in this matter.261 In 1807, a Wharfage Act262 was passed which should 
have had a clause relating to employing porters, but it was removed and although 
the Corporation appointed 24, it was not compulsory to employ them. 
 
The crane leases in 1758 refer to porters, as do the instructions to the Crane 
Master in 1772, but there are no details so it could be that it had become a generic 
term for general crane labourers. The reality is that with 16 cranes in place by 
1772, and at least 19 by the end of the century, they simply could not have been 
serviced by only 24 porters, never mind the fact that they were also covering the 
rest of the quays. The porters must have been subcontracting work for some time 
and this has been confirmed by nineteenth-century letters.263 
                                                 
257 Loose papers and letters attached to the document. BRO: 6787 Book of the Porters Company, 1671-1799. 
258 Appended to the 1699 rates. BRO: 6787 Book of the Porters Company, 1671-1799. 
259 BRO: 39290/FW/LN/37. The Company of Porters, p. 6. 
260 This would date it after 1748 when the sheds were built. 
261 BRO: 6787. Book of the Porters Company, undated memorandum. 
262 47 Geo 111. c.33.  
263 BRO: 39290/FW/LN/37 The Company of Porters, p. 6. 
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Considering the above, the conclusion is that the porters’ grip on cargo handling 
was tenuous, especially at the cranes, and the most likely scenario would be that 
they were strongest in non-crane areas where they hired men to work the ships, to 
assist in weighing, and probably to shift goods about the quayside, paying their 
wages out of the scheduled rates collected from the merchant or ship’s master.264 
Transporting goods to and from the quays is not on the 1747 schedule and may no 
longer have been part of their job. The licensed porter probably collected his 
money at the crane office from the crane master, paying his hirelings agreed 
amounts.  
 
There must have been some form of keeping tally, perhaps similar to that where a 
merchant’s clerk kept his own copy of the Custom’s blue book,265 or perhaps the 
porter attended to this but did not do the manual work. There were crane foremen 
as overseers, but the cranes could have been operated by porters as the work was 
not highly skilled. There are few job descriptions available and in this case the 
nearest was in the rates schedule of 1699 where they were said to receive their 
wages for ‘heaving, rowling and weighing’.266 
 
An entry in the Hall Book for 1776 detailing a complaint about damaged goods 
opens up another line of enquiry, that is whether or not porters were responsible 
for work within ships’ holds. In the complaint there are references to ‘shipmen’ and 
‘cranemen’ with the Committee concluding that the damage was equally the fault of 
both parties and that the Society would only pay one half, the owners the other. 
This division of responsibility is further shown in 1780 when the Society refused to 
pay for damage to a cask as it had been ‘safely delivered below the hatchway’,267 
again an indication of separate labour forces. Although two workforces could be 
considered uneconomical, it must be remembered that precise cargo stowage has 
always been vital to the safe passage of a ship and also its owner could have been 
worried about theft.  
                                                 
264 BRO: 6787 Book of the Porters Company, Undated memorandum.  
265 See Chapter 3. 
266 Attached papers, Schedule of Rates, 1699. BRO: 6787 Book of the Porters Company, 1671-1799. 
267 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 17 September 1776, 16 October 1780. pp. 240-242. 
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There is further evidence of this division of labour from documentation showing that 
the responsibility for the shipping and landing cargo lay with the mate. The mate’s 
disbursements for unloading the Sybil’s cargo in 1785, states that six men 
discharged the ship and the outgoing cargo was taken in and stowed, again by six 
men. All were paid at a rate of 2s per day per man and similarly in 1786 her cargo 
was worked by men earning 1s6d per day. The mate’s disbursements for the 
Success for 1779 again show men being paid daily rates to load and unload the 
ship.268 The cost of craneage – or porterage if no cranes were used – would be 
itemised on the bill of the merchant loading or unloading goods onto a ship and 
was not paid by the shipowner. It is likely that once the goods were onboard they 
were his responsibility so he paid for the final disposition.  
 
Unfortunately ships’ account books do not itemise the mate’s disbursements but 
there is always a general entry. Invoices for outgoing goods usually have an item 
‘shipping’, but there are few bills available for incoming goods and charges for 
‘landing’ are not itemised. The conclusion is that goods were discharged or loaded 
onboard ship by porters or other labourers belonging to the cranes, but distributed 
in the holds by workmen hired and supervised by the mate.  
 
If this was the case then it makes sense of an incident recorded in the Hall book in 
1783 reporting that sailors had assembled at Queen’s Square threatening to unrig 
ships unless, amongst other demands ‘lumpers’, that is non-seamen, ceased to be 
employed loading and discharging ships as this was a job for seamen who, they 
said, should be employed at the same wages as they get at sea. A deputation of 
them were seen by the Hall who agreed in general, but not to the wages.269 It is 
unlikely that the seamen would be claiming the jobs of the porters or their usual 
hired men, but were probably objecting to unqualified men working in the holds. 
 
 
 
                                                 
268 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success, 1779-86, pp. 22, 43, 82, 116. 
269 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 7 may 1783, pp. 25-26. 
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The Crane Office. 
 
Cranes were vital pieces of equipment at any port and so their use requires special 
attention in this study. At Bristol the Society controlled them and regularly 
discussed their operation at Committee meetings and recorded the proceedings in 
the Hall Books. This makes it possible to examine the Committee at work; to look 
at the financial aspects; to assess the actual operations of the cranes; and the 
effect on the merchants using them. 
 
The first crane at Bristol was on the Back, donated by a merchant’s widow Alice 
Chester in 1475, and when its foundations perished in 1634, another was erected. 
By the end of the seventeenth century new cranes had been built and let, reputedly 
of a design similar to those in use in London.270 The Society leased out the cranes 
until 1772 deriving income from rent in preference to having to deal with the 
complications of everyday administration. The leases were renewed every seven 
years by auction.271   
 
In 1758, the leases for six cranes were publicly auctioned in lots and an 
examination of the lease conditions set by the Society illustrates the way they were 
administered before they were taken over in 1772. The cranes varied in size and 
each had a working area of 30-35 feet on either side and the leaseholder was 
obliged to retain and pay a sufficient number of porters so that the ‘merchant’s 
business may be dispatched without loss of time’. They had also to provide ‘ropes, 
slings, can hooks, cradles and all other tackle fit and necessary for the loading and 
unloading goods’ and to have a presence at all convenient tides. Crane workers 
were forbidden to ‘cast off’ vessels from the quay when work was completed 
unless new arrivals were waiting, a sign that the Quay Warden, not the lessee was 
in overall control and that merchants’ could keep their vessels at the quay if there 
was space. The Society as leasers had to pay local taxes, king’s tax, poor tax, 
                                                 
270 McGrath, ‘Society of Merchant Venturers in the 17th Century’, p. 117. 
271 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 162.  
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bridge rate, watch rate and lamp tax,272 repair the moving parts of the crane and 
keep the quay walls in good order.273 
 
The Great Crane on the west wall of the Mud Dock was also auctioned, together 
with the dock itself, the quay between the crane and the Gibb slip on one side, and 
the wall as far as it went on after the dock.274 This crane will be described below 
but the annual rent from this lot was £195 as compared to the average rent from a 
single crane of £66, emphasising perhaps the lifting power of the crane and the 
position of the Mud Dock at the deepest water of the quays.  
 
The Society had not relinquished wharfage payments to the lessees and although 
the cranes had brought the Society a gross income of £6916 between the years 
1758-72, they were obviously impressed by the increasing popularity of leasing 
and wondered if it would not be better to retain control and profits for themselves. 
In the 1758 auction the Society had initially put the starting prices at £320 but took 
£652, more than double their estimate, and in 1765 annual rents again rose to 
£988. So, at the termination of the last lease in January, 1772, they decided to 
operate the cranes themselves for one year and it being successful continued this 
into the next century.275 
 
The General Account of the Cranes for the first nine months after taking over in 
1772 gives a gross income of £1461.12s and outgoings of £585.17s for labour, 
repairs and taxes making a net profit of £875.15, pro rata per annum, £1167. Of 
this, £260 was disputed by merchants. The gross income for 1771 was £988 and if 
the same amount for 1771 is deducted for repairs and taxes, then the net income 
would be £662. It was certainly more profitable for the Society in the first year but 
McGrath says that it is not clear if the new arrangement was financially satisfactory 
over the rest of the century.276  
 
                                                 
272 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/3. Cranage Accounts 1769 – 1792. These documents are in an unnumbered bundle.  
273 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/8 Hall Book 8, 25 March 1758. 
274 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/8 Hall Book 8, 27 April 1758. 
275 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 162:  
276 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 163. 
 113 
After taking over the cranes, the Society left the overall management to the 
Committee who began by appointing a crane manager to carry out their day to day 
management.  
 
The Committee in pursuance of the power given to them by the Hall of the 
31st January 1772, appointed Benjamin Thomas to be the Crane Master 
during so long time as he shall conduct himself to the satisfaction of the 
Committee and it ordered that he do employ a proper number of porters for 
the working of the cranes and receive the rates of landing and shipping 
goods and pay such porters their wages and that for such service he be 
allowed a salary of £50 by the year and so in proportion, and also proper 
clerks and assistants and all incident expenses.277 
 
An operation of this magnitude – at the time there were 16 cranes, including the 
Great Crane 278 – needed to be accommodated properly so at the same meeting 
the Committee selected one half of a warehouse on the north side of the Hall as 
the crane office. No records have so far been found detailing the method of 
operation, but this can be determined from documents recording complaints from 
the crane office regarding the periodic refusal of merchants to pay their ‘notes’ 
(bills). Formerly, when leasing out, the Society only had the problem of recovering 
arrears of rent from the crane operators,279 but after 1772 the issue was magnified 
as each participating merchant was invoiced individually by the crane office and all 
quibbles over payments were referred to the Committee. They could allow the 
complaint, reduce the charge, or as a last resort sue for payment, but the effort 
involved should be weighed against increased income from direct management.280   
 
                                                 
277 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall Book 9, 11 March 1772. 
278 Minchinton says that there were 14 cranes including the Great Crane in 1774. However there appears to be 
at least two more if three cranes built during the work done at the Grove were added to those on Illustration 
1.007. Minchinton, ‘Port of Bristol’, p. 146. 
279 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 3 September 1770, p. 49-50.  
280 The late renters of the cranes to be sued for all arrears, 27 May 1772, and again Clerk to bring actions, 11 
July 1772.  BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, p. 250.  
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Goods were worked according to a schedule denoting specific charges per item or 
in multiples of that item.281 The rates listed in the schedule had been in force 
before the Society took over the administration of the cranes and from time to time 
were revised, an example being that in 1768 the ‘renters’ of the cranes asked the 
Society to apply to the Quarter Sessions for an increase in the charges for landing 
and weighing butter. When the Committee considered the matter two months later, 
it saw fit to change the crane operator’s recommendations before sending the 
proposal on to the Quarter Sessions who eventually approved it eight months later. 
It is important to note the time it took to affect change, as even a simple matter like 
that had to be shunted between the initiator, the Committee, the full Hall, the 
Quarter Sessions and back again.282  
 
The day to day working of the cranes was the responsibility of the Crane Master 
and under him, stationed on the quays, were foremen supervising the actual 
handling of ships’ cargoes. Their duties are not recorded, but in 1775 the Quay 
Warden asked the Committee to order foremen to attend when ships came up in 
the night to let go the ‘fasts’283 and act under the Quay Warden’s directions. This 
shows that shipping did come up at night in spite of the regulations imposed by 
Customs.284   
 
As far as the actual collection of fees is concerned, they were taken by ‘collectors’, 
stationed at the crane office, but in 1778 the Committee visited the office and 
ordered them to pay the monies directly to Mr Nathanial Champion, appointed 
Examiner of the Wharfage and Crane Accounts in 1773 at a salary of £50, 
increased to £80 in 1776.285 He was then to advance to Mr Thomas, the overseer, 
money to pay wages, ‘so that there would not be any account between collectors 
and overseers’. Benjamin Thomas had been appointed Crane Master in 1772 but 
in this entry he is referred to as Overseer, and although his original job description 
had indicated he was to receive the rates of landing and shipping goods and pay 
                                                 
281 BRO: 39290/FW/LN/37 (a/b). Papers of F.G. Webb. Company of Porters. 
282 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 19 December 1768, 8 February 1769,  9 August 1769, pp. 46-47. 
283 A rope cablet or chain by which a cable is secured to a wharf. Smyth, Sailors Word Book, p. 289. 
284 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, p. 53. 
285 Appointed 10th November, 1773. BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, pp. 51, 53.  
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all incidental expenses, the Committee now instructed the collectors to list all 
outstanding debts quarterly, visit the debtors themselves to ascertain their 
excuses, and advise the Committee in writing. This apparent loss of status for 
Thomas could be due to the realisation that the work was beyond one man, or they 
may have suspected some dishonesty was taking place.286 However in 1781 the 
Committee were of the opinion that it was better to have the crane office managed 
by Thomas again and the two collectors were dismissed.287 
 
The above changes do not seem to have worked because in September, 1785, the 
clerk and collector were dismissed and the Committee decided to effect a 
reorganisation. Appointments to the higher echelons of the Crane Office would now 
have to be properly qualified people, giving securities. The ‘principal person’, a Mr 
Whitchurch288 with the title, ‘Chief Clerk and Accountant of the Crane Office’, was 
to have a salary of £100 per annum after paying a bond of £1000; to be 
accountable for all monies, and to produce balanced books monthly. Two boys 
from Colston’s Hospital were to be employed in the office.  
 
Benjamin Thomas was retained at the same salary to superintend the men at the 
cranes and assist in collecting, whilst three foremen at 9s per week were 
appointed. Another was shortly added and it is of interest that one of the new men 
had to be replaced as a condition of appointment was that a foreman could not 
also own a public house.289 By 1795, the number of foremen supervising daily 
operations had increased to five290 and therefore each must have had several 
cranes under his authority or to have been employed in a roving capacity.  
 
The numbers of men working at the cranes is not documented, but it needed at 
least two to operate each plus porters to manhandle goods, and petitions to the 
Society asking for employment as ‘cranemen’ are evidence that they were directly 
                                                 
286 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 20 August 1778, p. 240. 
287 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 7 September 1781, p. 243. 
288 James Whitchurch. Chief Clerk and Accountant of the Crane Office. BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 10 
September 1785, p245: Listed as a salesman based at 77 on The Quay. Sketchley, Bristol Directory, 1775; 
Listed as a merchant, St James Square. Bristol Directory, 1785; Listed as a merchant, Oxford Street. 
Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794. 
289 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 5 September 1785 to 13 October 1785, pp. 244-245.  
290 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 26 March 1795, p. 28. 
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employed.291 A letter from Customs to the Society in 1791 accuses them of 
condoning fraud at the cranes saying that under interrogation porters ‘working 
under the direction of your officers at the quays’ had been under-weighing, but 
were afraid to confess as they had been warned by a Mr William Long, probably 
the foreman, that if they did they would no longer be employed under him.292 This 
is an indication that the Company of Porters had no power to distribute their 
members or any real independence; the word ‘porter’ may even have become a 
generic term for quay workers. It is clear that all work at the cranes was done 
under the direction of men employed by the Society. 
 
The numerous entries in the Hall Books show that the crane office’s powers were 
limited to making recommendations about maintenance, repairs or setting up new 
cranes and that any measure costing money had first to be sanctioned by the 
Committee. In 1773, Crane 9 was seen as being unfit for use and it was decided by 
them that the present No 8 be moved to that position and a new double purchase 
crane be erected in its place.293 The estimate for this has survived and shows that 
the cost of £110 was reduced by £20 as the foundations, post and barrel of the old 
crane were still good.294  
 
Ever since they had had undertaken the provision of cranes in the 17th century, the 
Society had been responsible for the costs of their erection and maintenance. 
These were said to be a copy of the ‘rats tailed’ cranes used at London and were 
susceptible to mechanical damage through mishandling (Illustration 1.015). The jib 
was about 30ft long, enough to reach the hold of a ship lying alongside the quay 
and possibly, with some manipulation, that in the next mooring outwards. The state 
of the cranes on the quay deteriorated with constant use and in 1788 they were 
                                                 
291 Loose papers include petitions from individuals, some with minor disabilities, begging for employment as 
‘cranemen’. BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2 Miscellaneous papers re cranes, 1769-1792. 
292 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2 Miscellaneous papers re cranes. Letter from the Controller of Customs, 11 August 
1778. 
293 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/10 Hall Book 10, loose paper, 16 April 1773. 
294 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2 Miscellaneous papers re cranes, loose paper. Although this document has no date it 
must have been shortly after the 16 April 1773 entry in Hall Book 10. 
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inspected by a carpenter and millwright, Joseph Glasoedine,295 who found that six 
needed repairs to the frames, blocks or machinery.296  
 
However, most damage appears to have been caused by mishandling, details of 
which allows some insight into the difficulties people experienced by having to work 
in a congested tidal port. In 1790, the Committee were considering whether they 
would ‘call on’ Mr Tombs for the cost of the considerable damage to Crane 4, ‘at 
his dock’ which was inaccurate as he was a shipbuilder and Crane 4 was not at his 
dry-dock but on the quay opposite; therefore it must have been damaged whilst 
assisting a ship to leave or enter the dock. At that point, the river was only about 
120ft wide, see Illustration 1.007, and bringing a ship out must have been an 
intricate manoeuvre involving clearing vessels away from the quay opposite.297 
This must have been something of a nuisance as the dock was in regular use for 
ship repair and being about 200ft long could take several ships, all of which would 
need to be brought in and out near high tide, when the port was at its busiest. Farr 
says that ships were built at the head of the dock and launched through it, the 
slipway being clearly marked on Illustration 1.007.298 
 
The use of cranes outside of their primary purpose was again noted in 1792 when 
the Committee forbade the use of their cranes to lift ships over mud into their 
berths, they ‘having been much injured by the process’.299 As was typical in a tidal 
mud port; ships would shape themselves trenches in the mud as the tide ebbed 
and flowed and when they departed the outside lip would act as a reef over which 
the next needed to float or be dragged. Most damage, however, would have been 
caused through overloading, broken chains, worn blocks and wear and tear as the 
crane moved on its axis. The cranes themselves could cause damage as indicated 
in a letter from Customs in 1791 when they remonstrated that due to the necks of 
the cranes being lengthened to facilitate discharge, swinging parcels were 
                                                 
295 Carpenter, Penn Street. Bristol Directory (1785); Carpenter and mill-wright, Stokes Croft. Matthews, 
Bristol Directory, 1794. 
296 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2 Miscellaneous papers re cranes, loose document, 30 May 1788. 
297 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2 Miscellaneous papers re cranes, loose documents, 6 March 1790 and 30 April 1788; 
BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 17 March 1790, p. 23. 
298 Farr, Shipbuilding in the port of Bristol, p. 1. 
299 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 24 January 1792, p. 26. 
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damaging their weighing gibbets.300 These were the responsibility of the Society 
and they were requested to move them to a safe distance.301 Again an example of 
an attempt by the crane workers to overcome a problem caused by the tidal river. 
 
Refusals to pay and quibbles about dues by merchants and others were regularly 
entered in the Hall Books and took up a great deal of the Committee’s time. In 
August 1778, the Committee visited the crane office and instructed the collectors to 
list all outstanding debts quarterly, visit the debtors themselves to ascertain their 
excuses, and advise the Committee in writing. The crane officer’s returns are 
available for 8 August, 1779, and illustrate the additional complications brought 
about by direct ownership.302 There were 36 debtors, out of whom nine were in 
dispute with other merchants over responsibility; six claimed that cranes were not 
used to load their goods; two protested overcharging; three refused to pay under 
any circumstances; five had now passed out of the crane officer’s department, 
presumably under legal process; three agreed to pay; two claimed goods had been 
lost over the side by the cranes; one denied that the goods belonged to him; one 
was deceased; one had paid; and in three cases the excuse was difficult to 
understand. 
 
The Committee allowed merchants in dispute time to settle their differences before 
taking matters further but otherwise they had to adjudicate between the decisions 
of their own office and recalcitrant merchants. It is not surprising that they generally 
decided on legal action if payment was refused and in the two meetings following 
these returns, only one was altered whilst the clerk was ordered to take legal action 
if payment was not received.303 The Society insisted that the crane office received 
payment even when their own cranes were not used. Four entries on this report 
are of merchants unloading goods over the side into trows using their own ships’ 
resources, in one case the merchant landing them at his own dock, and in another 
that the ship was not ‘under a crane’.  
                                                 
300 The reality of the problem can be seen on Illustration 1.012 at the bottom left hand side where two men are 
operating a crane very near the Custom’s weighing gibbet.  
301 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2 Miscellaneous papers re cranes, loose document, 26 February 1791. 
302 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/3 Craneage Accounts 1769-1792, loose documents, 8/4/79. 8 May 1779. 
303 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 15 November 1779,  4/1/80, 4 January 1780, p. 2.  
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Evasion of duties had been a problem ever since the Society took over the cranes, 
one complaint being that merchants shipped goods and later denied responsibility 
for payment, so the Committee put out printed bills declaring that a note would 
have to be sent with goods denoting the shipper and small parcels would need to 
be paid on the spot.304 In 1775 additional rules were imposed which stated that 
goods without notes would not be accepted by the crane operatives and that small 
parcels had to be paid for at the crane office before being accepted.305 This 
appears to have worked because there is no further mention of it in the Hall Books.  
 
The theft of hawsers has been mentioned above but Bristol suffered less from 
organised crime than other ports, especially London where it became the driving 
force for the construction of secure floating docks.307 Matt Neale makes the 
argument that crime was a major factor at Bristol,308 but the theft of goods left on 
the docksides, stealing whilst ships were lading, and from warehouses is 
something that has occurred at ports since time immemorial. Port workers will 
always find a way. The reality was that when the West India Dock opened in 1802 
it had twenty foot walls surrounded by a six foot deep ditch, only dock workers 
were allowed inside, and it was patrolled by its own police force.309 When the 
floatation of the harbour at Bristol was completed in 1809, no wall was built, nor 
were any new restrictions put in place. 
 
Port installations were also targeted and the theft of a crane chain caused 500 
copies of the following hand bill to be distributed.310  
 
Merchants’ Hall, Bristol, March 15th 1773. 
Whereas on Saturday the 6th instant at noon, a cradle chain belonging to 
Crane No 4 on the Key weighing about 45lb and marked at each end MH 
                                                 
304 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/10 Hall Book 10, 9 March 1773. 
305 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/10 Hall Book 10, 31 October 1775. 
307 See Introductory Chapter. 
308 Matt Neale, ‘Crime and Maritime Trade in Bristol, 1770-1800’ in Steve Poole, ed., A City Built Upon the 
Water (Bristol, 2013). 
309 Gordon Jackson, The History and Archaeology of Ports (Tadworth, 1983) pp. 57-58. 
310 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 9 March 1773, p. 50. 
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was stolen off the Key. A reward of five guineas will be given to any person 
who will discover the offender or offenders, to be paid on conviction.  
By order of the Committee. S. Worral.311 
  
Nevertheless, there are few references to crime in the Society’s books, which may 
mean that they simply accepted the losses. Crime may also have been 
discouraged due to a shipkeeper being stationed aboard each foreign–going ship 
together with the tidewaiter. Also, to deter crime in 1791, the Chief Constable of the 
ward had requested permission to erect a stone watch tower on the quay and 
believed that the best spot to view the area was between the Dial Slip and Crane 
No.1. Agreement was made to build it 24ft below the Dial and 40 ft from the edge 
where it is shown on Illustration 1.007.312 An incident involving riotous crane 
labourers demanding higher rates of pay took place on the quay in 1792.313 
 
Ancillary services. 
 
The cranes and porters were vital to working ships but a number of other services 
and devices had to back these if shipping was to be handled efficiently. Goods 
being laden or shipped, whether by crane or manually would be measured, gauged 
or weighed using gibbets. Illustration 1.012 clearly shows them with their 
associated huts containing the implements required by customs to assess duties. 
These huts were large enough to shelter the landwaiters supervising the operation 
and may have been portable.314 Illustration 1.016, shows what could be called the 
working module; crane, gibbet, hut and an additional shed, all of which were the 
property of the Society.315  
 
                                                 
311 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/3 Craneage Accounts, loose document, 15 March 1773. 
312 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/12 Hall Book 12, 7 February 1791; and BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 11 February 1791. 
313 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/3 Craneage Accounts, loose document, 5 September 1792. 
314 G. W. Braikenridge catalogued drawings by Hugh O’Neil and referred to the ‘Landing Waiter’s movable 
box’. Greenacre, From Bristol to the Sea, p. 87. 
315 Evidence of the Society’s ownership of these appliances is to be found in BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2 
Miscellaneous papers re cranes, loose document, 26 February 1791. Customs had complained that damage to 
the gibbets might offset the weights and asked for the gibbets to be moved; and SMV/2/1/1/10. Hall Book 10. 
1/3/73. 1 January 1773. The landwaiters requested new boxes from the Society for the new legal quays. 
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To avoid cluttering and blocking the quays, merchandise had to be removed as 
soon as possible, either to one of the two large warehouses or a merchant’s own 
premises. At the quays, this was done by horse drawn sleds or by drays 
(Illustration 1.012). Transport was strictly controlled to avoid damage to the vast 
conglomeration of cellars at Bristol, but although the normal means of transport 
was by sled, wheeled vehicles were permitted provided they conformed to size and 
wheel-width regulations.316  
 
Since time immemorial, ships carried planks for access to and from quaysides but 
they could not be used at Bristol because in 1601 the Society had been granted 
the right to collect dues for supplying them.317 In 1751 a Plank Master was 
appointed to administer them and collect dues,318 although later this tax became 
consolidated with wharfage and as such the merchant paid and not the shipowner.  
 
As no fires were allowed on board any vessel at the quays,319 included in the 
general facilities were large iron hearths situated 20ft from the quay edge,320 each 
capable of holding three pots for boiling pitch enabling ships to make repairs. 
However, the position of these was strictly regulated causing the Committee to 
complain in 1770 that there were none on the Grove or the Back, and only three on 
the Quay, a situation not appropriate to the port’s needs; an indication that the 
quays were regularly used for repair work which would have adversely contributed 
to congestion. New hearths were still being installed late in the century.321 
 
Another fire precaution was the ringing of the ‘candle bell’ of an evening after which 
no candle was to be lit aboard any vessel on pain of a fine. This bell was situated 
beside the Drawbridge and had originated from a sixteenth-century act to prevent 
smuggling which had forbidden cargo working during the hours of darkness. The 
                                                 
316 BRO: M/BCC/CCP/1/14 Common Council Proceedings, 5/2/66, p. 78. 
317 Latimer, The History of the Merchant Venturers, p. 62. 
318 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/1 Papers re the quays and nuisances, 10/11/51. 
319 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall Book 9, 4/7/70. General instructions from the Quarter Sessions to be observed by 
the port, Clause 8. 
320 This was part of the regulations reorganising the port after 1700 when the Society had obtained an Act of 
Parliament, 11 and 12 William III c. 53. McGrath, ‘Society of Merchant Venturers in the 17th Century’, p. 
125-127. 
321 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 19 June 1788, p. 21; BRO: SMV/2/1/1/12 Hall Book 12, 28 January 1790. 
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port had secured some dispensations as being tidal it severely limited cargo 
working, and by the end of the century it was 6pm in winter and 9pm in summer.322 
To estimate the state of tides, a sundial on a pillar, about 25ft tall and known as the 
Dial, was prominently placed on the Quay323 (Illustrations 1.012 and 1.017).  
 
The original drawbridge was replaced by a bascule bridge in 1775 which had a 
‘mechanical contrivance’ allowing it to be operated by two men.324 It continued to 
be known as the Drawbridge and should have been an asset to the port as the 
upper St. Giles Bridge was unable to cope with road traffic passing from the Quay 
to St. Augustine’s Back. However, the Common Council Rules, Orders and Bye 
Laws governing the bridge banned all ‘wagons, carts, trolleys, sledges and drays 
and other carriages’ from crossing except for ‘coaches, landaus, chaises, phaetons 
and one-horse chaises or chairs’, in other words passenger traffic.325 Drays were 
designed to spread weight and so were allowed across empty but all other unfilled 
working vehicles were banned. Permanent staff  worked the bridge and imposed 
fines for breaching regulations. It is surprising that a more substantial bridge was 
not constructed to take harbour traffic and indeed a proposal for replacing it with a 
stone bridge was made at the same time but ‘unanimously negatived’.326  
 
A constant problem recorded in the Hall Books throughout the century was that the 
quays became encumbered with goods either awaiting collection or abandoned, 
which interfered with work and the movement of wares along the quays and thus 
was a direct contribution to congestion.327 From an examination of the data in the 
Society’s books and papers, the conclusion is that it was never properly dealt with 
although it was always within their power to take the matter to the magistrates and 
                                                 
322 McGrath, ‘The Society of Merchant Venturers in the 17th Century’, p. 125. 
323 Greenacre, From Bristol to the Sea, p. 86. 
324 Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794, pp. 36-37.  
325 BRO: M/BCC/CCP/1/16 Common Council Proceedings. 20 December 1788. Rules, Orders and Bye Laws 
for the Regulation of the Wooden Bridge over the River Froome, p. 253-255. 
326 Latimer, Annals, p 483. 
327 Examples are: Note from Samuel Worrall, Clerk to the Society, saying he would take people to the 
magistrates for cluttering the keys. BRO: SMV/7/1/2/2 Miscellaneous papers re quays, 27 March 1771; Quay 
encumbered with deal boards and other things, especially the Back and Grove. Complaint to be made to the 
magistrates. BRO: SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall book 9, 13 August 1785; Complaints made that the quays are 
encumbered. Crane master to send proper persons to examine what goods are lying on the quay and report 
when landed. SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 10 December 1792. 
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to have the goods confiscated. In 1771 and 1775 they did place advertisements 
threatening legal proceedings,328 but the only prosecution noted in the books was 
in 1787.329 
 
This matter was exacerbated by the complications involved in keeping the quays 
clean throughout the period. A letter in 1769 from Edward Davis, the Cleaner of  
the Quays, to the Committee outlines the problems:  
 
(He) acquaints them that as it has become almost general for the sweepings 
of ships’ holds which used to be thrown in the river to be put on the quay 
and a great many mast yards etc are now made on the Quay, the chips of 
which make a great increase to the dirt and filth which used to be hauled to 
the dung wharf. All other soil fit for manure he sends to his grounds but now 
the dirt on the quay is so much increased and become of so little value, 
being pitch, tar, gravel and such like, his being deprived of halling that to the 
Dung Wharf obliges him to decline halling the said dirt from the quay unless 
the salary be advanced.330 
 
This is an interesting letter as it shows that it was not only minor repairs that were 
being carried on at the quaysides; mast-making must have been particularly 
obstructive. The sweeper appears to have a point, but it was not resolved and at 
the end of his term in 1771 when he did not remove soil, the cost of this was 
deducted from his wages the following year.331 Arguments between the Society 
and the sweepers continued and in 1792 they found it difficult to replace them as 
the only applicant was asking for £5 on top of the present incumbent’s salary.332  
The work of the sweeper was obviously not highly rated, but a lacklustre approach 
due to low wages would increase the difficulties moving goods from the quays and 
could damage the more delicate merchandise.  
 
                                                 
328 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 20 November 1771, 7 March 1775, pp. 49, 53. 
329 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 27 October 1787, p. 246. 
330 BRO: SMV/7/1/2/1 Papers re quays and nuisances, 7 August 1769. 
331 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 17 April 1772, p. 49. 
332 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 14 February 1792, p. 27. 
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Similarly, they had problems with the ferry slips as there would have been a daily 
build-up of mud and other refuse brought by the tides. The Gibb Slip was probably 
used most as it accommodated people travelling between the quays and the 
shipbuilding and repair yards on the Somerset side of the Avon. In 1768 the 
Committee agreed to build a wooden house for the woman who took care of it,333 
but by 1790 it was under a similar contract to that of the sweeper, and this was 
cancelled after an inspection by the Committee who found it ‘much 
encumbered’.334 The author has found no evidence that fares were charged for the 
ferry but it would be unlikely that the Society would miss that opportunity and it 
seems confirmed by the fact that the caretaker required shelter.  
 
The replenishment of drinking water was vital to all ships, and for the Quay, and 
probably the Grove, a conduit brought water from a spring about five miles away 
dispersing it at an outlet called the Quay Pipe situated at Quay Head beside the 
Tontine Warehouse near St. Stephens, (Illustration 1.018). This was finally 
dismantled in the 1930’s.335 There was a lead cistern under the quay and the water 
was drawn from two  cocks,336 probably under natural pressure, but it must have 
had at least one mechanical pump attached as it would have been in constant use 
servicing outgoing ships and providing for a multitude of tasks on the quays. To 
take the example of a single ship, the Sybil in 1785 filled 10 Butts and 2 
puncheons, a total of about 1700 gallons of water.337 Filling ships’ water containers 
must have caused congestion on that part of the Quay and encumbrances would 
have led to difficulties for the heavy drays used to move the receptacles from ship 
to pipe and back again.   
 
Bristol’s water supplies were good and there were outlets in every street, 338 but it 
is not clear where the ships berthed at the Backs drew water. The St. Nicholas 
Pipe, equivalent to that on the Quay, was removed about 1762 when the old Bristol 
                                                 
333 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/9 Hall Book 9, 15 November 1768. 
334 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/12 Hall Book 12, 28 January 1790. 
335 S. Watson, Secret Underground Bristol (Bristol Junior Chamber, 1991) pp. 116-117. 
336 J. Leach, Pipes, Pumps and Conduits of Bristol (Bristol, 1853) p.9. 
337 BRL: 21258, Account book of the Sybil and  Success, pp. 28. 
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bridge was dismantled,339 and although the smaller ships on the Backs would have 
had less requirements than those on the Quay, there were many more of them and 
a proper outlet would have been necessary. The only information the author has 
uncovered is that there was a well at the back of the Quay Walk at the Welsh 
Market, but William Paty reported to the Society in 1793 that the fresh water in it 
rose with the tide and on the ebb did not sink in the well to the level of the river so 
a link would be necessary to the low water mark to drain away river water.340 
Parker says that river water at Bristol was not suitable for ship’s casks341 which 
could  mean that all ships had to use the Quay Pipe, again adding to the 
congestion on the quays.   
 
Illustration 1.012 shows that on the extremities of Broad Quay there were 
warehouses (shops) with accommodation above and it would seem logical that 
these warehouses would be primarily supplying the needs of shipping, but an 
attempt to confirm this failed because the buildings housed a mixture of retail, 
manufacturing and domestic accommodation. James Sketchley produced his local 
directory342 in 1775 and for the first time at Bristol a system of street numbering 
which continued well into the nineteenth century.343 Even with this, however, it was 
not possible to denominate businesses on the quays as although it lists names and 
occupations at numbered addresses, this could include a tradesman in domestic 
accommodation. However, most trades associated with shipping are listed and it is 
probable that these predominated. Messuages, defined by Johnson as a ‘house 
and ground set aside for household use’,344 on the quays were owned by the 
Society and reviews for the rent of those are entered in the Hall books which may 
have caused a conflict of interest. 
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340 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/12 Hall Book 12, 19 February 1793. 
341 Parker, ‘A Maritime Cultural Landscape’, p. 334.  
342 Sketchley, Bristol Directory, 1775. 
343 Roger Leech. The Topography of Medieval and Early Modern Bristol, Part 1 (Bristol Record Society, 48, 
1997) p. xvii. 
344 Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language, 14th ed., (London, 1815). 
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Conclusions. 
 
This section examined the structure of the city quays and their management by the 
Society. Unlike newer ports such as Liverpool,345 the city quays at Bristol 
developed over time in a built-up city area and as such the amenities concerned 
with shipping could not always be placed in the most suitable positions. On the 
whole, the manpower necessary to work the ships was efficiently organised and 
managed, but problems could arise through the frugality of the Society and indeed 
this could be reciprocated by the shipowners themselves. Again, the administration 
system was slow due to the hierarchy stretching above the men responsible for 
actually working the ships. However, in practical terms, all the facilities necessary 
for effective day to day working were provided and Bristol’s relative loss of status 
cannot be blamed on poor port management. Patrick McGrath believes that the 
Society’s achievements were of great value but that it committed a disservice to 
the port by obstructing the building of the floating harbour.346 This will be dealt with 
below. 
 
 
                                                 
345 See Introductory Chapter 
346 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, pp. 169. 
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Chapter 2. 
 
Shipowning and crewing at the port of Bristol. 
 
Section 1. The rationale behind shipowning at the port. 
 
Introduction. 
 
The main purpose of this section is to examine the oceanic organisation of trading 
areas by Bristol shipowners, the companies they formed and how these fitted into 
the national maritime structures at the end of the eighteenth century. Firstly, 
however, it is necessary to define what is meant by the term ‘shipowner’ in this 
age. There are few instances of the expression ‘shipowner’ being recorded in the 
port or town directories of the eighteenth century, people usually being described 
therein by their principal business interest or social title. However, Gordon Jackson 
says that the use of the word ‘shipowner’ as a title was first used at Hull in 1773 
and came into common usage in 1775 mainly to describe owners who had 
previously been master mariners.1 Nevertheless, shipowning generally was the 
province of the merchant who saw it as a useful adjunct to his main business, the 
entrepreneur who believed it was a sound investment, and the master who 
regarded owning his own ship as a necessary means of advancement. On the 
other hand, there was a certain amount of risk attached which for most of the 
century resulted in few ships being under the sole ownership of one person, the 
majority belonging to four or more shareholders,2 each ship being managed by one 
denoted the ‘ship’s husband’. Shipowners might own a part-share in a number of 
vessels, spreading their investments to reduce any individual loss, but leaving 
management to others. A ship’s husband received little or no additional emolument 
                                                 
1 Out of 114 shipowners he traced between 1766 and 1800, 81 had been master mariners. Jackson, Hull in the 
Eighteenth Century, p. 142. 
2 Ships were not owned by a partnership but by shareholders who could dispose of their shares as they 
wished. Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, p. 140. 
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but in this position could control operations to the advantage of his own trade and 
business.3   
 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, modifications in the approach 
to shipowning were taking place in the major ports of the country due to the growth 
of the English economy and its mercantile marine.4 As far as the port of Hull was 
concerned, Jackson saw the evolution of the merchant shipowner to specialist 
shipowner as a feature of the second half of the eighteenth century and although 
there was a long transitional period before it became recognised as a distinct 
profession, he believed that ‘by the end of the century the shipowner had made his 
mark on the economic and social life of Hull’.5  
 
It is difficult to establish exactly when the move towards specialist shipowning 
began as no dedicated research appears to have been done on the subject, but 
although Ralph Davis believed that it was a nineteenth-century phenomenon,6 he 
admitted that little research had been done into the operation of ships between 
1760-1860,7 and there were indications that the standard model of shipowning had 
begun to fragment in the eighteenth. The percentage of vessels with single owners 
at Newcastle when the shipping registers were established in 1786 was 24, and at 
Liverpool, 25.8 Concentration of ownership is further shown at the latter port as 25 
percent of all ships registered there at this time had two owners and on average 
the number of shareholders per ship had dropped to 3.25. 9 At London, research 
showed that in 1787, a quarter of ships had only one owner and two thirds four or 
less.10 Single, or limited ship ownership does not necessarily mean that a 
specialised company had developed but it is likely.11 
                                                 
3 Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, pp. 81, 89; Ville, English Shipowning, p. 2.  
4 Simon Ville, ‘The Growth of Specialisation in English Shipowning’, Economic History Review, New Series, 
Vol 46 4 (1993), p. 704.  
5 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 141-144. 
6 Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p. 81. 
7 R. Davis, ‘Maritime History: Progress and Problems’ in S. Marriner ed., Business and Businessmen, 
(Liverpool, 1978), p. 177. 
8 Ville, ‘Growth of Specialisation in English Shipowning’, pp. 707-8. 
9 Robert Craig and Rupert Jarvis, Liverpool Registry of Merchant Ships (Manchester, 1967) p. xxxviii. Table 
21. 
10 Jarvis, ‘London Shipping’, p. 414. 
11 Ville, English shipowning, p. 14. 
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A letter by a partner in a shipowning company in London in 1826 said that ‘within 
the last 30 years the shipowners of London have entirely changed character’12 and 
so gives an indication that changes there began about the end of the eighteenth 
century, which could confirm the intimation by a Bristol merchant in 1789 that 
London merchants had less than a sixteenth share of their vessels as compared to 
the major Bristol merchants who owned the majority of their own.13 Other 
differences existed between the way the merchants of the two ports operated, an 
example being in the way they organised their West India trade, the most important 
they shared.14 In 1792 at London, 37 percent of ships belonged to companies with 
three ships or more whilst at Bristol it was 77; those having two ships or less per 
company was 54 and 21 percent respectively; whilst those owned by a captain or 
captain and company were 9 and 2.5 respectively,15 the last being the sector who 
were most likely to emerge as specialist shipowners.16 As London had 
approximately double the number of West Indiamen compared to Bristol then the 
figures show that merchant firms could have been moving away from purchasing 
ships for their own purposes towards either freighting goods or chartering. To 
confirm this would require research beyond the scope of this thesis which is about 
Bristol shipping, but the point is that by the end of the century differences in the 
operating procedures between London and Bristol had evolved.  
 
Specialist shipowning does not seem to have come about at Liverpool, as in 1786 
merchants owned 79 percent of shares in ships, although 12 percent were owned 
by captains.17 Jackson puts this down to ships at Hull being fewer, smaller and less 
valuable than those of Liverpool18 but a more significant difference may be that at 
the latter port the most important and influential occupation was the slave trade 
where ships fitted out for what amounted to expeditions rather than as general 
traders. Regarding trade to the West Indies in 1792, 156 ships were listed in Lloyds 
                                                 
12 Quoted in Ville, ‘Growth of Specialisation in English Shipowning’, p. 707. 
13 Pares, West India Fortune, p. 209. 
14 Bristol was denied the East India trade. 
15 Bristol Presentments, Export, 1792. 
16 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, p. 141. 
17 Craig and Jarvis, Liverpool Registry of Merchant Ships, Table 26, pp. 201-202. 
18 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 142-143. 
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Register for Africa and most would be involved in the slave trade, whilst less than 
half that amount, 75, were registered as trading directly to the West Indies.19  
 
The reason why changes were taking place generally was that in the second half of 
the eighteenth century commerce was growing requiring larger, more profitable 
ships, which were now protected by underwriters and this made a attractive 
investment for the entrepreneur.20 Simon Ville believes that from 1780 ‘the old 
fashioned merchant organisation of shipowning was unable to cope with the huge 
increase in the shipping industry required by trade expansion and war’.21 The 
benefits of single ownership of a ship or a fleet was that decision making did not 
require discussion and possibly argument with shareholders, and ships could be 
used in a variety of trades depending on the markets. Operating a fleet of ships 
under one owner was less costly than the same number of single vessels each 
under a different set of shareholders because the larger shipowner could buy his 
supplies and other services in bulk.22 Also, in slack periods of his own trade, he 
could make his ships available for charter or to earn income from freight from other 
merchants. 
 
Although there are indications that by the end of the century shipping firms 
nationally were beginning to change their operational methods, there is little actual 
evidence as to where and to what extent. The theme of this thesis is Bristol’s 
organisational structure, management and operation of shipping in the late 
eighteenth century, so it is necessary to establish exactly what the position was 
there, and if the time honoured practices of traditional shipping were still in place, 
whether they were working efficiently or could have been improved by 
implementing change. 
 
To do so it was essential to have a model by which the procedures in place at 
Bristol could be compared, and this can be extracted from the surviving records of 
                                                 
19 Lloyds Register of Shipping, 1792.  
20 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, p. 142. 
21 Simon Ville, English Shipowning During the Industrial Revolution: Michael Henley and Son, London 
Shipowners, 1770-1830 (Manchester, 1987) p. 5. 
22 Ville, ‘Growth of Specialisation in English Shipowning’, p. 718 
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a London firm of specialist shipowners, Michael Henley and Son, which have been 
researched and published. 23 The firm came into existence in 1775 when Henley 
bought two colliers in 1775 to transport coal from Newcastle to London – a trade 
where single ownership was recognised24 – and by 1790 the fleet had enlarged to 
nine ships and in 1805 there was a total of fifteen. At the same time he expanded 
his trading areas to include the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Atlantic. Whilst 
researching this company, Simon Ville uncovered two other London shipowners 
who were sole owners of their vessels and in other aspects were similar to 
Henley.25 All three had comparatively old fleets, bought prizes or cheap American 
ships, and both Henley and one of the other firms always purchased vessels of 
between 200 and 400 tons, the size of the vessel being regarded as suitable for 
deployment in an assortment of  trades.  
 
In one aspect, Henley’s were considered different from the other London firms 
because of their dual involvement in the coal and foreign trades, but they also had 
ancillary activities which pointed to specialised shipowning.26 Primarily they: earned 
income from carrying freight and chartering; were flexible in their approach to ship 
buying and repair; did not raise capital from outside sources as this would have 
restricted their operations; generally kept vessels for a short period only; kept their 
own stores; bought second hand when prices were low; owned lighters and other 
cargo handling craft, and possessed their own warehousing and some wharves. 
Ville refers to specialised shipowners operating in these ways as ‘professional 
owners’,27 and their methods are compared to that of traditional shipowners in 
Appendix 2.001. The information in this appendix will be used as the template to 
evaluate the situation at Bristol towards the end of the eighteenth century.  
 
To begin with, it is indispensable to identify who owned ships at Bristol, their trade 
areas, and on an individual basis, the number of ships owned and how they were 
                                                 
23 Ville, English Shipowning.  
24 Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p. 91. 
25 James Mather and James Margetson. Ville, English Shipowning, p. 9. 
26 Ville, English Shipowning, p. 6-10. 
27 Ibid., p. 3. 
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operated. To find the identity of the principal Bristol shipowners, Lloyd’s Register28 
was consulted for the years 1778, the beginning of the American War of 
Independence; 1787 as it was in the middle period of a time of peace; and 1792 
when the volume of shipping using the port peaked a year before the resumption of 
war. Any company registered as having three or more ships in the given years was 
considered as having sufficient resources to be managing ships in the traditional 
manner or to have formed, or be in the process of forming, a dedicated shipping 
company in the new sense. The term ‘company’ will be used in this chapter to 
describe the shipping operations of any merchant house or business rather than as 
a technical term except when naming an actual company. The results of this 
investigation are listed in Appendix 2.002. 
 
As can be seen, the number of companies with three or more ships increased by 
12 percent between 1778 and 1787 and then by 32 percent between 1787 and 
1792. Similarly there was an increase in the numbers of ships per company, but 
taking simple percentages presents problems unless the large slave trading firms 
are ignored. A more accurate measurement to indicate individual growth is to take 
the number of companies with five vessels or more. In 1778 this was 24 percent; in 
1787, 26 percent; and in 1792, 48 percent. These figures show that the criteria of 
expansion in both numbers of ships and increase in size of individual companies 
was met in Bristol and so the conditions to form professional companies were 
there. 
 
Maritime operations in the Bristol trading areas. 
 
Before examining the companies on an individual basis, it is necessary to 
determine the overall characteristics of maritime operations in the areas to which 
Bristol merchants traded, as shipping practices could differ according to 
geographical area. Appendix 2.003 lists the overseas trading areas and the goods 
generally carried to each. Direct trade with Africa and the slave trade have been 
treated as separate areas because the slave ships were engaged in the so-called 
                                                 
28 Lloyd’s Register, 1778, 1787, 1792; Bristol Presentments, 1792.  
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‘triangular trade’ and, similarly, Newfoundland and Quebec were detached from 
North America as before the War of Independence, the colonies that became the 
United States were refusing British cargoes, and afterwards trade with them was 
on a different basis. The year 1792 was taken as a sample year as any changes in 
practice would have evolved by then.  
 
Appendix 2.004 gives a breakdown of the number of ships importing and exporting 
to and from Bristol by trade area as recorded in the Bristol Presentments for the 
year 1792, correlated to place of registry taken from Lloyd’s Register. In addition, 
the cargoes carried by ships registered in Bristol were separated into three 
categories; those being carried almost wholly for the shipowner; those carried both 
for the owner and for others to earn freight; and finally goods shipped entirely to 
earn freight from external shippers. Vessels not registered at Bristol were deemed 
to be foreign to the port and ignored; those owned by their captain would not form 
part of a shipping company, and a number of ships were not recorded in Lloyd’s 
Register and could not be classified. A study of the data recorded in Appendix 
2.004 confirms shipping operations differed according to trade area and therefore 
an assessment of each individual area can now be done.  
 
Africa. Direct trade between Africa and Bristol was carried out entirely by Bristol 
ships carrying cargo for their owners. The slave trade was again a Bristol 
operation, but what is of interest is that when the sixteen importing ships are 
subjected to further examination it becomes clear that eleven must have returned 
from the West Indies in ballast as their cargo consisted of  a minuscule quantity of 
elephants teeth or suchlike from Africa.  Two of the others had a fair amount of 
African goods, one had a full mixed cargo of African and West Indian commodities, 
but only two had cargoes purely from the West Indies. This would indicate that by 
1792 ships sailing on the so-called ‘triangular’ trade were unable to find cargoes in 
the West Indies for the home voyage and were likely to be making a loss.  
 
Baltic. It is obvious from the data that Bristol shipowners left most of the timber 
imports to be brought in by foreign registered ships. However, there was regular 
trade to there by Bristol vessels exporting manufactured and plantation goods and 
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returning with commodities for the shipbuilding trades and bar iron, this mainly on 
behalf of their owners.  
 
Newfoundland and Quebec. There is a discrepancy between the number of ships 
leaving Bristol  and returning due to the fact that many were involved in the 
triangular trade between Bristol, Newfoundland and southern Europe. However, 
the direct trade was mainly carried out by Bristol ships shipping goods for their 
owners. 
 
North America. The overwhelming majority of ships visiting Bristol were American 
owned, 74 percent, but those belonging to Bristol merchants were mainly 
employed in carrying their owners goods rather than shipping for freight. 
 
Northwest Europe. Relatively few Bristol owned ships traded in this area and those 
that did exported whatever cargo the owners could assemble, sometimes sailing 
almost empty, but imports for both the owners and other merchants had clearly 
been arranged beforehand. 
 
Mediterranean. There was not a great deal of trade with the Mediterranean and it 
was done almost equally by Bristol and foreign shipping. All ships leaving for the 
Mediterranean were Bristol owned, but only one carried goods for the owner. 
However imports, as with Northwest Europe, were mainly brought in for the 
shipowner, making it likely that these were cargoes that had been ordered 
beforehand. 
 
Southern Europe. The data taken showed that the ships were sailing without full 
cargoes, indicating either a lack of an export market, or that the owners of these 
ships had no real interest in exporting to this area. On the return trip only two of the 
sixteen Bristol ships were carrying a full cargo for the owner and the rest shipped 
wine and fruit for numerous consignees, the conclusion being that ships were 
being run for the income from freight charges. Also, the trade was dominated by 
foreign vessels including sixteen Irish, twelve of whom had not entered out from 
Bristol; and there was a surplus of  twenty-three ships importing to those exporting. 
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The triangular Newfoundland trade would account for some of this but other 
vessels must have gone direct from other ports. 
 
Southern Fisheries. In reality this was not a trade area as there were no exports, 
and although some ships sailed carrying a minimal amount of dutiable goods, 
others may have left unrecorded due to having no dutiable cargo. The imports 
were mainly whale products caught in these seas, and in two out of the three ships 
returning to Bristol, the cargo, or catch, was for the owner.  
 
West Indies. The data clearly shows trade in this area was carried out by Bristol 
owned ships and the goods in most vessels were carried for the owner, although 
there was always a quantity shipped on behalf of others to earn income from 
export freight charges. In a minority of cases, the shipowner had little or no export 
cargo of his own, but on the return trip the vessel carried his own commodities. An 
additional three ships came in from the West Indies compared to those that went 
out and were probably ‘interlopers’ or ‘seekers’, that is ships not necessarily British 
that had been in the West Indies speculating on picking up a cargo for freight.37  
 
This analysis shows that as late as 1792 Bristol merchants maintained the same 
systems of trade in the same specific areas that had been in place throughout the 
eighteenth century. Details of these systems have been recorded in publications by 
Kenneth Morgan, W.E. Minchinton, and others and the fact that no change had 
occurred by the end of the century history points to the continuation of traditional 
shipowning. 
 
Analysis of the operations of the major shipowners of Bristol.  
 
If the shipping companies in Bristol were evolving towards professional ownership 
there should be clear evidence of this near the end of the eighteenth century and if 
not it can be taken that the traditional approach to ship ownership and operation 
was in place throughout the era of this research. One of the key points in the 
                                                 
37 See R. Pares,  A West India Fortune (London, 1950) p. 207-8. 
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argument is that a traditional company tends to trade primarily to a single area, 
though there may be some slight deviations, whilst a professional concern will be 
more flexible as it is looking for freight income. The position at Bristol can be 
investigated by correlating the ships belonging to the major companies with the 
trading areas they served and analysing the results. 
 
The year 1792 is again chosen and data from Appendices 2.002 and 2003 entered 
on Appendix 2.005 to show where each company plied their trade.38 There is the 
anomaly that comparatively large numbers of ships belong to two slave trading 
companies and as this distorts the analysis their operations need to be examined 
separately. The primary trade area of a company is that to which the majority of its 
shipping resources are directed, and secondary trading areas are those to which 
one or a few of the company ships might be dedicated or would visit as part of its 
normal voyage. Companies tabled as having two primary areas have evenly split 
their fleets or are engaged in one of the triangular trades. This will be detailed 
below.  
 
Flexibility of trading areas is a major factor of professional shipping and the first 
observation is that it was not influenced by the number of ships owned. J. Harford 
and Co. has eight ships and visits seven areas whilst Philip Protheroe has the 
same number but is dedicated to trading with the West Indies. Similarly, G. & F. 
Fisher has five ships and six areas, whilst Samuel Span with the same number 
again trades only with the West Indies. The smallest companies are naturally 
limited to one or two areas. Statistically, seven companies, or 32 percent, trade to 
one area only, eight, or 36 percent, to two areas, together making a total of fifteen 
companies or 68 percent. Of the seven remaining, four were slave traders, who 
must be seen as having fixed routes, leaving just three, or 14 percent of the total 
that could fit the model of professional shipowning.  
 
Further analysis shows that at least one company was trading primarily in seven of 
the eleven trade areas, and that the interest of Bristol companies was low in four 
                                                 
38 For sources, see Appendices, 2.002, 2003 and 2.005.  
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other areas confirming the data given in Appendix 2.004. In all, twenty of the 
twenty-two companies dedicated the majority of their ships to one specific area 
leaving no doubt that traditional shipping was still in place.  
 
Out of this total fourteen, or 56 percent, were trading to the West Indies 
emphasising the overwhelming importance of this area to Bristol commerce, but 
this included four slave trading companies, an anomaly due to the triangular nature 
of their trade and so requiring separate study. It leaves a total of ten shipping 
companies dedicated to trading with the West Indies and these are listed with the 
number of ships they owned in Appendix 2.006. 
 
An initial examination revealed a remarkable consistency in the way eight of these 
companies operated, the exceptions being those of Richard Fydell and Walter 
Jacks which will be studied later. (Henceforth shipping companies will be referred 
to by the owner’s surname rather than the full title.) Out of the 37 ships owned by 
these eight companies, 36 traded to the West Indies in 1792 to the ports as listed 
for them in Lloyd’s Register, 1792, and 25 of these were denoted as constant 
traders. The one exception was a ship belonging to Miles which had been bought 
in 1792, and whose maiden voyage was to the Baltic, probably on charter to fill in 
time before embarking on her regular run to Jamaica. An initial voyage of this 
nature has been observed elsewhere.39 As part of the West Indies run, some ships 
might visit ports such as Cork and Madeira on the outward trip, and two of Span’s 
ships called at Virginia on their return trip. The only other deviation from the norm 
was a Protheroe ship that ended its voyage at Halifax. As far as trade within the 
West Indian islands was concerned, all except Span and Baillie, who visited three, 
limited themselves to one or two islands.  
 
The number of voyages a ship made per twelve-month period can be calculated by 
counting the entering or leaving of Bristol on two occasions as one voyage. This 
may seem a convoluted approach, but voyages were not arranged by the calendar 
year. Combining the ships of these companies as a whole, it is observed that one 
                                                 
39 The first voyage of the Fanny belonging to Samuel Munckley and Co. was made for the same purpose. 
BRO: 12162 Shipping  Account Book of the Snow Fanny, 1777-1791.  
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managed the much sought after two voyages, twenty-one ships made one and a 
half, ten completed a single voyage, and two, half or one leg. Of the remaining 
three, one went to the Baltic, one to Halifax and the other being of small size, did 
not carry cargo and may have been dispatched for use as a tender. Apart from 
Protheroe and Span, who averaged one voyage per year per vessel, the others 
made one and a half stressing the similarity of operation of these companies.  
 
Of paramount importance is the question as to whether these ships were carrying 
cargo mainly for the owner’s benefit or for others, and therefore primarily for freight. 
In all cases, both import and export, the greater part of cargo was carried on behalf 
of the owner and this preponderance was particularly so with imports. The process 
of shipping cargo for ships making ready to sail from Bristol would be to load the 
owners goods and those already accepted for other shippers, and if there was still 
space available to advertise it in the Bristol papers.40 There is no doubt that 
shipping was run for the benefit of the merchants who owned the ships and that 
freight charges were an important but secondary consideration. 
 
Regarding the two companies that were excepted above, Richard Fydal had eight 
ships, of which one was sold in 1792 and for which there is no record of its 
movements. Four of the remainder were registered as trading to the West Indies, 
but two of these were registered as departing from London. Of his West Indian 
ships, one, a supposedly constant trader, did not return to Bristol; another 
completed the voyage but the owner’s cargo did not constitute the majority of the 
goods onboard; and the other two left port but did not return that year. Two of his 
other ships exported to Newfoundland carrying the owner’s cargo but did not 
return, and the last sailed for Ostend, again not returning. Compared to the other 
shipping companies, Fydal’s appears disorganised, but he was a partner in a 
number of slave trading ventures with James Rogers and as detailed below, the 
methods of ship operation of slavers were in some ways dissimilar to those of 
ordinary traders. The point is that with his multiple trading areas and intermittent 
                                                 
40 For example. The Lively. FFBJ, 10 December 1791. The Sisters. FFBJ, 21 January, 1792. 
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carrying of cargo for his own purposes, he fits some of the criteria to qualify for 
professional shipowning. He was bankrupted in the financial crash of 1793. 
 
The other shipowner operating abnormally was Walter Jacks who was definitely a 
slave trader using three of his fourteen ships for the trade in 1792. Eleven of his 
ships were registered for the West Indies trade only, one for both West Indies and 
Africa, and two for Africa alone. His three slaving ships are examined below. There 
is no information on movements on six out of the eleven West Indian vessels 
although the other five followed the West Indian norm of shipping of goods 
predominantly for the owner. Jacks was not bankrupted and therefore the lack of 
consistency of his shipping operations may have been connected with his 
involvement in slave trading or perhaps he used them pragmatically, a sign of him 
moving towards professional shipowning. 
 
As far as shipping operations in the West Indies are concerned there is no 
evidence that the shipping companies were not following the traditional ship 
owning operations of the eighteenth century. 
  
Analysis of shipping companies trading outside of the West Indies and the 
slave trade.  
 
These areas, as has been observed above, were mainly serviced by foreign-going  
shipping, by ships under the ownership of their captains, and by single vessels 
chartered or owned by individual merchants or partnerships. The companies that 
did operate in these areas are listed below in Appendix 2.007. There were seven 
companies concentrating their efforts outside of the two main trades, the West 
Indies and the slave trade, and they are individually examined below. 
 
Henry Cooke and Co. had four ships, one of which was sold in 1792. Of his other 
three, all should have traded with Newfoundland,41 but the movements of two 
cannot be traced after 1791. The remaining ship is recorded as taking general 
                                                 
41 Lloyd’s Register, 1792. 
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cargo for the owner to Newfoundland and returning with whale products again for 
him, but there are no details of further voyages. It may be that as this was a very 
small ship and it was diverted to the coastal trade. 
 
Thomas Deane and Co. had four ships trading with London and registered as 
constant trade ships. As the ships were classed as coasters, there are no entries in 
the Presentments. 
 
John Noble had three ships all trading to Newfoundland. Again, it is difficult to trace 
the shipping movements of these small companies as they may have been sent to 
work at the coastal trade from time to time. One ship was engaged on the 
triangular run between Bristol, Newfoundland and Southern Europe, one trading 
with Newfoundland and Quebec and the last cannot be traced after leaving for 
Newfoundland. In all three cases the cargoes were carried on the owners behalf. 
  
J. Harris and Co. had three ships, one of which was reported at Antigua in 
December, 1791, but no further movements are traceable. The other two traded 
with North America, one to Virginia as a constant trader carrying general cargo 
outward, some of which was for the owner, and returning with tobacco mainly on 
behalf of the owners. This ship appears to have been operated along similar lines 
to the West Indiamen. The last ship made one trip to New York with goods shipped 
for others and then sailed to Petersburg carrying merchandise for other merchants. 
It is probable that this ship could have been chartered for the Baltic trip.  
 
Regarding the above four companies, the examination of the movement and lading 
of their ships adds little detail to the information previously gained from studying 
the other areas except that even the ships of the smallest companies seem to have 
been carrying goods for the owners and to have been following traditional trading 
practices. A caveat might be that the chartering of vessels was part of the change 
from traditional shipping.  
 
James Lockier and Co. had no constant trading vessels, but three of five of their 
ships were trading with South Carolina, one of which appeared to be importing and 
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exporting goods for the owner in the usual manner. Another left Bristol for 
Charleston but returned from London, which was not unusual as cargoes for 
London were accepted as an alternative to returning to Bristol partly laden. The 
third was registered for the Newfoundland trade but brought in a cargo of timber for 
the owner from the Baltic before leaving for South Carolina with a small cargo, 
some of which was shipped by the owner. Regarding the other two ships, one was 
a constant coaster to London, providing evidence that some shipowners were 
carrying out a mixed coastal and foreign-going trade, and the other was trading to 
Africa and Honduras. Richardson describes it as a ‘wood ship’, that is 
concentrating on importing wood rather than slavery, but he gives the owner as 
James Jones a slave trader, below, with Lockier as a partner. The return cargo of 
wood was for Lockier, Woodward and Co. and the complexity of Bristol 
partnerships is demonstrated by Lockier being involved in yet another partnership 
of timber merchants.42     
 
G. and F. Fisher and Co. merits closer investigation as its five ships were trading in 
seven out of the eleven areas, and four ships moved from one area to another 
during the year. There was a wide range of cargoes imported including fruit from 
the Mediterranean, timber and wood from four separate areas, rice from South 
Carolina, and some other goods. Exports followed the usual mixture of  general 
cargo, but there were also re-exports to the continent. The merchandise was 
mainly carried on the owners behalf, but there were three occasions when export 
cargoes were not predominantly shipped for the owners and on one instance both 
export and import cargoes were for another merchant which could indicate 
chartering of  the vessel. There was no connection with the slave trade, the African 
voyage being for the products of this area, timber, beeswax, elephants teeth and 
the like. The merchants owning the vessel must have dealt in a wide range of 
commodities. As far as the ships themselves are concerned their tonnage’s were 
81,145, 200, 279 and  287 with building dates 1791, 1774, 1787, 1791 and 1777 
respectively; the last three being built in Bristol.  
 
                                                 
42 Lockier, McAulay, Gee and Co. Timber merchants, Milk Street. Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794, p. 54. 
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There are factors concerning this company which could indicate a move towards 
professional shipowning, but referring to Appendix 2.001 for criterion brings a 
mixed message as the tonnage is suitable for flexible trading, which was what was 
actually happening, but the age of the ships did not suit, three being under five 
years. Also, the fact that the larger ships were built in Bristol and the smallest in 
Chepstow (where it could have been built to Bristol standards), point to owners 
who were not buying cheap easily disposable  ships. The company may have been 
moving towards the new mode of ownership, but the all important factor of cargoes 
being shipped for freight payments is missing.     
 
Harford and Co. consisted of two sectors, Harfords and Company and J. Harford, 
both shipping cargoes for Harford, Partridge and Co. and Daniel, Harford and Co., 
examples of the complicated business incorporation at Bristol. Again, this company 
traded to seven out of the eleven areas and deserves a more detailed analysis. 
They had a total of eight ships working in the coastal and foreign trade and 
because some shifted between the two, it is difficult to trace their movements, 
especially as they did not conform to the route registered at Lloyd’s. They 
appeared to have favoured two triangular routes; one to Northwest Europe and 
then to the Baltic, returning to Bristol; and the other to Newfoundland, southern 
Europe and then either Bristol or the Baltic. Two ships were registered for London, 
but one came in from Lynn as a coaster and then traded to the Baltic and Spain. 
There was one anomaly, that is a ship, the Trusty, sailing for, or chartered by the 
Sierra Leone Company to take stores and personnel out to the colony. Its 
departure was recorded in a local newspaper43 and it was  reported to have gone 
on to Barbados and New York, but sank on its return in Barnstaple Bay.44  
 
All import cargoes were carried for the owners, generally timber, iron and ship 
building materials. Exports were on behalf of the owners and others. The size of 
ships were 59, 100. 130, 200, 210 tons with four built in Wales and two in Bristol, 
and they were built in the years, 1790, 85, 89, 90, 86. The Trusty at 278 tons and 
constructed at Bristol in 1778 may have been used for one voyage only as it was 
                                                 
43 BRL: BL9F. Bristol Mercury and Universal Advertiser, 23 January 1792. 
44 Richardson, ed., Bristol, Africa and the Slave Trade, p. 229. 
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both older and larger than the other vessels. The size of the ships, on average, 140 
tons would make them too small to be able to adapt to West Indian or American 
trading and if any move towards professional shipowning was made, they would 
still have to keep to the current trade areas. Four of the five ships were built in 
Wales, but if Newport was used for all, as it was for one vessel, it was close 
enough to understand and build to the requirements of the Bristol shipowner. The 
remaining ship was built in Bristol. Again, though the flexibility of the trading routes 
was suitable for professional ownership, these ships were mainly carrying cargo for 
the owners and this one overriding factor suggests traditional operation.  
 
The slave trade. 
 
The history of the slave trade and its practices have been well documented,45 and 
it is not intended to elaborate on it in this work, but as it was an important part of 
Bristol’s maritime commerce the operations of its ships must be examined. They 
were usually outfitted as if for an expedition, carried additional crew and provisions, 
and a general cargo was put onboard by the owners to be sold at the coast, the 
proceeds being used to purchase slaves. This was the case in all thirty-four 
vessels sailing from Bristol in 1792. The slaves themselves were treated as what 
can only be described as merchandise, to be sold on the other side of the Atlantic 
and it was called the ‘triangular trade’ because if possible a cargo was loaded on 
the ship for the return leg to Bristol which would either provide the owner with 
freight income or profit by sale or commission. 
 
The reality was, however, that return cargoes were not easily obtainable in the 
West Indies unless there had been bumper harvests and only three of the sixteen 
slave ships returning to Bristol were actually laden with what could be described as 
a full cargo. This shows that the triangular trade was more or less finished in 1792, 
and this would have meant that the profits from a voyage were probably low and 
there could have been losses. In 1774, the Africa successfully completed the first 
                                                 
45 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, pp. 128-151; C. M. MacInnes ‘Bristol and the Slave Trade’ in 
Patrick McGrath, ed. Bristol in the Eighteenth Century (Newton Abbot, 1972) pp. 161-184; Dresser, Slavery 
Obscured. 
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two legs of the trade but was unable to find a cargo in the West Indies returning in 
ballast with only a few elephant’s ‘teeth’, and when the profitability of the venture 
was calculated she made a loss of £250.8s.46 
 
Although the slave trading companies could not be classed as professional 
shipowners due to the fact that the entire venture was operating for and on behalf 
of a partnership of owners, the overall research objectives makes it necessary to 
examine their systems as they owned a considerable amount of shipping, 40 
percent of that of the major shipowners. These companies, with the numbers of 
ships owned, are recorded in Appendix 2.008. David Richardson has detailed the 
movements of all vessels employed in the slave trade in 1792 and his work has 
been used in this study and will be referred to when necessary.47 Each company 
has been examined individually. 
 
Anderson had four ships engaged in the slave trade, one of which was a small 
sloop of 26 tons which may have been used as a tender, but did return direct to 
Bristol once in 1792 with a cargo of elephants teeth and camwood. The three other 
ships left Bristol on the first leg of the voyage but did not return that year. Two of 
these ships were of average size, 200-300 tons, but the last was of 600 tons which 
was massive by Bristol standards and would not have been able to berth at the 
City Docks. None of his ships were built in Bristol and with the exception of the 
sloop were all old vessels. 
 
Patrick Fitzhenry had four ships, three of which were slavers and the other was 
registered for Newfoundland, to where it shipped a cargo belonging to the owner in 
1792; its movements after this are unknown. They appear to have been following 
the normal slave trade routine and were between 130 and 200 tons, none were 
built in Bristol, and they were not particularly old. 
 
Walter Jacks owned three slaving vessels, one of which had been trading directly 
to Dominica until the notorious Captain Kimber was transferred to her after being 
                                                 
46 W. E. Minchinton, ‘The Voyage of the Snow Africa’ The Mariner’s Mirror, 37 (1951), pp. 194-195. 
47 Richardson, ed., Bristol, Africa and the Slave Trade, pp. 202-230. 
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cleared of a charge of cruelty to slaves.48 These were old ships, with three out of 
the four not built in Bristol. 
 
James Jones had twenty ships, seventeen of which were employed in the slave 
trade. Regarding the other three, contrary to the normal practices of the company 
one imported fruit and wine for other shippers from Lisbon and then went on to 
work on the coast. No information except registry details could be found for another 
and the last ship was a whaler bound for the Southern Fisheries area.49 All other 
ships carried both export and import goods for the owners benefit although the 
imports were minimal, consisting of a few elephants teeth and the occasional barrel 
of other goods. The size of his ships is given in Appendix 2.009. 
 
Most of the ships in this company were 100-299 tons and out of the twenty ships, 
only two were Bristol built, the others being of English, French or American origin 
and it is possible that the non-English ships could have been prizes.50 The age of 
his fleet is shown in Appendix 2.010. The oldest was built in 1746 and the last in 
1787 making it a comparatively old fleet.  As has been mentioned above, an 
important criteria of professional ownership is ‘concentrated ownership’ and for the 
vessels engaged in the slave trade the details of partnerships are known. 
Richardson says that from 1789-95, 37.8 percent of ships were owned by three or 
more individuals, 21.5 percent by two, and 40.1 percent by a single person.51 
Jones was the sole owner of twelve of his seventeen ships, engaged with one 
partner in three ships, with two in a single vessel, and had three in one other ship. 
This would point to a movement away from traditional ownership. 
 
James Rogers was by far the most substantial shipowner in Bristol having thirty-
two ships, but unlike James Jones his fleet was not dedicated to the slave trade 
although exactly half, sixteen, were used for that purpose in 1792. Of his other 
vessels there was no information available for two, but six were trading to the West 
                                                 
48 Report of the trial of Captain Kimber. FFBJ, 16 June 1792.  
49 Sale of the Catherine. When ships were being sold, some adverts made the statement that a ship was 
‘suitable for both the African trade and the Southern Fisheries’ indicating they had similar characteristics. 
FFBJ, 9 March 1792. 
50 Henley and Co. were known to favour buying prizes. Ville, English Shipowning, p. 9. 
51 Richardson, ed., Bristol, Africa and the Slave Trade, p. xx.  
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Indies, five with Africa directly, two with Newfoundland, and one with the 
Mediterranean. This indicates some flexibility with regards to trade areas, but as far 
as cargo carrying is concerned, there were only two ships where both export and 
import cargoes were not being shipped on behalf of the owner. Details of the ships’ 
tonnage is given in Appendix 2.011. 
 
The versatility offered by this range of shipping means his ships could be used in 
any trade area with the eight small ships available as tenders. Also, three of his 
ships were possibly on charter and there appears to be some evidence of a trade 
in ships themselves as four were sold, two of which were newly built in Bristol in 
1791 and disposed of as soon as they reached the African coast. He bought 
eleven ships originally built in Bristol and the rest were from England, France and 
America, the last two may have been prizes. The age of his fleet is shown in 
Appendix 2.012. He had a fleet with a mixed age range indicating pragmatic buying 
rather than following a set procedure. As far as concentrated ownership is 
concerned, of his sixteen slave trade ships he owned four outright, had one partner 
in three, two partners in six and three in three ships. 
  
When the information regarding the slave traders is analysed, no great difference 
can be found between the data regarding the three lesser operatives and other 
small companies working in the Bristol trading zones, except that their ships 
tended to be older and not to have been built in Bristol. The companies of Rogers 
and Jones however, not only had far larger fleets, but they could fit into more of the 
criteria for professional shipowning, (Appendix 2.001). In both companies there 
were a number of ships owned solely by the registered shipowner, and their largest 
partnership was of four people with most being less.  
 
In Rogers’s case, other trading areas were regularly being serviced by ships not 
involved in the slave trade, and there were a small number of vessels employed as 
tenders to the larger vessels. Some of his ships may have been on charter. The 
type of vessels bought by these owners were older, cheaper and were obviously 
bought, as they were in Henley’s case, on a wide market with some indication that 
Rogers himself bought ships with a view to selling them on at a profit. However, the 
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factor against the suggestion that they were professional ship owners was that 
although their methods fitted the criterion in many ways, there is no doubt that both 
Jones and Rogers were carrying goods primarily for their own purposes and not to 
make an income from freight. 
 
Analysis of the operations of the minor shipowners of Bristol. 
 
It is almost impossible to apply the above criterion to the minor shipowners even 
though there were a total of 46 Bristol shipowners owning 54 ships registered at 
Lloyd’s in 1792, out of which 39 were recorded in the Bristol Presentments as 
having 46 ships trading with the port. Appendix 2.013 shows the available data and 
it can be seen that six had two ships and the rest a single vessel. 
 
Conclusions. 
 
Analysis of the above data leaves no doubt that the vast majority of Bristol 
merchant shipowners adhered to their time honoured, conventional methods, that 
is they ran their vessels according to the criteria listed in Appendix 2.001 under the 
heading ‘traditional shipping’ and if that was the case in 1792, then no change 
could have taken place in the rest of the century.   
 
However, there is the caveat that in the non-slavery areas, Richard Fydal and 
Walter Jacks might bear further examination. James Rogers and James Jones, 
showed signs of innovation to a certain degree, and it could be that they were 
ahead of their time as far as running a shipping business is concerned, possibly 
having been influenced by the changes taking place in London.  
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Section 2. Crewing.  
 
General introduction. 
 
In Section 1, Bristol’s progress towards professional shipowning was discussed 
and it was concluded that there was little change in the traditional ways of working. 
In this section and the following, their methods of manning ships and paying crews 
will be investigated to establish what structures were in place and whether they 
were broadly similar to those used nationwide or if again Bristol had its own 
methods. 
 
No documented schedule of wages for Bristol, or any other port for that matter, has 
been found, so research must concentrate on the surviving ships’ account and 
wages books, and other contemporary documents. A great deal of information 
regarding the conditions of seamen was published towards the end of the century 
in the form of books and pamphlets due to the great debate on the abolition of 
slavery taking place, but the veracity of their data cannot be relied upon as both the 
pro-slavery and abolitionists propagated statistics and reports aimed primarily at 
supporting their cause.  
 
Merchants involved in the trade decried the work of the abolitionists, denied all 
abuses, and formed associations to present information to the various 
parliamentary commissions and committees investigating the matter in this 
period.52 On the other hand, Thomas Clarkson, one of the principal abolitionists, 
came to Bristol between 1787-89 seeking evidence, but although his cause was 
laudable and eventually was won partly through his efforts, much of the information 
he provided to parliament depicted the worst-case scenario and lends confusion to 
the more mundane questions asked in this research. For example, to substantiate 
                                                 
52 For example. The West India Society formed in 1782 was concerned with economic issues regarding the 
West Indies, the wages of seamen and freight charges. In 1788 a petition was presented by them against the 
bill before parliament aimed at regulating the African Trade. McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, pp. 
136, 238. 
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his claim that slave ships were highly unpopular with seamen, he argued53 that it 
was for this trade only that shipowners had to resort to crimping.54 As will be shown 
below this contradicts data taken directly from the account books of ships 
belonging to Samuel Munckley and Co. (referred to henceforth as Munckley) and 
R. and L. Bright (referred to henceforth in the singular as Brights) whose ships 
were regular West Indiamen.   
 
The most useful documents for determining crew numbers, fluctuations, 
destinations of ships and the length of voyages are the Muster Rolls (known 
henceforth as musters) mandatorily presented to the Controller of Customs by a 
ship’s master at the end of each foreign voyage.55 However, there is some difficulty 
in using them to trace movements of seamen as those of the foreign ships suffer 
from erratic recording of a crew member’s last ship. Jonathan Press analysed the 
1787 musters to determine the size of the Bristol seafaring community by 
extracting the numbers of seamen giving the port as their usual place of abode and 
put it at five percent of the total population, but argued that this figure could be 
distorted by immigrants and sailors from other ports claiming to be from Bristol. 
From the results of his research, he concluded that few came from the inland 
towns unless they were directly connected by river.56 
 
Having thoroughly examined the musters, the author decided to disregard 
statistical information regarding place of abode because in the vast majority of 
cases, the master had simply entered Bristol at the top of the column and ‘ditto’ 
henceforth, an indication that anyone signing on in Bristol was taken to be resident 
in the city. Only one roll actually has the addresses of the people listed and they 
mainly lived in boarding houses around the port area, which does not lend 
                                                 
53 Thomas Clarkson, The History of the Rise, Progress, and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the African 
Slave Trade by the British Parliament, (London, 1808) pp. 323-324. 
54 Usually a landlord of a hostelry who allowed a seaman credit but threatened to have him arrested for debt 
unless he signed on with a ship of the landlord’s choosing, whereupon the landlord received a fee from the 
shipowner. See Peter Kemp, ed., Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea (Oxford, 1988) p. 213; or Smyth, 
Sailor’s Word Book, pp. 222-223. 
55 For coastal vessels, Muster Rolls could be presented to customs every six months. BRO: SMV/9/3/1 Ship’s 
Muster Rolls 1748-1795. 
56 For example, Bath and Pill. Jonathan Press, The Merchant Seamen of Bristol, 1747-1789 (Bristol Branch of 
the Historical Association, Reprint Pamphlet No. 38, 2001) pp. 1-3. 
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credence to their residential status.57 Though there were seamen living in long-
term accommodation, by the nature of their calling many would be itinerant, 
especially in wartime and when there was an excess of employment. However the 
information regarding abode does have implications which will be considered 
below when dealing with men taken on at foreign ports and on coasting vessels. 
 
For the seamen of the eighteenth century there was no facility like the Shipping 
Federation of Employers ‘pool’ of seamen which was developed from the end of 
the next century, where men looking for a ship reported and were sent to whatever 
ships were available.58 This provision might have made it easier for seamen to find 
work, but they had to deal with officious, overbearing clerks who had complete 
power over them, making the system open to abuse.59 In the period of the thesis, 
crews would be made up of men who had been hired either by direct approach 
from the owner, master or mate, or by an advance to them by the men themselves.  
 
There are few references in documentation to the system by which seamen were 
employed in Bristol and indeed in the country as a whole. However, the archive of 
Michael Henley and Son, who ran both foreign and coastal shipping, is available 
and information from there can be compared with that from Bristol records. There 
was little evidence to show that the same seamen were employed on a regular 
basis on Henley’s vessels as no employment roll was kept, each master being 
responsible for ensuring that their vessels were manned. The master was also 
given leeway regarding the number of hands.60  
 
According to Ralph Davis, three methods of crew payments were in use in the 
eighteenth century; shares in a ship’s earnings – mostly used for fishing vessels 
and whalers; payment by lump sum in the coastal trades, Ireland, Hamburg, 
Norway and the nearby continental ports; and by monthly wages for seamen on 
                                                 
57  BRO: SMV/9/3/1/9 Muster Rolls 1783-89. Prince William.  
58 Shipping Federation 1890-1982. National association set up by employers to protect shipowners against 
growing union unrest. One of its main features was the ‘pool’ where crews would be selected. It was very 
much an employer’s union. National Museums Liverpool: D/SF MMM.1991.89. 
59 For general comments by seamen on this establishment see British Merchant Navy. Old Friends Plus. 
www.merchant-navy/general-postings/15558-merchant-marine-shipping offices-british-shipping-
federation.html 
60 Ville, English Shipowning, p.93.   
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longer foreign voyages. He says that this ‘firmly established custom would be 
followed by seamen when signing on for any voyage’.61  
 
The first of these methods is of slight interest to this thesis as the numbers of 
vessels working in the Southern Atlantic Fisheries was minute compared to the 
whole and there are no surviving account books. The ships operating out of Bristol 
were mainly foreign-going and coastal, with monthly wages generally being the 
method of payment of the former and lump-sum the latter. Although initial 
investigation showed that there was no fixed line of demarcation between them, 
the total number of ships was such that it was necessary to consider foreign and 
coastal in turn in order to determine whether or not Davis’s general principles were 
applicable to Bristol. Section 2 of this chapter has therefore been divided into two 
sub-sections.  
 
Section 2a. The crewing of foreign ships. 
 
Introduction. No introduction has been made to this section due to it being fully 
covered in the General Introduction above. 
 
The structure of ships’ crews. 
 
In the instructions to the master of Bright’s ship, Triton, a phrase such as ‘and 
order you to get your ship’s company aboard to the number of …, yourself 
included’ is at the beginning of all voyage orders, an indication that while it was the 
captain’s responsibility to engage crew he had no discretion as to numbers.62 He 
could, of course, delegate this to his mate,63 but there is no evidence for mates 
being employed prior to sailing for any purpose except to load the ship.64  
 
                                                 
61 Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, pp. 133-134. 
62 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, 1777-90, p.p. 3,19, 39,56,90,102,111,124. 
63 Clarkson says that the mates of slave vessels preparing for voyages used to pick up hands at public houses. 
Clarkson, History of the Slave Trade, p. 122.  
64 See Chapter 3. 
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It was of great benefit to this investigation to be able to examine the portlidge bills65 
from the account books of two ships of the same size voyaging to the West Indies 
between 1777 and 1788.66 Data from the first of these, the Fanny belonging to 
Munckley, was taken to compile Appendix 2.014 showing the numbers of crew and 
their duties in peace and war.67 There were distinct differences in the ways of hiring 
of seamen in times of war when there was a shortage, and peace when owners 
could impose wages and conditions.68 The first year of peacetime conditions for 
merchant shipping was taken to be 1784 as it took up to a year to return to 
peacetime establishments.  
 
The first item to note was that half of her voyages were completed under wartime 
conditions and she carried an average crew of 18 compared to a peacetime 15. 
This ship did not carry a Letter of Marque, but it will be seen that in 1783 she had a 
gunner on board and all her wartime outsets69 recorded taking on gunpowder so 
that she could defend herself to a certain extent. Another wartime anomaly was the 
shipping of a steward, who would normally be in charge of foodstuffs or the servant 
of the master, 70 but crew numbers had not increased considerably so it is possible 
that he may have been more of a clerk, assisting the captain with the wartime 
increase of paperwork. His wages were on par with a seaman. Twice in wartime 
the ship carried a third mate, which was unusual and may have been to assist with 
watch keeping, but as his rate of pay was less than that of a seaman on his first 
voyage and only equal on his second, it may be that he was rated as such as 
protection against impressment – see below. 
 
In the Royal Navy, hands were rated either as ‘able’, that is able to carry out any 
seamanlike task, or ‘ordinary’, capable of making themselves useful but not skilled. 
In the portlidge bills of the Fanny the term ‘ordinary’ was used but some seamen 
                                                 
65 Portlidge bills were completed at the start of a voyage and contained a list of the crew, their rating, pay per 
month and any advance. They are not to be confused with the Muster Rolls which were completed at the end 
of a voyage. Portlidge bill was a common seafaring term at the time but is not to be found in dictionaries. See 
Minchinton, ed., Trade of Bristol, pp. 92-93. 
66 BRO: 12162 Shipping account book of the Snow Fanny: BRO 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, 
1777-90. 
67 BRO: 12162 Shipping account book of the Snow Fanny, pp. 4,17,31,47,67,81,99,114,128,142,156,171. 
68 See Press, Merchant Seamen, pp. 5-6; Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, pp. 136-137. 
69 Outsets. The name given to the record of all outgoing expenses in the account books. 
70 Falconer’s Dictionary, p. 504. 
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were rated in fractions, for example ½ seaman. This appears to have been a 
general practice as it is seen on for other ships portlidge bills between 1759-91.71  
Unfortunately crews’ ratings were not entered on the musters so they cannot 
confirm that this was a system in general use at Bristol, but it is likely. The master 
probably rated seamen according to his own judgement of their skills, a system by 
which the unscrupulous might reduce his portlidge bill. When this is allowed for, the 
number of full seamen in peacetime was eight or nine and during war between five 
and nearly eleven. 
 
An important difference in crew establishment between peace and war was the 
carrying of apprentices. At Liverpool the practice in both states was to take on 
apprentices at annual wages as a method of cutting down on the wage bills 
(Appendix 2.015). Appendix 2.014 shows that this was not the case with the Fanny 
for although she did carry apprentices in wartime, she did not in peacetime except 
for the two who would be finishing off their agreement.  
 
Two types of apprentice went to sea, the boy paying a premium who was expected 
to learn the trade and become an officer when finished, and poor boys sent to sea 
as an introduction to seafaring.72 There were three main reasons for taking 
apprentices in wartime; the ships’ needed a higher level of manning and seamen 
were scarce; apprentices were not paid highly, if at all, and lowered the overall 
portlidge bill; and for the first three years of their apprenticeship they were exempt 
from being pressed and needed no protection to be purchased for them.73 
 
The Fanny’s portlidge bills confirm Munckley did not pay his apprentices monthly 
wages though he did provide clothing and shoes. Appendix 2.016 shows the 
progress they made as far as this ship was concerned. Apprentices could be 
transferred to another ship at the owner’s discretion – they did not like paying 
subsistence for idle hands during the period the ship was preparing for its next 
                                                 
71 BRO: 39654/1 Voyage Accounts for the Ruby, 1760, 1762; BRO: 39654/2 Voyage Accounts for the Swift 
1759; BRO: 39654/4 Voyage Accounts for the Druid, 1791: BRO FX/20: Bristol Shipping Account Books 
from William Clements Library, Ann Arbor. Industry, 1782. No pagination; BRL 21258: Account Book of 
the Sybil and Success. Success, 1779, p. 125. 
72 Press, Merchant Seamen, p. 3. 
73 Ville, English Shipowning, pp. 109-110. 
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voyage – so it is possible that this was why the six left the Fanny as all had 
returned to Bristol from their voyages.74 Without ratings being entered on the 
musters, it is difficult to trace them on other ships but of the four who progressed in 
this vessel, three became officers and after seven years the other became a full 
seaman. The length of apprenticeship depended on age which means that they 
probably came aboard about 14. Joseph Kendricks and Louis Cowper were 18 in 
1782  which would make the former 17 when he came aboard as that was his first 
trip, and the latter initially 14 or 15.75  
 
The conclusions are that Munckley used apprentices during the war years to make 
up for a shortage of seamen, but he treated them well and allowed them to rise 
through the ranks. However, the practice stopped when hostilities ended, showing 
that he was not using the Liverpool system to reduce his portlidge bill. He did put 
both paid and unpaid boys on board, the former earning about half a seaman’s 
wage, but there was no sign that he advanced them except in the case of Joseph 
Devonish, who was probably a protégé of his father, Captain John Devonish. 
 
The second ship, the Triton, was husbanded by Brights completing nine voyages at 
the same time as the Fanny’s twelve, five under wartime manning and carrying an 
average of 23 crew compared to 16 in peacetime. She required more men due to 
being a Letter of Marque ship and was thus armed with twelve guns and 6 swivels; 
hence the gunner on three occasions and the additional crew.76 Unlike the Fanny, 
she carried no third mates, ordinary seamen or apprentices and a steward on only 
three occasions, obscuring further the latter’s role. On the 7th voyage the position 
was taken by a man who had already made four trips as a seaman and who was 
on the same wages, making it a possibility he had a dual role as seaman 
(Appendix 2.017). 
 
                                                 
74 Ville says that apprentices could be transferred at the owners discretion. Ville, English shipowning, p. 109. 
75 Unusually, this muster roll had the age of the apprentices on it. BRO: SMV/9/3/1/8 Muster Rolls 1777-83, 
30.  
76 See Damer Powell, Bristol Privateers, p. 299. However, Damer Powell was wrong about the tonnage which 
was 230 and the number of men which he put at 30.  
 155 
The complement of officers was similar to the Fanny except, unusually, a cooper 
was carried on one occasion who was pressed at Barbados. Again, the seamen 
were rated according to how experienced the master considered them, but no 
matter how the author tried to compute the number of men equivalent to a skilled 
seamen, even counting boys, the figures per voyage in wartime were irregular, an 
indication that desperate masters would take anyone they could get. At the 
beginning of the war the Triton even carried landsmen, possibly because she was 
a Letter of Marque and like slave ships needed hands rather then skilled seamen. 
This does not seem to have been cost-effective as six of the eight ran or left in the 
West Indies, whilst the two who returned home did not continue with the ship. The 
Triton did not use apprentices and the economics of taking boys will be dealt with 
below. 
 
The allegiance of crewmen to one ship or company. 
 
Having looked at the structure of a ship’s crew, it is logical to consider whether or 
not there was any allegiance between shipowners and former crewmen, or if new 
crewmen were found for each voyage. The portlidge lists for these two ships are 
again the basis for investigation. Appendices 2.018 and 2.019 give lists of all 
crewmen who sailed for more than one voyage on the Fanny and Triton 
respectively. Appendix 2.020 condenses data from the previous two appendices . 
 
Considering the number of crewmen who sailed with the Fanny, it is shown that 
very few stayed for more than one voyage. Seven made two to three consecutive 
trips, but only one man left and returned several voyages later, an indication that 
there was no general allegiance to the ship. A few returned for another voyage 
having changed roles such as from seaman to cook, but the main reason for men 
making return voyages appears to have been personal advancement. The 
apprentices and boys have been dealt with, but in general the long-term men were 
officers; for example, the second mate Thomas Healey promoted from boatswain 
stayed for five years. The original master and part-owner, Thomas Richards, made 
seven voyages before becoming ill and being replaced by his chief mate who 
stayed with the ship till it was sold. The longest serving were the boy Stokes, 
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mentioned above, and the carpenter who returned for all voyages missing only the 
original to Petersburg.  
 
Discounting officers, there were no signs of allegiance but it would seem 
reasonable that an owner would take on men who had worked well for him before 
on his other ships and that a man would return if he had been treated properly. The 
difficulty for seamen might have been that they could not afford to wait between 
voyages for their ship to refit.  
 
Munckley husbanded two other ships, the Exeter77 and the Hope,78 during this 
period and although their account books have not survived, inter-ship crew 
movements amongst the three ships can be traced by comparing their musters. 
The recurrent problem for the researcher, however, is the accuracy of the ‘last 
voyage’ column which was dependant on the ability and inclination of the master. 
For example, Captain Winder of the Exeter was fairly diligent but Simms of the 
Hope made copious use of ‘unknown’ even for seamen who returned with the ship; 
his roll for 1786 had nine out of a total of 17 men listed as such. Comparing the 
portlidge bills and musters again brings out vagaries in the latter, the cooks’ names 
not being included in the first three voyages, perhaps because they were Africans 
having what were probably nicknames bestowed on them; on two voyages the 
cook was named ‘Somerset’. Apprentices and boys if not on wages were not 
entered on the musters and sailors taken on in Cork could also be omitted. Any 
research done using only the Bristol musters of this period must include some 
inaccuracies. 
 
However, the name and length of time onboard of each man was accurate as the 
deduction of hospital money from his wages depended on this, and so compiling 
data regarding allegiance to the ship is possible. Unfortunately, due to Simms, the 
musters of the Hope give only limited information, especially as the original ship 
was sold and another built during the period. Data from her will be referred to, but 
                                                 
77 Exeter; Captain W. Fuss, 300t, built Bristol 1776, Munckley, Bristol-Jamaica.  Lloyd’s Register, 1787. 
78 Hope; Captain J. Simms, 350t, built Bristol 1784, Munckley, Bristol-Jamaica. Lloyd’s Register, 1787. 
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the research will mainly concentrate on the voyage details of the Fanny and Exeter 
listed in Appendices 2.021 and 2.022. 
 
The Fanny at 230t was smaller than the other two with an average crew for all 
voyages of 16. This included apprentices and boys, residents of Bristol who would 
remain aboard. On two occasions in wartime, seamen joined at Cork and it is 
probable that a captain unable to fill his crew at Bristol would sail expecting to find 
seamen in Ireland. There is no sign of this happening in peacetime. A total of 70 
men, or 38 percent, rejoined the ship for another voyage, there being little 
difference war to peacetime except on the 7th voyage when the realisation that jobs 
might be scarce was probably the cause for almost doubling the percentage. As 
has been noted above, a higher proportion of officers showed allegiance to the 
ship but these figures demonstrate this was not the case with ordinary crewmen, 
either to the ship or between company ships. 
 
The percentage of crew returning to the Exeter was 42, higher than the Fanny but 
this could be weighted by having no portlidge bills to substantiate data. There 
appears to be no correlation between voyages having a high proportion of seamen 
returning and the length of time the ship refitted. In 1779 the ship had discharged 
its last crew in August 1778 and left late December with a fair proportion of the 
previous men, and the same occurred on her last voyage when she arrived in the 
September and left in December. Likewise short terms in port made no difference, 
so length of time in port has no effect on previous crew returning. Again, this ship 
took seamen on at Cork but only in the war years, and once more there was no 
sign of allegiance to company ships. 
 
Regarding the Hope, on average 25 percent returned next voyage. She also 
carried apprentices in wartime and took seamen at Cork. There was more 
movement between ships, but this was caused by Captain Simms and his mate 
moving to the Exeter when his own ship was being rebuilt. The conclusion as far as 
Munckley’s vessels were concerned is that there was no practice of retaining 
seamen or moving them between ships; they would stay if it suited them but there 
was no company policy to encourage them to do so. 
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Considering Bright’s vessels and using the same methods as with Munckleys’, the 
data for the Triton presented on Appendix 2.020 shows that even fewer men 
stayed with the ship long-term, the longest serving five trips. Even the masters 
were changed four times. Men did stay on to advance themselves, usually a boy 
becoming a seaman – although on a single occasion one advanced only to 
landsman but on more pay – but in general men simply returned for another 
voyage and with no structure of promotion it is unlikely that the company practised 
any policy of allegiance. 
 
Brights at this period husbanded more ships than Munckley, seven in all, and by 
using the same research methods for the Triton allegiance should be exposed by 
examination of the results shown in Appendix 2.023. The problem of inaccurately 
completed rolls was worse with this ship than with the two above, and was 
complicated further when the correlation of portlidge bills and muster rolls showed 
that some captains were leaving blank spaces to indicate repetition, otherwise 
‘ditto’.79 In addition, the portlidge bills and muster rolls did not always agree on 
crew numbers, for example on Voyages 7 and 8. Although the Triton did sail to 
Cork on her 3rd and 5th voyages she does not record taking on men.  
 
The number of crew returning for another voyage, 38 or 22 percent, was less than 
for the Fanny and yet the Triton was taking all outgoing seamen from her home 
port. This ship took more first voyagers, probably due to her being a Letter of 
Marque, and this is substantiated by their reduction in numbers at the end of the 
war. What was significant was that each time the captain changed, the number of 
previous crew remaining dropped significantly; Henderson and Jolly to none and 
only one man stayed to sail under Honeywell. Henderson brought four with him 
from his previous ship, two petty officers and two stewards, but the other captains 
came alone.  
 
                                                 
79 Captain Henderson was using a system of one ‘ditto’ at the top of a column and it is assumed that all 
underneath till the next entry are the same. He put Triton and one ‘ditto’ underneath which would normally 
mean two were from the previous voyage but the portlidge bills indicate seven. BRO: SMV/9/3/1/9 Muster 
Rolls 1783-1789, 66. 
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These anomalies may simply be coincidence, but it could mean that captains 
preferred to start afresh on new ships and likewise resident crewmen were not 
keen on following new captains. Captain Honeywell’s muster roll was well compiled 
and of particular interest was the column noting usual residence which showed that 
out of the 15 crew on it, eight were from Bristol, two were local and the other five 
from as far afield as Scotland. That is probably a more likely assortment than the 
usual entry claiming all were from Bristol. Again, there appears to be little 
allegiance of crew to the ship and no indication that there was movement amongst 
company ships. 
 
The Druid, another ship husbanded by Brights was chosen as the equivalent of the 
Exeter because she worked through the same period, and although no account 
books survived for these years, two are available for 1790-92. The data obtained in 
the same way as above is recorded in Appendix 2.024. Again there was the 
problem of inaccurate muster rolls, as can be seen in the unknown column, 
although those from Captain Stott were as good as any demonstrating that the 
quality of the returns depended on the captain. There were no portlidge bills 
available for 1778 so the number of boys or apprentices is unknown.  
 
The Druid was a Letter of Marque ship during the American War and like the Triton 
carried a larger crew to work 12 guns.80 Damer Powell records only the details of 
the ship and therefore she took no prizes and almost certainly no prize money.81 
Only in 1780 and 1782 did she pick up crew from Cork so they do not alter the 
composition of the outgoing crew. The ‘last ship’ column in Captain Stott’s musters 
had no unknowns so it can be revealed that crew came from a broad assortment of 
ships belonging to other companies, 12 or more per voyage, and sometimes three 
or more men from the same ship. Although that occurred in wartime, the 1787 
muster has the same pattern with 13 different ships represented, leaving no doubt 
that seamen did not have allegiance to one ship but would take what was 
available.  
                                                 
80 Druid, Ss, Captain T. Powell, 300t, Built Bristol, 1777, L&R Bright, Bristol-Jamaica. Lloyd’s Register, 
1787. 
81 Again Damer Powell has got the tonnage and the number of men wrong. Tonnage should be 300 and crew 
are as in Appendix 2.024. Damer Powell, Bristol Privateers, p. 294. 
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While Stott was captain, 28 percent of men returned for the next voyage and under 
Powell, 27 percent. The fact that five crewmen returned when Powell became 
captain does not alter the comments above regarding new captains as he had 
served as mate on three previous voyages and was therefore known. As far as 
crew were concerned, the 1784 voyage was particularly successful in that the 
same men he left with all came back with the ship and none had to be taken on in 
the West Indies.  
 
The difficulties of retaining crews in the West Indies. 
 
The crewing problems for ships trading to the West Indies were manifold, the 
extent depending on whether the country was at war or peace, the former causing 
men to be scarce as they could be impressed anywhere in the world there was a 
naval ship. Also with wages being at a premium, men were liable to run to seek 
better elsewhere. Technically, after signing articles a crewman should have 
remained for the entire voyage, but the numbers of men being discharged at the 
West Indies in both war and peace point to informal agreements between master 
and individual seamen. To examine these problems, the turnover of men during the 
voyages of the above four ships has been analysed with the data recorded in 
Appendix 2.025 and a précis of this in Appendix 2.026.  
 
Taking the situation in wartime first. The massive manpower requirements of the 
Royal Navy meant that they impressed every seaman they could catch, leaving the 
shipowners with the problem of finding and keeping men for their ships. Protections 
could be bought either for individuals or an entire ship’s company, but the slightest 
mistake in them could result in a man being pressed. Munckley bought individual, 
servants, and ship’s protections for the crew of the Fanny from 1777 to 1783, but it 
did not stop two men in 1780, and three in 1781 being pressed in Barbados.82   
 
There is no account book for the Exeter for verification, but being from the same 
company she would probably have carried protections though she had five seamen 
                                                 
82 BRO: 12162 Shipping account book of the Snow Fanny, pp. 5,32,50.69,83, 101. There was no entry in 
1778 but it is likely there were protections not recorded in the disbursements. 
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pressed in the war years. Unfortunately the Triton’s book does not record 
protections though again it is likely they were carried. The only loss she had was in 
1782, but that was a severe case of eleven men. The Druid had men taken 
regularly so it could be that Brights were not as careful as Munckley about 
protections, though it could be due to them shipping bigger crews.  
 
As has been mentioned above, shipowners in wartime resorted to using the 
landlords of hostelries and suchlike to inveigle seamen to join their ships and it is 
likely that they did use nefarious tactics, even though Clarkson believed that these 
devices were only used in the slave trade. The reality was that a respectable 
company like Munckley’s used landlords to procure seamen for every voyage 
between 1778 and 1782, paying a guinea per head.83 Unfortunately the Triton’s  
book records only one incident, ‘crimpage paid sundry landlords, £17.6s.6d’ in 
1779, but it was probably done every voyage and the actual sums lost in the 
general disbursements.  
 
The wages of crewmen will be described below, but one of the difficulties for 
owners during wartime was that men were inclined to desert in the West Indies if 
they thought they would earn more on other home-going ships short of crew. This 
problem was voiced in the instructions to the master of the Triton on its first 
voyage:  
 
As you come home with convoy there will not be any necessity of having so 
many men as you take out and as we expect many of them will leave you in 
the West Indies we would not have you supply their place with runners 
without so many should leave you as you would stand in need of some to 
work the ship.84 
 
This instruction shows that despite the ship carrying a Letter of Marque, Brights 
had no intention of allowing their ships to aggressively seek prizes. In fact, on this 
                                                 
83 BRO 12162: Shipping account book of the Snow Fanny. p.p. 18,32,15,69,82. The actual cost of an 
individual seaman is not recorded but all charges are recorded in multiples of a guinea and the cost, £13.13 in 
1781, was multiplied in terms of half guineas then the number of seamen would outnumber the whole crew.  
84 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, 1777-90, p. 6. 
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voyage ten men ran in Jamaica and one died, the captain replacing them with only 
four runners.85 It may be that the captain took it as an instruction to actively get rid 
of men because in the next four years of war, only two men ran though 23 were 
discharged. If the initial voyage and the single impressment event were discounted, 
there is no real deficit in crew numbers outward and inward on the Triton, and 
although the Druid had an overall shortfall of eight, this was mainly caused by men 
being pressed. Very few were discharged compared to the Triton and overall there 
is little indication that Brights deliberately tried to save money by encouraging crew 
to leave in the West Indies. Munckley’s ships had an even better record of 
replacing crew and as shown in Appendix 2.026, they ended the war taking a 
surplus of men back again.  
 
In peacetime, as might be expected, there were fewer runners because wages 
were stable and except for the Exeter the ships carried back more crew than they 
took out. More men died in peacetime from disease than from armed conflict in 
war; the figures being inflated by five at once on the Triton in 1786, which shows 
that death in the West Indies was a lottery. Some minor points the investigation 
brought to light were the need for some ships to take men on at Cork and that Irish 
seamen would join at Bristol and sign off again in Ireland, presumably the masters 
accepted this as they were short of men.  
 
Payment of crews. 
 
The conditions under which seamen were hired and paid were laid out in ‘Articles 
of Agreement Between the Master and Mariners’ which were first established by 
law in 1729 and made perpetual in 1762 after verbal contracts had become 
unworkable. Another act was passed in 1797 due to the problems of seamen 
deserting in the West Indies.86 These acts will be referred to where they apply to 
Bristol seamen.  
 
                                                 
85 BRO: SMV/9/3/1/8 Muster Rolls 1777-83, 52. 
86 2 Geo II c. 36. An Act for the better regulation and government of seamen in merchants service: Made 
perpetual by 2 Geo. III c. 31: Desertion of Seamen Act, 37 Geo III, c 73, sect 1. 
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Articles of Agreement (henceforth referred to as ‘Articles’) were not included in the 
account books so surviving copies are few and far between. Appendix 2.027 
contains a transcript of that of the Sybil for the voyage of 1785 to Antigua and 
Jamaica and this document will be referred to when examining the technicalities 
involved in dealing with crewing a ship.87 The Articles are an agreement between 
the master and crew, not crew and owners. The second paragraph gave the 
parameters of where the master was allowed to take his ship, and although it 
designated the discharging ports, it allowed him considerable freedom as to where 
his return cargo was loaded – and indeed he could go on to discharge at any port 
in Great Britain. The most likely alternative for Bristol ships was London. Trading 
outside of these areas left it open for the crew to enter into negotiations regarding 
pay.  
 
Wages will be dealt with below, but once a seaman had been hired either by the 
captain or an agent 88 and signed the ship’s articles, he was entitled to a month’s 
wages in advance. This was not given to him in cash but in the form of a docket 
known vernacularly as a ‘sailing note’. A number of them survive all following 
roughly the same format. The entries in brackets were made individually when 
signing on. 
 
No.   Bristol, August 11th 1779. 
Six days after the last sailing of the (Ship Success) from Kingroad (myself) 
master for (Jamaica). I promise to pay to (James Hill) or order, the sum of 
(four pounds ten shillings) for one month’s pay provided he proceeds in said 
vessel agreeable to the Articles he hath signed. 
William Ball for Messrs L & R Bright , Merchants Bristol.89 
 
This document is useful to the researcher as it was the custom to record on the 
back the date cashed, who had presented it and occasionally whether there had 
                                                 
87 BRL 21258: Account book of the Sybil and Success. Success,1779, p. 46: For further details of the refit of 
these ships and their voyage to the West Indies, see Chapter 4.2a. 
88 For example, Walter Jacks, a local merchant, signed some of the notes on behalf of Brights. 
89 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success. Success, 1779, p.166. 
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been an intermediary. From an analysis of this information it is possible to 
understand the structure of the hiring system.  
 
All the seamen’s notes found so far give the sailing port as Kingroad, not Bristol, so 
the likelihood is that all foreign-going ships stopped there to be cleared and have 
the articles signed by the master and witnessed by Customs. The Sybil’s were 
dated 23 November, 1785, but although the three surviving seamen’s notes were 
made over a week before, there is no date recording when they reported aboard.90  
The ship had been towed down on the 15th so it is possible that they could have 
joined it then, but it is unlikely that seamen would come aboard before they had to 
as they were not yet on pay and the agreement was that his wages would not 
begin ‘until the ship’s last departure from the port of Bristol’, which in the case of 
the Sybil was not till  9 December, this date being confirmed by the date wages 
began for each seaman.91 
 
The purpose of the advance was to allow the man to equip himself for the voyage 
and to clear any debts ashore but, of course, if a safeguard had not been built into 
the system there was no guarantee that the crewman once in possession of this 
money would not abscond or even join another ship. To prevent this, the sailing 
note clearly stated that it could not be cashed until six days after he had sailed, 
which was not a problem for an established man with family like William Saunders 
of the Success who was given his sailing note on 4 August 1779, and after the ship 
sailed on the 16th, it was cashed by his father on 14 September.92 It appears from 
the cashing in dates on these notes, that the shipowner did not honour them ad 
hoc, but probably published some sort of notice setting a specific day.  
 
However, many seamen had no family and would want the money immediately and 
so have to sell their notes for whatever sum they could get. John Donovan of the 
Fanny, received his note on 19 December, and from the back of the note, it 
                                                 
90 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success. Success,1779, p. 45,160-172; BRO: AC/MU/3/8c 
Promissory note Capt Richards for seaman’s advances, 19 December 1786. 
91 Hilhouse’s bill gives the actual sailing date. BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success,, 1779, p. 
25. The wages book was contained in the account book but not attached to it. 
92 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success. Success,1779, p. 162. 
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appears he sold it to another crew member, Thomas Kirby, who in turn gave or 
sold it on to the payee who cashed it on 7 January. The ship had sailed on 24 
December so Donovan had probably been in desperate need of the money.93 In a 
way this was similar to the manipulation of bills of exchange, but at a much less 
respectable level.  
 
The fleecing of seamen ashore was common practice94 but perhaps the most 
notorious way was the system of ‘crimping’. This has been mentioned above, but 
further evidence comes from dockets associated with the sailing notes. On a note 
signed by Walter Jacks, six pounds, six shillings was promised to a Mr George 
Porter95 provided three seamen sail in the Success, but of special interest is that 
this payment was split in two, one half to be paid when they were onboard, and the 
other six days after the ship sailed. One of these men made over his sailing note to 
Porter who cashed it the day the ship left and further examination shows that 
Porter was paid before the sailing day, but had to provide a note of hand saying he 
would refund the money if it turned out the man or men had not sailed. The latter 
note distinctly mentions crimpage.96 Other similar notes were available and it 
appears that Brights would pay out early provided the recipient was reliable and 
signed a note of hand.  
  
Porter appears to have been regularly involved in this business as two other 
sailors, one of whom did not sail, were lined up by him for the same ship and he 
again received his fee and the proceeds of the sailing note given to the other man. 
Another set of notes shows that others apart from him were involved in the same 
possibly shady trade.97 Porter was a salesman, contemporarily defined as ‘one 
who sells clothes ready made’,98 which indicates he probably ran a slop-shop, one 
of the trades known to take advantage of seamen.99 The word crimp is emotive100 
                                                 
93 BRO: AC/MU/3/8c Promissory note Capt Richards for seaman’s advance, 19/12/86. 
94 Press, Merchant Seamen, p. 4. 
95 George Porter was a salesman on the quay. Bristol Directory, 1785. 
96 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success. Success,1779, p. 170. 
97 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success. Success,1779, pp. 160-161. 
98 Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language. 
99 Press, Merchant Seamen, p. 4. 
100 Dixon suggests the following definition. ‘A crimp is an informal labour contractor who uses guile, force or 
fraud to gain physical or financial control over seamen taking his profits from their past or future earnings or 
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but there is no real evidence of the practice of what would be referred to in the next 
century as ‘Shanghaiing’, that is sailors being shipped against their will.101 Conrad 
Dixon’s term ‘an informal labour contractor’ albeit with few ethics, would probably 
be the best description of the work of the crimps at Bristol and no doubt they were 
aided and abetted by landlords. 
 
Crimping was not confined to Great Britain. The Success reached Barbados in 
February, 1780 and seven crew left including three seamen discharged with full 
pay, whereupon the captain was obliged to get five runners through the agent for 
the onward trip to Jamaica102 for which the agent received five guineas, his bill 
stating this was for ‘crimpage’.103 There is some confusion about the term ‘runners’, 
and although some may have been listed on their ship’s musters as having ‘ran’ 
from their ship, that is deserted, the term actually describes men who signed on for 
a ‘run’, that is a one way trip, usually back to England.  
 
Nevertheless, four of the five seamen joining this ship in Barbados wanted only to 
sail to Jamaica and on arrival signed off again receiving £7.14s for the eleven days 
run, more than double the monthly wage of those who joined in England.104 The 
fifth seaman received £4.10s but stayed on for about seven weeks to work on the 
ship at the current seaman’s wages of £2.16s per month eventually collecting 
£9.7s. Altogether another eight men and one acting second mate were taken on for 
one to two months at £4 per month, again an excellent salary. All the figures given 
are in sterling although they were paid in full in equivalent currency. It was 
obviously lucrative in wartime for seamen to remain in the islands taking short term 
employment maintaining and manoeuvring ships.  
 
At the end of the voyage, the Success’s crew’s final payments were entered in a 
separate wages book recording per man his due wages for the months and days 
                                                                                                                                                     
from the employers of sea labour when hands are delivered to a ship.’ C. Dixon, ‘Signing-on’, The Mariner’s 
Mirror 70 (1884), 311–319. p. 318.  
101 See Peter Kemp, ed., The Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea, p. 776. 
102 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success. Success,1779, p. 129. Letter from Captain Ball to 
owners. 
103 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success, 1779, p. 127. 
104 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success, 1779, pp. 127-128. 
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worked and the deduction of any pre-voyage advances and hospital money. Each 
man signed his page agreeing that he had no further claim against the owners and 
all crew members’ earnings were totalled at the end of the book. The Wages Book 
for the Sybil contains the same information, but there the seaman signed a 
stamped docket which was pasted on one side of a double page which also 
recorded his hospital money payment with the final wages calculated on the other. 
In two cases the docket requesting monthly payments to the seaman’s wife has 
been pasted in.  
 
Please to pay to my wife (name and sum per month) on account of my 
wages per your ship Sybil which I promise to allow her and to be deducted 
out of my wages.   
 
One man was paid an extra guinea for piloting the ship from Lundy to Minehead. 
Six seamen had signed on during the stay in the West Indies being paid normal 
wages when there, but their ‘run money’ was £9.9s taking their total wages for an 
average two months work above those of the crew who had served the whole 
voyage. 
 
There is one other Wages Book available dated 1761-1762 pertaining to the 
Clifton, one of Munckley’s vessels.105  It is of an earlier period but is of interest 
because the ship had a much larger crew than normal, 37 leaving Bristol compared 
to her usual contingent of about 15, and so may have carried a Letter of Marque. 
However Damer Powell says that it was not issued till April, 1762. It is odd that 
Munckley would pay wages to so many crew for no  purpose, but it is possible that 
she was manned purely for defence as she was running without convoy.106 In his 
penultimate letter, the master says that she ‘was well manned and fitted for 
defence hopes not easily taken’.107 As well as the Wages Book, three letters 
survive and analysis of these brings forth some of the problems faced by 
shipowners and masters in wartime. From the information in the Wages Book an 
                                                 
105 BRO: AC/MU/1/9 Wages book for the ship Clifton, 1761-1762. 
106 Damer Powell, Bristol Privateers, p. 239. 
107 BRO: AC/MU/1/8a Letter from John Smith commander of the Clifton to Samuel Munckley and Co, 
13/1/62. 
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itinerary of the movements of the Clifton’s crewmen can be made starting at Bristol 
(Appendix 2.028).108  
 
As would be expected a number of seamen ran at Barbados but Captain Smith 
says he carried no runners, so these appear to have been replaced without having 
to resort to crimping. The Sybil’s articles do not specify the penalty for desertion, 
but those of the snow Hope, 1768, follow the 1729 legislation, that is the seaman 
was liable to lose both wages and all goods and chattels on board.109 The book 
entry simply gives the man’s wages till he deserted and deducts his initial advance, 
two months wages in this case, and hospital money. It makes the balance out to 
the seaman but gives no mention of its ultimate destination.110  
 
Two were pressed at Barbados, one of whose wages was paid to Smith which 
could mean he originally paid the man himself, but there is no indication of where 
the proceeds of the other went or of the five who joined the army. Smith claimed he 
had saved money by not taking ‘runners’, but the wages of the men who joined 
were on average twice that of the resident seamen.  
 
The final letter was sent by Smith to the owners from Ilfracombe (Appendix 2.029) 
gives details of the dispersal of the men at the end of the voyage which, when 
combined with the information given in the Wages Book, highlights the uncertainty 
faced by seamen in wartime. The Clifton did reach British waters without 
encountering the enemy, but with the weather against her all the way and by the 
time the ship reached the Holmes in the Bristol Channel, only the master and four 
or five of the officers were fit to work the ship due to gales. She could not proceed 
past the Holmes and had to put into Ilfracombe, managing this only with the help of 
men from an impressment service tender.111  
                                                 
108 There is no page numbering in the Wages Book so column three gives the sequential number of the 
seaman’s entry starting at the first.  
109 BRO: AC/MU/1/12a Seamen’s articles of the Snow Hope. These were too damaged to be released to the 
public but are copied in Minchinton, ed., Trade of Bristol, p.169 
110 Conrad Dixon says that in 1790 forfeited pay from deserters amounted to £100 and was transferred to the 
Greenwich Hospital account. The amount is ludicrous because on this ship alone runners had earned at least 
£10. Dixon, ‘Signing-on’. 
111 For details of the history of impressment at Bristol, see Nicholas Rogers, Manning the Royal Navy in 
Bristol: Liberty, Impressment and the State, 1739-1815 (Bristol Record Society, 66, 2014) pp. xv-xvi. 
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In wartime the main impressment centre was a tender based at Kingroad 
supported by an active pressgang at Bristol, so returning seamen were vulnerable 
to the press. Stratagems were employed by masters to save their crews, such as 
allowing them to escape ashore at remote places like the Holmes and 
Ilfracombe.112 This ship was unfortunate in that it had needed the tender’s 
assistance and so once it reached Ilfracombe it was inevitable that men would be 
pressed. However, because of this  incident data is entered in the Wages Book 
which allows the researcher to analysis a situation that is not normally recorded, 
that is the actual method of paying off of men pressed at sea.  
 
There was certainly no attempt by Smith to avoid paying his men, and indeed he 
settled with them the next day after taking the trouble to obtain cash by a Bill of 
Exchange from his local agent because the men were ‘in want of necessaries’.113 
All outstanding monies were duly paid including internal debts between crewmen 
and those to the master. It is unusual in contemporary documents to see debts 
such as these recorded and indeed there are no entries in any wages books 
concerning advancements made once a ship had left port, an indication that money 
was only available to the crew overseas by taking loans on the Captain’s account 
or from other crew members.  
 
All nine pressed men owed money to the captain, probably for slops and minor 
loans, ranging from £1.9s. to £4.5s., the latter being a considerable sum as the 
men earned £1.8s. per month. Smaller debts of under one pound were owed by 
men to the officers and to each other. Considering that these represented the 
financial dealings of only nine men, out of a total of 48 employed on the voyage, 
relatively substantial sums must have been exchanged when wages were paid at 
the end of a voyage. 
 
Only the pressed men had their debts formally recorded as private enterprise was 
not the business of the shipowner, but the special circumstances here were that 
                                                 
112 Rogers, Manning the Royal Navy, p. 40. 
113 AC/MU/1/8e. Letter from John Smith to Samuel Munckley and Co. from Ilfracombe. 
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these men would be incarcerated in the Impress Service’s local lockup and it may 
have been difficult for the captain to exercise the usual end of voyage system, 
where he would have his own account book and settle during the payoff. Eight 
others were discharged, four of whom were given an advance of £2 each, possibly 
to get them back to Bristol overland and to keep them till they cashed their notes. 
Going by the higher wages involved, these men must have been petty officers and 
although by discharging them the captain might have been saving a few days 
wages, it is possible that they were returning overland to avoid the attention of 
other press tenders. Also, the tenders were required to leave enough men onboard 
to work the ship. The remaining four men were probably foreigners and as such not 
liable to the press.  
 
The advance given these men was not entered in the Wages Book but recorded on 
a docket which survived within the book meaning they must have received a 
payment note rather than cash. The men who actually took the ship back were 
signed-off two days after leaving Ilfracombe and all were paid eleven days later 
showing that they too had avoided the press. The short delay in men getting their 
wages at Bristol was part of the articles, their pay being held back until the cargo 
had been discharged lest the owner wanted to charge them for damage. There is 
no sign of any owner doing this in any of the surviving Bristol wages books and the 
time limit of 30 days was always observed. Similarly, there were no fines or 
forfeitures listed in the books and as these would not be the property of the master, 
it is likely that it was not a normal procedure used against ordinary Bristol 
crewmen. Perhaps, as with other traditions built up over the years, the Bristol 
shipowners and seamen had developed a system that satisfied each other. 
 
Crew Wages. 
 
When considering seamen’s wages on Bristol ships in the eighteenth century, the 
information above has shown that there was a marked difference between peace 
and wartime conditions. In the former case, the levels remained remarkably stable 
with a seaman receiving about 25s per month for most of the century up until the 
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end of the American war when it went up to 30s.114 John Latimer says that in 1768 
there had been a disturbance on the quays by seamen trying to raise wages to 
30s, but it had been unsuccessful. However, after the war there had been poverty 
in Bristol and following another disturbance, the mayor agreed to recommend to 
shipowners to pay the increase and also half-wages at Kingroad.115 Wartime 
wages were still being paid in 1783 but from the following year 30s became the 
norm. There is no indication the seamen ever received wages for being at 
Kingroad. 
 
Immediately the country went on a war footing and the press began, seamen’s 
wages rose and fluctuated to cope with the inevitable shortage of men. To examine 
this phenomenon and to compare war and peacetime wages, data has been taken 
from the portlidge bills of the Fanny and Triton covering the period 1777-1788 and 
has been recorded in Appendices 2.030 and 2031, voyage by voyage. These 
appendices will be referred to later, but for the immediate purpose of comparing 
peace and war wage levels, data has been extracted from them to compile 
Appendix 2.032 and 2.033, into which the wage levels from the portlidge bill for a 
pre-war vessel, the Sally, have been inserted as a yardstick.116 All wages are per 
month. 
 
Jonathan Press believed that at Bristol wage levels were far less affected by the 
onset of war than were those of London due to the former not being a naval port 
and therefore not so affected by the pressgangs. He puts the figure at an increase 
of 16 percent for an able seaman, but this was certainly not the case at the start of 
the American war if these two ships on the same trade but belonging to different 
owners are taken as standard.117 The Fanny’s seamen had a 120 percent increase 
whilst those of the Triton gained 140, and on both ships the wages for seamen 
continued to rise through the course of the war.  
                                                 
114 Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p. 136-137. 
115 Latimer, Annals,  p. 385, 454. 
116 BRO: 39654/2 Voyage accounts for the Swift (1759-60), Sally (1767-72) and Nevis Planter (1770-75). 
There are no page numbers in this account book. This portlidge bill was for the Sally’s 7th Voyage, she sailing 
1 April 1768. The Sally sailed for Jamaica and was husbanded by Henry Bright, father of Richard and uncle 
of Lowbridge. 
117 Press, Merchant Seamen, p. 6. 
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Comparing both ships, it can be seen that Triton’s men were on slightly higher 
wages than those of the Fanny, which was probably due to the former being a 
Letter of Marque and needing more inducement to get crew, or Brights simply paid 
a little more. If it were the latter then the appendix shows it did not continue into 
peacetime. However, when the individual wage rises by rank are considered, it can 
be seen that some fared better than others.118 Appendix 2.034 gives the 
percentage rise of wages by rank from peace to wartime and its peak. 
 
The master’s wage had risen before the war to £6 and remained the same 
throughout and after, but this cannot be seen as his true income as he had other 
sources such as primage, day money in the islands, cabin money, passenger fares 
and as described above he would have revenue from the crew. Also, if his owner 
was operating in the traditional way, he might own part of the ship and would 
certainly be carrying some freight on his own accord. The reality was that small 
increases in his wage were not of great importance to him and hence his wages 
did not fluctuate.  
 
Although the chief mate did not have the master’s potential to augment his salary 
significantly, he would not have sought temporary increases as he was in waiting 
for that post and so would not risk losing it.119 On African ships the mates and other 
officers usually had the right to carry slaves freight free and so increase their 
earnings,120 but the freight lists outwards and the few surviving inwards for these 
two ships have been scrutinised and there are no goods for any member of the 
crew except the master. With all the warnings in the master’s instructions about 
smuggling, it is unlikely that crew members would take the risk. The most likely 
                                                 
118 The word ‘rating’ is used here as a general term to indicate the position held on the ship. 
119 John Devonish and William Fuss of the Fanny became captains as did James Jolly of the Triton. See 
Appendices 2.007 and 2.008. In the instructions to the master at the beginning of a voyage the mate was 
almost always denoted to be master in the event of the incumbents death.  
120 Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p. 148. 
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reason for chief mate’s wages to stay near peace time levels is that they were 
technically exempt from being pressed so there would be no shortage.121    
 
Carpenter’s wages did not rise dramatically, which is surprising considering he was 
a man whose skills were always in demand, especially during wartime, but again 
there was no real shortage as they were exempt from the press. There was 
another factor preventing their impressment and that was that they were well 
organised. In 1799, an ex-carpenter of a West Indies ship was pressed and then 
released by ‘a very considerable body of ship’s carpenters’ after which it took the 
intervention of James Hilhouse to calm the situation. Again in 1804, a letter states 
that a carpenter had been had been rescued by ‘a large body of shipwrights 
belonging to the merchants’ yards’ and gives the information that the carpenters of 
the ships of Bristol belonged to the yards and at the end of a voyage they returned 
to work there.122 
 
The other crewmen, however, all had large increases and although Press may 
have been correct in saying that the press was not as effective in Bristol as 
elsewhere, the reality was that the shipowners would be obliged to increase wages 
to near a national level because otherwise the men would move to another port or, 
more likely, take the wages and ship for the West Indies but desert there. Second 
mates and boatswains could claim exemption, but they were usually only 
experienced seamen who could not easily escape the press so there would be 
some shortages. Similarly, many cooks were actually seamen and probably did 
both jobs at once, especially when men were short, so they could expect their 
wages to compensate for this. Ships’ boys were not apprentices and so not exempt 
and thus could expect an increase though it must be remembered that this was 
from a low base. 
 
Lastly, differentials do not appear to play a part in wartime wages. Before the war, 
the chief mates of the Fanny and Triton earned three times the wages of a seaman 
                                                 
121 In actual fact, no one was truly exempt as the impressment service could find an excuse to press anyone, 
but it was unusual for masters, chief officers, boatswains or carpenters to be taken. Rogers, Manning the 
Royal Navy, p. xvii. 
122 Rogers, Manning the Royal Navy, p. xvii. Letter No. 402 p. 195.  
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and the carpenters almost the same. During the war this fell to about a fifth more, 
an indication that the shipowners were paying according to the principles of supply 
and demand and not proficiency, and that this was accepted. After the war, roughly 
the same differentials returned. 
 
The effect of war on the wage bills of the shipowners.  
 
The American War ended in 1783, but its effect did not show in the manning levels 
of merchant ships until the following year. Appendices 2.030 and 2.031 clearly 
illustrate this with the Fanny and Triton’s outsett123 wage levels dropping by 
approximately half and remaining near that figure for the following years of peace. 
In the account books’ insetts,124 the figure year by year for crew wages is given, 
and that should have provided accurate data from which the relative costs of 
wages in war and peace could be calculated.125 Unfortunately, this was not the 
case as when these figures are examined there are a number of anomalies such 
as the captain’s wages being included in some but not others, and it is uncertain 
whether his perks, or indeed his whole disbursements, were not there as well.126 
The Triton’s accounts are particularly difficult as for some voyages they separate 
the advances to seaman’s wives and at least one has a separate book for 
Jamaica. For reference, the insett totals have been included in Appendices 2.030 
and 2.031.  
 
The only way to be sure of the final figure would be to examine wage books as 
these had all transactions in them, but only three survived.127 However, the entries 
in the portlidge bills were the wages agreed at the time of signing the articles at 
Bristol and although they cannot be used to calculate the final bill for the voyage, 
                                                 
123 In all ships’ account books, the ‘outsett’ is the account of all outward expenses. 
124 In all ships’ account books, the ‘insett’ is the account of all inward expenses. 
125 BRO: 12162 Shipping account book of the Snow Fanny, pp. 6, 20, 48, 54, 72, 85, 103, 117, 131, 147, 160, 
175; BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, pp. 16, 34, 48, 68, 86, 98, 108, 120, 144. 
126 At the end of the first voyage of the Fanny, the figure is for seamen’s wages and captain’s balance, but 
voyages 2, 3, 4, 7 are for seamen’s wages only whist 5, 6, and 8 are for both captain and seamen.  
127 Those of the Sybil and Success. BRL: 21258 Account Book of the Sybil and Success, 1779-86; and the 
Clifton. BRO: AC/MU/1/9. Wages book for the ship Clifton, 1761-1762. 
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they provide a monthly wage figure which can be used to examine trends and also 
dissimilarities between the two vessels. Appendix 2.035, compiled from 
Appendices 2.030 and 2.031, give the monthly wage bills per year. 
 
The first trend noted was from 1777 the wage bill rose almost linearly for both ships 
until 1784 the year after the war ended, the most likely reason being the numbers 
in the pool of seamen decreasing and owners having to obey market forces. As 
Appendices 2.014 and 2.017 show, crew numbers rapidly stabilised at the 
beginning of the war and it is unlikely that they would raise wages for any other 
purpose. Immediately after the war, wages dipped to their lowest figure in the 
period of peace that followed, which would be due to the reduction from wartime 
manning levels and also an ardent desire by shipowners to cut costs. Wages rose 
slightly but then stabilised with both ships on approximately the same levels. 
 
The wage bills in wartime reached approximately double that of peace but on 
average that of the Fanny was £30 per month in wartime and £20.10s in peace, or 
about a third lower, whilst the equivalent figures for the Triton were £38 and £22 
which is again nearly double. As the peacetime figures of both ships are similar, 
the difference in wartime was caused by the Triton having a bigger crew due to the 
Letter of Marque. Bristol had always been a centre for privateering but these ships 
sustained disastrous losses during this war with only two or three exceptions.128 
The Triton was not an active privateer but its wage bill shows that over the war 
period, it must have cost Brights a minimum of nearly £700 extra in wages alone, 
plus food for six extra men a month129 at 12s a head 130 equalling £302, and taking 
the total figure to over £1000 not accounting for the cost of martial material. 
Privateering was no longer profitable.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128 Latimer, Annals, p. 436. 
129 The difference between the average wartime wages and size of crews of the Fanny and those of the Triton. 
130 Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p. 145. 
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Conclusions. 
 
There were marked differences between the manning of foreign-going ships in war 
and peace with the former leading to a shortage of men, higher wages and a more 
numerous though less skilled crew. Bristol shipowners had to resort to crimpage 
and the buying of protections for their crews. Traditionally, Bristol had fitted out 
privateers which exacerbated the problem but with little sign of profit from the ships 
considered above. Established companies differed in their attitude to this and also 
on the way ships should be run in wartime, a difference that receded when 
peacetime practices were resumed.  
 
In both war and peace there was little sign of allegiance by seamen to ships or 
owners, and vice versa, except in the case of senior officers, and indeed crew 
members might show more allegiance to a master whose ways they were used to. 
The high wages to be earned in wartime at the West Indies meant a loss of crew 
there and paying higher rates to their replacements, adding to the wages bill. 
Nothing seems to have been done about this by shipowners except to warn the 
masters against overpayment. The men were subject to impressment but when this 
occurred on one of Munckley’s ships, they were treated fairly by the captain and 
received their due wages. Peacetime wages remained stable between wars and 
there was little difference in the amounts paid by the two shipowners considered 
above. In effect, it was back to the traditional ways once war ended. 
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Section 2b. The crewing of coastal and short haul ships. 
 
Introduction. 
 
As has been mentioned in the general introduction to Section 2, the method of 
paying seamen involved in coastal and foreign shipping cannot simply be 
partitioned and described under these headings because the lump sum payments 
per voyage, or part voyage, normally associated with coastal shipping was also 
used for ships sailing to Ireland and nearby Europe, classed as sailing foreign. The 
question is whether Bristol merchants followed the national trend described by 
Ralph Davis, above, or if they had developed methods of their own or even moved 
towards new ways of working.131 Therefore the purpose of this sub-section is to 
investigate how Bristol seamen working outside of the areas described in Section 
2a were paid and if there was a set pattern to their employment. 
 
There are few account books available for coastal vessels nationally, and none 
known for any of the Bristol vessels described below132 and therefore the primary 
investigative source used was again the musters.133 The number of ships involved 
in these trades was such that research had to be limited to 1785-87, chosen as it 
was peacetime and in the same period as most of the research done for the 
previous sub-section. The use of the musters limits the research to Bristol shipping 
because unlike foreign-going vessels, a high proportion of the coastal trade was 
carried out by vessels registered at other ports. The criterion for the research was 
to take data regarding manning and retention of crews on ships making three or 
more voyages from Bristol. More information was available when vessels normally 
sailing on the coast made short-haul voyages to areas geographically classed as 
‘foreign’. Irish ships are a prime example and information such as ship details, 
names of owners, trade area and whether they were constant traders was 
obtainable from Lloyd’s Registers.134 
                                                 
131 Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, pp. 133-134. 
132 There is one known ledger from a Bristol collier, probably the Barum, dated 1812 and held at the National 
Maritime Museum, AMS 38/2. This is outside the time scale for this thesis. 
133 BRO: SMV 9/3/1/9 Muster Rolls, 1783-89. 
134 Lloyd’s Registers, 1785-87. 
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Payment on a monthly basis for the crews of coastal or short-haul ships was not 
economical to the coastal shipowner as they spent more time in port than at sea, 
so according to Davis the payment of crew by ‘lump sum’ was common and when 
income was averaged out over a year the earning power of the short-haul seaman 
was only slightly lower than those in the foreign trade.135 Whilst it is entirely 
reasonable to accept that this also applied to Bristol coasters, initial examination of 
the musters gave the impression that there was no common policy regarding the 
engagement of crew on these ships, which indicated the need for further research 
if the movement and deployment of Bristol’s seamen on short voyages was to be 
fully understood. 
 
The amount of shipping involved was too great to be examined as a whole and for 
the purposes of this research it was divided into four regions; London, Liverpool, 
the general coasting trade and Ireland. The method of research was to examine 
individual Bristol ships that had made three or more voyages to the specific region 
during the research period. 
 
Vessels trading with London.  
 
The musters recorded a total of eight ships trading with London, two were 
disqualified as they were foreign-going, and another, a coaster completing a single 
voyage only, was also deleted. The other five were constant traders belonging to 
Thomas Deane and Co. who appears to have dominated the Bristol-London 
coastal trade.136 Although for individual voyages each ship had submitted a muster, 
unlike those for foreign-going ships it was generally divided into two parts to record 
the outward and inward voyages, a detail that allows the chronology of each 
vessel’s voyages to be compiled giving more insight into the way coasters 
                                                 
135 Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, pp. 133-134. 
 
136 Thomas Deane, Merchant, Princes Street; Banker, Merchant and Mayor of Bristol, 1770. Bristol Directory, 
1785. 
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operated and the varying composition of the crews. Appendix 2.036 gives data 
regarding the voyages of the five regular traders.137 
 
All ships were run on the same basis, which might be expected as they belonged 
to the same company, but this showed a discipline that was not always the case for 
foreign ships where the master had more control. On arrival, the majority of the 
men were discharged and after an interval, presumably for unloading and loading 
of new cargo, another crew was assembled for the return trip to Bristol. Some men 
remained onboard on pay for the whole voyage, presumably as ship-keepers and 
to assist in the loading, but in the eighteenth century ships anchored at the pool of 
London suffered constant damage from passing vessels and were plagued by 
organised gangs and petty thieves, so security may have been the main 
explanation for their presence.138   
 
Appendix 2.037 provides general crew data for the five ships and it may be seen 
as further confirmation that security was at least part of the reason for retaining the 
men, there being generally at least two men onboard each ship unlike the single 
shipkeeper employed by large foreign ships at Bristol. The master occasionally 
remained on the ship, probably for duties concerning the cargo, but this was a 
regular feature only on the Pollard. Crew numbers per ship per voyage remained 
the same inward and outward but the personnel did not. As was usual at this time, 
the master was a permanent fixture on all these ships, but few of the outward men 
returned to take the ship back to Bristol. The obvious reasons for this would be that 
it was costly to send men to London by coach and by the time the seamen were 
required again, they might have taken another ship.  
 
However, this raises the question of how coastal sailors practised their trade. As 
mentioned before, it would be unlikely that the men being discharged in London or 
elsewhere would be given transport to and from Bristol by the shipowner due to 
costs, and this seems to be confirmed by the fact that the return crews were a 
                                                 
137 The Chard completed only two voyages in the time period but was included as it belonged of Thomas 
Deane and Co. 
138 J. Pudney, London’s Docks (London, 1975) pp. 18-21. 
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mixture of men from other ports, from foreign ships and from Bristol. If return 
transport had been provided then it would appear rational that they could be sent 
back again but the evidence points to the majority being hired at the discharge 
port. If the men were not given expenses or compensated by high wages – though 
it is probable that the masters were – then the only other way they could get back 
would be by sea which leads to the conclusion that seamen would find a berth for 
the return trip by some informal method of their own.  
 
However, there was a far greater affinity between Deane and Co. and the men they 
hired than was apparent in foreign shipping as about half the men sailing on these 
ships had been on one or more of the five vessels. Some were regular employees 
moving between ships but rarely, apart from the ship-keepers, completing both 
parts of the voyage (Appendix 2.038). As regards employments outside of the 
company, two sailors had been on a voyage to Lisbon, another to Ireland and one 
returned to Bristol on a London registered vessel, lending credence to the idea that 
seamen returned to their original port by sea.  
 
If the ‘previous ship’ column is correct then most of these men sailed almost 
entirely on Deane’s ships with occasional voyages on other vessels, apparently 
preferring to wait ashore a month or more before the next employment. This is an 
important detail as it is an indication that they would have to take up some form of 
shore employment between voyages as they were not strictly full-time seamen. 
The wages they earned at sea sailing four or five times per year on average, would 
not have been enough to keep themselves and a family, or indeed to live the 
extravagant life of a deep sea sailor ashore disposing of his pay.  
 
Nevertheless, because these men were returning regularly to Bristol, they would 
have the time and connections to set up some form of regular work ashore which 
may indeed have been their main income. The crews were probably chosen by the 
ships’ masters who would know which men were reliable and could send for them 
at the beginning of a voyage. 
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The possibility that the coastal seaman led a double life has not, as far as the 
author knows, been researched. There is some argument regarding the age of 
men on the coast with Dixon and Press believing the men changed to coastal as 
their physical powers deteriorated whilst Ville says that the physical exertion there 
demanded younger men.139 The decision of a man to leave the sea or move to 
short-haul sailing is usually for personal reasons, marriage, family or offers of 
shore employment – not all seamen in the merchant service were there for the wild 
lifestyle.  
 
It clear that wages on the London ships, unlike those on foreign, could not have 
been paid on a 30 day monthly scale as a single leg of a voyage could be as little 
as seven days and rarely exceeded a month.  A seaman could not earn an 
economical wage at these rates and so must have been paid a lump sum for each 
leg of the voyage. The ships stayed in port at London for, on average, about six 
weeks and those who remained might have negotiated a lump sum, or if the owner 
knew how long the average stay was likely to be he could have paid by the month. 
At Bristol, the crew were all paid-off and there is no evidence of regular crew being 
employed as ship-keepers during the discharge and loading period. It is difficult to 
obtain an exact figure of the lump sums paid to the men due to a lack of 
documentation, but there was a high degree of stability of wages, including lump 
sum payments, in the eighteenth century.140  
 
It is also wrong to consider coastal shipping round the British Isles to be less 
strenuous than in the Atlantic trades as on average the weather is generally worse, 
especially in winter when the men would be constantly adjusting sails near the 
coast and in shallow waters. Appendix 2.039 shows that Deane’s medium size 
brigs, all of about the same tonnage, were regularly replaced, a sign that they 
suffered at least the same wear and tear as vessels on the Atlantic runs.    
 
 
 
                                                 
139 Ville, English Shipowning, pp. 92-93. 
140 Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p. 134. 
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Vessels trading with Liverpool. 
 
Using the same series of musters and criteria as for London, it was established 
that the Bristol, master and owner Edward Prust, was the only Bristol registered 
ship trading regularly with Liverpool between 1785-87, and so research is limited to 
this vessel. The ship was a brig of 127 tons built in 1784, slightly smaller than 
Deane’s ships, and made seven voyages during the time period including her 
maiden voyage. The chronology of these is tabulated in Appendix 2.040.141 There 
were two other ships listed as constant coasters at Bristol, the Liverpool and the 
Mayflower, but as there are no entries in the musters they must have been 
registered elsewhere, probably Liverpool.142 
 
Data from the appendix points to short sea voyages from 7 to 26 days on the way 
out and similar figures on the way back except for two difficult trips lasting over a 
month. Time spent at Liverpool varied between a few days and nearly three 
months and it was a comparable pattern at Bristol. Apart from a short first voyage, 
their average length was 144 days or nearly five months. In a similar fashion to the 
London ships, crew were taken on at Bristol and at Liverpool all were discharged 
except the master, and for six out of seven voyages, the mate.143  There is no 
doubt that the pay of these men was by a lump sum for the sea trip as otherwise 
they would have found it uneconomical. One stay there was covered by the master 
alone, and bearing in mind that he was also the owner, it would be likely that he 
would take the responsibility for assembling the new cargo and ship-keeping.  
 
Appendix 2.041 gives the crew disposition per voyage and it shows that the 
numbers remained the same inward and outward as did that of ship-keepers. More 
men stayed on the vessel for the return trip than occurred with Deane’s ships but in 
general half the crew left and had to be replaced at Liverpool. Whether Bristol 
owners’ paid for victuals for discharged crew remaining onboard on any run has 
                                                 
141 SMV 9/2/1/13. Thomas Rothley’s Account Book 1747-1787. (An index to the Muster Rolls).  
A vessel’s maiden voyage can be found from the Muster Roll Index as the entry in the column ‘to what time 
paid’ is ‘first payment’. 
142 Bristol Directory, 1785, p. 74.  
143 Although again rank does not feature in the muster rolls, the same man listed second stayed on board with 
the master for four out of six of the voyages. 
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not been discovered during the research, but given their frugality it is unlikely and 
may have been a reason for having to replace men. The general conclusion is that 
when crew were discharged at Liverpool most left the ship even though the time in 
port was relatively short, somewhere between 6 days and a month. This is an 
indication that many men were actually from Liverpool but as usual the master did 
not fill in the musters ‘abode’ column accurately. 
 
Apart from the master, 12 men sailed more than one leg of a voyage and are listed 
in Appendix 2.042. Only one of them, apart from John Moon, assumed to be the 
mate, showed any allegiance to the ship, he sailing on six out of seven voyages. 
However, according to the details in the musters ‘last ship’ column, he also 
regularly worked on the Mayflower, one of the constant traders to Bristol from 
Liverpool. Similarly, other crew members sailed on the other two Liverpool constant 
traders between voyages and on three Irish traders whilst one worked for one of 
Deane’s London ships. Again, the master was lax in filling out the ‘last ship’ 
columns so it is not possible to examine all voyages.  
 
The conclusions based on the data in this appendix are that the crew worked less 
regularly on this ship than their colleagues on the London ships. However, this was 
a single ship owned and run by the master, and the lump sum payments would not 
be enough to keep a man making an occasional trip even though he had work 
ashore. More likely, the men on this run had the opportunity to work on the many 
coasters trading between all west coast ports and Ireland and took whatever vessel 
was available when they needed work. Nevertheless, they seem to have remained 
on the coast and as at London, they may have formed an informal fraternity 
exchanging information about what ships were available and the general pay and 
conditions.  
 
The general coasting trade. 
 
As is described in Chapter 1, the majority of ships using the port were coasters or 
Severn Estuary traders, but when the research criterion was applied for this 
section, only three Bristol ships were found to meet the parameters, two trading 
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with Cowes, and another with St. Ives. Subsequently, when their crewing and trade 
arrangements were investigated they were dissimilar to the extent that each had to 
be considered in its own right.  
 
The first was the Elisabeth, a sloop of 60 tons built in 1782 and trading mainly with 
Cowes though on three of her seven voyages she went to other ports, an indication 
that the owner would send her wherever there was freight to be earned. Unlike the 
London and Liverpool ships, she retained her four man crew throughout the 
voyages so it is not possible to reconstruct her movements chronologically from the 
musters although the times of arrival and departure from Bristol were obtained from 
the dates her crew signed on and off (Appendix 2.043).  
 
The length voyage ranged between 1 month 20 days to nearly three months so 
economically it is possible that the crew could have been paid either by the day or 
the voyage, but it is likely that it was the latter. The ship sailed to Cowes on four 
out of seven trips, almost constant trading, but alternated with one to Portsmouth 
and two to Ireland. Coasting vessels were not included in the Bristol Presentments 
so the cargoes are unknown.  
 
Unfortunately there is nothing in the musters to say if the ship called in at other 
ports as the crew was unchanged during each voyage, they paying off immediately 
on return to Bristol. On two musters there is a pre-voyage entry for two additional 
days worked by the crew just before the new voyage began, probably because the 
ship needed seamen to move her to her loading berth and this was normal for the 
incoming crew. Administratively it was probably the easiest way to record the 
payments, but another unusual feature regarding this ship was that the master 
remained on articles throughout the entire period, signing off and on the same day. 
He may have owned the ship and lived on board. 
 
As usual, there was no change of master during the seven voyages and as for the 
crew, out of the 15 men employed during the period, one man did four voyages, 
two three, and one two, which negates the idea of a permanent crew (Appendix 
2.044). There are too many ‘unknowns’ in the previous ship column to trace the 
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mens’ movements, or to confirm they were actually Bristolians, information that the 
master must have had as some of the men had sailed with him before. The 
surnames of a few of the men employed are similar indicating family connections. 
 
This occurrence may be more widespread as the second ship, the Cams Delight, 
also trading to Cowes, was captained by a Henry Morris possibly related to the 
William Morris of the Elisabeth. Appendix 2.043 gives details of her movements. 
According to the musters her voyages lasted approximately two to three and one 
half months, taken from the signing on and off dates but, as with the Elisabeth, she 
could have visited other ports in between. The whole crew including the master, 
signed on and off together and a considerable period between voyages was spent 
in port at Bristol without any crew onboard. This was similar to the refit period of 
foreign-going ships, but the most likely reason would be a lack of freight. The crew 
were not discharged during the voyage which means that either they had short 
stays at ports other than Bristol, where it would be uneconomical to discharge 
them, or they had an agreement to stay the whole voyage. The method of payment 
is open to conjecture but the fact that they were not discharged points to monthly 
wages, although if they followed the model set by Henley and Sons on the 
northeast coast then it would be payment by lump sum for the entire voyage.144 
 
Appendix 2.044 gives data on the allegiance of men to the ship. The same master 
was employed for all five voyages but there was no sign of consistency by 
crewmen as only one man returned for further voyages. The period in port at 
Bristol would be mainly responsible for this, but four of the crew on this vessel also 
served on the Elisabeth so this was another connection between the Cowes ships. 
 
The third ship was the Nancy, a small 30 ton burden ship built in 1785 manned by 
a crew of two or three men including the master, he being employed for all the 
ship’s voyages to St. Ives. The constant changes of crewmen showed that the ship 
was either putting into other ports during each voyage or more likely, as it was only 
a short distance from Bristol to St. Ives, sailing back and forward between the 
                                                 
144 Ville, English Shipowning, pp. 102-103. 
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ports. Technically, this ship’s musters probably do not represent distinct voyages 
but record several on each submission. Appendix 2.043 records the ship’s 
‘voyages’. The master appears to have made a number of errors in his first entry 
for the second voyage and been forced by the authorities to resubmit the following 
year.145 
 
It is not possible to calculate the number of voyages the ship made as there were 
constant changes of crew which could have taken place at any port, but most men 
stayed nearly three months although some only a few weeks. This again leaves the 
system of payment in question, the most likely being by the month with possibly 
advances being dolled out by the captain. There was no sign that any crewmen 
were aligned to the ship, the maximum stay being two men for two voyages, a total 
of about 4 and 5 months respectively. Only one man had sailed on either of the 
other two ships. 
 
The conclusions regarding these three ships is that they were manned from a 
floating population of coastal seamen, but as regards payment the most likely 
method is monthly wages. 
 
Trade with Ireland. 
 
Ireland was in such close proximity to Bristol that the ships trading there should 
have been considered coasters but even though it was under British rule, they 
were designated foreign under the Navigation Acts which were strictly enforced 
until the Act of Union in 1800. The Bristol merchants themselves fought to maintain 
the status quo.146 Bristol’s trade with Ireland’s southern ports had been consistently 
high during the centuries and by the end of the eighteenth there were between 100 
and 120 ships involved.147 Previous research by the author provided the figure of 
121 in the period September-August, 1791-1792, but many were not registered at 
                                                 
145 SMV 9/2/1/13. Thomas Rothley’s Account Book 1747-1787. First submission was 1785-86, no. 129 and 
second 1786-87, no. 12.  
146 MacInnes,  Gateway of Empire, pp. 219-222. 
147 Minchinton, ‘The Port of Bristol’ p. 129. 
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Bristol and did not fit the criteria for the present research.148 However these ships 
being classed as foreign was an asset to the research as they were included in 
Lloyd’s Register. 
  
From the musters, eight ships were found to be regularly voyaging to Ireland 
(Appendix 2.045). Four traded to Dublin; one to Cork; one with Irish and English 
ports; another to various Irish ports; and although the last made only two voyages 
out of six to Ireland – with the rest being to a mixture of continental and British 
ports – it was included as it was useful to compare the manning arrangements, see 
Appendix 2.046 for the movements of these vessels. 
 
The four Dublin ships were of comparable tonnage, 100-130t, with their voyages 
and time spent in Bristol similar, that is of six to eight weeks away on average and 
four to six weeks at home although the Warren, possibly because it was a newer 
ship, operated to a faster schedule (Appendix 2.047). The port time at Dublin was 
available only for the Bristol and could be anything from two weeks to a month, but 
was deemed long enough for most of the crew to be paid off there on four out of 
seven voyages. On the other three trips the reason for retaining the crew could 
have been that the owners believed there would be a quick turnaround. At Bristol 
the entire crew including the master was paid off. 
 
On all voyages most of the crew returned to the ship after the break in Dublin, so 
payment by lump sum must have been the arrangement for them if not for the 
master, but even he was laid off on one occasion. However the other three Dublin 
ships kept their crews on and as the Draper had the same owner, the Bristol may 
have been an anomaly. There is data for two of the Draper’s voyages giving the 
same length of stay there as with the Bristol, so there is no rational behind keeping 
men on as money could have been saved on wages and victuals. There was one 
other inconsistency regarding one of the ships and that is the master of the Warren 
was continually employed even during the stay at Bristol. Lump sum wages were 
                                                 
148 J. G. MacMillan, ‘The Port of Bristol during the latter part of the Eighteenth Century: An In-Depth Review 
of its Operations and of its Limitations as a Functional Port’ (University of Bristol MA thesis, 2003) p. 41. 
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probably the means of payment, but apart from the Bristol, the ships were run on 
foreign crewing lines and payment by monthly wages possible.  
 
In yet another arrangement, the Juno trading to Cork kept the master and two crew 
on permanently, but hired four more men each voyage who were laid-off in Ireland 
but came back for the return voyage to Bristol and paid off on arrival. It is probable 
that the payment of individual crewmen’s wages was by both methods, the 
permanent men being paid monthly and the others by lump sum. The length of the 
ship’s voyages were similar to those of Dublin, but on average the time at sea was 
less due to Cork’s proximity and this would have to be accounted for in the lump 
sum.  
 
Concerning the allegiance of the crews to their ships, Appendix 2.048 gives full 
details of the crew movements for the larger Irish ships and the data in Appendix 
2.049 shows that more men committed themselves to consecutive voyages in the 
Irish trade than any other area dealt with so far. This is probably due to the 
regularity of the ships’ sailing schedules enabling men to get home whilst the ship 
was in port, especially in Ireland where it was the tradition of farming families to call 
upon their relatives in times of harvest and suchlike.149 However, only two seamen 
actually worked on another ship in the same trade. Again, there were few men 
recorded in the musters as being other than from Bristol but the likelihood is that 
many were Irish and interchanged with Irish owned ships. 
 
The three smaller ships included in this research were probably typical examples of 
many of the coasters which plied their trade from and to Bristol to wherever they 
could find freight. The Denizen’s first voyage was to Lisbon, followed by two Irish 
ports, a short trip to Milford, Ireland again and then to Rotterdam. She may have 
visited others during those voyages but this is not clear from the Muster Rolls. She 
had seven crew for the foreign voyages and six for the rest, with the men paying off 
each time at Bristol. The master left at Bristol after the first two voyages, but from 
then on was permanently on the ship. One man, probably the mate, did five 
                                                 
149 Discussion with Mary O’Loughlin, Irish social historian. 
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voyages and another man three, but the general trend was to get a completely new 
crew after each voyage. There was little allegiance to the ship. 
 
The Elisabeth was registered at Bristol and made two long voyages during which 
she must have been picking up and delivering cargoes wherever her owner-master 
could find them. In modern parlance this was a tramp ship. Two trips taking the 
same time period as the others were made to Ireland, but on her second voyage 
she must have been sailing to ports other than Exeter as that run was only a few 
hours sail from Bristol and she was away nearly three months. In a similar way to 
the Denizen, most of the crew stayed with the ship for an entire voyage, all 
including the master paying off on return to Bristol. One man other than the master 
was onboard for all voyages and another for four, so there was some stability but 
with only five men this cannot be taken as the ship having a established crew.   
 
The last ship in this section, the Endeavour made only three voyages in the period 
and all to Ireland. However the time away on the first two voyages was such that it 
is likely she went to other ports as well, an indication that it must have been difficult 
for these ships to find regular work out of Bristol and so probably took to tramping. 
The crew was stable for two out of three of the voyages but as she was a small 
ship carrying only four men, this cannot be seen as showing allegiance to one ship. 
 
Conclusions. 
 
The most important result of the research was to show that as with foreign 
shipping, the coastal trade showed no signs of movement towards a new way of 
operating to break with tradition. The individual shipowners had established their 
own operating systems and method of paying crew, some taking men on for the 
entire voyage, but others signing off all or part of the crew at the outward port and 
taking on a fresh set of men – or a mixture of old and new – for the return voyage. 
During their stay at Bristol most ships, though not all, discharged their men, but 
again there were anomalies, and the only factor common to all ships was the 
continuous employment of the master although he too could be temporarily 
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discharged for a period at the home or outward port. Some masters appear to have 
spent their entire time on articles, a system not replicated on foreign-going ships.  
 
The likelihood was that wages were paid by a mixture of lump-sum and monthly 
arrangements, depending very much on what was most economic for the owner. 
There was little sign of allegiance to one ship or owner although on the London run 
men appeared to be willing to sail there whenever wanted by the company. This 
leads to the conclusion that they might have mixed coastal seafaring with regular 
work at home. There was also no indication that men moved from one vessel to 
another on the same trade, but were more likely to be part of a vast pool of coastal 
seamen who knew the logistics of the trade and made themselves available when 
they needed work. This could not be proved without research beyond the scope of 
this thesis as most of the coastal vessels plying their trade to the port were 
registered elsewhere. Finally the musters, as filled out by the coastal masters, 
were more accurate than those completed for foreign ships, but again they cannot 
be seen in this period as being suitable for establishing residency figures. 
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Chapter 3. 
 
The management of shipping operating from the port of 
Bristol. 
 
General Introduction. 
 
It was established in the last chapter that the purpose behind shipowning at Bristol 
was to enable merchants to service the needs of their own commercial affairs and 
that their ships earning freight money was simply a useful appendage. To 
understand how this translated into ship management, it is essential to 
comprehend the administrative and organisational structure of the port itself, the 
hub of all mercantile affairs. All shipping using the port was subjected to the same 
systems so ideally every trade area should be investigated, but as shown in 
Appendix 2.003 there were eleven and it would be impossible to do so within the 
confines of the thesis. One area was chosen for analysis, the West Indian, and 
although in terms of ship numbers it was not the greatest – the Irish, coastal and 
Severn being larger – it was certainly the most consistent and lucrative.  
 
It will be shown that in the organisation of the port the shipowner had very little 
control over its structure or administration, except through the various merchant 
organisations, and so he had to adapt to its regime. He did have some choice over 
the routing of his vessels’ passage through the harbour, but this was limited by 
competition for the use of its facilities – although the experienced owner could 
always plan ahead to ease the way. While a merchant had only limited leeway to 
overcome the complexities of the port, he was master of his own business and his 
judgement would decide whether or not he made money, and in fact many became 
rich men so there must have been a structure in place that worked, although the 
underlying issue for this thesis is whether or not it could have been improved. As 
well as examining the port operations, this chapter will investigate how shipping 
fitted into the fiscal system, the rationale behind operational decisions, and the 
extent to which a ship itself was capable of making a profit.  
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Section 1. The transit of a vessel between arrival and departure at the port.  
 
Introduction.  
 
Before attempting to examine the underlying principles behind the management 
techniques of the shipowners, it is necessary to consider the mundane, but vital 
issue of the logistics and costs of getting a ship in and out of a port having the 
extreme tidal conditions found at Bristol. As will be seen, this not only involves 
pilotage fees but also preparation costs and inevitable time delays.   
 
Incoming procedures for an incoming vessel and the accumulated costs.  
 
A vessel returning to Bristol was required by law to pick up a pilot to take it 
onwards to its destination, but an examination of pilots’ itemised bills shows that for 
West Indian ships bent on berthing at the Bristol quays the voyage would be 
completed in stages, the first being to stop at the anchorage at Kingroad to be 
boarded by customs officials, and to discharge the crew – see Appendix 3.001 for 
details of customs officers.1 On arrival there, a tide-surveyor and two tide-waiters 
from Pill would go onboard to ‘clear’ the ship for entry into port, a process referred 
to as ‘clearing at Pill’ in the account books, and although Customs2 generally had 
the use of its own fleet of water boats, there appears to be a system particular to 
Bristol of boats being hired from pilots at the shipowners’ expense to ferry the 
surveyors out.3  
 
He and his officers would examine the ship’s papers (Appendix 3.002), check that 
the cargo was as listed in the manifest, rummage the ship, and then the surveyor 
would depart leaving the two tide-waiters to guard it until customs duties were paid. 
The ship’s details would be entered in their Day Book, and if the vessel was to be 
quarantined it would be placed off Portishead under guard, but without tide-
                                                 
1 BRL: 21258, Account book of the Sybil and  Success, 1779-86, pp. 81, 145. 
2 His Majesty’s Customs. It will be abbreviated to Customs from now on. 
3 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, p. 120. Specifically, the account book of the Triton has the 
costs for clearing ship surveyors and boatmen, but there are similar examples throughout ships’ account 
books. 
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waiters.4 The entire crew were paid off at Kingroad, but although the signatures on 
the musters was usually only the master’s, a combined set of articles and musters 
for the slave ship Recovery in 1791 was endorsed at the beginning of the voyage 
by the tide-surveyor making it likely that customs were also involved in the 
discharge of the crew.5 They would certainly have checked the roll as details from 
it were entered in their Day Book.  
 
The initial clearance of the ship at Pill was the defining point of the vessel’s return 
because at that stage the master had to leave the ship within twenty four hours of 
arrival as it was his duty to go ashore to report at Custom House at Bristol – his 
ship would almost certainly be remaining at the mouth of the river. On the other 
side of the river from Pill at Shirehampton, there was a well-known hostelry and 
staging post, Lamplighter’s Hall, frequented by masters and other personnel from 
the ships lying at the river’s mouth. Receipts show the Lamplighters was a centre 
for the hiring transport to Bristol and it was from here that a newly returned master 
would travel onwards.6 It was also used by the Committee to examine and 
discipline pilots and on one of these occasions fighting between the pilots broke 
out giving some indication of the general lack of unity between them.7  
 
The essential entry papers being obtained, and with the tide-waiters onboard, large 
ocean going vessels not discharging all or part of their cargo into lighters could 
move into the river to begin their passage up to the quays at Bristol. Nevertheless, 
many were forced to moor at Hungroad and it has been generally assumed that 
this was due to an insufficient depth of water in the river caused by the Avon’s tidal 
condition.8 However, this was not the only reason because a correlation of 
contemporary tidal data with details of the ships’ movements taken from the 
account books, shows that navigating the river was postponed at times when tides 
                                                 
4 BRO: 04399 Richard Neal Daybook, 1761-64. 
5 BRO: SMV 9/3/1/10 Muster Roll 1791-1792. Ship Recovery, Captain Kimberly, 10 April 1791 to 2 January 
1792.   
6 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success, pp. 24, 81, 145; BRO: AC/MU 3 (8)b, 1780. Account, 
Thomas Richards, Captain of the ship Fanny with Samuel Munckley & Co, owners, for costs of 
disembarkation and other charges. (Master’s disbursements Fanny 4th Voyage).  
7 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 166. 
8 See Minchinton, ‘Port of Bristol’ pp. 138-139. 
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were favourable.9 On her third voyage, the Sybil arrived at Kingroad on 4 July, 
1785, and the tide was favourable from at least the 6th, weather conditions were 
good, yet the ship did not arrive at the quays until 9 September.10 At the end of her 
fourth voyage, she arrived at Kingroad on 12 September, 1786, with three days of 
suitable tides, but spent four days at anchor at Hollowbanks at the mouth of the 
river before being towed to Hungroad and so losing the tide to Bristol. Eventually 
she arrived there on the 21st, a loss of nine days, although again weather 
conditions had been favourable.11  
 
The difficulties in navigating the river were serious enough to require ships to have  
insurance, and one of the reasons for the delays was the necessity to prepare 
them before they made the attempt.12 Whilst at Kingroad at the end of her third 
voyage, the Sybil brought aboard men who spent three days ‘tending the ship’ at 
the roads and on arrival from her fourth voyage she reported as usual at King Road 
and then moved to anchor at Hollowbacks where ‘Pillmen’, who will be discussed 
later, were put on board for three days to complete work which required the use of 
a boat.13 The ship then moved to Hungroad where again men came aboard for the 
purpose of drying and unbending the sails and clearing the decks. The names of 
these men are recorded, and as they were not crew members, they must have 
been waterfront labourers, their work being described in bills as ‘labour at 
Hungroad’.14 There is no record of cargo being unloaded into lighters in the mate’s 
disbursements.  
 
With regard to the Success, men were brought aboard at the roads for five days in 
May 1779 to ‘attend to’ the ship, and again no purpose is given, but on her return 
from her voyage of 1779-1780, her mate’s disbursements show that the workers 
                                                 
9 Tidal prediction system TotalTide, 2003 edition, Admiralty Charts and Publications. The accuracy of this 
software to predict the tidal range at Avonmouth in the eighteenth century has been thoroughly assessed and a 
correlation between the conditions pertaining to the River Avon then and now, has established that the levels 
of water at the quay at Bristol would be the same if the floating harbour had not been built. J.G. MacMillan, 
M.A. Dissertation Bristol, 2003.  
10 FFBJ, 4 August 1785. 
11 FFBJ, 1 September 1786. 
12 Elkin ‘Aspects of the Port of Bristol’, p. 30. 
13 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success, pp. 22, 81. 
14 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success, p. 82. 
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actually slept onboard for nine days and were employed ‘clearing’ the ship before it 
arrived at Hungroad and then discharging into a trow at Sea Mills. Another bill was 
for men designated as riggers whose task was described as ‘assisting the vessel, 
striking yards and topmast, and other necessary work in order to ease the vessel in 
the river’. The mate’s disbursements of May, 1779 also records a payment to 
‘riggers’. The costs of  labour at the river’s mouth is recorded in Appendix 3.003 
and the conclusion must be that after lengthy voyages, these vessels needed a 
considerable amount of work done before they could face the River Avon. The 
implications of this are important as the expense incurred by Bristol shipowners 
due to delays and the cost of hiring men must have been considerable compared 
to ports without such a hazardous river passage. 
 
Apart from the financial aspects, the information taken from the workers’ wage bills 
reveals a method of ship-working at Bristol which may be peculiar to there. It is 
clear from the Sybil’s wages book that the crew’s pay stopped when they arrived at 
Kingroad on 13 September, 1786,15 and from that time until they received their 
wages on 3 October, there were no further payments to them. The question is 
whether they actually continued to work without pay as part of their articles of 
agreement or whether they simply left the ship and received their pay later.16 The 
names of workers brought aboard at the mouth of the river are on the bills and 
none were crewmen, making it unlikely that the crew were still aboard. The master 
had died during the voyage and the mate was retained, but this was normal as he 
would oversee cargo handling anyway and as he was paid separately for this then 
he cannot be labelled as a crewman.17  
 
Similarly, the Success on arrival at Kingroad also signed off all but the master and 
a seaman on 14 November, 1780, and they left the next day when the ship moved 
to Hungroad. The mate remained on the ship at least until the cargo was 
discharged, but again there is no record of the crew earning wages between 
signing off and 8 December when they were actually paid. The four men named as 
                                                 
15 BRO: SMV 9/3/1/9 Muster Roll, No. 58. 
16 See Chapter 2, Section 2a, for details of the system of crew payments. 
17 BRL, 21258, Account book of the Sybil and  Success, pp. 81, 150; BRO, 39654/4, Account book of the 
Druid, 1790-91, pp. 18, 37.   
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working on the ship at the mouth of the river were not crewmen. The musters 
provided additional confirmation that the crew were paid on arrival at port as the 
hospital payments were deducted at that point.18  
 
The wage of a seaman was £1.10s per month, which was less than the 2-3s per 
day earned by the workers had they completed a month, so the rationale behind 
discharging the seamen must have been that it was cheaper to hire men for a few 
days at a time. There were a number of examples of fresh beef and potatoes being 
sent down to meet ships in the roads which could only have been used to feed the 
workers who slept onboard and the shipkeeper. It must be inferred from this 
evidence that on arrival at Kingroad the ship simply became a floating warehouse 
in the charge of the mate and shore workers and the voyage continued under the 
pilot and hobblers (towboat men).  
 
A ship-keeper, or in modern parlance, watchman, was put onboard Brights’ ships 
when they reached Hungroad remaining until they was ready for sea again, a 
practice in which other ships probably participated, although it is not detailed in the 
Fanny’s account books. The account book of the Druid for 1790 also records Pill 
men working on the ship at the roads and although it seems logical that there might 
have been considerable numbers of skilled riggers and waterfront labourers at Pill, 
little has been written of this, possibly because the village has always been seen 
as being the home of pilots and hobblers, equally renowned for their skills and 
notorious conduct. The only other explanation is that the men were brought down 
from Bristol by boat. Appendix 3.004 gives details of the incidental expenses 
incurred as the ship progressed into the river.  
 
Process and costs of incoming pilotage. 
 
An analysis of the bills presented to shipowners by pilots reveals their working 
practices and the process by which they took large foreign-going vessels such as 
the Sybil and Success to and from the quays at Bristol. For incoming ships nearing 
                                                 
18 BRO. SMV 9/3/1 Muster Rolls.  
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Lundy, the first stage was to pick up a mandatory pilot for the trip up to Kingroad. 
These men were generally described in account books as Channel pilots but if they 
came from the small port of Ilfracombe they were abbreviated to ‘Comb’ pilots.19 
There was an argument at the time concerning the number of pilots that should be 
aboard a ship on its way in as more than one increased the shipowner’s bill. For 
example, when another pilot joined the Success at the Holmes in 1780, the original 
pilot was paid his full fee of £3.3s whilst the new was paid £1.1s.20 The matter of 
two pilots being aboard was discussed at the Hall, an indication that this had been 
an ongoing problem caused by Comb, or channel pilots, who were not endorsed by 
the Society, boarding ships when no fully qualified pilots were yet onboard. This 
was discussed at the Hall with the following conclusions: 
 
The committee consider the rule respecting pilotage is that the Channel pilot 
is paid for the pilotage of the vessel till the Branch pilot comes on board and 
that the Branch pilot is to be paid for the pilotage from the time of his coming 
on board. Clerk to be directed to acquaint them therewith.21  
 
After the clearance of a ship by customs at Kingroad and it entered the river, the 
onboard pilot either handed over control of the ship to a river pilot or, if they were 
so qualified, assumed that role themselves. Pilots’ bills clearly show that they had 
the sole responsibility for taking the ship up river, for determining the number of 
tow boats and men necessary, and for all material. They had to provide their own 
tow boats, clearly numbered, with their names painted in white letters, and mooring 
boats had to have rollers at each end. If they failed to comply with these rules then 
they were reported to the Hall. In the Hall Book in 1788, it was recorded that the 
‘Haven Master to give pilots notice that such of them that have not towboats and 
yawls will be discontinued at the next licence day…’22 
 
                                                 
19 BRO: AC/MU 3 (8)b Master’s disbursements Fanny, fourth voyage; BRO: 12162 Account book of the 
Fanny, p. 56. 
20 BRL: 21258 Account Book of the Sybil and Success, p. 145. 
21 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/12 Hall Book 12, December 1790. 
22 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, September 1788. 
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As has been described above, the river passage for the larger ships would be 
completed in stages, the first being river preparation work or possibly discharging 
into lighters, but most ships, unless they arrived at a spring tide, would need to 
moor to chains in Hungroad to await suitable tidal conditions. Nearby Pill was not 
regarded as an anchorage for trading vessels but there is evidence that it could be 
occasionally used as such. In 1791 the master of a ship wished to be moored at 
Pill where another ship lay, but the pilot persuaded him to go on to Hungroad 
incurring greater expense. A complaint to the Hall found in favour of the owner.23  
 
The term ‘mooring’ is used in all pilot bills, and in strict nautical terms it means that 
the vessel rides between fore and aft anchors or is attached so to chains on the 
bottom.24 This is necessary in strong tidal waters such as the Severn and River 
Avon as otherwise there would be chaos and damage to ships as the tide turned, 
and so a picture of Kingroad would have shown the ships lying roughly parallel to 
each other. It is confirmed in the log book of the Africa Queen which describes her 
as being towed down to Kingroad ‘and came to anchor with the best bower to the 
westward and the second bower to eastward with 90 fathom of cable in 10 fathoms 
of water’.25 
 
The pilots could not move the ships from Hungroad until a licence had been 
obtained from the harbour master and the tidal conditions were right, at which point 
the pilot set off relying upon the brute force and skill of the hobblers to carry the 
ship through the obstacles in the river in time to moor to chains at the Quays. The 
process of arrival, preparation and passage, could take weeks to complete 
although it was usually a matter of days. There is no record of pilots staying aboard 
a ship during any waiting period on bills, but the same man returned later to take 
the ship onwards.  
 
When comparing the cost of pilotage at Bristol with that of other ports, it would be a 
mistake to simply correlate charges because pilots were not paid a flat rate for 
                                                 
23 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/12 Hall Book 12, January 1791. 
24 Smyth, Sailor’s Word Book, p. 484. 
25 NMM: Log/M/64 Log Book of the Africa Queen, 1790. 
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making a passage, but submitted an itemised bill recording the cost of each 
manoeuvre, and at Bristol these were determined to a large extent by tidal 
conditions.26  Similarly, the pilot’s decision regarding the number of men and boats 
required to tow a ship would not depend on its tonnage, but on the existing rate of 
flow of the river and weather conditions. The number of men per boat could vary 
but for the larger ships there were approximately ten men per boat, and depending 
on the state of the river six to ten boats were usually necessary, the cost being 
between 20-25s per boat. This added considerably to the overall costs and there 
was no difference between incoming and outgoing vessels.27  
 
Appendix 3.005. lists the pilot rates per manoeuvre and Appendix 3.006 the 
average costs of boat work, which apart from towing included such tasks as rowing 
the master out to his ship and the use of a chain boat to fix mooring buoys to the 
chains at the quays.28  
 
Appendix 3.007 records the total yearly cost of incoming pilot fees paid by two 
ships in the period 1777-1789 and for both ships the costs were similar as they 
were roughly the same size and carried the same cargo. There were some 
anomalies, such as the costs to the Fanny were below average in 1777 when she 
was on her maiden voyage and under charter. In 1780 the bill for the master’s 
disbursements shows that she had picked up a Comb pilot and when his fee is 
added to the branch pilot’s, the payment is again average.29 Similarly, the amount 
paid by the Triton in 1778 was well below average, but if the channel pilot was paid 
by the master, then the combined payments would again bring the sum to the 
average.  
 
In 1789 the insett account is more detailed and shows that the river pilot joined at 
the Holmes and acted as assistant to the Comb pilot, the former’s costs being paid 
by an agent and the latter’s by Brights, which can be interpreted as the channel 
                                                 
26 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 165. There were books of rates which had been agreed between 
pilots and the Society. 
27 BRO: AC/MU/3/7a-c. Voucher for pilotage Blaze Castle, 1773; BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and 
Success, pp. 49, 81, 118, 148; J. Rich, The Bristol Pilots, p. 55.   
28 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success, pp. 49, 81, 118, 148. 
29 Fanny fourth voyage, 1780. BRO: AC/MU3(8)b Captain Thomas Richards disbursements in Bristol.  
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pilot being joined by the river pilot who was taking the ship from ‘the Holmes up’. 
There is a record of this happening with another of the company ships in 1785 and 
so it could be that it occurred from time to time, something that must be taken into 
account when using the account books for research.  
 
In 1778 and 1779, the pilotage costs for the Fanny were considerably above 
average, a fact that cannot be put down to any annual variation in rates as the 
Triton’s charges did not change. The account book has entries in both years for 
payments for lighterage, an item that does not occur in any other year, and 
therefore there is a strong possibility that this was the reason for the extra cost. 
The pilot did not supervise or provide lighterage, but he would be onboard the ship 
whenever she was re-moored to facilitate discharge, which would account for his 
increased earnings.  
 
Included in Appendix 3.007 are the two voyages of the larger Brights’ ship Druid in 
1790 and 1791. The pilot fees are slightly more, but again there is little difference 
between the two years. Finally, a correlation of the names of the pilots attending 
the vessels of both companies shows no preference, and therefore the master of 
the incoming vessel must have had to take whatever pilot was available at the 
time. 
 
The method by which shipping was moved around the harbour at Bristol is not 
documented, yet it must have been a daily occurrence as ships were not supposed 
to accumulate at the Quays. Also, repairs were necessary after each voyage, 
usually done at the various shipyards and dry docks which necessitated movement 
after discharge, but again this is not usually recorded. None of the account books 
or bills show payments for pilotage across the inner harbour, but there are entries 
for ‘halling’ and on one occasion for ‘halling the ship’ – ‘halling’ being the term used 
for haulage or transportation of goods but also for moving a ship. Without further 
evidence, the conclusion must be that no pilot was necessary, and that local boats 
and labourers were hired to shift the vessels.  
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On her tenth voyage, a number of entries in the account book imply that the Fanny 
went aground on her way out and had to be ‘piloted from the Hole to the Dock’, the 
dock being Hillhouse’s, and there her cargo was discharged into lighters and taken 
to a warehouse whilst the ship was surveyed. This was a commonplace scenario 
which could occur at any port and shows that the steps taken in the eighteenth 
century were the same as would be carried out in this day and age.30 At the end of 
her last voyage for Munckley entries give the cost of  towing her to lie at Tombs 
Dock, and as it was necessary to buy a rope to do it, it would not have been carried 
out by the usual well equipped hobblers.31 
 
The discharge and lading of ships. 
 
The account books show that a ship’s discharge was generally overseen by her 
mate who was also responsible for supervising and paying the men, and when she 
was clear of goods, he made her ready to lie up between voyages unless outgoing 
cargo was to be taken in immediately (Appendix 3.008). For example, when the 
Sybil arrived at the quays in 1786 it was necessary to clear her decks and remove 
working gear such as anchors from her hold before unloading. After discharge the 
ship was cleaned, her cables, anchors and guns sent down into the hold, and 
finally the water casks were discharged and sent ashore to be repaired and filled 
for the next voyage.32 If cargo was taken in at the same time as discharging a 
special licence was necessary.33 
 
As has been previously mentioned, some ships discharged part of their cargo 
before attempting the river passage, and in 1780 the Success moored at Sea Mills 
for 7 days in order to clear the ship and discharge part of its cargo into a trow 
before continuing up river to unload at the quays at Bristol. After this the holds 
were cleaned, brick ballast trimmed, wooden dunnage sent ashore, fenders 
constructed from faggots, and finally, after the ship was moved to a fresh mooring 
                                                 
30 BRO: 12162 Account book of the Fanny, p. 148. 
31 BRO: 12162 Account book of the Fanny, p. 175. 
32 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success, p. 82. 
33 BRO: 12162 Account book of the Fanny, p. 48, 
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to lie up, the cables were coiled and sent down to the hold.34  It is of interest that 
Sea Mills was being used in 1781 for discharging cargo, because it was reputed to 
have been closed long before this date. W. E. Minchinton believed that it had been 
used as a base for privateers in the Seven Years War and after it closed in 1763 
no further use for it was found, it being utterly abandoned by 1779. 35 Other 
historians have agreed with Minchinton but the evidence is that it was still useful, if 
not operational.36  
 
Appendix 3.008 also details the costs and time taken to carry out the above tasks 
and it can be seen that ships could be loaded and discharged in a relatively short 
period compared to the length of their stay in port even when preparation is taken 
into consideration. The Sybil was a large ship for Bristol, but the actual number of 
days loading were just 13½ although the calendar period was 26, and similarly on 
discharge she took only 3½ days to discharge the 130 tons she had onboard. The 
Success discharged her cargo in 10 days through a calendar period of 15 days and 
both used only  a small workforce. This shows that the cause of the notorious 
congestion on Bristol’s quays was not due to the practical difficulties of cargo 
handling.  
 
An example of the outbound process of loading cargo is detailed in the mate’s 
disbursements of the Sybil in 1785.37 He used shore workers to provide the labour 
necessary to service pumps and windlass; to clear the hold and then take in and 
stow the cargo. At the same time minor repair work was done and the ship rigged 
for sea. The ship’s carpenter, boatswain and two crewmen were employed at times 
during this period and were paid for this labour before actually being signed on the 
ship, showing that sea wages did not begin until the vessel arrived at Kingroad.38  
 
This is confirmed by all outsett accounts of the Fanny which all record 
extraordinary payments to the mate and six out of eight name the carpenter, so the 
                                                 
34 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success, p. 150. 
35 Minchinton, ‘The Port of Bristol’, p. 139.  
36 Damer Powell, Bristol Privateers, p. 151. 
37 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success,  p. 43. 
38 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success,  pp. 23, 43, 44. 
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likelihood is that he too was in attendance on all occasions during preparation 
work, and was paid circuitously.39 At times selected members of the crew of the 
Fanny, the mate, carpenter, boatswain and steward, were employed on pay some 
weeks before its sailing date, but this does not appear to have been the practice on 
Brights’ ships. A comparison between discharging and loading expenses is made 
in Appendix 3.009 using the mate’s disbursements regarding two of Brights’ 
ships.40 It can be seen that the outgoing costs of his work on all but one occasion 
were greater and more varied than the incoming, possibly due to the diversity of 
export goods and containers and the disparity of their weights and measures. 
 
The process and costs of outgoing pilotage. 
 
Outward bound, pilots boarded at Bristol having the usual tow boats ready to move 
a ship when the tidal conditions were right and as bills show the vessel would 
normally be taken directly to Kingroad. A ship could remain there for some time 
simply making preparations for its voyage or awaiting suitable conditions, as was 
the case when the Africa Queen was towed to Kingroad from Bristol on 3 February, 
1790 and remained there for three weeks.41 The pilot’s bill for the Sybil in 1785 
shows that after the original mooring, he returned on two occasions take up 
anchors and sail the ship with the captain onboard, presumably to carry out the 
modern equivalent of sea-trials, before finally coming again to pilot the ship to 
Lundy to start the outward voyage.42 Ships could also leave the anchorage towards 
the wider stretches of the estuary to allow themselves more sea-room in the event 
of gales as Kingroad could be dangerous in an onshore NE wind, but on this 
occasion the weather conditions for the Sybil were good.43 
 
Appendix 3.007 records similar data regarding outgoing pilotage as previously 
given in for incoming vessels. Year by year the payments for the Fanny and Triton 
                                                 
39 The mate’s attendance is recorded on all outsetts, and carpenter on outsetts for voyages. BRO: 12162 
Account book of the Fanny, pp. 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12. 
40 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage insett accounts for the Triton, pp. 16, 34, 48, 68, 86, 98, 108, 120, 144. No entry in 
insett accounts for the 2nd, 6th, and 7th voyages; BRO: 39654/4 Voyage insett accounts for the Druid, pp. 18, 
37. 
41 NMM: Log/M/74 Log Book of the Africa Queen, 1790. 
42 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success, p. 49. 
43 FFBJ, November to December, 1785.  
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are similar and the reason for any anomalies is probably the same as discussed 
above for incoming ships. Awaiting escorting ships or convoys in a war period 
would increase the pilotage costs. As far as the use of pilots is concerned, there 
was a tendency on the part of the owners of the Fanny to favour certain pilots, but 
those of the Triton seem to be taken at random. When the incoming and outgoing 
pilotage costs averaged for both ships, they are remarkably similar considering the 
differences in the processes.  
 
The average cost of pilotage for the Fanny was £14.4.0d incoming and £15.13.0 
outgoing, and for the Triton, £13.3.0d and £13.7.0d respectively, to the nearest 
shilling. There was one other expense associated with pilotage and that was the 
awarding of pints of ale to the hobblers. Brights conformed to this but they 
appeared reluctant to make it universal, preferring that the pilot gave only to those 
who deserved it. Henry Tudor, pilot to the Sybil in 1785, comments on his bill that 
he ‘gave (ale) the best of the men as the other ships give ale to all’ and the cost 
was 5s for 70 men.44 These payments are not recorded separately in the account 
books. 
 
Conclusions. 
  
Although this section has mainly illustrated processes, it is obvious that the 
shipowners of Bristol were subject to costs brought about by the conditions set by 
the tidal river which were beyond their control. Apart from ships being delayed until 
a suitable spring tide arrived, preparation was needed before a large ship could 
attempt the river and this in itself meant additional pilotage costs as the vessel was 
manoeuvred from one mooring to another. Similarly the tow up or down river added 
to costs not incurred at other ports. The bills appeared to be similar in peace and 
war.  
 
The outgoing shipping costs were greater than the incoming, probably due to the 
nature of the cargoes, the export having a greater diversity of containers and 
                                                 
44 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success, p. 49. 
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disparity of weights and measures, but the available documentation indicates the 
process could be completed quickly if necessary.  
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Section 2. Clerical and administrative interactions between the merchant 
shipowner and the harbour agencies 
 
Introduction. 
 
Ralph Davis described the various tasks which the managing owner, or ship’s 
husband, faced during the period a ship was in port between voyages (Appendix 
3010).45 These will be discussed later but absent from the list was the task of 
dealing with the complex and dissimilar clerical and taxation systems of the various 
harbour agencies, which must have added to the burden of merchant ship owners 
both in financial terms and in time expended, the latter an important factor when 
considering efficiency. This would be a relatively simple matter to investigate with 
regards to any port if in each there had been one agency dealing with all dues, 
fees and taxation, but in every port particular systems had evolved over the 
centuries which included the establishment of local organisations as well as 
governmental. 
 
At Bristol there were three main agencies, the Society of Merchant Venturers, the 
Corporation of Bristol and the Board of Customs (as well as interactive systems 
between the merchants themselves and traders) and the obvious way to carry out 
research would be to systematically examine the documentation of each port 
agency and its operating practices, and then evaluate the resources that the ship 
manager would need to put in to comply with its regulations.  
 
However at Bristol this option would not give a clear picture of the structure as a 
whole, because in reality the working practices of the various agencies were 
inextricably interwoven, sometimes counterproductively, and as will be explained 
below, ship managers appear on occasions to have farmed out some 
responsibilities for dues payments to what can only be seen as agents.46 Again, 
although the manager paid a ship’s port dues, other taxes were the responsibility of 
                                                 
45 Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p. 160. 
46 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, pp. 105, 116, 136; BRO: 39654/4 Voyage accounts for the 
Druid, 1790-91, pp. 12, 37.  
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the merchant shipping goods and if merchandise was carried on behalf of 
individual owners, then payment of these dues was their own responsibility. Most 
of the required documentation was statutory and unavoidable, as without it being 
completed a ship could not proceed through its home and foreign ports, and indeed 
could be seized at sea by naval vessels. This could result in fines or confiscation of 
the ship or goods, but even if these were remitted on investigation, the delays 
could ruin the profits of a voyage.  
 
An examination of the procedures affecting incoming vessels. 
 
To give some idea of the extent of the bureaucratic tasks a shipowner faced before 
cargo could be discharged, the following details the process that had to be 
followed.  First the ship had to clear through customs, initially at Pill and then at 
Bristol, whereupon, if its papers were correct, it was free to pass into the port and 
then the discharge of its cargo became the priority. On arrival at customs, the 
master had to present the ship’s manifest which detailed goods carried, their 
containers with individual markings, the name of the shipper, and to whom they 
were consigned. He would also have a copy of the bills of lading, receipts given by 
him at his port of loading stating that the ship had taken on specified merchandise 
to be delivered to an individual at a stated port on payment of the stipulated freight. 
A copy of each bill was retained by the shipper and another sent on by faster ships 
to the consignee together with invoices for the goods placed on board. Invoices 
gave a description of the goods shipped, freight payments, and sundry costs, and 
when a merchant knew that a ship on which he had goods had arrived, he 
attended at Customs House presenting these documents as evidence to claim his 
shipment.  
 
A warrant was issued which would authorise the landing of the cargo after payment 
of duties and this contained the kind and quantity of cargo together with the marks, 
numbers and weights of the containers. If he had no invoices or bills of lading, then 
a ‘bill of sight’ was made out in which his estimate of the quantity of cargo was 
noted and a deposit for the payment of duty taken. From the warrant, the clerk 
made out a transcript called the ‘bill of entry’ and after this was completed the 
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importer took his warrant and bill of entry to the Clerk of the Rates who calculated 
the duty payable. After payment the warrant passed through the custom’s internal 
administration system and was then forwarded to the land surveyors and 
landwaiters to allow them to start work on the vessel.  
 
As the ship was unloaded, customs officials kept a ‘blue book’ listing the goods 
unloaded per consignee to provide a check against the warrants and other internal 
customs documents. Each container had its own markings and the contents were 
checked and recorded together with the exact weight, measurement, or quantity 
depending on the type of goods. An allowance called tare was made for the weight 
of the container, and another, draught, for the addition to the weight due to the turn 
of the scales.47 The ship’s husband or representative kept an almost identical 
volume known as the discharging book, but in this case it also recorded the freight 
and average charges. Ship’s accounts tended to refer to this book rather than 
listing the goods item by item as was done with exports. A copy of the discharging 
book of the Sybil for the year 1786 survives and will be referred to below.  
 
The above process was initiated by the Board of Customs Commissioners in 
London, which Hoon believed had become disorganized and unable to cope 
because high duties had created a situation where fraud and smuggling were 
financially attractive, leading to counter measures involving rigorous checks and a 
complicated system of calculating and collecting duties.48 According to Ashworth, 
trade had outstripped the capacity of the London Customs House due to the sheer 
number of clerks and suchlike all vying for space to do paperwork leaving 
frustrated merchants to complain that their business was being ruined due to the 
delays.49 On top of these delays was the problem of Customs House opening 
hours as there had been no alteration for 150 years during which time trade had 
increased considerably. In London, the Long Room, where all documentation was 
handled, opened for three hours from nine to twelve and although minor officers 
                                                 
47 E. E. Hoon, The Organisation of the English Customs System, 1696-1786 (Newton Abbot, 1968) p. 33. 
48 Hoon, English Customs System, p. 36. 
49 W. J. Ashworth, Customs and Excise: Trade, Production and Consumption in England, 1640-1845 
(Oxford, 2003) p. 135.  
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had two additional hours, these could easily be ignored. At Bristol the Long Room 
hours were the same as London, but with an additional two in the afternoon.50 
 
The merchants of Bristol regularly complained about the time their deputies wasted 
at Customs House, and at a meeting of the Hall agreed to write to the Treasury 
asking for a change in the laws relating to fees and hours of attendance. They did 
not want to negotiate with Customs, rather for parliament to produce a tabulated 
scale and they recommended that ‘Custom’s officers should attend the Long Room 
of Custom House from 9am to 2pm. Waterside officers 6am-6pm from 10th March – 
10th September and from sunrise to sunset 10th September till 10th March. Holidays 
should be abolished except for four days over Xmas; three days Whitsuntide; three 
at Easter, Good Friday and the birthdays of the King and Queen.51 In 1793 there 
were still 45 Custom’s House holidays listed in Matthew’s, Bristol Directory.52 This 
problem probably affected Bristol more than most as the larger ships would arrive 
en masse during the spring-tide periods. 
 
The overwhelming bureaucracy that developed in London was passed on to the 
outports because of the former’s insistence upon centralisation and it affected 
Bristol shipping. The negative effect was obvious, but looking at the positives as far 
as Bristol was concerned, customs were responsible for overseeing the navigation 
acts and without them goods could have been shipped directly by Bristol ships 
from anywhere in the world to Europe, thereby avoiding the port and reducing its 
income.53  Bristol merchants fought to uphold the laws against overseas direct 
trade to Ireland and again were reliant on customs oversight.  There is another 
factor that writers have generally ignored, and that is the sheer amount of 
documentation that accumulated which had to be processed by hand in the 
counting houses adding considerably to the clerical wage bill.  
 
To get some understanding of the extent of the paperwork, an ordinary ship’s 
export manifest like that of the Fanny in 1783 had seven pages and 39 entries, 
                                                 
50 Hoon, English Customs System, p. 221-222.  
51 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 17 September 1787. 
52 Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794, p. 101. 
53 Rupert Jarvis, ‘Critical Historical Introduction’ in Hoon, English Customs System, , pp. xxv-xxvi. 
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some with over ten items, and this manifest had to be exact and at least three 
copies of it made.54 This, with its copies, had to be correct in every detail and every 
item taken on board as cargo recorded on it. The bills of lading had to record the 
same details, but they could consist of a bill made out for one or two items55 or, as 
in the case of the Swift in 1759, the whole cargo was minutely printed on it.56 Three 
copies were made of these bills and they were each accompanied by invoices 
which detailed goods, price and shipping fees. Another factor was the cost of each 
document exchanged at customs, and using the bill of lading as an example, the 
cost in 1774 was 9d57 and in 1787, 1s1d,58 which appears small, but when 
multiplied by three and for possibly numerous parcels of goods, plus postage, it 
could be a significant sum to be added to the general administration costs.   
 
Under the wharfage agreement, the Society had the right to impose various taxes 
and these could be a source of irritation to the merchant. Cannage was payable for 
the use of can hooks which were no longer provided, and plankage was charged 
for running a plank out from the shore to the ship. These were combined with 
wharfage, which will be dealt with below, and so could not be avoided. Two other 
taxes, anchorage and moorage, remained the same throughout the century apart 
from coastal shipping going from 40 to 30 tons, and are listed in Appendix 3.011 
together with the criteria for assessing payment.59 Severn traders were exempt. 
Although the cost to coasting vessels was much less, the large foreign-going 
vessels which carried out lucrative yearly voyages to the Americas, but spent a 
great deal of time in port, annually paid far less than foreign-going ships on other 
trade routes which regularly came into the port. These taxes were collected for the 
Society by Customs.  
 
Tons burthen was used for calculation of dues until the passing of the Ship 
Registry Act of 1786 after which each ship’s tonnage, as registered, was the figure 
                                                 
54 BRO: 12162 Account book of the Fanny, pp. 105-111. 
55 BRO: AC/MU/2/22a-b Bill of Lading, Fanny 11th Voyage. 
56 BRO: 39654/2 Voyage accounts for the Snow Swift, 1759. (No page numbers) 
57 BRO: Microfilm FX/20 Bristol Shipping Account books courtesy of William L Clements Library, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, USA. Volume 2. Invoices Neptune, 1774. (No page numbers) 
58 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, p. 114. 
59 BRO: SMV/7/1/1/78 Wharfage Book, 1792-93. (No page numbers) 
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used in all official documents.60 This act created a permanent register of all British 
owned ships and a copy of the registration had to be carried on board. For most 
ships this meant an increase in payments, an example being that the Fanny when 
she was registered at Lloyd’s in September 1777 was 230t, but her burden of 160t 
was the figure entered for calculation in the moorage section of the Wharfage 
Books for 1778 and she was still being rated at this tonnage for moorage charges 
in February 1786, but by 1788 after being re-registered the figure used for 
calculation of dues was her new registered tonnage of 207t and payments had 
increased from 13s4d to 17s3d, an increase of 30%.61  
 
Ships’ anchorage and moorage payments were entered in the Wharfage Books on 
a daily basis and when the dates are correlated with other sources,62 it is obvious 
that collection of the Society’s dues were carried out by custom’s officials as soon 
as the vessel arrived. Indeed, when these five duties were finally established by 
the 1807 Wharfage Act, it stated that a ship was not to be entered inwards or 
cleared outward by customs officers until a certificate of payment was produced.63 
None of the ships’ account books record these payments in their own right and 
therefore the probability is that the shipowner settled them when ‘entering in’, or 
through an agent. Ships husbanded by Brights used agents, including themselves, 
to pay some port duties whilst the owner of the Fanny, Munckley, always paid his 
own.64 
 
Wharfage was a more complex duty levied on goods themselves and therefore 
settled by the shipper, but again collected by customs officials acting for the 
Society. Imports were taxed according to a schedule of payments which depended 
upon the type and quantity of specific goods. The schedule for this period was 
                                                 
60 26 Geo. III c.60. An Act for the further increase and encouragement of  Shipping and Navigation.  
61 The 1787 Wharfage Book is missing and her re-registry in that year cannot be confirmed. 
62 Ships account books, Muster Rolls, Presentments and contemporary newspapers all give ships’ arrival 
dates. 
63 47. Geo III. c. 33. An Act for ascertaining and establishing the rates of Wharfage Cannage, Plankage, 
Anchorage and Moorage to be received at the lawful Quays in the Port of Bristol: for the regulation of Crane 
keepers in the said port; and for the better regulation of pilots and pilotage of vessels navigating the Bristol 
Channel, 1 August 1807, p. 4-5. 
64 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, 1777-1790; BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the 
snow Fanny, 1777-1791.  
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attached to the 1764 lease and appears ongoing with no changes being found 
when the 1785-1786 Wharfage Book65 was compared to the schedule contained in 
the 1807 Wharfage Act. Unlike customs duties which were constantly changing, 
wharfage charges were stable.  
 
Wharfage on exports was more complicated as the goods were converted by a 
scale into standard measurements of barrels and hogsheads, the former charged 
at 1d and the latter 2d. No trace of this scale has been found, but it appears to be a 
rare example of efficiency among contrary methods of fees collections. Settlement 
of these dues probably took place as the goods were unloaded because in the 
case of the Sybil, the dates of payments by individual shippers, as recorded in the 
books, spanned the cargo discharge period and not beyond.66 Although wharfage 
payments were not recorded in the ship’s account books, as they were the 
shipper’s responsibility, copies of invoices for goods imported for sale by the 
owners themselves on which the charge of wharfage was recorded are available.67   
 
It was the duty of the ship’s master to keep the ship’s muster roll68 and of the 
owners to deduct each crewman’s one shilling per month contribution from his 
wages. Nationally the seaman’s contribution was 6d but at Bristol an equal amount 
was deducted for the Seaman’s Fund overseen by the Society. Receipts from the 
account book of the Sybil show that the monies for the Greenwich Hospital and the 
Society were both collected by Customs, the former endorsed with the stamp of the 
Register Office of Seamen, a subsidiary of the Board of Customs, and the latter 
carrying no endorsement but signed by the same customs official Thomas Rothley 
under his title of Receiver for the port of Bristol.69  Again Customs are used as a 
collection agency which might or might not be an efficient way of working but every 
task they undertook would certainly increase their income. As trustees for the 
Corporation, the Society had the right to appoint its own receiver, but followed the 
                                                 
65 BRO: SMV/7/1/1/73 Wharfage Book, 1785-1786. 
66 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success, together with BRO: SMV/7/1/1/73 Wharfage Book, 
1785-1786. 
67 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, pp. 104, 140 ; BRO: 39654/4 Account book of the Druid, p. 
36. 
68 2. Geo II. c. 36. 
69 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success, p. 47. 
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general convention of the outports by having the dues collected by customs 
officers.  
 
According to Hoon, there were attempts by some masters to avoid payment and so 
regulations were made prohibiting the clearance of a vessel inwards until receipts 
were produced showing that the duties had been paid, thus the receipts for the last 
voyage were carried onboard.70 This order does not appear to have been enforced 
in the case of the Sybil which arrived at Bristol in July 1785 as hospital money 
would have been deducted when the crew were paid off, but was not paid into the 
fund until November, even though it is on record that the cargo had been 
discharged by the end of July.71 Although this may be a minor point, it is an 
example of the discrepancy between actual practice and the course ordered by the 
regulations. Customs also used the document to check the composition of the crew 
in line with the Navigation Laws and so it was in the form of a muster roll. 
 
Bristol Corporation retained three fees for themselves, quay warden and water 
bailiff’s, mayor’s, and town dues. Quay warden and water bailiff’s fees were ancient 
taxes dating from the reign of Henry VII, but although mentioned, they were not 
included in the lease to the Society in 1690. The income from the mayor’s dues, a 
tax levied on ships arriving in the port, was used to fund mayoral expenses and 
again gave no maritime services in return.72  
 
These taxes were collected each time a vessel arrived in port and were a flat rate 
irrespective of its burden, which during the period covered by this research was 
£1.19s.0d for the mayors, and 6s for the other two. The surviving receipts for these 
dues show that they were collected simultaneously by customs officers and in the 
shipowners’ account books they are always recorded together. As will be seen 
below, these taxes were unpopular and opposed by the shipowners well beyond 
                                                 
70Hoon, English Customs System, p. 41. 
71 BRO: SMV9/2/1/13 Thomas Rothley’s Account Book 1747-1787. This document serves as an index to the 
Muster Rolls and gives dates of payments; BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success, p. 22. Mates 
disbursements. 
72 The Corporation gained parliamentary title to collect these taxes by 28 Geo. III. J. A. Kington, City and 
Port of Bristol: Letters, Essays, Tracts and other Documents, Illustrative of the Municipal History of Bristol 
and of the Trade of its Port, Written Collected and Arranged by ‘A Burgess’ with a Dedicatory Preface to the 
New Town Council (Bristol, 1836) pp. 16-18. 
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the eighteenth century, one example given being that on a yearly basis a small 
coaster visiting the port on twelve occasions would pay £27 compared to a large 
West Indiaman whose annual visit cost £2.5s.0d; all for no marine purpose.73 
 
The Corporation was given parliamentary title to these taxes in 1788 and 
considering that their raison d’être was the same as that of anchorage and 
moorage, the conclusion must be that they were taxes retained simply for the 
benefit of the Corporation.  
 
An examination of the procedures affecting outgoing vessels. 
 
Before a ship could sail on its next voyage, another complex administration 
process had to be completed. The master would attend at Customs House to 
register on oath before the Collector Outwards that his ship was ready to accept 
cargo, whereupon the name of the ship and master, together with the port of 
destination, would then be recorded in the Ship’s Entry Book Outwards, the 
information being made available to the public in the same way as with an 
incoming vessel, that is by way of local newspapers and by the publishing the bills 
of entry in the Presentments. 74 Eventually, when the process described below was 
complete, a cocket was delivered to the master for the voyage and the ship was 
cleared to leave. 
 
The exportation of goods was complicated by the fact that the Navigation Acts 
stated that certain goods bound for foreign ports must firstly be imported into Great 
Britain with normal duties being paid; but a percentage of this could be refunded 
under a system of drawbacks if the goods were then re-exported. Most direct 
exports, but not all, were not subject to duty but still had to be recorded. Merchants 
with goods to be directly exported would attend at Custom House to make out their 
                                                 
73 J. Latimer, The Annals of Bristol in the Nineteenth Century (Bristol, 1893; reprinted 1970 edition, Bath) p. 
103. 
 
74 The two local newspapers generally used to obtain this information were, BRL: BH7HI/BL8G, Felix 
Farley’s Bristol Journal, 1752-1800 and BRL: BL9F, Bristol Mercury and Universal Advertiser, 1790-1798; 
Both the import and export sections of the Bristol Presentments lists ships when they are first ‘entered out’ 
and continues to list them until the ships are ‘cleared’.  
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bills of entry outwards recording port of consignment, exporting merchant’s name, 
and the quantity and description of goods. After presenting the bills to the Collector 
Outwards and paying the duties, he received a warrant, the authority for the goods 
to be taken onboard.  
 
For merchants re-exporting goods the process became more complicated as firstly 
they had to obtain a certificate to say that the import duties had been paid, upon 
which they would be granted a cocket which permitted the goods to be shipped 
provided a bond was taken out repayable when landed at the designated port. 
They would also have to complete the same process as for direct export in order to 
obtain a warrant which, combined with the cocket, authorised loading. All of these 
transactions were made on oath and when complete the papers were given to the 
searchers who began the process of loading. After they had loaded the ship and 
checked that all goods were correct, they certified the accuracy of each cocket and 
delivered them to the Collector Outwards as authorities for the ship to sail. Once a 
ship had sailed, the exporter had to swear on oath that his goods had gone to 
foreign lands, and he was then given an order for the payment of the drawback.75 
All of this took time and effort with the costs being borne by the merchant. 
 
From 1701 the Customs Commissioners were directed to keep a register of trading 
ships, overtly to keep a watch on Britain’s trading position, but the main purpose 
was to make sure that the criteria laid down in the Navigation Acts compelling 
British merchants to use British built ships with predominantly British crews was 
being enforced, and as part of the enforcement process shipowners were required 
to give details of their vessels on oath before the local collector of customs and 
these details would be passed on to the Board of Customs in London.76 However, 
the information in this register was not concise enough to deter fraud, hence the 
passing of the Registration Act of 1786, mentioned above, which at the same time 
established the Register General of Shipping, again under the Board of Customs. 
 
                                                 
75 Hoon, English Customs System, p. 260. 
76 Hoon, English Customs System, pp. 117-119. 
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A copy of the registration details was a compulsory inclusion in ship’s papers after 
1786 and the sworn details on this were used as evidence for the issuing by 
Customs of a Plantation Certificate without which a vessel could not trade with the 
plantations, and as this was the most lucrative trading area for Bristol, it was 
obviously essential. As well as details of the vessel and its crew, it listed the goods 
enumerated in the various Acts that could only be brought back to a port in Great 
Britain.77  According to Hoon, bonds to the value of £1000 for ships under 100 tons 
and £2000 for those over had to be given for vessels trading with the plantations.78 
Although this could be recovered, it was capital that the owner could have used 
elsewhere. 
 
On arrival at a plantation port, the appropriate duty was paid for goods shipped out 
by cocket and a bonds discharge certificate issued by Customs addressed to the 
master for the purpose of reclaiming the surety on return to Great Britain. 
Merchants shipping goods back to Bristol from Jamaica had to swear on oath that 
their goods were from the island, and give the exact location on the island where 
the goods were produced. They also had to give an assurance in the form of bonds 
if they were taking enumerated goods back to England, and when they arrived, to 
produce a certificate to prove that this had been done.79  
 
To ensure that a ship ‘entered in’ at a port in the plantations and remained in the 
customs area, movement between ports required a let-pass, which in the case of 
Jamaica kept it within sight of the island. It was again a sworn certificate and when 
a ship was ready for the return voyage another let-pass was obtained certifying the 
same sworn details, but stating that all customs and other duties had been paid. 
This gave the master authority to leave Jamaican waters and bade all to accept 
that the ship was on its lawful affairs. It also had to be produced when a ship was 
stopped at sea by the Royal Navy as evidence of the legality of the voyage. They 
were not issued by Customs but by the Secretary’s Office of the Governor. One 
other document used in the plantation areas was the List of Men, which was a 
                                                 
77 BRO: F/D/T/2/1 Town Dues; Collectors Accounts 1790-1791, 1 September 1791. 
78 Hoon, English Customs System, p. 259. 
79 Hoon, English Customs System, p. 246. 
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customs document giving the name of the ship and master, the burden and listing 
the crew by name, station, age, stature and facial appearance.80 
 
Two Acts of Parliament allowed a certain amount of ships’ provisions and stores to 
be exempt from customs duty for a voyage.81 The ships’ masters had to attend at 
Customs House to be issued with what was known as a Victualling Bill giving the 
usual details plus the number of crew, where bound and the likely duration of the 
voyage. A surviving example from the Success at Bristol dated 1781 has a printed 
list of provisions each with a standard measure, on which the master has hand-
written the quantity carried onboard. The document was addressed to the Surveyor 
and Searcher and signed by the Collector, Comptroller and Customer and dated. It 
is again an example of the extent of the bureaucracy surrounding the Custom’s 
service. Lists of provisions onboard were copied into the  account books of ships 
husbanded by Brights and were endorsed and signed for by the master when 
receiving his instructions. Lastly, when the ship sailed it carried receipts for the 
mandatory payment of light dues, 10s10d for the two lights at Milford and St. 
Georges Channel. The Sybil, paid these duties to Customs whilst the vessel was at 
Kingroad waiting to sail.82 
 
Conclusions. 
 
When set out in detail, the extent of the bureaucratic administrative tasks becomes 
clear and it would be impossible for any merchant to survive without the backup of 
a busy counting house to process his ship through the port, never mind to handle 
the other business of a traditional shipowner. It must also be remembered that 
much of this administration had to be done by the ship’s master away from the 
owner’s writers and clerks. Unlike Royal Navy vessels, a clerk was rarely carried 
on a merchant ship let alone a purser, so the task fell to the master to ensure that 
all the documents accumulated during his voyage were accurately completed and 
                                                 
80 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success, pp. 51, 53.  
81 1. William and Mary. c 22: 13 and 14 Charles II c 2.  
82 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success, pp. 47-48. 
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ready to be handed over on his return to Bristol. Mistakes by the master, or any 
shore clerk, when dealing with the various agencies could involves fines or delays.  
 
All of these tasks took time and effort but also added to the costs of a voyage. 
Every document had to be paid for and many had additional stamp duties. The 
shipowners of all ports had similar expenses but Bristol with its emphasis on trade 
with the West Indies probably paid more than most.  
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Section 3. The strategy employed by the managing owner to pass his ship 
through the port  
 
Introduction. 
 
An axiom that can be applied to modern shipping is that the longer stay a vessel 
has in port, the less money it makes. This also applied in the eighteenth century 
and the managing owner would stress to the master in letters and instructions83 the 
need to turn around quickly,84 but due to seasonal cycles, especially in the West 
Indies, there were times when it was more realistic to stay. In general terms 
though, the aim was to get a ship through the harbour as quickly as possible whilst 
incurring the minimum of expense.  
  
Achieving this at Bristol depended upon the ability of the shipowner to overcome a 
multitude of tasks and problems arising out of competing with other ships for port 
facilities, whilst dealing with a number of agencies which at times appeared to be 
working at cross-purposes. To a certain extent good planning could alleviate some 
of the problems, but an owner could never be certain as to the return date of his 
vessel or be sure what facilities would be available, especially in wartime when 
convoys of ships would arrive en masse.  
 
Before examining the actual operations, it is necessary to consider the role of the 
shipowner whilst his ship was on transit through the port. Firstly, he would be 
working to dual purposes; that is, it was his duty to oversee all the tasks associated 
with getting the ship into port, discharged, refitted, loaded and then sent out again; 
and secondly, he had to manage his own commercial activities related to the cargo 
and possibly that of the subordinate owners. Also, as has been described in the 
last chapter, he would be carrying on his normal business interests which would 
probably include ownership of other ships, local and overseas investments, 
perhaps an insurance brokerage, and indeed any venture where there was money 
                                                 
83 In order to be more concise the word ‘shipowner’ in this chapter will in future infer ‘managing owner’ 
unless otherwise stated. 
84 For example, in BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 121; BRO: 39654/3 Voyage 
accounts for the Triton p. 144; BRO: 39654/4 Voyage accounts for the Druid, p. 37. 
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to be made. The centre point of all his activities was his counting house, or ‘house’, 
as it was referred to in the eighteenth century and from there he controlled his 
activities in Bristol and overseas.  
 
The arrival of a shipowner’s vessel. 
 
The first hurdle was that a shipowner had no means of knowing exactly when a 
foreign-going vessel would arrive, although letters from its last port of lading carried 
by the faster packet ships would give him some idea, and there was also the 
possibility that his ship would have been seen and its position reported by other 
vessels. The Bristol newspapers published short reports on local ships such as: 
 
Captain Coates of the Expedition arrived in the Downs from Honduras on 
the 9th April in Lat 43 North, Long 30 West spoke the Roebuck, Bliss, from 
hence for Philadelphia out 30 days, all well.’ He also talked to the Druid and 
all was well.85 
 
So some preparations could be made such as alerting those with an interest as to 
its likely arrival and obviously he would take note of the physical conditions of the 
river, the present position in the port regarding congestion and the likelihood of 
docking facilities and suchlike being available. His clerks would have the vessel’s 
documentation ready and be prepared to deal with the various harbour agencies 
when the time came. However, until the ship had been cleared at Pill and the 
master could come ashore to report, the owner could not finalise his plans as he 
would not know the true state of the ship or its cargo. 
 
The first indication that his ship had arrived would be the appearance of the 
‘Warner’, a gentleman whose express purpose was to lookout for newly arrived 
vessels and then, for a fee, ride to Bristol to inform the owners of the arrival and 
apparent condition of their vessel. Warners were originally appointed by the 
Society but not paid by them, their income being derived from their fees. There is 
                                                 
85 FFBJ, 30 April 1792. 
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very little documented information about these men, but in the nineteenth century 
the pilots complained that they were not being paid enough by them for 
information. The Society refused to act claiming that warners were appointed by 
the ‘merchants at large’86 and the presumption is that there was possibly more than 
one warner and that he or they got their information from the pilots rather than their 
own observations.87 Their half-guinea fees were recorded in the account book 
insetts of both Munckley and Brights’ ships.88  
 
From whatever source the information came, it would give owners an indication of 
the likely progress of their ships, but in the initial stages control of an incoming 
vessel was still completely in the hands of the master. He would be following the 
standard incoming procedure unless diverted by weather or some other problem, 
as within the Bristol Channel any deviation would be likely to be seen and reported 
to the owners.  
 
Minchinton published details of a voyage of the Parham in 1731 where the master 
was berated by the owner in a series of letters for being late leaving his last port. 
Another ship had departed at the time this ship should have and arrived at Bristol 
with the information that the Parham was still there, and later a fisherman reported 
the vessel to be way out of position. Finally, the owner found that the vessel was at 
St. Ives89 and believing a month had been lost in passage due to a basic mistake, 
he rebuked the captain. It is obvious that despite the distance between ports, there 
was a well established intelligence network in the eighteenth century, however 
informal, operating on behalf of the shipowners. 
 
Clearing through Customs. 
 
Provided that a ship was not quarantined or an embargo placed on it during the 
initial clearance procedure at Pill, its future movements from this juncture were 
                                                 
86 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, pp. 76, 319. 
87 However, on Poet’s Walk at Clevedon today, there is a shelter re-erected by the Clevedon Civic Society in 
the belief that the Finzel family in 1835 built it for the Warner.  
88. BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny all voyages; BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for 
the Triton, p. 144; BRO: 39654/4 Voyage accounts for the Druid, p. 37. 
89 Minchinton, ed., The Trade of Bristol, p. 110-116. 
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directed by its ‘house’. The report of the arrival of a ship at Customs was an 
anxious time for the shipowner as all future movements through the port depended 
on obtaining clearance. The customs service was involved at all levels of port 
operations and shipowners were extremely conscious of their power, especially 
after the passing of the Manifest Act in 1786.90  
 
This act was designed to check smuggling, but was seen by the Bristol merchants 
as being heavy-handed and the Hall petitioned the House of Commons in 1788, 
asking for ‘immediate relief’ for merchants whose goods had already been seized. 
They claimed that petty mistakes by crew and others were severely punished and 
cited the confiscation of a puncheon of rum because it was marked with chalk 
instead of being inscribed, and that five puncheons had been seized due to being 
marked with what looked like a ‘U’ instead of a ‘V’.91 These are examples of the 
acrimonious relationship between shipowners and merchants on one side, and an 
agency they saw as deliberately thwarting their ability to trade.  
 
Their concern was shown in the written instructions to their captains where they 
invariably insisted on scrupulous adherence to all customs regulations and to 
keeping accurate documentation. The following is an extract from the letter of 
instructions from Brights given to John Honneywell, master of the ship Triton, at the 
commencement of her eighth voyage to Jamaica in March, 1787. 
 
The late acts of parliament respecting the entry and manifests of ships, 
require such great exactness that you must be very careful that the officers 
of the customs in Jamaica fill up every article of your clearances in the 
manner herein directed for upon the least omission or irregularity on their 
part or on yours, your ship upon her arrival here may be for a long time 
detained or perhaps not admitted to an entry at all. You must likewise 
remember that under certain circumstances the late Act requires that you 
should deliver manifests of your cargo to officers of the Customs who may 
come on board you before your arrival in the Port of Bristol. It will therefore 
                                                 
90 26 Geo. III c. 40. 
91 Minchinton, ed., Politics and the Port of Bristol, pp. 163-164. 
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be necessary that you should have always two of the manifest ready and 
complete in every part exactly corresponding with your Customs House 
clearances with the manifest to be delivered into the Customs House here 
as those copies of the manifest will be forwarded by post to the collector 
here by the officer who may come on board and receive them from you.  
 
For the same reasons it will be requisite that you prevent any of your people 
from bringing home with them any larger quantity either of coffee or rum 
than what is just sufficient for expenditure on their homeward passage. The 
heavy penalties under the late Acts rendering very small quantities of either 
sufficient to confiscate the ship provided they are not in legal packages and 
are not included in the manifests. For your further guidance we give 
herewith abstract of the Acts and some blank manifests which you will have 
only to fill up according to the printed directions thereon.92 
 
Other shipowners gave similar instructions to their captains, an illustration being 
Munckley stressing to Captain Richards of the Fanny in 1782, that ‘the great 
severity of the laws make it absolutely necessary that the utmost attention should 
be paid to this particular’.93 It was vital, therefore, that a ship carry a complete and 
accurate set of ship’s papers and the Bristol account books show that these were 
supplied by the shipowner before the start of a voyage and had to be signed for by 
the master.  
 
However, the owners themselves do not appear to have been as stringent with 
their personal goods. John Pinney actively avoided paying duties on small luxuries 
by storing them inside barrels of other goods and writing to the recipient giving 
details of their markings. He was outraged at the duty on sweetmeats and was 
determined to deny them to his children as a matter of principle, but after losing 
that domestic battle he had them sent home concealed in a barrel of bread – and 
this was after the Manifest Act had been passed.94 Lowbridge Bright also appeared 
                                                 
92 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, p. 112. 
93 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 80. 
94 MacInnes, Gateway of Empire, pp. 328-329. 
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to be flouting the rules in 1774 when he included brass hinges in a case of 
ironmongery with the initials of the recipient marked on the package.95 It might 
seem like hypocrisy to demand that their employees observe total obedience to a 
statute whilst breaking it themselves, but the shipowners seemed genuinely afraid 
of losing or having their ships delayed so the most likely explanation is that they 
were as parsimonious in their personal expenditure as they were careful with that 
of their business. 
 
When a ship cleared Customs, its details and those of the cargo were made 
available in the Bristol Presentments, printed bills of entry and clearance, published 
twice weekly from 1770 in the form of a leaflet,96 and this information was repeated 
weekly in the local newspapers. These were published by a ‘sub-patentee’ by 
authority of the Board of Customs,97 again reflecting their status in the port. This 
information was of particular importance to merchants with cargo aboard a vessel, 
and also it alerted business people and tradesmen not directly involved but whose 
services might be called upon. FFBJ also recorded all goods imported to Bristol 
each week.98 
 
Appendix 3.012 gives the costs for inward custom’s fees, and shows that they were 
relatively low for clearing at Pill and so could be paid on the spot and included in 
the master’s disbursements, but the more expensive Custom’s House fees were 
paid for by the firm, evidence that the owners had taken over the ship from the 
master.99 As the appendix shows, the cost to each ship remained consistent year 
by year, the increase in the period 1787 onwards being due to the Ships 
Registration Act altering tonnage. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 Morgan, ed., Bright – Meyler Papers, p. 461. 
96 Bristol Presentments. 
97 Grahame Farr, Records of Bristol Ships: 1800-1838 (Bristol Record Society, 15, 1950) p. 18. 
98 For example. FFBJ, 5 December 1791. 
99 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, p. 120; BRO: 12162 Shipping account book of the snow 
Fanny, p.72. 
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Factors concerning the owner when considering his ship’s further progress. 
 
After consultation with the master, the shipowner of a large foreign-going vessel, 
whose priority would be to get its cargo unloaded, had to make decisions as to its 
further progress. Two factors predominated, time and as always, cost. In an ideal 
situation the ship would go straight to the quays as most facilities were centred 
there and they were ‘legal quays’ where by law enumerated cargoes could be 
discharged. Following the harbour improvements around 1770, there was more 
quay space, but at Bristol there was always congestion and indeed the state of the 
quays themselves added to it. An entry in the Hall Book dated 13 August, 1785 
stated:  
 
The committee viewed the Back and the Quay and found that the same are 
greatly encumbered with timber, anchors and other things, particularly at the 
lower end of the back opposite the south side of Queen Square and at the 
Grove where a great quantity of deal balks are laid and as the committee 
were informed have lain a long time. And the committee directed that a 
complaint be sent thereof to the magistrates.100  
 
Additional complications for the shipowner arose following the Society’s purchase 
of the Floating Dock and the passing of the Merchant Dock Act in 1776,101 because 
it became mandatory for naval stores, that is timber, deals, staves, tar, pitch, 
turpentine and the like to be unloaded and stored there. Also, in 1789 a Tobacco 
Act102 was passed which allowed Customs to commandeer the Mud Dock 
containing the four deepest berths in the harbour for the discharge of tobacco. In 
1791, the Hall petitioned without success the Commissioners of the Customs 
asking that the berths be released to general shipping when not being used to 
unload tobacco.103 It did not affect the West Indian ships, but the problem for those 
                                                 
100 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 13 August 1785, p. 163.  
101 16 Geo. III. cap 33. Act to remove the danger of fire amongst the ships in the port of Bristol by preventing 
the landing certain commodities on the present quays, and for providing a convenient quay and proper places 
for landing and storing the same, and for regulating the said quay, and the lighters, boats, and other vessels, 
carrying goods for hire within the said port of Bristol; and for other purposes therein mentioned. 1776. 
102 29 Geo III c. 68.  
103 Minchinton, ed., Politics and the Port of Bristol, pp. 177-178. 
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trading with the Chesapeake and other naval stores areas was that the shipowner 
might find that he could unload quickly in one place only to face delays due to the 
lack of water to take the ship on to its new berth.  
 
In 1786 Customs directed four ships with some tobacco, but mainly naval stores, to 
unload firstly at the Mud Dock whereupon the Society threatened to sue if they 
unloaded naval stores there. The ships’ masters wrote back and requested to 
discharge in situ because there would not be water to move the vessels for ten 
days, pointing out that the two acts covering tobacco and naval stores were in 
conflict. Eventually the Society agreed and allowed discharge provided the goods 
were immediately removed.104 Apart from this incident showing the intransigence of 
the Customs – and later the Society had to complain that Customs were unlawfully 
giving permission to ships to unload naval stores at the Quay – it is an example of 
the complexities the shipowners faced when dealing with a tidal harbour and 
obstinate agencies. To lose ten days at least was expensive for the owners 
involved and this must have made them consider whether it was worthwhile to load 
these commodities for freight, especially small quantities. 
 
The same problem could arise for ships forced to unload at Merchants’ Dock as 
this was the only place in the harbour where dues were charged on a weekly basis 
and without sufficient tide a ship couldn’t leave. Also, the cost of transporting cargo 
from there to the city could mean the difference between profit and loss and when 
timber merchants brought a case before the Society the example they used was of 
a cargo of staves and timber unloaded at the Dock making a loss of £77, whereas 
if it had been unloaded at the quay it would have made £22.10s profit.105  
 
The operations at Merchants’ Dock appear to have caused friction between 
Customs and the Society as the Hall Books record arguments over landing naval 
stores in 1790, and in 1792 Customs contentiously disputed it being a legal 
quay.106 Arguing from the other point of view, a letter to the Committee pointed to 
                                                 
104 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 11, 29 July 1785, 2 August 1785, pp. 236-38. 
105 Minchinton, ‘Port of Bristol’, p. 140. 
106 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/11 Hall Book 12, 30 December 1790, 24 January, 1792. 
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the considerable expense and trouble of moving a ship from the Mud Dock to 
Merchants’ Dock as tow-boats and a pilot107 were required, and finishes by saying 
that the tobacco could have been carried to the Mud Dock by lighters.108  
 
Another factor that had to be considered was that the delays at the mouth of the 
river might be reduced if part of the cargo was loaded into lighters for the passage 
up river. This could be worthwhile to a shipowner if his cargo was seasonal and he 
wanted to reach markets early, or if a slight reduction in draft allowed the vessel to 
move sooner. However, it would incur the extra expense of discharging at anchor 
or moorings using shore workers and a ship’s own tackle, plus the costs of 
lighterage, and finally of discharging the lighter at Bristol. In 1780 part of the cargo 
of the Success had to be unloaded into a trow before the ship moved on up to the 
Quays which involved not only the costs of separate lading and discharging, but of 
coopers attending the discharging of the trow as well. An extra week was added to 
the Success’s inward voyage.109 The Fanny used lighters on two of her voyages 
but unfortunately there is no indication whether this was at the mouth of the river or 
at the Quays.110 
 
Before an owner decided on the discharge of cargo and its movement from the 
quay, he had to be aware of the state of the quays, warehousing, and the situation 
regarding the ship repair wharves. Arguments with crane operators were ongoing 
with disputes frequently arising over payment of crane duties. Sugar hogsheads, 
for example, needed cranes but they could be difficult to come by. A list of 
outstanding debts in 1779 included an owner’s refusal to pay because he had 
unloaded his ship using its own tackle, and also a report of another owner declining 
to pay because he had discharged his ship into his own trow without any 
assistance from the shore.111 Intransigence was not confined to the Customs and a 
shipowner was forced to juggle with the various agencies even though, in the case 
of the Society, he himself might be a member.  
                                                 
107 This is the only reference to using a pilot to move ships in harbour that has been found. 
108 BRO: SMV. Loose letter dated 21 July 1789. Not catalogued. 
109 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success, pp. 147-150.  
110 BRO: 12162 Shipping account book of the snow Fanny, pp. 20, 48. 
111 BRO: SMV. Loose letter dated 8 April 1779. Not catalogued. 
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Once cargo had been discharged, the shipowner orchestrated refitting and re-
provisioning (see Chapter 4) and would have been working on the logistics of the 
next voyage. However, ships’ account books show that most voyages followed a 
pattern based on the past with few deviations. Appendix 3.013 gives the routine 
costs incurred by the ship Fanny passing through the port after her voyages.112 
The following section examines these arrangements and comments on the value of 
adhering to this system.  
 
Conclusions. 
 
For the West Indian shipowner, the arrival of his vessel at Bristol began the 
process of clearing his ship through Customs, bringing it upstream and discharging 
its cargo. He could have difficulties with Customs, because at times an 
acrimonious relationship existed between them and shipowners generally, leading 
to the former being obstructionist when it came to the matter of berths. The 
shipowner’s ability to plan ahead was limited by this and having to compete with 
other owners for the facilities at the quays among which was the use of cranes, 
which could in turn lead to friction with the Society. 
 
 
                                                 
112 When consulting Appendix 3.013 it should be noted that these expenses may not have been incurred every 
year and that sometimes the information was missing. 
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Section 4. The logistics and economics involved in a West Indian voyage.  
 
Introduction. 
 
The larger Bristol merchant houses, as described in Chapter 2, ran their ships as 
constant traders and provided there were no technical hitches during their time in 
port, they would dispatch a ship on a similar voyage giving the master detailed, 
written instructions as to how it was to be carried out. These were copied into every 
ship’s account book and are an important source of information when considering 
the logic behind the owner’s directives to a particular vessel as they cover all 
aspects of the voyage including the management of the ship, its ports of call and 
the arrangements for cargo. They are remarkably consistent in layout but show 
considerable differences in content during times of peace and war. Unfortunately 
the information in the surviving Bristol books lends itself only to the West Indies, 
the slave trades and a few ships sailing to North America.  
 
It is not intended to examine the wider issues of Bristol’s trade with West Indies, 
the macro-economics, the processes or the personnel involved, as this has been 
more than adequately covered elsewhere by prominent historians,113 but to look at 
the way a shipowner planning the next voyage of his vessel expected it to function 
and to comment on whether his methods appear to be efficient and cost effective; 
or alternatively, if he was simply maintaining a entrenched structure, which could 
be the case since close examination of his instructions voyage by voyage shows 
that he repeats the same orders even though some have proved optimistic and 
others unachievable.114  
 
The role of the master of a West Indiaman.  
 
First and foremost, the shipowner addressed his plans to the master and not to a 
representative or factor, although they might get covering letters, because a 
                                                 
113 For examples see Minchinton, ed., Trade of Bristol; Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade; Pares, West 
India Fortune. 
114 The former generally referred to the master having enough provisions onboard for the voyage and the latter 
the likelihood of the ship accomplishing two voyages in one year. See Chapters 4 and below. 
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system had developed whereby the success of the whole venture depended on 
having a ship’s master whose skill as a seaman was overshadowed by his ability to 
act as a factor or agent for the House at the ship’s ports of call. He had many 
responsibilities, not least that he was accountable for amassing a homeward cargo 
for the vessel and for negotiating the freight rate to be paid by the West Indian 
planters. Success in these areas could only be achieved by his ability to negotiate 
personally with planters shipping cargo back to Bristol, and to do this he had to 
know them and their geographical area well, and above all to be respected and 
astute.115  
 
As will be shown below, the extent that a firm used a master varied, but he was 
always the most important component in the venture and indeed many masters 
had shares in their vessels. Samuel Munckley’s Fanny will feature significantly in 
this part of the thesis and the ship’s master for most voyages, Thomas Richards, 
owned one eighth of the ship and it was an indication of the family alliances of the 
West Indian trade that his brother James owned a similar share, and at its regular 
port of Barbados, the firm’s agents were T&S Richards, one partner being the 
captain and the other a brother. 
 
Two masters might have identical skills and experience, but an intimate knowledge 
of an area was the predominant asset when it came to deployment. On her 
seventh voyage, the owners of the Fanny feared that the crop at Barbados would 
be poor and directed the master to sail for Jamaica if he found that to be the case, 
but in anticipation of this, John Sims, a master with Jamaican experience, sailed as 
a passenger ready to take over.116 The cost of sending two masters on one ship 
not only increased the wages bill, something that ship owners constantly carped 
about, but the perks associated were considerable. Mackenzie-Grieve says that 
Liverpool shipowners had little respect for their compatriots at Bristol who they saw 
as poor businessmen: 
 
                                                 
115 Pares, West India Fortune, pp. 220-221. 
116 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 98.  
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The Bristol Merchants treated their captains like young gentlemen on the 
Grand Tour. Cabin privileges, port allowance and primage. They ate ashore 
in the West Indian ports and drank imported Madeira. Captains did not pay 
at five shillings a day.117 
 
This may have been true in 1750, but by 1793 the Bristol captains were 
complaining in a round-robin to the Society of West India Merchants that their 
privileges had dropped behind Liverpool and London.118 As an indication of costs, 
Appendix 3.014 records the personal account rendered by Captain Mattocks of the 
Sybil after her third voyage in 1785. The crew wages bill is not available for this 
voyage but some idea of the relative cost of a master’s expertise under this system 
can be seen by comparing his £88 earnings to that of the rest of the crew’s 
£195.17.5d in 1786.119 It is approximately 45 percent. 
 
Ships’ masters could be replaced, but when they were they had to have experience 
of the same trade area. James Henderson of Bright’s Industry, a constant trader to 
Jamaica, replaced William Mattocks of the Triton when the latter was moved to the 
newly built Sybil in 1782, and again in 1786 when Mattocks died at sea, it was 
Henderson who followed him.120 Shipowners needed a pool of experienced 
captains. In the event of a master’s death, his instructions included a section 
promoting his chief mate to master, although in some circumstances there were 
caveats such as the appointment being approved by the house’s ‘friends’, that is 
agents at the port of destination.121 The appointment of a chief mate to master was 
a common occurrence, continuity, experience and industry being the relevant 
factors and these led Lowbridge Bright to insist on promoting the mate of the 
Milford in 1774, despite being lobbied to select another man.122  
 
                                                 
117 Averil Mackenzie-Grieve, The Last Years of the English Slave Trade; Liverpool1750 - 1807 (London, 
1941) p. 4. 
118 Pares, West India Fortune, p. 361. 
119 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success. From the detached wages book. Pages are not 
numbered. 
120 BRO: Microfilm FX/20 Bristol Shipping Account Books 4. No page numbers; BRL: 21258 Account book 
of the Sybil and  Success, p. 86. 
121 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, p. 41. 
122 Morgan, ed., Bright – Meyler Papers,  p. 460. 
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The role of the Bristol ship’s master in the West Indies is well documented and will 
not be gone into at depth it being sufficient to say that when a ship arrived at its 
port, the day by day work of maintenance and cargo handling was left to the mate 
whilst the captain carried out his primary purposes of assembling a return cargo, 
collecting debt from previous voyages and disposing of goods dispatched by the 
owners.  
 
The omnipotence of the master has been established123 but there were also times 
when the owners could be critical of him. William Mattocks, a long serving captain 
of Brights, was master of the Sybil in 1785 when his instructions included a rebuke 
concerning his expenditure on provisions during his last voyage and the state in 
which his ship arrived home. They admonished him by saying that he had been 
supplied with as much if not more stores than any other captain and asked the 
question, ‘Why the Sybil is in so much worse condition than the other ships you 
alone can know?’, finishing by telling him that he would get his customary wages 
and such like but ‘nothing beyond’.124  Mattocks died during this voyage and his 
ship returned without a full cargo. The other problem for masters was that they 
were subject to the whims of the planters and found it impossible to please all of 
them, but at the same time if they combined against a captain the owner would 
have no alternative but to change him.125  
 
To revert to the unfortunate Captain Mattocks of the Sybil, he wrote a series of 
letters to his owners apologising for what was in effect a succession of minor 
disasters culminating in sailing with a short cargo, but stressing that he was 
following the advice of Duncomb and Savage, the agents. Savage had had to visit 
the ship to sort things out and by the fifth letter it is obvious that the master was 
following his orders as he fearfully assured the owners that he took the weekly 
advice from the agents. Finally, in his last letter just before sailing, he again 
pleaded that he had followed their orders ‘in every respect weekly’.126 It is hardly 
the usual image of the omnipotence of a West Indiaman’s master, especially as 
                                                 
123 See Pares, West India Fortune, pp. 220-222. 
124 BRL: 21258, Account book of the Sybil and  Success, p. 48. 
125 Pares, West India Fortune, pp. 221-222. 
126 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and  Success, pp. 56-59. 
 233 
Mattocks was a very experienced captain, but he had been warned about his ability 
and behaviour before the voyage. His ineptitude is confirmed by the account books 
of the Triton and Fanny, as they show these ships sailed fully loaded that year 
taking a full income from freight so there could not have been shortages. In freight 
money alone, compared to the Triton, his incompetence probably cost the owners 
£598.127 
 
Ships were also diverted from their usual route for technical reasons. The Druid 
replaced the Sybil in 1790 when shipments increased at Jamaica due to the latter 
no longer being able to carry hogsheads and so having to load smaller tierces. This 
would mean less cargo overall due to stowage problems.128 However, diversion 
was usually due to a change in conditions at the ports of destination such as 
severe weather, crop failure or the ship being delayed elsewhere. Normally, 
though, the ships stayed as constant traders to the same locality, again confirming 
Bristol was not moving away from traditional practices.  
 
A ship’s income from freight.129 
 
It was established in Chapter 2 that Bristol West Indian merchants owned ships as 
adjuncts to their business, but in London and other areas new ways of working had 
been taken up as quoted in a letter from the House of Pinney in 1789: 
 
Shipowning at this port is a much more serious affair than it is in London 
where the merchant seldom holds more than a sixteenth, and often no part 
at all; whereas our ships are entirely owned for ourselves, which in the first 
place ties up a large sum of money which might be more profitably 
employed in procuring consignments and in the next place makes it 
absolutely necessary that we should find freight both out and home for them 
without which they must prove very sinking funds indeed.130  
                                                 
127 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 138; BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the 
Triton, p. 109. 
128 BRO: 39654/4 Voyage accounts for the Druid, p. 1. 
129 The word ‘freight’ can either mean goods transported commercially or the charge made for this.  
130 Pares, West India Fortune, p. 209. 
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This is useful as it not only confirms the changes taking place in London, but the 
reference to freight is important. In terms of professional shipowning, the purpose 
of a merchant ship was to make a profit for its owner by earning income only from 
freight131 and the Pinney letter implies that he at least believed it was of prime 
importance at Bristol. It indicates a divergence from traditional trade methods in the 
minds of some shipowners.  
 
The account books show three reasons for goods being carried. Firstly, those 
shipped on the owner’s account; secondly, merchandise shipped on the personal 
account of one or more of the owners; and thirdly, commodities carried for others 
for freight. Considering the last: if these ships were being used to make money in 
their own right, it follows that there should have been enough profit to make it a 
viable business. An initial study of  ships’ manifests in account books shows that 
freight was paid on all goods carried including those exported on the owners’ 
account, although they did not pay primage to the master if the goods were 
consigned to him. 
 
As they cover the same period, the account books for the Fanny and Triton are 
particularly useful tools with which to analyse freight as both ships were involved in 
the same trade, albeit the Fanny sailed to Barbados and the Triton to Jamaica. 
This investigation compares the income from freight alone from each ship with the 
costs voyage by voyage, and if freight was of prime importance then there should 
have been a considerable profit. The relevant sections of the account books are 
the outsetts giving all outgoing transactions, and the insetts dealing with the 
incoming.132 Appendix 3.015 records the results. 
 
Fanny’s first voyage was on charter to the Baltic and so is not valid for this analysis 
but overall she completed two voyages more than the Triton . To compensate for 
this in the analysis, Fanny’s 6th and 10th have been deleted, these randomly 
                                                 
131 From now on, the single word ‘freight’, as used in ships’ account books, will indicate freight charges or 
income. 
132 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny; BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton. 
See Appendix 3.026 for page numbers of outsetts and insetts. 
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chosen. It is apparent from the data that the outgoing costs of both ships, except 
on one occasion, were higher than the income from outgoing freight due to the 
costs of refitting. Except on two occasions, insett costs were lower than income 
from freight and therefore a profit was made. The total profit from freight is 
therefore the inset profit less the outset loss. The actual profit is freight plus any 
transactions directly related to the ship such as the sale of ship’s material.  
 
The evidence is clear that under the one voyage per year system, neither ship 
could have been operated for freight alone as the Fanny averaged £476, a 
reasonable return and the Triton £100 profit per annum, but on their own these 
sums were not enough to compensate for the effort, especially as they had to be 
split amongst all partners. The addition of the two missing voyages of the Fanny 
increases the annual freight income to only £480 further confirming the figures. The 
actual profits, that is freight profit plus any ancillary business done by the ship 
itself, barely improved matters with the former increasing to £581 and the latter to 
£209, and indeed on two occasions the Triton operated at a loss. Clearly, reducing 
the costs of the outsett would increase the profits but these are thoroughly 
examined in Chapter 4 and there are no items that could be removed or even 
significantly reduced.  
 
The reality was that these ships were following the traditional way of operating and 
the profits they made from freight charges did not give the owners a sufficient 
return for their investment. That is not to say that they were adverse to freight, 
rather the opposite, but their main concern was receiving the commission on sugar 
which will be described below. Pares quoted Charles Pinney as saying that ‘the 
commission is in no consequence in comparison to the freight’ but he was an 
exception as most owned ships for consignments.133 Freight was essential, 
however, to offset the costs of a voyage and immediately a ship had been entered 
out and was ready to take cargo, adverts were placed in the local papers advising 
its intended departure and capability of accepting cargo. Prospective shippers were 
                                                 
133 Pares, West India Fortune, p. 209. 
 236 
advised to contact the owners or master, again showing that the latter had many 
facets to his work outside of seamanship. 
 
The importance of freight is reflected in the masters’ instructions, but when 
comparing those of Brights and Munckley, the former appears to be the more 
insistent that their masters stick to their guidelines. Before most voyages they gave 
the Triton’s master particular orders concerning his freight negotiations and 
generally tried to set prospective rates by giving him what were probably over 
optimistic recommendations to follow; although they temporised this by insisting 
that at least he should get the full current rate at the port of loading.134 
 
Amassing a cargo was a complicated business and any possible loss of freight 
money was taken seriously by owners who usually had long experience at the 
business. On her second voyage, for example, the Triton’s owners advised the 
captain against taking on sugar at a certain port because it was contained in small 
casks which were never well filled, and as freight was calculated by weight small 
barrels would take up more room than large giving lower returns.135 Another saving 
that could be made was by charging freight on goods that could be used as 
ballast,136 and again the master was generally instructed to try to get wood for 
dunnage on freight rather than paying for it. Small savings, but the eighteenth-
century merchant believed in them.  
 
Samuel Munckley was also concerned about freight and if he knew the state of the 
crops at Barbados was affecting freight rates he advised his masters accordingly, 
but the tone of his instructions indicated he was more prepared to trust the 
masters’ discretion than were Brights. Freight was obviously important enough to 
give permission to Captain Richards to get it at another island if Barbados fell 
short, but again it was left to his discretion.137 For her 9th voyage, the Fanny had a 
new master and advice was more detailed including a warning about not waiting 
                                                 
134 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, p. 39. 
135 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, p. 20. 
136 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, pp. 39, 111. 
137 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 96. 
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around for freight, something that was not said in instructions to more experienced 
captains.138  
 
Outward and inward goods shipped on behalf of the owners. 
 
One of the assets associated with traditional shipowning was the profit made by 
the owners on the sale of goods they shipped to the West Indies for their own 
benefit. The Fanny’s account books record the income from these transactions 
which was then sent back either in bills of exchange or in actual goods shipped 
home, although the latter were not necessarily dispatched on the same ship. Her 
third voyage insett shows 69 hogsheads of sugar, payment for goods brought out 
on one ship, being sent home on three others as well as the Fanny.139  
 
The following advice taken from the master’s instructions for Fanny’s fifth voyage 
elucidates this process and how owners would use the proceeds to invest in 
merchandise for the return trip.  
 
Enclosed you have invoice of sundry goods consigned you for our account 
which we hope will come to a good market. These you will dispose of in the 
best manner you can for our interest, and remit a good part in good bills of 
exchange, the remainder in sugars by your own ship to assist her lading. 
We should prefer an assortment of clayeds to musco, even if you were to 
pay a trifle more in proportion for them, as the loss in weight is generally 
considerably less on clayed sugar than musco, and the quantity not to 
exceed twenty-five hogsheads, unless you find it necessary to put more on 
board to forward the loading of your ship. This we leave to you not doubting 
that you will act in the best manner.140 
 
                                                 
138 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 20. 
139 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 49. 
140 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 63. 
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The invoice shows that the outward goods consisted mainly of provisions, soap 
and salt being the only non-foodstuffs,141 and on this occasion they were bought in 
England but the southern Irish ports Cork and Waterford were regularly visited to 
load these items. Heavy items like bricks and iron hoops could be included and 
from the quantities there is no doubt that Munckley intended to make a profit on 
these goods and they were not simply for ballast. The eighth and ninth voyages 
had small invoices listing only the heavier goods, an indication that provisions were 
cheap on the island and not worth  carrying, but on that occasion ballast was 
needed. 
 
The instructions given to their masters by Brights regarding owner’s goods were 
not as detailed as Munckley’s as they were generally consigned to their agents in 
Jamaica. However, on Triton’s ninth voyage, the master was given goods to sell at 
his own discretion to cover disbursements, though he could seek advice from the 
agent if necessary. When all Triton’s voyages are examined, it is noticeable that 
unlike Munckley’s Fanny, the owners appear to have little interest in owner’s 
account goods, there being few items on their invoices and these usually weighty, 
like bricks, coal and iron hoops indicating shipment for ballast.  
 
Goods belonging to the owners were usually consigned to the captain and freight 
was paid, but no primage. However, on her eighth voyage, possibly due to the 
captain’s ill health, – it was his last voyage as master – the owner’s goods were 
consigned to T&S Richards for disposal and primage was paid.142 Again, the 
instructions detail how the proceeds are to be remitted home after helping pay the 
ship’s disbursements.143  
 
When the instructions given to both ships are compared, there seems a clear 
variation in the way each owner treats their captains. Munckley sent trade goods to 
make a profit rather than simply to cover disbursements and allowed the master 
more leeway, although less so after Richards was replaced after which for three 
                                                 
141 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 64. 
142 Richards health is discussed in a letter to T&S Richards in Jamaica at the outset of the ninth voyage when 
he was replaced. BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 127. 
143 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, pp. 112, 114. 
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out of four voyages the owner’s cargo was consigned to their factors. Kenneth 
Morgan acknowledges Munckley’s willingness to tolerate initiative, and also points 
out that with the proceeds from outward goods, he was buying sugar and other 
merchandise to be shipped back for sale by himself and not relying completely on 
the commission trade.144 This would increase his profits, but the market for exports 
to the West Indies was too unpredictable to be relied on. 
 
Appendix 3.016 compares Munckley’s expenditure with Brights and there is no 
doubt that goods sent out by Munckley could be ten times the value of Bright’s. 
The Triton’s manifests were checked to see if there was an increase in cargo 
consigned to the agents but that was not the case. It could be that Barbados was a 
more lucrative market for exports than Jamaica, but the significant difference in 
expenditure is more likely to indicate diverse attitudes to business. However, 
Appendix 3.015 shows that the Fanny’s profits from freight were consistently higher 
than those of the Triton, so it may be that Munckley’s business acumen was better 
than Brights or that the latter was concentrating more on land-based enterprises. 
Certainly, the former appears to have put more thought and effort into trading and 
given more advice to his captains. Nevertheless, had these owners been involved 
in professional shipowning, it is unlikely that these differences of income would 
have occurred between two almost identical ships.  
 
The process by which goods sent out on the owner’s account were sold can be 
deduced from the examination of a letter with attachments sent from Barbados in 
1762 by the master of Munckley’s ship Clifton. The letter itself gives details of the 
master’s financial dealings (Appendix 3.017). One attachment is a complete list of 
all merchandise that was imported and the dates when parcels of each item were 
sold, to whom, and the price. Another is a list of debts that remain uncollected on 
the island. There is an invoice for sugar bought by the proceeds and finally the 
master’s account current. The sale took place over a period of two and a half 
months and all goods were sold except those eaten by rats. Few items went 
                                                 
144 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, pp.198-199. 
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particularly quickly, except some that may have been specially ordered, and 
eventually the remainder had to be auctioned.145 
 
Data from this letter can be analysed to understand the economics of this type of 
trading but, unfortunately, the initial cost of the goods is unknown. The total income 
from selling them minus porterage and stowage was £1476 out of which £309 
remained unpaid, and on the master’s account current with the owners it was noted 
that he had collected in debts of £288 left from the sale of goods on the last 
voyage. He himself was paid £87 as his 5% commission on the sales and for 
collecting debts and was returning with £1214, in bills of exchange. He purchased 
24 hogsheads of sugar for £496 for the owners, and paid all expenses concerned. 
The total weight of the sugar was 33401 lbs, which, using the English 112 lb per 
cwt measure rather than the West Indian 100 lb, calculates to 298 cwt, and a rough 
estimation using the price of sugar in 1762 as 35s per cwt in England, grosses 
£522.146 The invoice gives the cost of sugar and all inward expenses as £496, so 
the profit would be about £522 - £496 or £26. This sum is small but sugar prices 
fluctuated month by month and a rise of 5s could increase the profit to £100, less 
duty of about £4.10s, on a relatively small batch of sugar.  
 
Merchants like Munckley and Brights took the unpaid ship’s husband role because 
it meant that their goods would get priority and, more importantly, they could 
dictate a ship’s movements. Although the Fanny sailed regularly to Cork and 
Barbados, Munckley diverted her to Madeira on her eighth voyage to examine the 
business prospects and the possibility of setting up a permanent trading 
arrangement. However, he could not have deemed it profitable because after one 
more try the experiment was discontinued. As ship’s husband it was his 
prerogative to do this.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
145 BRO: AC/MU/1/8b Letter from John Smith, Commander of the ship Clifton. 
146 This price was estimated by using Table 7.8 in Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 206.  
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Shipping goods on behalf of other merchants. 
 
Part of the business of the merchant shipowner was to prepare and ship packages 
of goods for overseas correspondents to order, and for this they charged a 
commission of 2½ percent on the total cost.147 This charge was not recorded 
anywhere on the ships’ account books as the work was not carried out on behalf of 
the owners, but by the merchant involved. However, as the purpose of this section 
is to investigate the profits made by ships’ husbands such as Munckley and 
Brights, it would be useful to have some idea as to the profits to be made from this 
part of their business and whether this service was financially rewarding.   
 
Since few invoices of goods prepared and dispatched by merchants on behalf of 
others survive, there is not enough data to produce a figure for commission 
income, but it is possible to approach the matter indirectly. The names of Munckley 
and Bright’s overseas correspondents are listed on ships’ manifests and it can be 
assumed that any goods sent out to other than their own agents would be subject 
to this commission; and although the sum is unknown, the freight charges per 
correspondent can be found from the manifest and used as a factor for assessing 
commission.  
 
The problem is that the cost of goods and the expenses involved was not included 
on manifests, data necessary for the calculation of commission. Nevertheless, 
invoices for owners’ goods are available for most voyages that include both freight 
charges and this data, so a ratio of freight to cost and expenses can be calculated 
for a package of goods for a specific voyage. This ratio can then be applied to all 
commission freight carried on the voyage to find its value and the commission 
income calculated from that sum. It gives only an estimated figure but accurate 
enough to provide a rough assessment commission income.  
 
The invoices for the Triton’s voyages show that commission charges were 
calculated not just from the cost of goods, but in addition all associated expenses 
                                                 
147 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 108. 
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such as freight and primage, custom’s dues, halling, shipping (craneage), and 
supplying bills of lading. It did not include insurance as this carried its own 
commission of ½ percent. The Fanny’s invoices were similar but no charge for 
insurance was even listed. Appendix 3.018 gives the export commission for a 
sample of four voyages of Munckley’s ship Fanny and three from Bright’s Triton.  
 
The commission earned by the Fanny for preparing and shipping goods for others 
averaged £12 per voyage, but this did not include a charge being made on goods 
shipped on the owner’s account such as was entered on Bright’s invoices. 
Technically, Brights were correct to implement this charge because they performed 
this service on behalf of the partners as distinct merchants. If Munckley had 
entered this charge then his income would have nearly trebled.  
 
Whatever the procedure used, the commission did not substantially increase the 
profits, but most West Indian shipowners were sugar factors in Bristol and the 
purchasing and shipping of goods out to their planters was a recognised part of the 
business arrangement.148 On its own, however, the effort Munckley put into earning 
outward commissions was hardly worth the trouble.149 
 
As is shown in Appendix 3.016, the Fanny carried a substantial amount of owner’s 
goods on every voyage compared to the Triton and this trait is shown to be 
repeated on commission goods. On three voyages only was the Triton carrying 
enough commission goods to allow income assessment which when calculated 
was slightly less than the Fanny per voyage so the same comments apply as 
above (Appendix 3.018). The indications are that during wartime Brights shipped 
very few of their own goods or on behalf of others, but relied for income on 
chartering or freight from merchandise sent by their partners. However, the 
eighteenth-century business methods meant that Brights had interests in 
associated firms: for example, on the second voyage the main shippers were 
Bright, Baillie and Bright, and Richard Bright owned two-twelfths of the vessel in his 
own right whilst L&R Brights had seven-twelfths.   
                                                 
148 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 193. 
149 Pares, West India Fortune, pp. 186-187. 
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This network of ‘interests’ meant that there were hidden profits connected to 
traditional shipowning. Brights were connected to Bright, Farr and Davis, rope-
makers, and their partners in the Triton were Bush, Elton and Bush, coopers, so 
goods or services were available from their own sources. An invoice from the 
eighth voyage of the Triton detailing goods shipped on the owner’s behalf included 
the purchase of casks, their filling and transportation (halling) to the vessel and, as 
Bush, Elton and Bush were responsible for both the incoming and outgoing 
cooperage, it is likely they also did this work.150   
 
The invoice shows that Brights also arranged the payment of fees of entry, 
wharfage, town and patent dues, prepared the bills of lading and arranged the 
actual loading of goods. Samuel Munckley had a haulage division as part of his 
business151 and was also a general merchant supplying the Fanny, and no doubt 
his other ships, with assorted goods such as bread bags, pilchards, tar, firkins and 
butter. Butter was extensively imported from Ireland and a letter from a business 
woman in Youghal in 1773 solicited him buy this and other commodities direct from 
her.152  
 
Lastly, the above invoice shows another shipowner’s sideline, the provision of 
individual insurance for each package of goods he sent out. This entailed a 
separate policy on each arranged for a service charge of ½ per cent. Again, using 
the Triton’s invoice as an example, the commission on £200 of insurance was £2 
per hundred, the policy 9s, and the commission 20s.  
 
Provision of insurance. 
 
The negotiation of insurance for land-based and mercantile purposes was among 
the tasks of a shipowning merchant house; the former being on behalf of the firm or 
                                                 
150 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, pp. 114, 120.  
151 Referred to in all outsetts except for the 10th and 11th voyages. BRO: 12162 Shipping account book of the 
snow Fanny. 
152 BRO: AC/MU/1/22a-c. Catherine Roberts, Youghal to SM regarding shipments of oats and butter, 25 
August to 7 September 1773. 
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owner, their business associates or trades people, and interests overseas; whilst 
the latter was for ships, the owners’ goods, and the commodities exported and 
imported by overseas clients. Insurance premiums were taken seriously by 
merchants, some of whom appear to have scrupulously guarded every investment 
with policies. Lowbridge Bright writing to his agents in Jamaica in 1777 devoted 
most of his letter to the subject, admonishing them for not stating whether the sum 
of insurance they wanted was in currency or sterling, there being a 40 percent 
difference, and also pointing out that rather than them advising him of the value of 
goods they wished to insure, they should say how much cover they wanted 
because the cost of the policy itself was high and a return on the value of lost 
goods would not include this sum unless added to the document.  
 
This is a prime example of the detail that an assiduous merchant like Bright would 
go to in order to maximise profits, and he went on to say that he felt the need to 
guarantee the underwriters themselves at another ½ per cent due to the 
‘prodigious losses’ they had suffered that year.153 There are many similar 
examples, but to illustrate the actual systems being used, the accounts of Samuel 
Munckley’s Fanny need be examined alone as Brights did not include insurance 
details in those of the Triton (or in their other contemporary ships’ accounts). 
However, there is sufficient information to be found in the twelve voyages detailed 
in the account book of the Fanny, the first seven of which were for war years 
(Appendix 3.019).  
 
The first voyage of the newly built Fanny was to Petersburg under charter for the 
return trip as she was finished too early for the West-Indies run. No cargo was 
loaded for the outward voyage and Munckley used Bristol brokers to obtain ship 
insurance. However, for the return voyage the charter conditions insisted on 
insurance being obtained from London associates of the charterer. Munckley’s 
letter to a London firm survives and as he was making an indirect request to them 
to approach London brokers, it illustrates the initial process of a customer seeking 
insurance. Munckley gave them the value of the insurance he wanted, advised that 
                                                 
153 Morgan, ed., Bright – Meyler Papers, p. 492. 
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he had a suitable captain, and that the ship already had a report of her forthcoming 
outward voyage published in Lloyd’s List.154 He gave the value of the ship as 
£2500, which agrees with that recorded in the outsett, and suggested that the 
premium might be £2.10s percent but allowed them to go to £3. He claims that he 
had heard it could be as low as £2.2s but believed this might be ‘neighbours fare’, 
that is, special prices for London ships. Eventually the cost was £2.10s percent. 
Insurance was also taken out on his homeward freight.155 In this letter, Munckley 
was at pains to stress his ship and captain were sound, indicating the cost of 
insurance depended on a range of factors rather than just the monetary value.    
 
Concerning insurance on the ship itself, Appendix 3.019 shows that outward and 
inward  insurance could vary but not to any great extent, and also that the owners 
gradually reduced the ship’s value from £2,400 to £800 as the years passed. After 
the 12th voyage she was actually sold for the lower amount. There were upturns, 
but this probably represents slight increases in value due to wartime. However, 
Lowbridge Bright considered an older ship to be worthwhile because it cost less to 
insure ‘as there is not so great a capital to cover when premiums are high in 
wartime’. He lamented the loss of the Rebecca bought in 1774 when her value, 
£1335, was about half its original price. Associating the Rebecca chronologically to 
the value of the Fanny on her fifth voyage when the outward insurance was £126, 
as compared to new at £189, a difference of £63, and the inward £158 to £316, 
difference £158, it makes a total saved of £221 which is not an inconsiderable sum 
and as there is no sign that cost of goods insurance was increasing with the age of 
the ship, one can follow Bright’s reasoning.156 
 
There were substantial differences between rates of insurance of ships in wartime 
and in peace. In 1777, on her first voyage to the West Indies the Fanny’s insurance 
for the trip out was £189 and in the last year of the war it was £101, the reduction 
being due to the owner insuring the ship for less as she had aged. In the first year 
of peace, the same insurance was reduced to £31, but that was for £1200 for an 
                                                 
154 BRL: Lloyd’s List, Greg International Reprint, 1760-1777.  Early commercial newspaper issued by Lloyd’s 
of London from 1740 onwards.  
155 BRO: 12162, Shipping account book of the snow Fanny, pp. 3, 5-6. 
156 Morgan, ed., Bright – Meyler Papers, p. 492. 
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older ship. If the owners had insured her at her original value, £2400, the cost 
would have been about double, the comparison between war and peace being 
£189 to £62.  
 
There were, however, return premiums on both ship and goods insurance in 
wartime provided the ship sailed in convoy. On the aforementioned voyage the 
total insurance was £652 and the return premium £340, but as the war continued 
returns became less and for the ship’s third voyage the total insurance paid was 
£695, the return £169, or 24 percent. Munckley insisted on sailing in convoy in all 
his wartime instructions and in that of the seventh and last ordered the master to 
sail with another vessel as far as Cork ‘as it makes a difference in the premium’. 
This is an indication that some rebate was due if a vessel kept company with 
another ship even if not in a convoy.157  
 
Brights were much more explicit in their orders to the Triton on this subject even 
though it had been fitted out as a Letter of Marque. On the first voyage the master 
was ordered to sail with two other ships for mutual protection and come to an 
agreement with them over signals, and later for the return voyage from Jamaica he 
was to wait for the first convoy and take orders from the man of war ‘remembering 
to bring all sailing orders or agreements and signals with any other ships of force 
home with you that we may get our return premium from the underwriters’.158  
 
Similar instructions were given for the second voyage with the owners insisting that 
by sticking to the convoys or ships of force they will get a return of 4% on 
insurance.159 The instructions for the next two wartime voyages were similar giving 
the impression that the loss of rebates to Brights was a particular anathema. The 
orders, compared to Munckley’s, gave the master little leeway to act on his own 
account and from their tone it is difficult to decide whether they were being 
parsimonious or simply timid.  
 
                                                 
157 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 96. Master’s instructions.  
158 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, pp. 3-7. Master’s instructions  
159 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, p. 19. Master’s instructions. 
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Even more confusing was their rationale regarding privateering. The Triton was 
equipped as a privateer yet she was given strict orders that her Letter of Marque 
was not intended for taking action –  he must not ‘endanger his ship in any degree’ 
– but to enable the firm to claim a share in any prize taken whilst in company. The 
instructions then spelled out the administrative action to be taken in such a case.160 
The expenses incurred included the Letter of Marque, £22; guns, £56; gunpowder 
throughout the five voyages, £33 minimum; gunsmith, £5; a total of £116. 
nonetheless, the main cost was for extra crew and provisions, the Triton carrying 4 
or 5 more crew than the Fanny including a gunner for three trips.161  
 
The Triton has been recorded by Damer Powell as having a Letter of Marque from 
1777, but the details are inaccurate or possibly the owners recorded incorrect 
information in the register.162 However, the Bright family had a history of 
privateering, the famous Tryall taking six prizes in the previous war, and in the 
current they had Letters of Marque for at least four other vessels, but none of 
whom appear to have been successful.163 This is not surprising if the same 
instructions were given to all ships and it is difficult to understand why they 
continued in this field. There is no indication that Munckley had any interest in 
privateering during this war.  
 
In both war and peace, insurance on goods or ships could be split between 
insurers. Referring again to Appendix 3.019, on voyages 1, 2 and 10, outward, 2 
and 3 inward, the Fanny itself carried two sets of insurance possibly because an 
individual insurer refused to cover the entire value, or perhaps the owners wished 
to spread the risk. Similarly cargo insurance could be split to cover losses of freight 
income, the actual goods, or as in voyages 9, 10 and 11, deck cargo. Another 
wartime insurance covered a ship for a year whilst it was in port, as with the Fanny 
on voyages 3, 4 and 6, the premium being relatively low at £6 per £1000.  
                                                 
160 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, pp. 4, 20. Master’s instructions. 
161 See Chapter 2 for crew breakdown and Chapter 4 for provisions. 
162 Apart from wrongly naming the owners, Damer Powell says the ship was 230 tons, not 100, her crew a 
maximum of 24 not 30, and it is unlikely that she carried 12 guns and 6 swivels as even the smallest gun 
needed a crew of 3 or 4 and there simply would not be enough men handle the ship and fire six guns per side 
or even single side. Damer Powell, Bristol Privateers, p. 299. 
163 Damer Powell, Bristol Privateers, pp. 246-299.  
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An outlay shipowners tried to avoid was the increase of insurance premiums during 
the hurricane season levied from 1 August till the end of October, which caused a 
scramble to be loaded by the end of July. Although most publications refer to 
‘doubling’ of insurance there is an entry in the Fanny’s insetts for her third voyage 
where Munckley paid an extra premium for sailing after 1 August, but it was £105 
as compared to the initial insurance of £460, less than one quarter so this premium 
may have been negotiable.164 Finally, there were numerous insurance brokers in 
Bristol and although Munckley used twelve of them, on most voyages they used 
Schimmelpenning and Co, and less frequently Greasley Blake & Co., both of the 
Exchange, confirming the tendency of shipowners to return to known and trusted 
companies (Appendix 3.019).  
 
Homeward passage. 
 
There are no Bristol Presentments or legible Port Books for the period 1782-89, but 
there was little change in the shipping patterns at the end of the century and for an 
approximate figure of the proportion of cargo belonging to individual partners of 
ships, information from the Presentments for the year 1792 will suffice. They show 
that a ship’s principal owner was usually the predominant shipper with about 75 
percent of the goods on board consigned to himself, and that the main commodity 
was sugar, with rum, cotton, spices and timber produce next. Compared to the 
outward cargo, the assortment of goods was far less as was the number of 
shippers. There were basically three categories of cargo; those items owned by 
planters and consigned to a factor in Bristol for sale, the latter usually the principal 
owner of the ship; goods being shipped on the owners’ account; and finally those 
belonging to other merchants with no connection to the carrying ship, some of 
whom were shipowners in their own right.   
 
                                                 
164 Davis says that insurance was doubled after 31st July and gives his source as PRO: BT 6-189 (1788). 
Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p. 279; Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 202; BRO: 
12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny. Insett account p. 48.  
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The Bristol West India merchants believed their fortunes were dependant on the 
commissions they earned as factors on the sale of homeward cargoes of sugar, 
and as Pares says ‘his main business in life was to sell sugar, and his main 
revenue – or so he thought – was the commission upon these sales.’165 Unlike the 
freight charges on outward bound goods, which were fixed at meetings of the 
Bristol West India Society,166 those on sugar homeward bound were negotiated 
between the planters and ships’ captains or agents and could be a source of 
friction or indeed a battle of wills.167 This could delay a vessel adding to its costs 
and time spent in the islands. Direct purchasing of sugar by merchants’ factors or 
supercargoes had given way in the second half of the eighteenth century to the 
commission system whereby planters shipped their sugar home to be sold for a 2½ 
percent commission on the gross sale price by sugar factors such as Munckley and 
Brights.168 
 
Examining the financial aspects of the return voyages is more difficult than the 
outward because owners rarely entered details of homeward cargoes in their 
account books – the costs and final sale prices being accounted for in folios which 
have not survived. However the Fanny’s third voyage accounts do contain 
information not recorded for her other voyages. The owner’s instructions ordered 
Captain Richards to sell the outward goods consigned for the owners’ account ‘for 
our best advantage and remit the proceeds partly in bills of exchange and the 
remainder in produce by your own ship’.169 In fact, Richards was only able to bring 
back part of the produce in his own vessel and the remainder was carried on three 
other non-company vessels. The insett account details a remittance of five bills 
value £520 and four batches of sugar which were shipped home and sold for 
£1023, the bills of sale for the latter being included in the accounts.170 This makes 
a total of £1543 as compared to the cost of the outward goods, £1306.  
 
                                                 
165 Pares, West India Fortune, p. 187. 
166 McGrath, Merchant Venturers, p. 238. 
167 Pares,  West India Fortune, pp. 220-221. 
168 The commission system is described in Davis, Rise of the English Shipping Industry, pp. 193-198; 
Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 202; and Pares, West India Fortune, pp. 254-257. 
169 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, p. 28. 
170 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, pp. 34-36, 45-49. 
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If these were the final figures then the profit was £237, or 18 percent. However, 
seven hogsheads were payment for unpaid goods from the second voyage, which 
would have been worth about £174, diluting the profit to £63 or 5 percent. 
Nevertheless, there was generally a residue of goods left unsold from each voyage 
so the actual profit would be somewhere in between the two sets of figures.  
 
Appendix 3.020 is a typed copy of the invoice for the sale of 5 hhds of this sugar 
remitted to the owners of the Fanny and shipped home on the Britannia.171 An 
examination of this document shows the total weight of sugar minus an allowance 
for tare is entered together with the selling price per hundredweight which when 
calculated gives the gross income. The expenditure involved in processing the 
sugar to its selling point is listed and when this total, £164.15s.8d in this case, is 
added to the gross income, the figure from which the factor calculated his 
commission is reached.172 This was not included on the invoice because Munckley 
was selling for the owner’s account, but if he had been acting as factor he would 
have made £4.1s.2d. The cost of sugar per cwt in the West Indies at this time 
would have been about 28s currency or 20s sterling,173 and therefore the profit that 
had actually been earned on this batch of sugar by buying directly would be about 
£48, that is the net proceeds £95.7s.11d minus the cost of the sugar, 
approximately £47. The weight of the sugar would have been greater when bought 
as there was always a loss during the voyage back.  
 
The bill of sale shows deductions came to 27 percent of the gross and most of 
these were for customs duties and freight charges; but the sugar still had to be sold 
and therefore incurred minor expenses for haulage to a cellar; brokers fees – which 
in this case had 7d abated in negotiations between the broker and buyer; emptying 
and refilling the hogsheads during weighing; cellarage; and finally a commission of 
½d of the gross was deducted by the broker. Homeward insurance is not on this 
invoice, but it was a major item and was listed on the other three. Munckley 
                                                 
171 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, pp. 35, 49. 
172 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 193; Pares, West India Fortune, p. 186. 
173 Morgan, ed., Bright – Meyler Papers, p. 503.  
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charged ½ percent and on two of these the same for pursership, that is the 
administrative work. 
 
The lack of Bristol Presentments for the peacetime years makes it difficult to 
calculate the factor’s commission ship by ship by referring to the return cargoes of 
the Fanny and Triton as this data is not recorded in the account books. The 
Wharfage Books do have some details, but the problem is that only the name of a 
merchant and the date and payment he made for his goods was recorded, the 
name of the ship that brought them in is not. For example, the Fanny arrived about 
15 August, 1786, and on four occasions between 6 to 23 September, goods such 
as sugar, cotton, ginger, rum, ebony and pimento were entered in the books, but 
they were not necessarily all from the Fanny as Munckley also imported on other 
ships. Brights had even more entries during the same period.174 
 
Data regarding imported cargoes for the Fanny and Triton replacements, the 
Charlotte and the Hero, was available from the 1792 Presentments and is suitable 
for the research. The Charlotte was built in 1788 by Munckley175 and was slightly 
smaller than her predecessor at 183 to 207 tons. The Hero was also newly built in 
the same year for Brights, but at 328 to Triton’s 230 tons she was nearly a third 
bigger.176   
 
On 25 April, 1792, the first West Indian ship of the season to return was in fact the 
Charlotte from Barbados carrying a cargo dispatched to Munckley consisting of 
202 hhds of sugar, 6 puncheons rum, 73 bags cotton and 1300 staves, the rest of 
the cargo belonging to three other shippers and carried for freight. The Hero 
arrived on 5 September with 370 hhds sugar, 42 puncheons of rum, 20 tons of 
logwood and various small packets all consigned to the owners.  Again, there was 
freight cargo belonging to five other shippers including 60 hhds sugar for Munckley 
showing that merchants relied at times on other peoples’ vessels. Similarly on 11 
September another Munckley vessel, the Hope, arrived with part of its cargo being 
                                                 
174 BRO: SMV/7/1/1/74 Wharfage Book, 1785-1786. 
175 Now trading as Munckley, Gibbs and Richards but will continue to be referred to as Munckley. 
176 Lloyd’s Register, 1772;  G. Farr, Shipbuilding in the Port of Bristol, p. 29. 
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sugar and rum for Brights. These two entries show that any calculation of a 
merchant’s imports cannot rely solely on knowing the contents of their own 
vessels.  
 
The early arrival of the Charlotte would have found favour with the owners because 
first cargoes, especially sugar, meant a better sale price and also that there was a 
possibility of completing two voyages in one year, the holy grail of the West Indian 
shipowners.177 The ship was quickly loaded again and sailed on 3 May with a short 
cargo and arrived back from Barbados on the 15 September with sugar, cotton and 
ginger for Munckley.178 However, early ships were few and far between and 
although in 1785 the Fanny’s master’s instructions specifically said that they 
wanted him to return as soon as possible because they had ‘immediate occasion 
for an early ship’, and she did manage to get back in July, she did not leave until 
the following February due to the vessel grounding.179  
 
As distinct from their dealings as ships’ husbands, Appendix 3.021 records the 
data used to calculate the commission that Munckley and Brights would have 
received for selling the consignments of sugar and carrying out associated tasks. 
The ship Sybil is included because her cargo discharge book is available and 
contains the exact number and weight of her hogsheads, minus tare, and so 
provides a figure for the weight of a hogshead that can be used as a yardstick for 
the other vessels.180 The sale price of sugar is known month by month, but the 
commission for both ships has been calculated using the prices for 1787 to get a 
realistic figure because by 1792 the price of sugar had risen high above the norm 
due to the possibility of war, making the data misleading.181  
 
Considering again the income of the individual companies, for his half-ownership of 
the Fanny, Munckley’s share of the profits for the return trip in 1787 was £700. The 
                                                 
177 Pares, West India Fortune, pp. 227-228. 
178 Bristol Presentments, Imports and Exports, 1792. 
179 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, pp. 120, 147. 
180 BRL: 21258 Account book of the Sybil and Success. Sybil’s Discharge Book, p. 1-8. 
181 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 210. 
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ship’s outfit plus share of owners cargo cost him £667 giving a total profit of £33182 
and if the commission fee for the sale of sugar £172 was added – the quantity 
taken as the same as the Charlotte if she had been sailing at that time – it would 
increase the profit to £205. Bright’s share of the profits for the return voyage of the 
Triton, of which they owned three-quarters, was £279. Their contribution to the 
outfit plus owners cargo was £726, making their loss for the voyage £447,183 but 
with the commission for the sale of sugar, £314 added, the firm’s loss was reduced 
to £113 (Appendix 3.022). 
 
The difference between the two merchants is illustrated by this data which shows 
that although the Fanny made a loss for Munckley on three occasions, payments 
for goods sent out were collected and brought back on following voyages. As was 
shown above, Brights did not invest in owners’ account goods until the 8th and 9th 
voyages and even though they owned between seven-twelve’s and three-quarters 
of their ship, the Fanny’s profits were greater, that is £176 to £99 per annum 
averaged for all voyages, and if her profit for 11 voyages is equated to the Triton’s 
eight, it was still £117 ahead. 
 
The extent of the income from each voyage varied, but the commission from sugar 
sales made a considerable difference even after a poor voyage like the Triton’s 
whilst other goods loaded in the West Indies as part of a factor’s consignment 
again added to the commission income. Using the same criterion as for sugar, 
Appendix 3.023 gives an estimation of the commission earned from secondary 
goods imported on the Charlotte and Hero showing that although they were less 
valuable, they contributed to the overall profits.  
 
An estimated yearly income for the commission taken on the sales of sugar by the 
two shipowners can be made for the period 1775-1780 by using the same criterion 
as above and data from the period (Appendix 3.024). Similarly, the commission 
income for the year 1792 was calculated using information from the Bristol 
                                                 
182 BRO: 12162 Shipping  account book of the snow Fanny, pp. 144, 147. 
183 BRO: 39654/3 Voyage accounts for the Triton, pp. 117,120. 
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Presentments giving the number of hogsheads imported by each merchant and the 
number of ships each used (Appendix 3.025).184  
 
To put these figures into perspective they need to be compared with the profits 
earned by Munckley and Brights solely from their husbandry of the Fanny and 
Triton  (Appendix 3.022). Throughout the period 1777 to 1792, Munckley 
husbanded three ships whist the Brights appear to have lost interest in shipowning 
towards the end of the period, reducing their fleet from seven in 1778 to six in 1787 
and finally all their ships were sold in 1792. If, as is likely, these ships all had a 
similar income then combined they still would not match that from the commission 
trade. 
 
Conclusions. 
 
It is relatively simple to calculate the profits of a ship belonging to a professional 
shipping company as they are to be found by simply deducting the running and 
maintenance costs from the sum earned from carrying freight. The problem with 
the ships examined above is that they and their contents were only one part of a 
complicated financial system designed to accumulate profit from both land and 
maritime branches of the business as a whole. 
 
The last section looked at the various branches and computed profits against costs 
and it can be seen that when income from freight was compared to costs for the 
two ships, Fanny and Triton, an average annual profit of £476 and £100 
respectively was made  (Appendix 3.015). This was a reasonable sum, but the 
yearly depreciation of the ships was about £133, which means that this income 
alone did not justify shipowning. The system of the master selling the owner’s 
goods on the West Indian market and then buying goods for the return trip was 
favoured by Samuel Munckley, and the example of the Clifton’s voyage showed 
that a small quantity of sugar brought in somewhere between £25 and £100 
depending on current prices. Most of his profits were remitted in bills of exchange, 
                                                 
184 Bristol Presentments, pp. 24, 32, 52, 57, 68, 70, 74, 77, 83. 
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though. The Brights did not put the same effort into this, but sent produce to their 
agents for direct sale in Jamaica. However, due to the system of extended credit 
being in force there, they had difficulty in obtaining remittances for the sale of their 
goods and by the end of the century were actually owed £72,820.185  
 
Similarly, the commission income from shipping goods for others averaged £12 to 
£23 per annum and was probably not worth the effort (Appendix 3.018). The 
mainstay of the business was commission on the sale of sugar, but when looking 
at the profits made by a single ship on its own (Appendix 3.021), it brought in a 
profit but even with other income included, it was not excessive. The annual profits 
from commission sales were substantial (Appendix 3.024-3.025), but these were 
divided between income earned from direct imports carried by company ships and 
batches of sugar brought on other vessels so the totals were not strictly from a 
company’s own ships.  
 
Both Munckley and Brights were prosperous merchants but made their money from 
a number of interests and not just shipowning. This was the traditional method of 
shipowning and it obviously brought in profits. Nevertheless, the freight returns, as 
recorded Appendix 3.017, were also profitable although made from only one 
voyage per year. If the ships had been working for freight alone, then at least three 
to four trips would have been made per year to various trade areas and the 
outgoings reduced as they would spend less time lying in infected waters. This 
makes it likely that professional shipowning would have brought in more profit, but 
the conversion to another system would make so many facets of their business 
redundant that it is unlikely that change was even considered. After all, they were 
making a profit. 
 
 
 
                                                 
185 Morgan, ed., Bright – Meyler Papers, p. 103. 
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Chapter 4. 
 
Congestion. 
 
Section 1. Overcrowding and cargo handling at the quays. 
 
Introduction.  
 
The first real anxiety expressed by the Society regarding the capabilities of the 
harbour was recorded in 1755 when a committee asserted that there was a need 
for further room as ships were sustaining damage daily.1 Thus began a long 
process involving plans being produced, discussions between the Society and the 
Corporation, and copious letters to newspapers and pamphlets from a divided 
public before the Floating Harbour was finally opened in 1809.2 Several important 
improvements had been completed to the harbour (see Chapter 1) but the reality 
was that from the end of the American war, it struggled to cope with an increase in 
trade and in October 1791, the Society passed nine resolutions the first of which 
was as follows:  
 
That the state of the harbour of Bristol is by nature so inferior to many other 
ports of Great Britain that the ship holders are not on equal terms with those 
of other ports either in respect to the security of the ships whilst in port or 
the ease and expedition with which they may be discharged, loaded and 
proceeded again to sea.3 
 
The remaining resolutions note that the adverse river conditions are discouraging 
‘stranger’ trade; that the prosperity of the city depends on the port; the steps that 
might be taken to dam the river; and how the money for this could be raised 
(Appendix 4.001). However, the Society saw their own financial contribution to the 
                                                 
1 Latimer, History of the Society of Merchant Venturers, p. 207. 
2 The arguments around this produced copious documentation which will be referred to throughout this 
section of the thesis. 
3 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, p. 71.  
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floating of the harbour terminating with the expense of having produced plans and 
estimates and believed it was now up to the Corporation to take the matter forward, 
although they expressed a willingness to cooperate 
  
The purpose of this section is not to debate the politics of the situation – Section 3 
below will consider the floatation of the harbour from a practical perspective – but 
firstly to examine the dynamics of the actual congestion to see if it could have been 
eliminated or reduced other than by altering the environmental structure of the port. 
 
The layout of the quays with their amenities has already been described in Chapter 
1, but to determine how proficient or otherwise these were, it is imperative that two 
questions be answered; firstly, were there enough of them, and secondly were they 
readily accessible to shipping. A negative answer to either of these means the port 
could not service its shipping effectively and that congestion was inevitable. 
 
Regarding the first, the simple explanation could be that the undeniable increase in 
the numbers and size of ships using the port5 led to insufficient space at the 
quaysides and the Society had failed to provide enough resources to service the 
increased tonnage. However, considerable improvements had been made during 
the latter part of the century so it may be that that the amenities in place were not 
being used effectively causing loading and unloading to be delayed and the 
quaysides blocked by the slow removal of goods. 
 
The tidal conditions of the river have been detailed in Chapter 1 and it is obvious 
that this must have had an effect on the ability to work ships at the quaysides. This 
will be examined and the extent determined, but associated with it is the question 
of whether shipowners, merchants and authorities cooperated to overcome the 
problem or selfishly guarded their own interests. It is known that shipping was 
being damaged due to overcrowding and this might have been unavoidable, but it 
is also possible that it could have been mitigated had there been a better 
arrangement of allocating berths. Again, there was a wide range of shipping using 
                                                 
5 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 31.  
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the port; foreign vessels of various sizes, coasters and the ubiquitous trows. This 
leads to the question as to whether overcrowding affected all or simply larger ships 
of the more influential shipowners. 
 
The extent and effect of congestion at the quaysides. 
 
The simplest method of assessing the extent of congestion is to correlate the 
shipping arriving at the quaysides with the numbers of berths available to them. 
There is no single item of contemporary documentation showing this, but the 
movements of the various types of vessels over a set period of time can be 
established by combining information from newspapers and official records. 
Similarly, an accurate plan of the quaysides detailing the berthing facilities together 
with depths of water can be drawn from the available data and shipping can be 
superimposed for analysis. Due to the space available it would be impossible to 
examine the entire half-century, and so a sample year, 1792, was chosen to 
correspond with the publication of the Society’s resolutions and the last full year 
before the economic crisis of 1793.6  
 
A great many plans, proposals and counter proposals for creating a floating 
harbour were produced between 1755 and 18097 and especially active in the 
project was the merchant Richard Bright whose family archive contains many 
contemporary records.8 Included in these papers is a document tabulating shipping 
data for all vessels entering the port of Bristol for the years 1789 -1791 and 
compiled by him for the purpose of establishing prospective dock dues – and thus 
the future income – should the floatation of the harbour go ahead.9 It is a useful 
document as it shows how shipping was demarcated into trade areas in the eyes of 
the local merchants, and as the dues were to be in proportion to the registered 
tonnage, this data is recorded as well.10 Its statistics will be used as a starting point 
for analysing the extent of congestion and are recorded in Appendix 4.002 to which 
                                                 
6 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 29. 
7 For a list of these see Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes’, pp. 182-188. 
8 BRO: 11168 Records of the Bright Family.  
9 BRO: 11168/3l Tonnages of ships into Bristol.   
10 Bright’s system was eventually used for the tariff scale when the floating harbour was opened.  
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has been added the research year. It illustrates the breakdown into trade areas 
and because the figures for the four years are more or less consistent, it confirms 
trade was still thriving during this period.  
 
Appendix 4.003 breaks down the year into monthly periods using the same 
designations, but with ships of the African trade area split into those involved in 
slavery and those trading directly. Examination reveals an irregular traffic flow, the 
numbers of ships entering the port being lowest in the winter and spring periods, 
peaking during the summer and early autumn, and falling again as winter 
approached. As far as congestion was concerned, it was the peak times that 
caused the problem and had the ships of all the major trades arrived at once in the 
summer months the port would have been overwhelmed. However, closer 
examination shows this was avoided because each trade area either had its own 
peak arrival time for shipping or its vessels arrived ad hoc. However, there were 
overlaps and the reasons for this will be discussed below. 
 
The most difficult month was November, when 89 vessels arrived simultaneously 
as compared to a maximum of 60 during the height of summer. In this month, as in 
the previous, shiploads of wool arrived from the north of Spain whilst from the 
south came fruit and nuts. Cargos of wine and fruit also came inwards from 
Portugal, and from beyond the Straits currants, plus the only goods from Egypt that 
year, natron, a soap making alkali. This sudden influx would take place annually 
due to the harvest in Europe and the oncoming Christmas market. 
 
Newfoundland ships added to this glut following the end of their fishing season, 
and although there was an increase in vessels from Russia due to ships leaving 
there before ice set in, this can be discounted as they discharged at Hungroad. 
Nevertheless, they added to the congestion indirectly as their cargos would 
increase the numbers of rafts and lighters converging on the harbour. Early in the 
following month when most of the November ships would still have been in 
harbour, ten ships arrived from the Low Countries carrying grain. However, the 
greatest single influx came from Ireland when their average monthly ship numbers 
doubled, again due to grain imports. Ten shiploads of oats arrived from Youghall 
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alone whilst Wexford sent four, the first imports from there that year and this 
commodity continued to arrive in the following month.11 Appendix 4.004 gives the 
average dimensions of shipping from the trade areas, and as can be seen most 
were smaller vessels, but the influx must have caused problems for the harbour 
officials. Their disposition will be examined below.  
 
The West Indian ships and congestion.  
 
In terms of size ships trading to the West Indies were the largest single group using 
the port, and their presence had a massive effect on it as a whole. Appendix 4.005 
gives data for all ships trading with the West Indies in 1792 and Appendix 4.006 
their statistics.  
 
The West Indiamen mainly arrived between July and September putting a strain on 
harbour resources such as pilotage and tow boats. The majority of these vessels 
were of considerable tonnage and dimensions and had to be berthed at Narrow 
Quay and the Grove due to the limited availability of deep water in the harbour. 
Every ship trading directly with the various West Indian islands arrived back at 
Bristol carrying sugar as its primary cargo with a secondary consisting of any 
combination of rum, cotton, dyewoods and molasses. Coffee, ginger, hides and 
cocoa could supplement the main cargoes and some ships carried quantities of 
Madeira wine, although they may not all have traded there, an indication that there 
were facilities for warehousing this commodity on the islands.12 Sugar, by far the 
most common item, was heavy and the use of cranes unavoidable in a tidal port, 
which meant ships could berth only at the Quays where they were situated. There 
was sufficient water at the Backs, but few cranes. As there was no appreciable 
difference in the nature of cargoes brought in from the various islands, the 
allocation of berths depended only on a ship’s size.  
 
                                                 
11 Details of incoming goods were obtained from the Bristol Presentments, Imports, 1792. 
12 Taken from the Bristol Presentments, Imports, 1792.  
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The numbers and dimensions of ships trading with the West Indies had increased 
throughout the eighteenth century13 and apart from the additional space they 
required, the cargo handling facilities would have had to have been efficient if the 
turnaround period, generally a major factor in congestion, was to be kept short. It 
would seem reasonable that if there was any emphasis on quick turnarounds at 
Bristol, then it should show up in a data analysis. For example, if speed was of the 
essence then logically this should be represented by smaller ships, which took less 
time to discharge and load, spending less time in port. However the data from 
Appendix 4.007 shows no correlation between the size of a ship and turnaround 
time. Nor does that from Appendix 4.008 give any indication that the island from 
which a ship arrived made any difference to time spent in port. The conclusion 
must be that a fast turnaround time was not a factor concerning shipowners even 
though it was a major aspect of congestion. 
 
Another contributory factor could be that the harbour facilities were simply unable 
to cope with West Indian ships even though new cranes had been installed and 
porterage re-organised. According to Kenneth Morgan the large ships took a 
considerable time to load and unload and this led to congestion,14 but although it 
seems logical, the data in Appendix 4.009 contradicts this as eight ships of various 
tonnages managed a turnaround period of between 8 and 29 days.  
 
Further examination revealed the significant factor was not the size of the ship but 
the fact that – apart from the Druid – they were all ‘early ships’ motivating their 
owners to get them out as fast as possible to achieve the elusive two voyages per 
year to which the shipowners aspired. All but two arrived fully loaded and four left 
in a similar condition, showing that when necessary any ship could be serviced 
quickly. This will be seen below as the norm at Merchants’ Dock, and will also be 
highlighted in the thesis when it occurs with other vessels. Ships may have got 
bigger, but not to the extent that they caused appreciable lading problems. 
 
                                                 
13 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 39; Bristol Presentments, Imports and Exports, 1792.  
13 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 39 
14 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 31. 
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Significantly four of these ships left with an estimated half-cargo, a sign that the 
owners were prepared to lose freight on the voyage out in order to make a greater 
profit on the return goods. In all probability, this would have been due to the 
difficulty involved in quickly assembling a cargo. The anomaly regarding the quick 
turnaround of the Druid so late in the year might be explained by the fact that her 
inward cargo was from Maryland and would have been mandatorily unloaded at 
the Merchants’ Dock which, as will be shown below, had fast discharge times. The 
point is that this demonstrates that the quay’s cranes, porterage and other facilities 
were capable of turning a ship round quickly no matter its size and therefore 
congestion was not due to the port having substandard equipment or a second-rate 
workforce.  
 
The problem was that the West Indiamen mainly carried home sugar, a seasonal 
cargo, and so voyage itineraries had to be carefully organised if a full cargo was to 
be loaded and the master obtain it against competition from other ships. Arriving at 
the islands too early increased the overall costs due to crew wages and victuals, 
and caused wear and tear on the ship’s bottom because the sea was plagued by 
the teredo worm and marine growths. As has been shown above, seasonal cargos 
from other trade areas did cause problems, especially in the month of November, 
but the majority of the small ships quickly turned round and left the port on the next 
voyage. Appendix 4.007 shows the West Indian ships had a mean turnaround time 
of 88 days, which was a considerable period when compared to most other 
shipping. It is arguable that some Bristol merchants could have branched out from 
the West Indian sugar trade into importing non-seasonal commodities from other 
areas or goods with diverse harvest times, but as Morgan says regarding the 
wealth accrued from the West Indies, ‘many merchants rested contentedly on their 
laurels and became unwilling to diversify’.15 
 
In Chapter 2 the shipping procedures at Bristol were examined to establish 
whether or not its merchants were moving away from the traditional system of 
merchant owned and operated ships towards chartering from dedicated ship 
                                                 
15 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 217. 
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operators and concluded they had not. If a sustainable chartering system had been 
in operation, however, then the effect on congestion would have been considerable 
because the port’s facilities were capable of achieving fast turnaround times. Time-
chartered ships risked demurrage if they failed to unload in time and so it would be 
in the interest of the chartered ship’s operator to finish one voyage and move on to 
the next, and as there were few vessels dedicated to carrying one type of goods in 
the eighteenth century – colliers and some timber ships excepted – they could 
easily be diverted to another port or other trade areas. This would free the 
quaysides to allow other ships to move directly alongside to use the cranes and 
other facilities rather than doubling or trebling up to other vessels.  
 
The accumulation of goods on the quaysides would be less if a more effective 
distribution system had been put in place, and although some sheds and 
warehouses had been built and roads were improving it did not seem a priority for 
the merchants. The process of loading could have been more efficient if goods had 
been gathered together sooner for the next voyage, but it was the practice to buy 
when prices were right and this could be at the last minute. Traditionally the 
shipowner put his and his partners’ goods onboard first and then advertised for 
goods to fill up the remainder of the space. The following is the form of a typical 
advert: 
 
For Madeira, Cape Verde Islands and Honduras 
The snow Salter, John Shortridge, Master, burthen 200 tons. 
A fast sailer will be ready for sea in the ensuing spring (tide). A great part of 
her cargo being already engaged. For freight or passage apply to the master 
or William Chapman, No 2 Stephen Street. 
Felix Farley’s Bristol Journal. 27 January, 1792. 
 
This ship was not cleared till the 9th April and actually sailed on the 21st. This is a 
fairly typical example of these adverts and it shows that if chartered ships had been 
used, a merchant would have to have a full cargo ready for a ship’s arrival rather 
than be waiting for it to arrive piecemeal as it would be in his interest to avoid 
delay. No reference was found in any contemporary documents to indicate 
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shipowners had considered dealing with the congestion problem by chartering 
ships. At the time conservative-thinking merchants would have been unlikely to 
change their ways of working even to free up the harbour. 
 
The American trade’s contribution to congestion. 
 
The other trade area involving large numbers of vessels was that of the United 
States. Appendix 4.010 gives details of the shipping involved. Out of 68 vessels 
trading between the United States and Bristol in 1792, 52 were registered in the 
United States and would not be dependant on the port for refitting and stores. This 
was fundamentally different to the West Indian all of which were British. Another 
dissimilarity was that in the course of the year, 18 ships out of 68 managed two 
trips and a further two, three voyages, a much higher proportion than achieved by 
those trading to the Caribbean. In fact, to examine these ships properly, the period 
needed to be extended backward into 1791 and forward to the first months of 
1793. Appendix 4.011 gives statistical information and when data is compared with 
the West Indian (Appendix 4.006), it can be seen that they were on average 
smaller, but only by 57 tons, although in both cases the majority were in the 200-
300 ton range.  
 
When addressing turnaround times and their contribution to congestion, the nature 
of the incoming American cargoes must be considered. Most ships carried wood in 
the form of timber, board, planks, lathwood, staves and suchlike, together with 
ready-made roughly or fully fashioned ramrods, anchor shafts, and oars. These 
were mixed with naval stores such as turpentine, tar, and tallow, all of which were 
combustibles and had to be discharged at Merchants’ Dock.16 Unfortunately for the 
researcher, the surviving dock master’s documents only date from 1795 so the 
number of American ships that actually went into the dock in 1792 cannot be 
established with certainty because of the two-thirds rule;17 the probability is that all 
would have come up river as they would need to load return cargoes. The ships 
from Virginia and Charleston also carried tobacco and Customs insisted that this 
                                                 
16 See Chapter 1, Section 2 for details of the regulations. 
17 Ships carrying less than two-thirds combustible cargo could unload at the quays.  
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was discharged at the Mud Dock. The ships also carried quantities of iron ore, 
probably as ballast.  
 
Appendix 4.012 shows that as with the West Indian ships, the tonnage of the 
American had no influence on turnaround times. Appendix 4.013 illuminates the 
peaks in incoming shipping in the summer months and in November, but unlike the 
West Indian, these could not be caused by the entry of seasonal crops as only 
tobacco and rice from Virginia and Charleston were imported in any quantity, and 
no more than two of the seven ships trading there arrived at a peak period. 
 
The American ships had an outward seasonal factor, the commercial need for 
goods to leave Bristol to arrive in America in time to be sold on for the spring and 
fall (autumn) seasons. According to Kenneth Morgan spring goods left Bristol in 
December or January, and the fall in June,18 but shipping adverts from owners 
claiming their vessels would be the first ‘spring’ or ‘fall’ ship only came out in 
January and June and the ships did not sail until over a month later.19 The 
seasonal factor, together with the desire of owners to miss the worst of the winter 
weather, would account for March being the peak spring leaving date and the fall, 
July to September. 
 
However, when the turnaround times are investigated (Appendix 4.014) it is shown 
that despite having to share facilities at a time when the West Indian ships were 
arriving en masse, the stay of American ships in summer was less than in winter 
due to fall goods going out – an indication that the actions of the shipowner could 
lessen the effects of congestion if he were so determined. However, from 
September onwards the quantity of goods exported was significantly less, possibly 
due to missing the fall market, but economically it would make sense for the ships 
to return to America rather than have them spend the winter months at Bristol. It 
was noted that the size of cargoes exported after the winter months of 1791-1792 
                                                 
18 K. Morgan, ‘Business Networks in the British Export Trade to North America, 1750-1800’ in J. J. 
McCusker and K. Morgan, The Early Modern Atlantic Economy (2000), p. 39. 
19 Adverts FFBJ, 17 January 1792; FFBJ, 2 June 1792.  
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were greater than those shipped in the summer. The most probable reason was 
that with ships being in port longer there was more time to assemble cargoes. 
 
The direct African trade. 
 
In Bright’s classification (Appendix 4.002) there is no distinction between bilateral 
ships trading directly with Africa and those involved in the slave trade, yet the data 
shows that 7 out of 26, that is 27 percent were of this category.20 Combining these 
figures conceals the growing trade in African goods. Known as ‘wood’ or ‘produce 
ships’, and mainly carrying an assortment of palm oil, bees wax, dye woods, ivory 
and Guinea grains,21 their cargoes were not numerically significant at this time but 
Richardson says it kept up the numbers of ships trading to Africa as the slave trade 
diminished,22 and led to Bristol developing an important role in general African 
commerce – especially palm oil – after the abolition of slavery in 1807.23 As can be 
seen from Appendix 4.015, the ships were on average 101 tons and mostly owned 
by slave traders – the Pilgrim was not – who imported for their own business 
concerns.24 None of the ships were consistently in the trade, being used as slavers 
or tenders from time to time, and as they had no peak time of arrival or departure 
they did not contribute significantly to the overcrowding. Out of the seven ships 
arriving only two returned to the same trade the following voyage. 
 
The slave trade and its effect on overcrowding.  
 
This thesis concentrates on the workings of the port of Bristol and it is beyond its 
scope to consider the numbers and conditions of enslaved Africans shipped from 
Africa to the West Indies,25 but essential to the research is an analysis of the goods 
the ships imported to and exported from Bristol and the length of their stay in port.  
 
                                                 
20 Richardson puts the figure at 23.3% for the period 1780 – 1807. Richardson, ed., Bristol, Africa and the 
Slave Trade, p. xvii.  
21 Guinea grains. A form of pepper obtained from ground seed.  
22 Richardson, ed., Bristol, Africa and the Slave Trade, p. xvii. 
23 Martin Lynn, ‘Bristol, West Africa and the Nineteenth Century Palm Oil Trade’ Historical Research 
64.155 (1991) pp. 359-374. 
24 See Bristol Presentments, 1792 on given dates. 
25 This subject has been adequately covered in Richardson, ed, Bristol, Africa and the Slave Trade. 
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The common conception of the so-called triangular trade is that trade goods were 
exchanged for slaves in Africa and the proceeds from their sale in the Americas 
used to purchase a homeward cargo which in itself brought further profits. Although 
this had undoubtedly been the case historically, there is dispute among academics 
as to whether there was in fact a final leg to the triangle, that is, whether freight 
goods were in reality carried on the return leg after 1750 or whether the ships 
mostly returned in ballast.  
 
R. B. Sheridan believed the latter, his reasoning being that it was difficult for non-
constant ships to obtain homeward cargoes; that the merchants and shipowners in 
evidence to the parliamentary investigation into slavery of 1788-1790 denied high 
profits; that ships could not stay in the West Indies long as they had already been 
ravaged on the African coast by the teredo worm and could not take much more; 
and the cost of maintaining a ship between its arrival in the West Indies and the 
start of the sugar and other harvests. His conclusion was that ‘the physical 
transport of goods to Africa, slaves to the West Indies and sugar to England by the 
same ships was the exception rather than the rule’.26 
 
W.E. Minchinton disputed Sheridan’s premise by presenting a detailed analysis of 
shipping returns and mercantile correspondence which he believed showed that 
the great majority of ships had some form of return cargo, and although most ships 
adhered to a 12 monthly voyage pattern, they would stay longer if there was the 
possibility of a consignment for home.27 There was also the problem of West Indian 
finance. Money in the form of cash or bills of exchange was difficult to obtain in the 
West Indies and the proceeds from the sale of slaves frequently had to be at least 
partly remitted in produce, taking up the space in ships that might have been used 
for freight, in itself difficult to obtain due to the competition of the constant traders.28 
 
                                                 
26 R. B. Sheridan., ‘The Commercial and Financial Organisation of the British Slave Trade 1750-1807’, 
Economic History Review, 2nd Series, II (1958-9) p. 252-3. 
27 W. E. Minchinton, ‘The Triangular Trade Revisited’ in Gemery and Hogendorn, eds., The Uncommon 
Market (London, 1979) p. 340. 
28 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 146. 
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Nevertheless, although shipowners might set limits to the time spent seeking a 
return cargo, they were always anxious to obtain one as it could mean the 
difference between loss and a profitable voyage. As quoted in Chapter 2, the 
Bristol merchant, John Pinney insisted freight out and in was an absolute 
necessity,29 and an example of this was the slaving voyage of the snow Africa, 
which successfully completed the first two legs of a voyage from Bristol to the West 
Indies in 1775, but failed to find a cargo for the return trip resulting in an overall 
loss.30  
 
Statistically, the above becomes important when considering the disposition of 
ships at Bristol, as vessels in ballast or those carrying a minimum cargo, could 
proceed directly to refit or to load for an outward voyage. Appendix 4.016 gives the 
loaded condition of the ships arriving from slaving voyages and an analysis shows 
that 14 were either in ballast or were carrying a minimal amount of cargo, usually 
elephant’s teeth, the contemporary description for ivory. Although most ships 
carried only a few teeth, this was a valuable item regarded as being almost on a 
par with slave purchase. The owners of the Swift in 1759 instructed the master that 
if there was plenty of ivory he should purchase all he could to the detriment of a full 
cargo of slaves and limited the amount officers could buy for themselves.31  
 
Two ships returned with cargoes purchased for the owners on the African coast, 
one fairly substantial for the size of the ship, an indication that there was no 
intention of picking up goods in the West Indies. The other belonged to James 
Rogers and carried similar goods as with his direct trading ships, suggesting he 
was not expecting to load in the West Indies. Four ships had a mixed cargo of 
African and West Indian commodities and two ships loaded all their return cargo at 
the West Indies though neither ship had a full load.  
 
                                                 
29 See Chapter 2; Pares, West India Fortune, p. 209. 
30 Minchinton, ‘Voyage of the Snow Africa’, pp. 195-196 
31 BRO: 39654/2 Account book of the snow Swift, 5 March 1759. 
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The results of this analysis show that as far as Bristol was concerned, Minchinton 
was correct to conclude that the majority of ships carried some cargo home,32 but 
in 1792, 14 out of 22 ships would have needed full ballast to return and only one of 
the remainder could be considered fully laden. As trade was still improving at this 
time, it is unlikely that the previous years would have been otherwise unless there 
was an abundant harvest out there, facts that confirm Sheridan’s premise was 
basically correct. The research also shows that the direct African imports by ‘wood’ 
ships was augmented by those of the slave trade, albeit the goods took longer to 
return to Bristol.  
 
Most ships from the West Indies were allocated berthing facilities at the quays, but 
there is little reference in any documents as to where those involved in the slave 
trade were lodged. The only record of this says that they ‘chiefly loaded and 
discharged at the wet docks’ and as no other source has been found yet, the 
rationale behind this can only be conjectured.33 Unlike other ships, the slavers 
required special fittings to lodge slaves in the middle passage and it is possible that 
these were either constructed or removed at the wet docks. They were an internal 
structure so dry-docking was not necessary and if little cargo had been brought 
back then it would have made sense to leave the fittings to be dealt with when the 
ship returned to Bristol. 
 
The main wet dock belonged to Sydenham Teast, a ship builder with interests in 
the direct African and whaling trades,34 but it was situated across from the Grove at 
Redcliffe, which would have made it difficult for the outward goods to be brought to 
the ships other than by the use of lighters. Nevertheless, Redcliffe Backs were 
nearby and its caves were later used by African merchants to store palm oil, tusks 
and ebony35 so it is possible that outward goods for African ships were stockpiled 
there. The problem with this scenario is that there were no legal quays on the 
                                                 
32 Minchinton, ‘Triangular Trade Revisited’, p. 351. 
33 BRO: 11168/27 Plans for Improving the harbour of Bristol, 22 March 1796. The problem with this 
document is that the title is not specific enough to refer to by name. It will be referred to in this work as the 
‘Untitled Broadsheet, 1796’.  
34 Farr, Shipbuilding in the Port of Bristol, p. 2; David Richardson says that Teast was only occasionally 
involved in the finance of the trade and not a trader. Richardson, ed., Bristol, Africa and the Slave Trade,. p. 
xxi.  
35 Lord and Southam, The Floating Harbour, p. 28. 
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Somerset side of the river and unless some form of dispensation had been granted 
to vessels in the slave trade, they could not have loaded or discharged goods 
there.36 
 
Statistical analysis of slave trading ships with regard to congestion. 
 
Appendix 4.017 contains data regarding triangular trade ships at Bristol leaving for 
Africa in 1792. Again, 1792 is a viable year for data as the numbers of ships on the 
African trade had been growing since 1789, reaching its apex in 1792.37 Appendix 
4.018 shows that the majority of ships were between 100 to 299t averaging 204t 
which was slightly less than the American and about 70t smaller than the West 
Indian, meaning that the majority of these ships, if they did not load in the wet 
docks, would need berths at the quays.  
 
Appendix 4.019 shows that the time they spent in port was calculated in months 
and not days and this negates the idea that they remained in the wet docks as the 
dock owners would have charged them by the week during their stay. The 
likelihood is that they were laid up in mud or taking up room at the quays. The 
shortest turnaround time was 42 days38 and this ship had a record of fast 
turnaround times – it had managed two departures the year before. It carried the 
normal cargo for a ship of that size, 161t, and therefore the efficient use of time 
must be put down to good organisation on the part of its owner. Unfortunately it is 
the only example, but it does show that fast turnarounds for slave ships could be 
accomplished. Again, no correlation of time spent in port to ship’s tonnage was 
found so the long turnaround times cannot be explained by size of ship. 
 
Appendix 4.020 shows that at the end of 1791 there were 16 ships remaining in 
port and therefore taking up space either on the quays or in the harbour generally. 
However during 1792 more left than arrived with only four remaining. The 
congestion problem created by slave trade ships was not due to peak influxes but 
                                                 
36 For details of the extent of the legal quays following the Commissions of 1724 and 1771, see Minchinton, 
ed., Politics and the Port of Bristol, pp. 14-21, 114-121. 
37 Richardson, ed., Bristol, Africa and the Slave Trade. Table 3, p. xx. 
38 See Appendix 4.017. 
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simply the time it took to organise their next voyage, and it was at times when the 
trade was slow that these vessels became a nuisance, which was a problem 
created by their owners and not harbour conditions. The logistics of fitting these 
ships into the available quayside will be visually represented in Illustrations 4.003-
6. 
 
It has been shown above that the port facilities were technically capable of turning 
ships around quickly, but the problem was that the traditional trading methods 
adhered to by the merchants themselves were not amenable to the efficient use of 
time. The West Indies trade could have been transformed by chartering; slave 
ships’ voyages could have been convened faster; and with more planning seasonal 
peaks could have been reduced. However, there was one important amenity 
available that if used properly could have reduced overcrowding and that was the 
Merchants’ Dock.  
 
The contribution of Merchants’ Dock to cargo handling and congestion at 
Bristol. 
 
Although there is no single set of documents describing the daily movements and 
cargo handling procedures at the quays, the Dock Master’s day book, ledger and 
journal have survived allowing a deeper understanding of the work practices at the 
dock.39 Unfortunately these are for the last years of the century when the numbers 
of ships entering Bristol fell by 30 percent between 1792 and 1800,40 and by 1795 
the volume of shipping using the dock had dropped by 75 percent.41 Nevertheless, 
its purpose, organisation and structures remained the same throughout as can be 
seen from the journal which continued until 1807.  
 
                                                 
39 BRO: SMV/7/1/3/13 Dock Master’s Day Book, 1795-99; BRO: SMV/7/1/3/14 Dock Master’s Ledger 
1796-99; BRO: SMV/7/1/3/16 Dock Master’s Journal 1799-1807. 
40 Minchinton, ed., Trade of Bristol, p. 177. 
41 These figures could be misleading because, A.F. Williams, relies on the ‘Untitled Broadsheet’ whose 
creator has a political point to make and the author has established that some of his data is incorrect. However 
it is difficult to find information on the numbers of ships using Merchants’ Dock before 1795. BRO: 11168. 
Untitled Broadsheet; Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes’, p. 173.  
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In a port like Bristol lacking space both on and at the quays, a fully equipped 
floating dock should have been an important asset, especially as Merchants’ Dock 
had been designed to accommodate about forty vessels of the deepest draught, 
and had ample facilities for storing goods in warehouses and on the ground. 
Although its primary purpose was to handle ships carrying inflammable cargoes, 
the proprietors had anticipated a good income from servicing other vessels whose 
owners preferred the security of remaining afloat to the risk of damage due to the 
tides. 
 
It also had the additional attraction of having berths available as soon as a ship 
was able to come upriver, avoiding the delays and sharing of resources, the norm 
at the quays. However, the extent to which the dock was of benefit to the port 
depended on it being put to full use, and that in turn meant a substantial number of 
ships other than those obliged to by law would have to use its amenities. The 
following research examines the use of the dock in the years 1795-1799 and 
compares it to the sample year 1792. The data for 1796-1798, the complete years, 
is recorded in Appendix 4.021. 
 
As previously shown, ships carrying timber and naval stores from northern Europe 
were generally larger than those from the Atlantic and avoided the river passage by 
unloading at Hungroad; only one visited the dock during the entire research period. 
This was possible because they departed carrying a minimal cargo delivered by 
lighter and so for the purpose of this research they can be ignored although lighters 
will be dealt with later. The North Atlantic ships, however, had to come up-river for 
their return cargoes and, as discussed above, if their goods fell into the mandatory 
category they were obliged to use the dock. However, if mandatory goods 
consisted of less than two-thirds of a vessel’s cargo then they could be unloaded 
on the quays42 and from now on these cargoes will be referred to as ‘mixed’. This 
allows the attitude of the merchants to the dock to be examined. If they had 
considered it to be an asset then they would have made use of it to avoid 
                                                 
42 Geo. III, Cap 33. 1776. Section III. 
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overcrowding and damage; if not they would have avoided going in there as much 
as possible by evoking the two-thirds rule.  
 
The data from 1795-1798 was analysed,43 and 1792 included as a control factor 
presenting peace-time trade.44 The results are in Appendix 4.022. It is immediately 
apparent that the volume of shipping arriving in 1792 was far greater than in any of 
the other years as trade suffered after this due to the 1793 slump and war 
conditions; a simple example being that seven ships arrived at Bristol from the Bay 
of Honduras in 1792, six of which went into the dock, but between 1796-1798 only 
one arrived and it came home via Charleston.45 Shipping using the dock fell on 
average by almost three-quarters but the arrivals at the port with mandatory 
cargoes only halved. This was partly due to the dock being closed for repairs for 
six months in 1797, but there was another factor and that was the increase in ships 
carrying mixed cargoes to which the two-thirds rule applied and so could avoid the 
dock. In 1792, the ratio of ships arriving with mixed cargoes to those entering the 
dock with mandatory was 14-39 or 36 percent, whilst the average for the other 
years it was 8-17 or 47 percent.46  
 
Ships that had previously arrived with cargoes of pure timber or naval stores plus 
iron or ashes, now carried additional items such as tobacco and rice, probably due 
to the wartime economy, which allowed them to evade going in to Merchants’ 
Dock. Unfortunately the author has not been able to establish if this was deliberate 
or not as nothing has been recorded in contemporary documents. However, it is 
obvious from the data that when possible the shipowners avoided the dock despite 
it having facilities dedicated to handling the bulk of their cargo. 
 
                                                 
43 The Presentments for 1799 were mislaid at the BRL. 
44 The data from 1795 and 1799 was ignored as they were incomplete years due to the format of the 
documents. 
45 Honduras was technically Spanish, but by the Convention of London between his ‘Britannick’ Majesty and 
the King of Spain, London 1786, the British had cutting rights for mahogany and logwood. War with Spain 
broke out in 1797; See Appendix 4.005. 
46 This is a difficult figure to obtain due to the dock closing in 1797.  
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Details of the activities at the dock between 1795 and 1799 are recorded in 
contemporary documents from which the following information was computed.47 
Eighty-nine ships entered the dock between October 1795 and July 1799, the 
average number per year pro-rata was 28, far below the capacity of the dock, yet 
as Morgan says, ‘it was abundantly clear by this time (1797) that Bristol’s physical 
capacity as a port was too limited to cope with even a reduced level of overseas 
trade’.48 Any ship entering during this period would have no difficulty in completing 
all its business, be it discharging, loading or shipping stores, without the necessity 
of moving to the quays yet the port was still overcrowded. The dock had been 
designed as an all-purpose facility, but its use as such depended on the 
shipowners being willing to participate.  
 
The status of cargoes landed is shown in full in Appendix 4.023 which in turn 
provides condensed data for Appendix 4.024. Twelve ships arrived during the 
period carrying only mandatory goods and as would be expected they were simply 
discharged. Another 5 had full cargoes of general goods – exactly the type of ships 
that the dock needed if it were to perform effectively. However, only 3 ships were 
involved, an indication that their owners had a special connection with the dock, or 
alternatively, as two were West Indiamen they could have been discharging before 
being repaired there. 
 
The remaining 19 had general as well as mandatory cargo, all of which could have 
been discharged at the dock, but although seven of the ships did this, the 
remainder retained their general goods for discharge at the quays.49 These were 
typical imports from North America, cotton, horn, and seeds but not in great 
quantities. Pearl and pot ashes for the glass and soap making industries were 
generally discharged at the dock, but this may have been because they were 
destined for the nearby glassworks. The conclusion must be that the majority of 
shipowners and merchants still preferred to use the quays even after having paid 
to enter the dock.  
                                                 
47 BRO: SMV/7/1/3/13 Dock Master’s Day Book, 1795-1799; and BRO: SMV/7/1/3/14 Dock Master’s 
Ledger 1796-1799. 
48 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 29. 
49 All these ships took on cargo after leaving the dock. Bristol Presentments, 1796, 1797, 1798. 
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The mandatory use of the dock only applied to landing goods, but the same safe 
berthing and facilities were available to any shipowner for whatever purpose he 
required. It is apparent from Appendix 4.02550 that the number of ships loading at 
the dock was considerably less than those discharging, an indication that 
shipowners were not keen on using it for that purpose; and a further breakdown 
shows that only 9 of these had landed cargo, 7 used the dock as a loading facility, 
9 were re-exporting to the Channel Islands and 6 were coasters. Only 7 foreign 
ships loaded full general cargoes, but at least this showed that goods could be 
assembled at the dock. However, it is clear from these figures that the dock was 
not seen as a viable exporting facility by the majority of merchants and shipowners. 
 
Finally regarding turnaround times, it is difficult to compare like for like with the 
quays because most ships entering the dock did not complete their business there 
and some part-loaded and discharged. However, 24 American ships discharged 
their goods in an average time of 10 days. Only one West Indian ship landed cargo 
at the dock, the Levant belonging to Walter Jacks who used the dock regularly for 
this vessel. There appears no reason why he should do this as none of his cargoes 
were legally obliged to be discharged there, but for four years out of five he both 
landed and loaded from the dock, the outward cargoes being suitable for the 220t 
ship and taking an average of 21 days loading time. No other West Indian ship 
discharged at the dock but 10 loaded at least part cargo in an average of 10 days.  
 
When calculating the time taken to disharge cargo, a useful guideline might be that 
a ship could unload at least 70 hogsheads of sugar in one day51 which means that 
the largest West Indiaman could easily be discharged in a week. The Channel 
Island ships loading at the dock took an average of seven days. Fast turnarounds 
were possible – the actual working time of the Levant to load and discharge took 
20 days in 1796 – but few ships took advantage of this indicating it was not a 
priority. 
                                                 
50 Again compiled from data in contemporary documents BRO: SMV/7/1/3/13 Dock Master’s Day Book, 
1795-1799; and BRO: SMV/7/1/3/14 Dock Master’s Ledger, 1796-1799. 
51 The Brilliant. BRO: SMV/7/1/3/13 Dock Master’s Day Book, p. 1.  
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Another function of the dock was to load and discharge stores. Appendix 4.025, 
shows 14 ships took on small amounts of provisions such as beer and beef, 
obviously to top-up those taken on in their home American ports. Nineteen British 
ships provisioned fully. Ships going for repair in local dry-docks landed and 
warehoused all stores, shipping them again before sailing and there are numerous 
entries in the accounts debited to James Hillhouse. The documents show that 
there were ample numbers of warehouses and open space to store goods landed 
from ships, or awaiting shipping, all within ‘wheeling’ distance of the ships. It was a 
self-contained secure dock well able to carry out any function available at the 
quays yet it was underused.  
 
Guppy, Armstrong and Co.52 
 
The Dock Master’s documents were analysed to see if any merchant had regularly 
employed the dock for normal trading purposes rather than under compulsion. The 
most prolific user of the facility in the years covered was the firm of Guppy and Co. 
who had a total of 30 individual entries recorded in the documents, all other 
merchants having less than seven. The first appearance of this company appears 
to be an  advertisement in 1786 regarding their new warehouse on the Back, which 
stated that it would be supplied from their manufactory at Redbrook, Gloucester, 
with ‘braiziery, brass foundry, tin wares and suchlike’ which they would sell 
wholesale, and that they would retail urns, plated goods and lacquered-ware. Also 
scrap metal would be bought or taken as payment.53 No record has been found to 
show that the company were involved in shipping at that time, but trows regularly 
brought down similar produce to Bristol from the upper Severn.  
 
Samuel Guppy (1755-1830) came from an extraordinary West Country family 
tracing their roots back to the 1400s. In 1795 he married Sarah Beach, a wealthy 
woman whose family had estates in the West Indies and who was an inventor in 
her own right, patenting a method of making piling for bridges safe that was later 
                                                 
52 Within the period of the Dock Master’s papers, Guppy, Armstrong and Co. was referred to as such or 
Guppy and Co. For the purpose of simplicity the latter will be used in future or simply ‘Guppy’. 
53 Salisbury and Winchester Journal, 4 September 1786. 
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used by Thomas Telford. Their son Thomas became an engineer working with 
Brunel on the Great Britain and was a founder member of the Great Western 
Steamship Company. Samuel Guppy was also an inventor, developing a machine 
for ‘cutting, heading and finishing nails’ in 1796, and a barbed copper nail for 
fastening copper to ships’ bottoms. He eventually sold the patent for this to the 
government for £40,000. These were produced by his company, the Patent 
Sheathing Nail Manufactory of Bristol which also made copper tokens used at the 
end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth to make up for a 
specie shortage. They could be redeemed for currency of the realm at his business 
addresses.  
 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis it is his prowess as a merchant and his 
use of Merchants’ Dock that is of importance. The growth of Guppy and Co. in the 
last two decades of the eighteenth century exemplifies the changes that were 
occurring in the business practices of the Bristol merchant. Unlike the port’s 
established merchants, this company did not own or manage ships54 and had no 
interests in the African trade, that is they shipped no goods there, unusual 
considering their basic business was the manufacture of copper, tin and ironware. 
Their products may have been bought and sent there indirectly by others, but 
possibly they themselves were against the trade because he was a Unitarian and 
his wife a Quaker.55 Similarly, they did not ship goods directly to the West Indies 
even though Sarah Guppy’s family had estates there.  
 
Guppy and Co. opened their business on the Backs in 1786 and were exporting 
metal-ware and other goods regularly to the United States throughout the nineties, 
but no consignment left from the dock as they went mainly in American ships, 
which as described above, did not use it for exports (Appendix 4.026). However, it 
is important to note that notwithstanding wartime restrictions, their business 
increased during the decade as did the number of new ports to which they 
                                                 
54 Perusal of Lloyd’s Registers, 1792 and 1799. 
55 Not listed in Richardson, Bristol, Africa and the Slave Trade; See Bristol Presentments, Exports, 1792, 
1796, 1797, 1798. 
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exported. Although trade was mainly with the North American ports, especially 
Boston and New York, by 1796 southern ports were also being serviced.  
 
Guppy was also regularly exporting bricks, staves and earthenware to the Channel 
Islands, though most of the merchandise was their own metallic products.56 The 
Channel Islands were experiencing a building boom in the last quarter of the 
century which stimulated a demand for building materials including bricks and 
glass. St. Peter Port, for example, was an entrepôt for wine, spirits and tobacco 
and so merchants and coopers required more bottles, iron, wooden staves and 
hoops to package alcohol and tobacco. The busier the harbour got, the greater 
demand for ironmongery for the chandlers trade and for staves to make containers 
for food, drink and textiles.57 Guppy imported to Bristol four shiploads of old iron, 
glass and junk in 1792, but as business increased their trade with the Channel 
Islands became exclusively export.  
 
By the time the surviving Dock Master’s documents begin, Guppy had been 
exporting to the Channel Islands – Alderney, Guernsey, and Jersey – for over five 
years, the diversity of goods increasing so that a shipload resembled a standard 
colonial consignment, albeit of a lesser quantity.58 Although there were ten 
shipments in 1796 none left from Merchants’ Dock, but in 1797 four ships out of the 
16 sent by them to the Channel Islands were fully loaded there, all with American 
staves except one with bricks – no doubt from the on-site brickworks. In 1798, five 
out of 14 ships loaded staves and other goods for the islands, all leaving from the 
dock. 
 
Appendix 4.027 shows that apart from the few wares from the Channel Islands, 
Guppy was not an importer until 1793 when they began bringing in goods from the 
United States, mainly timber, naval stores and pot ashes. As these had no link with 
their manufactory, the presumption is that through their export trade they had made 
                                                 
56 Bristol Presentments, Exports, 1792. 
57 Gregory Cox, St. Peter Port. 1680-1830 (Bury St. Edmunds, 1999) pp. 23, 36. 
58 The staple metallic and coopers items had been supplemented by pipes, stationary, woollens. household 
furniture, porter, Hotwell water, salt, haberdashery and wearing apparel. Bristol Presentments, Exports, 1796. 
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connections in America and opened up another line of business using the 
Merchants’ Dock as a base.  
 
Guppy brought eight American ships to the dock between 1796-98 in which he was 
the sole importer apart from a few minor items belonging to others. This was the 
norm for incoming American ships discharging anywhere in the harbour, and even 
if there were several importers per ship, one always predominated.59 Unlike other 
trades, most ships were not carrying their owner’s goods and paying the discharge 
costs, but had a principal importer to administer them.60 
 
This shows that a system of agents was in place, but the same agent for imports 
did not necessarily deal with exports. For example, three adverts posted on the 
same day in Felix Farley’s Bristol Journal in 1797, show that Guppy was acting for 
three ships at least at that time.61 For the first, the Jerusala, he was the sole 
importer of a mixed cargo from Charleston which was not discharged at the dock, 
but when the ship sailed back again there were ten exporters. As agent, Guppy 
posted the sailing advert, but was not the principal exporter, something that would 
not have occurred if they had been West Indian shipowners. 
 
The second, the Two Brothers, came in from Portland with a sole importer, John 
Waring, who paid all dock duties, but it left again under Guppy who was by far the 
principal exporter among ten. The third, the Patty from New York had Guppy as the 
principal importer and they were also the main exporters and at the same time 
agents. This system of working shows that although the majority of Bristol 
merchants were still operating along traditional lines of ship-husbanding, Guppy 
and possibly others were carrying out most of the tasks associated with mercantile 
trading but without actually owning the ships. 
 
                                                 
59 For example. In 1796, the principal importers on the Merchant were Guppy and Armstrong whilst the 
secondary was G. Sawtell, p. 6; In 1797, the principal importer on the Philadelphia was a  J. Smith, and the 
secondary included Guppy and Co. bringing in only a barrel of bees wax, p. 6; In 1798, Guppy and Co. were 
principal importers on the Patty, with two other secondary importers. Bristol Presentments, Imports, 1775-
1799. 
60 BRO: SMV7/1/3/13 Dock Master’s Day Book and BRO: SMV7/1/3/14 Dock Master’s Ledger.  
61 FFBJ, 6 May 1797: Bristol Presentments, Imports, 1797, pp. 18, 19, 22; Bristol Presentments, Exports, 
1797, pp. 110, 112. 
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As described previously, the dock had facilities for long term warehousing and 
storage, and although there were complaints about fees, which were charged on a 
weekly basis, the evidence is that many dock users had accepted the situation and 
used the facilities for indeterminate periods as they had been intended rather than 
shipping goods onwards as soon as possible. Once cargoes had been landed, they 
tended to remain until sold. There are numerous instances of this; for example tar 
from the Philadelphia was discharged in July, 1796, and then warehoused until 
sold in twelve assorted batches over the next seven months.62  
 
Guppy frequently landed goods which remained a matter of weeks or months 
before being sold, and he re-exported from the dock directly.63 There was also a 
regular internal market amongst merchants. When Guppy needed staves in 1797 
for Alderney, a batch was purchased from another importer which had been lying 
for almost a year. The system was that once goods had been purchased, the new 
owner took over the ground rent until they were removed.64 Apart from items 
landed at the dock, Guppy hauled general goods by wagon from the city for 
onward shipment.65  
 
It is obvious from examination of the documents that he was making full use of the 
dock and that it contributed to the expansion of the original business into a diversity 
of profitable fields. A newspaper advert placed in his capacity as shipping agent 
shows that he was dispatching ships, goods and passengers, and was also 
retailing his own imports of naval stores.66 No other merchant was using the dock 
to the extent of Guppy, but although many were not directly involved in shipping, 
like him they bought, sold and stored goods within the dock. Guppy was probably 
more imaginative than other merchants and his range of activities there showed 
that if the will was there the dock could be used profitably. 
 
 
                                                 
62 BRO: SMV7/1/3/14 Dock Master’s Ledger, p. 2, 12. 
63Staves per Mary together with locally made bricks. BRO: SMV7/1/3/14 Dock Master’s Ledger, p. 11..   
64 BRO: SMV7/1/3/14 Dock Master’s Ledger, p. 15. 
65 BRO: SMV7/1/3/14 Dock Master’s Ledger, p. 19. 
66 FFBJ, 3/7/97. 
 281 
Conclusions. 
 
The above analysis of congestion at the port shows that it was a problem that was 
basically insurmountable without floating all or part of the harbour. However, it 
could have been alleviated to a certain extent if the shipowners had been willing to 
adopt new ways of working, especially the chartering of ships by merchants rather 
than owning their own. However, the decision to continue with the traditional ways 
of shipowning and trading meant that the problem could only get worse.  
 
If Merchants’ Dock had been used to its full extent it would have improved the 
situation but again this would have needed change beyond the mindset of the 
shipowners. Guppy and Co. showed that the facility could be used profitably and 
their overall business methods gelled with the new idea of professional shipowning, 
albeit from the consumer’s viewpoint. They were manufacturers, importers and 
exporters, with a sideline of being shipping agents, possibly entrepreneurs ahead 
of their time.  
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Section 2. The effect of tide on the movement of shipping at the harbour. 
 
Introduction. 
 
It has been shown that it might have been possible for the facilities of the port to 
have been used more effectively, but nothing could be done about the tidal 
conditions which dictated all ship movements and in particular the larger foreign-
going, except to float all or part of the harbour. The question facing the City was 
not so much about the obvious solution to the problem as to whether it was worth 
the expense, and if so how and when. The following describes the actual 
conditions prevailing in the harbour in the research year of 1792. 
 
Congestion and tides affecting foreign-going shipping. 
 
Richard Bright as part of his investigation into the harbour conditions, had 
requested one of his captains, James Jolly, to keep a diary of winds and tides at 
Bristol from March 1792 to March 1793.67 Appendix 4.028 summarises the 
information he collected, and the remarkable statistic is that on 170 days of the 
year, or 48 percent, ships could not enter the harbour; and similarly on 241 days, 
or 68 percent, they could not leave. Mostly this was due to neap tides, although 
weather accounted for a proportion of these delays and this could apply to ships’ 
manoeuvrings at any port. At Bristol, however, the long winding river down to the 
sea was particularly vulnerable to wind and tide and any strong wind between 
south and west could delay sailing. Jolly does not indicate the size of ships his 
calculations were based on, but it is likely that they would be for the largest, the 
West Indiamen belonging to merchants such as his patron, Richard Bright.  
 
However, the vast majority of ships using the harbour were smaller and to have a 
clear picture of the problems faced by all, it is necessary to examine the tidal 
conditions throughout the harbour around a set period. The varying depths of tide-
                                                 
67 BRO: 11168/6a(i-iii) Diary of wind and tide taken at Bristol from 25th March 1792 to 14th March, 1793 by 
Captain James Jolly at the request of Richard Bright. Only 7 days were recorded in March 1792 and 14 in 
March 1793. 
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water throughout were calculated for July 1792, chosen as it was in the middle of 
the summer period when the first batch of seasonal shipping was arriving from the 
West Indies. The busiest month was November but data from that month would 
have given a distorted picture of average congestion.68 There are no tide tables 
available for the period and although Captain Jolly included the time of high tides, 
he did not incorporate the actual height in his calculations. This difficulty was 
overcome using plans drawn by engineers during the contemporary investigations 
(Illustration 4.001); an extract from a modern Admiralty Chart (Illustration 4.002); 
and mathematical calculation and modern technology (Appendix 4.029).69 The 
result of these computations was a tide-table for Bristol for July, 1792 (Appendix 
4.030). 
 
Using the same material, the depths of water throughout the harbour can be 
calculated relative to the 15ft mark on a marker post situated on the quay wall at 
the confluence of the Frome and Avon rivers, which was also referred to by 
contemporary engineers and port authorities when making their calculations 
(Appendix 4.031). By means of this data, water depths can be transcribed to a plan 
(Illustration 4.003) which when used in conjunction with the tide-table and the 
known shipping movements around July, creates a model of shipping in the 
harbour for any instance during this period.  
 
The allocation of berths has been described in Chapter 1 and due to coasters and 
trows being more numerous they had more berths, congregating on the Backs, 
Head and Broad Quay leaving the deep water berths along Narrow Quay and the 
Grove for the larger foreign-going ships (Appendix 4.032 and Illustration 4.003). 
Cranes 3 to 4 could take most ships at high spring tides and therefore could be 
used for either foreign ships or large coasters, and the line between them at Grove 
was drawn at the end of the New Mud Dock. Regarding ships’ draughts, they were 
                                                 
68 See above Appendix 4.003. 
69 J. G. MacMillan. MA Dissertation Bristol University, 2003. Proof submitted then is reprinted in Appendix 
4.029 of this thesis. BRO: 11168/59. A plan of part of the River Avon and Frome and also sections of the 
same with proposed dams, locks for the improving of the harbour of Bristol; BRO:11168/2e. Section of the 
river at Black Rock showing level of high and low water; BRO: 11168/3y. Letter from Dr Falconer to Richard 
White saying he had sent his opinion; Extract from Admiralty Chart International Series. The Port of  Bristol, 
1973, reprinted 1986. No 1859; United Kingdom Hydrographic Office: TotalTide software for tidal 
prediction, 2003.   
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built to individual owner’s specifications and as a result the correlation with tonnage 
was not always linear. However the data given in Appendix 4.033 gives fairly 
accurate estimates as it is compiled from known contemporary shipping figures.70 
Illustration 4.004 gives the water depths at the various cranes at high tide. 
 
As has been noted above, the large ships trading across the Atlantic required 
cranes and Appendix 4.032 shows that Cranes 1 and 2 were reserved for coasters 
leaving 15 cranes available including those at the Old Mud Dock for tobacco 
discharge,71 plus the two at the New Mud Dock. Each crane had a working area of 
60-70 feet of quay,72 but most ships would take at least 100ft when bowsprits and 
space between vessels were considered. Also the length of ships had been 
increasing causing damage so in 1792 the Society petitioned the Corporation to 
commandeer 100 feet of space between Cranes 2 and 3 from what was known as 
the ‘porter’s births’.73 There was also room for two ships between the mud docks, 
but serviced by only one crane. An absolute maximum of 17 ships could be 
accommodated alongside the quay walls and another ten bow-on at the mud 
docks, although due to the tobacco regulations those at the Old Mud Dock would 
be restricted. 
 
It has been shown that very few of the ships carrying wood and naval stores from 
the Baltic came upriver, so when considering congestion they can be discounted 
although a few would make the passage from time to time. Those from Europe and 
the Mediterranean were generally smaller and will be dealt with below, so the 
situation regarding large Atlantic traders at the end of June was that there were 10 
American, 8 West Indian and 10 triangular trade ships in the harbour (Appendix 
4.034). Four of the American ships were recent arrivals and would have been 
                                                 
70 Full details of ships dimensions are given in shipping registers but, unfortunately, most details of Bristol 
ships of the eighteenth century were destroyed when the Customs House was burned down during the riots of 
1831. Graham Farr managed to put together the details of a few contemporary ships. Graham Farr, Records of 
Bristol Ships 1800-1838 (Bristol Record Society, 15, 1949) pp. 1, 30-34. 
71 As part of an Act of Parliament, 29 Geo. III c. 68, repealing the duties on tobacco, the Commissioners of 
Customs were allowed to fix the berths where tobacco might be unloaded in any port. At Bristol the entire 
Mud Dock was delegated for this and in 1791 the SMV petitioned against this saying it ‘ contained four of the 
best births for shipping’ and that ships should be able to use it if empty of tobacco ships. See Minchinton, 
‘Port of Bristol’, pp. 177-178. 
72 BRO: SMV/2/1/1/8. Hall Book 8, 25 March 1758. Letting of Cranes. 
73 See Minchinton, ed., Politics and the Port of Bristol, pp. 180-181; BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, p. 26. 
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unloading at Merchants’ Dock as they carried naval stores and no tobacco; the 
remaining six were due to leave in July or early August and would have been 
loading at the quays. Similarly four of the West Indian ships were preparing to go 
and two others probably still discharging. It is not certain as to whether the slave 
ships loaded at the quays or wet docks, but the three leaving in July would be at 
the quays to finish voyage preparations. Altogether, there were probably 15 ships 
at the quays.  
 
On this assumption, 15 deepwater berths would have been occupied with the Old 
Mud Dock empty, but some space available at the New Mud Dock. The lighter 
goods were generally loaded last and this could be done without cranes. No 
contemporary document shows the precise location of ships and although a 
reasonably accurate list of ships in port can be drawn up from other 
documentation, it does not include ships for sale or those entering or leaving port 
without goods.74 However, disregarding this for the moment, Illustration 4.005 
shows that at the end of June the larger ships in port could have been allocated 
berths at the quays with some space remaining. There appears to have been no 
set area for the different trades in these areas of the quays, so depth of water 
would be the only criteria but, as will be shown next, the allocation of berths was 
complicated due to the tides.  
 
Illustration 4.005 is a static representation of shipping in the harbour but to 
understand the effect of the tides on commerce, it is necessary to look at the 
matter in a more dynamic way. For example, Appendix 4.034 shows four American 
ships were entered in on 26 and 27 of June and should have gone into Merchants’ 
Dock immediately, but the reality was that even if they had discharged part of their 
cargo at Hungroad, tidal conditions would not allow them to enter the dock until 2 
or 3 July. As has been shown above, this was the only trade that accomplished fast 
turnarounds – they could discharge at the dock in 5-12 days – but these ships had 
already lost a week. Once discharged their owners or agents would wish to move 
                                                 
74 Ship data  and movements in the appendices in this chapter are compiled from the following documents 
unless stated otherwise. Bristol Presentments, Imports and Exports, 1792; Lloyd’s Register, 1792; FFBJ, 
1791-1792. 
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as soon as possible to the quays to load, but even a light ship would have to wait 
for sufficient water in the chamber before being released. It is likely that they would 
have been kept in until about the 18th before moving on. Two of these did manage 
to be cleared by the end of the month and to be able to sail two days later, but a 
third was not cleared till 10 August – but at a neap tide period and so was delayed 
another week.  
 
As far as congestion was concerned, on the first spring tide these four ships were 
immediately berthed at the quays together with one triangular trade ship and five 
West Indian, a total of 10 additional ships. Three ships went out in this period. At 
the second spring a total of 20 ships were entered into the port of which 11 were 
West Indian, 3 triangular possibly bound to the quays and 6 American, 4 of which 
would go to the dock. In all 5 ships left making the total input to the quays for this 
period between 8 and 11 ships. Altogether, the increase in Atlantic shipping at the 
quays in July totalled 15 to 17 ships, or 100 percent, (Illustration 4.006). In the 
following month, the 4 American ships at the dock, together with 8 new arrivals, 
came to the quays and the West Indian increased by 28 at the end of September.   
 
Doubling up at the quays – and it got worse in the following two months – meant 
that cranes were available only to the inside ship and considering that all West 
India ships required them for their heavy containers of sugar and other 
commodities, constant manoeuvring of ships in and out of berths was essential and 
that would have been difficult even without the addition of tidal factors. At neap 
tides, no large ship would be afloat at the quays so when the inner ship had 
discharged her cargo she could not be moved to allow in the outer.  
 
The average draught of the West Indian ships when loaded was 15½ ft and about 
another foot was needed before they floated. This meant that there were 7 days 
during the first spring tide in July when this height was reached but none in the 
second. Towboats were needed to drag ships over the mud, and as has been 
previously mentioned, cranes were damaged when surreptitiously used to pull a 
ship onto a berth. There must have been constant minor damage to ships and 
indeed towboats. In July three ships with draughts of 17ft and one of 18ft arrived 
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on the second spring tide and could not have been taken alongside the quay. To 
bring these ships in at this time, the owners must have lightened them at the mouth 
of the river adding additional cost to their voyages. 
 
The other problem with manoeuvring ships was that the Avon tide flowed and 
ebbed rapidly, and as shown in the tide-table the highest tide of 20.8ft ebbed to 
16.5ft within an hour, and within two it would hardly float a barge. This meant that 
outgoing ships had to be shifted immediately they floated and if turning was 
necessary, it would have to be done rapidly as with the falling tide the width of the 
river decreased and they could be grounded. 
 
Considering that the owners of ships lying at Hungroad would have wanted their 
vessels up-river as soon as possible, ships would have arrived en masse at the 
quays at the same time outgoing vessels were going downstream, creating a 
massive logistics problem for the Quay Warden which called for exceptional 
diplomatic and organisational skills. Damage was inevitable, not just from ships 
grating against each other due to tides, but also during the manoeuvring process. 
Most of these problems disappeared when the harbour was floated because once 
through the locks ships could be manoeuvred at any time, and when going 
downstream, they could be safely moored or anchored nearby ready for the locks 
to open. 
 
Congestion and tides affecting other shipping. 
 
In simplistic terms, it should be possible to illustrate the problems of congestion for 
ships other than those on the Atlantic trades by correlating the space available on 
the remaining quaysides; that is Broad Quay, Quay Head, the Backs and the 
market sheds, with the number of vessels requiring berths. There is adequate 
information to conclude that there were at least 23 foreign ships from other than 
the Atlantic trading areas (Appendix 4.035), 38 Irish (Appendix 4.036), 98 coasters 
and an estimated 48 trows and 83 market boats moving through the port in the 
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specimen month of July.75 However, there were probably more ships than were 
recorded because unless a ship arrived or departed with cargo it was not 
documented unless paying anchorage or moorage.  
 
Out of necessity Atlantic shipping had commandeered the central part of the 
continuous quayside relegating other shipping to the remainder. The berthing 
arrangements of the non-Atlantic foreign ships are not listed in the directories and 
Appendix 4.035 shows that at any one time in July about half, 12, were in port. By 
trade area, these ships could be separated into Mediterranean, Iberian, French, 
Newfoundland, north European and Channel Islands. In general they were smaller 
ships, but wine from Iberia and the Mediterranean was carried in butts and pipes 
roughly double the size of a West Indian hogshead of sugar; train oil from 
Newfoundland in hogsheads; and the Rouen vessels carried heavy building 
materials. It would have been difficult to unload these without the assistance of 
cranes as for at least eight hours of a twelve hour tide the ships would have been 
well below the level of the quay and would have difficulty using their own tackle. 
The probability is that most of these ships, except perhaps the smallest, which 
could have been discharged at Quay Head, would have had to wait in turn with the 
Atlantic and other ships to get to the cranes. At any rate, whilst waiting they would 
have to lie alongside other ships at the quay. 
 
The addition of at least 12 ships to those at the central part of the quays would 
mean that many vessels would have to lie three abreast. Obviously, it would be 
best to service ships alongside a quay but most ports had to work ships lying 
abreast; but they did not have Bristol’s tidal problem. Safety and the ability to work 
ships’ tackle depended on wind and rate of ebbing tides, the latter at Bristol being 
extremely high, and even in the month of July there were strong south-westerly 
breezes at the beginning of the month which would have set the vessels at diverse 
angles to each other.76 As wind changes could occur on a daily basis it would 
                                                 
75 No records remain of the trows and market boats attending the port but the annual numbers for 1791, taken 
from payment of bridge dues, were listed in BRO: 11168/3/l Tonnage of ships into Bristol. The figures, 572 
and 1001 were divided by 12 to give an estimation but it is likely that Bright referred to all vessels from the 
Severn as Market Boats as he has no separate section for trows from that area. 
76 BRO: 11168/6a/ii Diary of winds and tides by Captain Jolly. 
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make it impossible for goods such as butts of wine and hogsheads of sugar to be 
lifted from the hold of a ship lying beam-on to the mud and then transported across 
planks towards the quayside. And even if the goods from outer ships could be 
carried to the inner, the wind could have made it settle too far from the quay wall 
for the cranes to reach. 
 
Unfortunately, there are no surviving records of Bristol ships’ cargoes being loaded 
or unloaded, and neither the time taken nor costs were recorded in account books 
due to it being the individual merchant’s responsibility to pay the port taxes. The 
European ships were not large, yet the average time spent in port was 48 days 
which might have been acceptable for seasonal trades, but as discussed above, 
ships requiring short turnarounds like the American would have been hindered by 
being unable to get to the quays due to the jostling for berths. The combination of 
ships requiring quick turnarounds with those whose owners were ambivalent about 
it, would have caused delays and could have been a factor in Bristol losing their 
American trade to Liverpool. It would certainly not have attracted new trade to the 
port. 
 
According to the directories, the area from the Drawbridge to the first slip was 
designated for the use of Irish shipping; the slips themselves being reserved for 
coasters trading to the south and southwest coasts of England; whilst Cranes 1-4  
were used by London, Liverpool and Cork ships, the first two officially classed as 
coasters, but sometimes recorded as foreign by newspapers. Coasters from further 
afield in mainland Britain except for Lancaster and Chester were probably sent to 
wherever was available  (Appendix 4.032). 
 
Irish vessels were classed as ‘foreign’ and therefore information is available from 
the Presentments and newspapers (Appendix 4.036). Out of the total of 38 ships in 
port during July, 15 were from Cork, six from Dublin and six came from Waterford. 
Appendix 4.032 positions Cork ships at Cranes 1 and 2 whilst those from Dublin 
and Waterford were berthed near the Drawbridge.77 There appears to be no 
                                                 
77 Bristol Directory, 1785, pp. 73, 75: Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794 lists constant traders but does not 
give locations. 
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practical reason for Cork ships at the cranes as Dublin ships were far larger and a 
check of incoming cargoes from Cork shows that over half came in empty, whilst all 
but two from Dublin were full as were five out of the six from Waterford. Outgoing 
cargoes consisting of general goods were similar to all ships and again, on 
average, more ships sailed light bound for Cork than the other two. This 
information is important as it could only mean that the cranes themselves were 
immaterial to the Cork ships but designated their location on the quay and this, as 
will be shown below, was the common practice when identifying coasters at the 
quays and backs.78 
 
The cargoes brought in by the Cork ships were mainly animal products and linen; 
the Dublin predominately linen but also animal products; Waterford mainly animal 
and tanner’s waste. Examining the cargo containers, there was the occasional 
hogshead, but most goods were packed in bundles, barrels, boxes, bales and 
bags, all capable of being carried ashore by porters across other vessels after 
being brought up out of holds with ship’s tackle by the crew or hired landsmen. 
Near the Drawbridge, the water was 5ft shallower than the depth at the Gibb, but 
even so that still left 15ft of quayside above the mud. In July, the Irish ships’ 
average tonnage was 68, signifying a height of about 10 feet; so at low water a 
ship’s deck would have been at least 5 feet under the quay edge. This did not 
present an insurmountable inclination, but it would certainly slow down the 
discharge and lading times considerably. 
 
The average turnaround time in July for all Irish ships was 24 days and as the 
other vessels from Irish ports had roughly the same cargoes, the same conditions 
would apply. Matthews Bristol Directory denotes 16 constant traders out of which 
12 came in during July, but throughout the year there was always a ship available 
from the listed Irish ports albeit it was not a constant trader. As is shown below, this 
was a common factor with all trades.  
 
                                                 
78 Again, Irish ships were considered foreign when in reality they operated in a similar fashion to coasters. 
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Five Liverpool and six London ships came to Cranes 1-4 during July but 
unfortunately as they were not entered in the Presentments it is difficult to find the 
composition of their cargoes (Appendix 4.037). Matthew’s Bristol Directory lists 
three constant Liverpool traders whilst there are five for London.79 Only three of 
those were in port in July, but again there were other ships that could have shipped 
goods for these ports. A breakdown of the movements of these ships shows that 
not all could be classed as regular traders, never mind constant. One came from 
Ireland to load for Liverpool; another stayed only four days before moving to 
Liverpool; two appear to have been bought in London for the Straits and African 
trades. This may be an indication that direct trade with London was less than a 
straight count of vessels in and out, especially as many Bristol ships from the West 
Indies discharged their cargoes there and returned to Bristol in ballast. From such 
a small sample, it is difficult to examine turnaround times, but for the regular ships 
they appear to be short, probably due to the availability of cranes. 
 
The use of the slips on Broad Quay. 
 
The Backs at the other end of the quaysides were mostly frequented by Welsh 
coasters at specific slips but there was the anomaly that two of those were 
designated for use by Somerset ships (Illustration 4.003). The proximity of the 
Somerset market at the Exchange could be the reason but probably it was 
because Somerset shipped mainly agricultural goods to Bristol; grain, cereal crops 
and suchlike, and that the facilities for storage of these were on the Backs rather 
than at the quays. Also imports of meat and dairy produce brought in from 
Somerset could be sold immediately at the Exchange80 and an increase in trade 
may have led to the creation of the new Bridgewater slip in 1785.81  
 
Nevertheless, the cargoes from Somerset were analogous to those brought in from 
Gloucestershire to Quay Head to be sold at the Gloucestershire market adjacent to 
                                                 
79 Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794, p. 99. 
80 D. Hussey, Coastal and River Trade in Pre-Industrial England: Bristol and its Region,1680-1730 (Exeter, 
2000) p. 91. 
81 Bristol Directory, 1785, p. 73. 
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that of Somerset.82 And, as there was no real distinction between the merchandise 
arriving from England and Wales, it likely that each berth was traditionally given the 
designation of its trading port to suit merchants rather than to show it had special 
facilities for servicing that port’s goods. 
 
A number of the vessels attending the four slips on the quay were recorded in the 
Bristol directories as being ‘constant coasters’ with additional information on the 
frequency of their visits per month.83 During the specimen month of July, 34 
coasters came to the slips and according to Matthew’s Bristol Directory about 29 of 
them could have been constant traders (Appendix 4.038). However analysis shows 
that none had kept to such a precise schedule in the previous year, six visits being 
the maximum (Appendix 4.039). 
 
Nevertheless, vessels from the designated ports were always available each 
month at their nominated slipway. For example, five ships each from Padstow and 
from Plymouth arrived in July, none of which had regularly visited during the year 
although three were listed as constant coasters in 1793.84 Whether there was an 
agreement at local levels to ensure that there was at least one ship from each 
nominated port, or two if that was the listing in the directories, is uncertain, but 
prospective shippers and passengers would have known that there was always a 
ship available even though it might not be the named vessel.  
 
This highlights a difference between the foreign and coastal trade because the 
former ships listed by Lloyd’s Register as constant traders did keep to their 
designated routes. The reality was that most coasters were owned by their 
captains,85 or at any rate a small concern, and could not afford to wait for cargoes 
to be assembled unless on time-charter and so on return to their home port would 
take whatever work was available. In some cases, the captain not only navigated 
the ship but also ran the trading side of the business himself. As coasters could not 
                                                 
82 Minchinton, ‘Bristol-Metropolis of the West’, p.74. 
83 Bristol Directory, 1785, pp. 72-75; Matthews Bristol Directory, 94, pp. 98-100. Unfortunately there is no 
directory for 1792.  
84 FFBJ, 1791-1793.  
85 Minchinton, ‘Bristol-Metropolis of the West’, p. 72. 
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depend on regular shipments – although these would have been welcome – there 
was more flexibility and faster turnaround times. Some ships arrived or departed in 
ballast. 
 
Vessels would undoubtedly try to berth at their designated slip, but an analysis of 
inward goods showed little difference from one slip to another (Appendix 4.040). 
Extractive items such as copper ore, clay, tin and lead were common to all ships as 
were items for re-export, Bristol being the entrepôt for the area. The export cargoes 
of manufactured goods and other items are too numerous to list86 although an 
atypical item to the southwest was mining equipment made in the local ironworks. 
These could all have been loaded at any slip. The conclusion is that there were no 
specialised facilities at these slips so no practical advantage in using one slip or 
the other although keeping to the designated one would help the delivery and 
collection of goods and assist port organisation.  
 
There is a lack of  information regarding the turnaround times at the quay slips but 
for those regular traders where data is available, 5 to12 days is the usual figure 
(Appendix 4.041). Considering that coasters were of a similar size to Irish and 
European ships, then these ships were operating more efficiently. This could be 
due to better organisation but the fact that they used slips for working cargo must 
have had a positive effect. Illustration 1.012 shows a porter carrying goods down 
Broad Slip and it is estimated that the end of the slip is 5 ft down from the quay 
edge which would have the effect of bringing a 68 ton ship’s deck almost level at 
low water.  
 
The Backs 
 
At the Backs, a similar situation existed as on the quay but with individual slips and 
ladders allocated to ships associated with ports from the same coastal area. Again 
the directories listed constant coasters with their frequency of visits. During July, 40 
coasters came to the Backs and about 29 of them could have been constant 
                                                 
86 When discussing outward cargoes from Bristol, Willan invariably uses the expression ‘miscellaneous 
goods’. T. S. Willan, The English Coasting Trade 1600-1750 (Manchester, 1938) for example, p. 163. 
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traders according to Matthew’s Bristol Directory (Appendix 4.042). Analysis again 
shows that the majority of ships were not visiting monthly but all ports listed as 
having a constant trader, except Carmarthen, had at least one that visited at two 
month intervals, and where there were two, it appears they were timed to overlap 
ensuring a monthly visit.87 Four ships that completed over six visits in a year must 
be classed as being regular if not constant traders, and when the service to the 
Back is taken as a whole, it was certainly more frequent than that to the slips on 
the Quay. Again, there were always ships arriving during the month from the ports 
using the Back, albeit they were not listed, so trade was never interrupted. 88 
 
Appendix 4.043 gives an outline of the goods imported to the Backs and the slips 
could be interchanged if necessary. It is not clear from the contemporary maps as 
to where the ladders were placed, but there were two cranes upriver of the slips 
and they were probably situated there (Illustration 4.003).These cranes are not 
mentioned in any of the Society’s documents but are clearly shown on Tomb’s plan 
of 1797 and were still in place in 1828 (Illustration 1.007).89 The reason for them 
being situated at that point is unknown but they may have been placed there to 
unload heavy items like coal although at that time there were few imports of coal 
from Cardiff.  
 
Apart from coal, the emphasis here is on the import of agricultural and dairy 
products most of which would be destined for the nearby markets. The outward 
cargoes were again miscellaneous goods too diverse to detail.90 As with the quays, 
these could have been loaded at any slip so slips could be interchanged if 
necessary. 
 
                                                 
87 Unfortunately there is no directory for 1792 with the names of the constant coasters. Some ports had more 
than one and they could be overlapping.  
88 It must be accepted that the Cardiff trade would have been regular, but information as to numbers of 
shipping is not available, probably because Cardiff was situated between the Holmes and the mouth of the 
Avon and so its ships were not officially regarded as a coasters.  
89 BRO: 41561/57 Minchinton papers. Photograph of Tombs plan of 1792 for keeping the ships afloat in the 
harbour of Bristol; John Plumley and George Ashwood, 1828. 
90 Minchinton says that ‘cargoes of manufactured goods sent coastwise ….. were so various as to defy 
description’. Minchinton, ‘Bristol-Metropolis of the West’, p. 78. 
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The given location of the coasters on the Back is probably the best fit that can be 
obtained from the information available, but there were other factors which need to 
be considered before congestion can be assessed. First, there were the market 
sheds built to store corn, the generic name for wheat, barley and oats, and they 
would be used by any ship bringing  these items in be it foreign, coastal or market 
boat.91 There were seven almost identical slips and sheds and it is possible that 
each was reserved for a different type of grain. It is difficult to assign shipping to 
them as, for example, did a coaster from Carmarthen carrying a mixed cargo 
unload its grain at the sheds and then move to its nominated berth to discharge its 
other goods, or did it go to its nominated berth and have the grain carted down? 
The latter is the most likely scenario and bearing in mind that all shipping on the 
Back would be moving goods on, off and along, it paints a picture of an extremely 
busy quayside and one cluttered with merchandise.  
  
According to Richard Bright, approximately 48 trows92 from below the Holmes, and 
83 market boats93 went through the port each month, the latter of which would 
have included the constant traders listed in Matthew’s Bristol Directory (Appendix 
4.044).94 Again there is the problem of apportioning ships to berths, as the trows, 
being small vessels, were reputed to discharge at Quay Head95, but in reality would 
have discharged at the same slips as the coasters from their area if they were 
carrying the same cargoes.  
 
The data in Appendix 4.044 depicts 21 trows coming in twice per month at Quay 
Head totalling 42 visits; an additional 12 from the Wye would berth at the market 
sheds and 12 from southeast Wales at Slip 2 on the Back making a total of 66. 
                                                 
91 Martin Bodman, ‘Some Evidence for the Coastal Grain and Flour Trade in the West Country, 1770-1900’, 
Bristol Industrial Archaeological Society Journal 35, (2002) p. 21. 
92 Trows in the late eighteenth century were open sailing ships with a tonnage of up to 100t and about 60-80ft 
long. There was a smaller type of about 40t but they would not normally leave the rivers. C. Green, Severn 
Traders, p. 63. 
93 It is unclear as to Richard Bright’s definition of market boats. He writes that the figure for trows is for those 
making an entry at customs except market boats from the Wye, Severn or other port in the channel. 
Unfortunately he does not split his figures into the Directory categories of Severn Trows, Wye Trows and 
Market Boats from Caerleon, Cardiff and Chepstow, but it must mean that combination as he lists no other 
category and his figures are for the total shipping into Bristol. BRO: 11168/3 (l) Tonnage of ships into Bristol. 
94 Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794, p. 100. 
95 Henceforth referred to as the Quay Head. 
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However, it was noted above that constant traders did not always keep to their 
schedule although the slips always had ships in attendance from their designated 
ports. Those, together with irregular traders from the Severn would easily make up 
Bright’s figure of 83.  
 
Bright’s total would probably be made up of Severn and Wye trows carrying a 
multitude of goods and bulk cargoes and it is doubtful if that figure is accurate as 
there were so many small vessels using the river and port that they would probably 
come in and out without notice.96 For example, there were daily market boats from 
the Parish Wharf at Portishead taking foodstuffs to Bristol and returning with 
building materials.97 It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the 
enormous imports of agricultural and dairy products, industrial raw materials, and 
metallic goods that came down the rivers to the estuary and eventually Bristol. 
Outward cargoes consisted of all the usual Bristol exports and they would be 
distributed on by the river and canal systems to all parts of the country. As with the 
coasters, such goods did not need special facilities and could be loaded onto trows 
at any point on the quays. 
 
Although the turnaround times for coasters at the quay was good, the ships on the 
Back did better as the height of tide was almost the same as at the Gibb 
throughout and allowed more time for cargo working (Appendix 4.045). The 
indications are that any ship on the Back could turn around within 7 days and so 
congestion there would be less.  
 
There was one other regular trade from the Backs and that was the barge traffic to 
Bath. The Avon was tidal as far as Hanham Mills eight miles beyond Bristol, but 
before 1727 Bath could only be reached by low draft vessels at spring tides. An Act 
of Parliament had been passed in 1712 allowing the river to be cleared between 
Hanham and Bath98 but it took a further 15 years to overcome landowner and 
                                                 
96 Minchinton says that it was impossible to state how many vessels there were altogether were engaged in the 
coastal and river trade. Minchinton, ‘Bristol-Metropolis of the West’, p. 72. 
97 Farr, Somerset Harbours, p. 56. 
98 10 Anne. Cap 8. An Act for making the River Avon in the Counties of Avon and Somerset, navigable from 
the City of Bath to or near Hanham Mills. 
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worker opposition before it was opened and the first barge arrived at Bath carrying 
deal boards, pig iron and corn meal.99 As Bath was expanding, general household 
goods were shipped in and heavy goods such as iron and copper ores were 
delivered to the rapidly growing metal industries along the way above Bristol 
Bridge.  
 
By 1793, Bath was seen as a ‘proper inland port’ being supplied by 60-80 ton 
barges.100 The main cargo returning to Bristol was freestone dug from the hills 
above Bath and carried down to the river by tramways that followed an original 
design by John Padmore – the builder of the Great Crane – overcoming a 500 foot 
drop between the quarries and the quay where the barges were loaded using his 
advanced rat’s tail crane. This crane needed a brake drum and ratchet and pinion 
system to be able to bear the load.101  
 
The directories refer to constant trade barges voyaging between Bristol and Bath 
twice per week leaving from the market houses on the Back and from Queen 
Street upstream of Bristol Bridge. The entries refer to the ‘Bath Barge’, but do not 
give it a name or permanent location so at that time it must have been randomly 
located somewhere near the bridge.102 Only lighters and barges with folding masts 
could pass under it and the fact that the Bath vessels were located on either side of 
the bridge shows that this barge traffic was unimpaired by the new bridge. 
Wherries had taken passengers to and from Bath since before the waterway was 
built and afterwards they developed into more complicated vessels with enclosed 
cabin areas.103 Towards the end of the century, the roads to the east of Bristol 
became safer and the journey more regular than water transport, but it was more 
expensive.104 
 
                                                 
99 Warren Berry, The Kennet and Avon Navigation: A History (Chichester: Philmore and Co. Ltd, 2009) p. 6-
7. 
100 Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794, p. 33. 
101 Berry, Kennet and Avon Navigation, p. 8-9. 
102 Bristol Directory, 1785 p. 73; Matthews, Bristol Directory, 1794, p. 100. 
103 Latimer, Annals, p. 161. 
104 Minchinton, ‘Bristol-Metropolis of the West’, p. 73.  
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There are no surviving records of the number of vessels operating between Bristol 
and Bath, but there were many industries along its banks needing raw materials, 
coal to process them and finished articles taken away. The waterway must have 
been extremely busy, especially as there was no tow-path until well into the next 
century. The first Bristol register of vessels of 13 tons or over operating in inland 
waters was produced in 1795 following an Act of Parliament and showed that 
vessels were registered according to their trade route.105 Examples of the trade 
routes in the document are: 
 
Navigation from Hanham Mills on the River Avon in the County of 
Gloucestershire to Kings Road in the port of Bristol and the River Frome in 
the same city extending 14 miles or thereabouts. 
Navigation from Bristol to Bath on the River Avon extending 20 miles 
thereabouts. 
Navigation from Bristol to Bath occasionally into King Road extending 30 
miles. 
 
Vessels registered under the first provision could not trade to Bath whilst the other 
two could with the last able to trade the entire length of the river. There appears to 
be no system whereby ships could deviate from their routes unless re-registered. 
Appendix 4.046 gives details of the barges trading to Bath.  
 
There were 13 lighters in the register but they could only operate between the 
extremities of Brislington and King Road. Six men were listed as crew to man them 
all, an indication that they were not all operating simultaneously and therefore 
would be taking up moorings in the harbour somewhere, the most likely place 
being somewhere above the bridge and not in the congested harbour. As shown in 
the appendix, there were 11 barges operating on the waterway and at least half of 
these would be berthed downstream from the bridge adding to congestion.  
 
                                                 
105 BRO: 05077 Register of ships navigating within the City of Bristol exceeding 13 ton. 1795-1802; 35 Geo 
III cap. An Act requiring all boats barges and other vessels of certain descriptions used on navigable rivers 
and inland navigations in Great Britain to be registered. 
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It is likely that tolls were charged but so far no documentation has been found 
listing these. In 1810, after the Avon and Kennet were connected, the rates 
depended on the type of goods being carried per ton per mile, and this probably 
copied the original system, but gauging the amount of cargo became a source of 
conflict between the canal company and traders throughout the waterway’s 
history.106  
 
Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this analysis was to examine the effect of the tides in detail, not just 
where they affected Atlantic shipping – the main concern of the merchants 
considering change to the harbour – but on maritime trade as a whole. The tide-
table when taken in conjunction with the plans of the quays and backs shows that 
no trade could work without regard to the tides. The largest ships, the West Indian, 
had an average draught of 15½ feet when loaded which meant that there were only 
seven days at the beginning of the month and none at the end when they would 
have been able to come alongside the quayside. Obviously they could do so by the 
use of lighters, but this added to the financial outgoings of the voyage, something 
that the merchants at other ports did not have to face. Also there were periods 
when they did not float at all – 19 in July – and therefore could not be manoeuvred 
even around their berths, which would affect their lading. Finally on only three 
occasions when they were afloat did they have more than an hour on either side of 
high tide to shift the ship. 
 
These were the largest ships, but although the other vessels at the Quay were 
smaller, the water shallowed towards Quay Head and near the Drawbridge to the 
extent that a 68t Irish vessel with a draught of 9ft would not float at all on 15 days 
in the month unless cargo was removed. Even the trows with their 3ft drafts at 
Quay Head required 11ft at the Gibb and that was not available on six days of the 
month. The Grove had the deepest water of all and the mud docks were ideal for 
large ships but use of the Old Mud Dock was limited. The coastal shipping at the 
                                                 
106 Berry, Kennet and Avon Navigation, p. 70. 
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Back had almost the same depth as the Gibb and if the coasters were moored in 
what Elkin calls ‘Bristol Fashion’, that is bow on to the quay wall, then they could 
have been afloat or able to be pulled off for 20 days of the month.107 This would be 
a tremendous asset to the coasting trade. 
 
Damage to ships has been discussed above and the problems of a tidal harbour 
compared to non-tidal can be visualised from Illustration 4.007. This picture from 
the Backs in the late nineteenth-century, after the harbour had been floated, shows 
orderly moorings in a line of small coasters, trows and barges lying together with 
masts still shipped. However, this would have been impossible in the eighteenth 
century as even with good fenders the masts would have tangled as the ships 
settled due to the incline near the quay walls. Ships would have dug their own mud 
berth, but this would not secure them in high winds and tide. Even more so, the 
large ships lying against each other at the crowded quays would be damaged 
unless sufficient space was left between them by the use of chains, and this in 
itself would reduce the numbers of ships in a line.   
 
The Quay Warden and the Water Bailiff needed both skill and forceful personalities 
to marshal the ships into suitable berths and enforce harbour regulations. 
However, they could not be everywhere and masters, pilots and watermen must 
have cooperated to some extent to moor and manoeuvre ships about the harbour. 
The additional cost to the merchants must have been considerable compared to 
that encountered in other ports, but there was little they could do about it. New 
quays could have been built, perhaps on the other side of the Frome and along the 
river from the Merchants’ Dock towards the quays, but the reality was that it might 
give more berths for shipping, but the same problems of manoeuvrability and 
potential damage would continue to exist. There could have been a reorganisation 
– which was what the author of the 1796 Broadsheet was really suggesting – but 
there is no record of this being taken seriously. As has been discussed throughout 
this thesis, the merchants and shipowners of Bristol were intent on maintaining 
                                                 
107 Elkin, Images of Maritime Bristol, p. 14. 
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their long-established practices and it is unlikely that they would have changed 
even if it had been feasible.  
 302 
Section 3. The floatation of the harbour from a pragmatic perspective. 
 
Introduction. 
 
In 1791 the Society produced resolutions regarding a scheme for keeping ships 
afloat in the harbour after accepting that due to the nature of the River Avon the 
prosperity of the port was suffering. As will be shown below, this was not the first 
time that the matter had been discussed or plans put forward, but the resolutions 
themselves are important as they emphasise the fact that due to the nature of its 
river, the port of Bristol had become inferior to many others in the country. In plain 
terms, ships were liable to be damaged and could not be turned around as quickly 
as at other ports due the tidal river, and the solution to this was that the Avon 
should be dammed below the port to keep ships permanently afloat so that they 
would be secure and easily worked – see Appendix 4.001.109  
 
The political analysis. 
 
As noted above, this had first been mooted in 1755 and although discussed by 
both the Society and the Corporation, no constructive action had been taken by the 
end of the century. Scholars have been severely critical of this, seeing it as 
showing a lack of leadership and foresight. John Latimer, writing in the nineteenth 
century, was particularly scathing about the Corporation collaborating with the 
Society in 1764 to allow them to make relatively minor improvements rather than 
tackling the real problem of the floatation of the harbour.110 Patrick McGrath 
believed that the oversight of the port by the Society gave value for money, but 
criticised their lack of support for schemes to turn the river into a floating harbour 
and so to compete with rival ports.111 Walter Minchinton notes that the ‘spirit of 
unambitious caution animated the discussions of port improvement’, and that 
‘politics, parsimony, lethargy and conservatism’ hindered progress.112 Even Alan 
Williams, in his outstanding, comprehensive history of the improvement schemes, 
                                                 
109 Chapter 4. Section 1. Introduction; BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 13 October 1791, pp. 71-72. 
110 Latimer, Annals, p. 317. 
111 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 169. 
112 Minchinton, ‘Port of Bristol’ p. 156. 
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the content of which has provided much of the practical details for this thesis, 
concluded that that floatation was ‘held back sometimes by lack of purpose, often 
by inability to raise capital, and constantly by the voice of ‘non-progressives’.113 
Latimer had also used the term ‘progressives’ to describe those who supported 
floatation when the first committee had been formed in 1757.114 
 
The common denominator of the research carried out by previous historians was 
that it was done from a political and economic viewpoint and accurately determined 
that the motive foremost in the minds of the opponents of the dock plans was 
money, and they would probably agree that the contemporary participants in the 
various committees and debates could be divided into progressives, that is those 
who wished to invest in the floatation schemes; and those against, the non-
progressives. However their assumption, by the very terms used, was that the 
progressives were fighting to implement dynamic, well-grounded plans for the 
improvement of the port and were being obstructed by niggardliness. Nevertheless, 
whether reluctance to spend money was a failing depends upon whether or not the 
investment was valid. The men who were taking these decisions were mainly 
merchants whose livelihood depended upon the river and who were aware of its 
vagaries and so qualified object to or even obstruct plans that they considered 
unsound. None of the authors recorded above appear to have considered that far 
from being the villains of the piece, the non-progressives may have been right and 
by blocking premature investment in projects that would have failed in the 
eighteenth century, they left the way open for success in the nineteenth.  
 
The obstacles associated with floatation in practical terms. 
 
The research in this thesis is aimed at investigating the contemporary structures, 
systems and operations existing at the port and therefore the subject of the 
floatation of the harbour is approached from that perspective. Chapter 1 has 
established the environmental conditions of the river and the first two sections of 
this chapter the nature of the congestion and the effects of the tides. This data will 
                                                 
113 Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes’, p. 180. 
114 Latimer, Annals, p. 317. 
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be applied to the plans put forward by engineers and others to establish whether, 
in hindsight, they were feasible and ought to have had been implemented, or if it 
was fortunate that they did not come to fruition. Using this method, the motivation 
behind the actions of the participants becomes irrelevant. What is important is 
whether the harbour at Bristol could have been floated in the eighteenth century 
and so improving the conditions for shipping. This in itself would not have stopped 
the relative decline of the port,115 but it might have reduced merchants’ costs and 
attracted shipping foreign to the port which apart from increasing income, might 
have made ships available for chartering that would not normally have risked the 
river passage.116  
 
It will be shown below that there was never a consensus of opinion regarding the 
benefits of constructing the floating harbour and even after the work had been 
completed criticism continued well into the nineteenth century. It would be 
impossible to go into detail as there is enough archival material for a thesis in itself, 
but in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century a great many port users 
intuitively opposed spending what they saw as vast sums of money on a project 
which, in spite of the arguments of the engineers brought in as experts, they 
believed was doomed to failure. One such, Solomon Roach, a Superintendent of  
the Society with a lifetime’s experience of the river had been asked by them in 
1791 to record his objections to the engineers’ plans117 and in his report he 
commented.  
 
‘Your engineers may be men of experience in erecting inland canals 
navigation, please to remember here is a great flow of tide and floods in the 
River Avon to encounter with’.118 
 
This was the essence of the problem; the engineers were competent to construct 
the necessary dams and wet docks but they were unfamiliar with the conditions at 
                                                 
115 Minchinton says that the trade of Bristol did not recover when port improvement took place but only when 
new staples were found. Minchinton, ‘Port of Bristol’ p. 158. 
116 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/5 Index 5, 13 October 1791. pp. 71-72. 
117 BRO: SMV/2/1/2/4 Index 4, 3 November, 1791. 
118 Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes’, p. 169. 
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Bristol, where any interference in the flow of the river not only affected the city as a 
whole, but industry on either side of it and crucially the access to the Hung Road 
and the estuary. 
 
It is not intended to examine each plan individually, but to assign them to three 
categories, those where a wet dock was to have been created without damming 
the Avon; those involving the damming of the River Avon, and those where a cut 
was to have been dug to redirect the river around the port. The first plan was put 
forward by John Smeaton in 1765119 and involved damming the mouth of the River 
Frome to keep ships in this part of the harbour permanently afloat, entrance being 
by canal and lock through Cannon’s Marsh.120 This was a feasible project as it was 
similar to the creation of the wet docks at London and Liverpool,121 knowledge of 
which was available to engineers. It would not interfere with the day to day 
operation of the harbour and the cost was reasonable at £25,000-£30,000,122 but it 
was never attempted and there is general agreement amongst scholars that it was 
deliberately undermined by the Corporation and Society in order to bring in the new 
wharfage lease – see above. As part payment for this lease the Society agreed to 
build the dock at the Grove and put the final link between the quay and the 
backs.123 The eventual cost was £9747, a relatively minor amount, but it is 
inconceivable that this work could have been left undone anyways,124 so if the 
Frome River project and this had both been completed, the total cost of 
improvements would have been in the region of £40,000, a challenging sum to 
raise even if the participants had shown any enthusiasm. 
 
Through research and hindsight, however, it is difficult to see how this project, if 
successfully completed, could have seriously effected the problems associated 
with the harbour by 1791 when the resolutions were made. It would have created a 
wet dock, but this would have only provided eight berths against the quay wall 
where the cranes were for large ships, about another eight for medium size vessels 
                                                 
119 John Smeaton, civil engineer, 1724-1792. 
120 See Illustration, 1.003. 
121 See Introductory chapter, pp. 29-30, 31-33. 
122 Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes’, p. 146. 
123 See Chapter 1.3 p. 80. 
124 See Chapter 1.3 pp. 82-84 and Appendix 1.012. 
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and about seven at the quay head for the smallest vessels.125 The problem with the 
Frome was that its bed sloped upwards from the mouth to the head, the depth of 
water dropping from 15 to about 4ft.126 To deepen it would mean digging out the 
river bed and would not only have been costly, but it would have been likely to 
damage the ancient quay walls. Obviously ships could lie abreast or even moor, 
but although that would reduce damage, it would not necessarily reduce 
turnaround times. William Jessop, a consultant engineer brought to advise, 
confirmed this in a report to the Society in 1788.127 It would be possible to buy land 
and develop the other bank of the Frome, but compensation would have been 
extremely costly – it was not done until the late nineteenth century. Also, as the 
tide-table in Appendix 4.030 shows, the positioning of the entry canal was too far 
upstream as this would have reduced the tidal window controlling ship movements.  
 
A similar project to dam the Frome and bring ships in through Cannon’s Marsh was 
put forward in 1796 by an ‘anonymous citizen’ in an untitled broadsheet,128 who 
believed that with trade being low at the time all foreign ships in the harbour could 
be accommodated using only a wet dock created in the Frome. It is doubtful if he 
was an active port user because he believed that 65 large vessels could be 
accommodated five abreast between the dam and the drawbridge and 31 smaller 
ships between the Drawbridge and the Stone Bridge. As Illustrations 4.003-6 show, 
the absolute maximum number of ships that could lie abreast would be five, leaving 
no room to manoeuvre or pass. Also, ships in this part of the harbour required 
cranes and these could only work one vessel at a time.129 What the writer was 
trying to achieve was a reorganisation of berths for shipping at a time when trade 
was low in order to avoid implementing the more expensive projects.130 He put the 
costs of his project at £20,000, but would be reduced to £10,000 if no canal was 
built. The latter would have meant that ships could only come in and out of the 
Frome wet dock through a lock on the dam which would then mean navigating 
                                                 
125 See data detailed in Chapter 4.b and Illustration 4.003. 
126 BRO 11168/59. A Plan of the Rivers Avon and Frome. 
127 William Jessop, civil engineer, 1745-1814; Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes’, p. 
155. 
128 BRO: 11168/27 An Untitled Broadsheet, 22 March, 1796.  
129 See Chapter 4.2 for an explanation of the shipping using the quay. 
130 Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes’, p. 172. 
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through massed shipping to reach their berths. It would have brought massive 
congestion similar to that at London.131 
 
Apart from Seaton’s, all the plans put forward by engineers132 in the eighteenth 
century advocated damming the River Avon and bypassing these dams with a lock 
and a basin, except for the Black Rock project detailed below which had no basin. 
In 1766, William Champion133 proposed constructing a dam at across the Avon at 
Redcliff, to be bypassed by a lock and basin situated at the beginning of the Avon 
Gorge and feeding into the chamber of his own wet dock at Hotwells,134 which 
would have provided access for ships in and out of the now floating harbour. The 
cost was between £30,000 and £37,000. In 1788, Jessop himself suggested a 
scheme very similar to Champion’s but with the dam slightly down river. Estimated 
cost £39,500. Another copy of Champion’s plan was put forward by Smeaton in 
1789, this time costing £74,000. None were accepted, possibly because the 
engineers were not consistent, but also the ‘non-progressives’ could not be 
convinced.  
 
There is no doubt that if implemented all of these plans would have kept all ships in 
the port permanently afloat, but the engineers appear to have been unaware of the 
effects of fast, silt-bearing tides and rivers.135 Smeaton himself, arguably the most 
experienced engineer, admitted he had never seen a dam erected in such 
conditions.136 No matter how many sluice gates were put on the dams the rate of 
flow of water, which normally built up over a distance of ten miles, would inevitably 
be hindered leading to unavoidable deposits of silt.137 Within the harbour it would 
increase and none of the engineers’ plans included a means whereby it could be 
regularly cleared without interrupting trade, although one by Richard Tombs, a 
                                                 
131 See Introductory Chapter, p.28. 
132 The term engineer will be used in this work to denote a professional civil engineer called in for advice. 
Civil engineering in the eighteenth century was still defining its scope and stature as a distinct profession. R. 
A. Buchanan, Nineteenth Century Engineers in the Port of Bristol (Bristol Branch of the Historical 
Association, Pamphlet No. 26, 1971) p. 3. 
133 William Champion, 1709-1789. Metallurgist rather than civil engineer. 
134 See Appendix 1.006. 
135 Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes’, p. 164. 
136 Ibid p. 156. 
137 See Chapter 1.1. for a discussion on the problems of silt. 
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local shipbuilder, was produced in 1792 with this facility in mind.138 As shown 
above, Merchants’ Dock was closed for long periods for this purpose, but there the 
dock could be closed if necessary, impossible with a sluiced river dam. Also, lock 
gates and chambers would suffer the same damage as occurred at Merchants’ 
Dock but their failure in the river would be disastrous as it would stop the 
movement of ships through the harbour.139 Debris too, both man-made and natural, 
would inescapably pile up behind dams and at times of flood cause damage 
requiring costly repairs.140 At Hung Road, where berths had already been lost, the  
weakened ebb tide would not have been strong enough to remove estuary silt and 
debris from upriver precipitating a reduction of the number of berths and the port’s 
effectiveness.141   
 
Joseph Nickalls,142 another consultant engineer brought in by the Society, 
advocated damming the River Avon much further down at Black Rock143 to allow 
ships to reach there even at neap tides. Another advantage was that little 
compensation would have been necessary. However, due to the physical 
constraints of the terrain, there would have been no room for a tidal bypass or 
basin and the entrance locks would have to be situated in the middle of the dam. 
Nickalls estimated an economical cost of £20,000 – £24,000, but its construction 
would have involved massive losses to the port users as it would have halted traffic 
to and from the port while it was being built. 
 
If this project had been realised all the problems associated with the other 
schemes would have occurred, exacerbated by the fact that the dam with its 
central lock gates would have received the full force of the river, its debris and land 
floods without a bypass. It is also likely that ships arriving at the dam during springs 
would have had to confront a counter current caused by the river hitting the dam 
wall. This was raised by an opponent of the projects in 1791 who gave as proof the 
                                                 
138 See Illustration 1.007. 
139 In 1790 it was closed for three months for this purpose. For details of lock gates damage see Chapter 1. 
Section 2. p. 77-78. 
140 To understand the extent of the problems see Chapter 1. Section 1. p. 55-61.  
141 See Chapter 1. Section 1. p. 34 
142 Joseph Nickalls. Engineer, 1725-1793. Former assistant to Smeaton. 
143 See Illustration 1.002.  
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counter current in the River Frome at the end of the quay.144 Any ship failing to 
reach the dam due to this or adverse winds would have to anchor on a rocky shore 
risking damage.145 The plan did not include chambers and it is difficult to see how 
the lock could cope in quiet periods never mind when there was an influx of traffic 
at times of fleet arrivals for although the dam increased the time available for 
shipping to proceed to the harbour, the incoming tide took a finite time to reach the 
water level on the other side.146  
 
In 1792 another scheme to dam the Avon at Rownham Meads was put forward by 
William Jessop and this was accepted by the Society and Corporation, in truth 
because their members were beginning to panic over the success of their rival 
ports.147 There were vociferous objections from the non-progressives but the plan 
would have been carried forward had France not declared war and had trade not 
been falling. However, it again relied on simply damming the River Avon. The 
outlay was to be £57,836. Even Alan Williams, despite extensive research, does 
not appreciate the fact that none of these plans would have worked. In this case he 
infers that if the non-progressives had not caused a year’s delay, Jessop’s project 
would have been started and completed successfully for the benefit of the port.148 
The reality is that for the reasons stated above, and below, the port would have 
been left with a white elephant. 
 
Jessop’s scheme was not abandoned but there was no further action on it. In 1791, 
a clergyman, William Milton,149 proposed the novel idea that a new river bed be cut 
to bypass the entire harbour leaving it flooded, but with locks at either end to 
control its water level and allow access to shipping. The new river would enter the 
old at Hotwells leaving its flow unaltered and therefore removing many of the 
objections put forward by the non-progressive party. However it had one major 
                                                 
144 BRO: 11168/47 A Reply to the Answer to the Objections usually raised against the Embankment of the 
River Avon, 1791.  
145 See Chapter 1. Section 1 p. 56 for details of the river conditions. 
146 Data from Appendix 4.030, the tide-table, could be used to authenticate this. 
147 Williams, ‘Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes’, p. 171. 
148 Ibid., p. 171. 
149 The Reverend William Milton (1743-1824). Lived in Bristol for the last 25 years of the eighteenth century 
but with a living at Heckfield, Hampshire. Father of Frances Trollope and grandfather of Anthony Trollope, 
writers. [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27751, accessed 7 April 2016]  
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defect and that was the estimated cost was £159,627. What is significant, however, 
is that all the plans that followed into the nineteenth century, included a tidal 
bypass. Milton may have been an amateur but once he had pointed the way to 
overcome the tidal problem, the engineers followed suit.  
 
Although the floating dock was not opened until 1809, some comment on the final 
plan is necessary. William Jessop accepted the idea of diverting the river and in 
1802 brought out a plan which involved floating the harbour as far as the Frome, 
but it was not acceptable because it did not include the Grove or the Backs. The 
estimated cost was £150,840 exclusive of the purchase of land. Eventually he put 
forward a similar plan incorporating the entire port area which was more or less 
that from which the floating harbour was constructed. The initial cost was estimated 
at £212,470, but eventually this increased to about £600,000 which left the port 
with a financial problem that continued for the next forty years. The arguments for 
and against dockisation continued and even Richard Bright, a strong supporter, 
turned against it in the end; but without its construction the commercial port could 
not have continued for another 150 years. However, had one of the eighteenth-
century plans that ignored the vagaries and power of the River Avon been tried and 
failed, it is highly unlikely that that the merchants of Bristol would have supported 
another. 
 
The situation at Bristol compared to other ports. 
 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the environmental problems experienced by 
shipping at the port were far from being the only cause of its decline, but they were 
a factor and one which, arguably, in this sphere, was greater than faced by any 
other port in the country. Referring back to the data recorded in the Introductory 
Chapter, London had no access difficulties but had a serious problem with 
congestion which in turn led to large scale theft, damage to shipping and long 
turnaround times. However, there was a relatively simple though costly answer, the 
building of secure wet docks, and once the politics had been resolved and the 
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money made available it provided a permanent solution.150 Structurally there were 
no engineering difficulties and wet docks were easily constructed in good 
ground.151 The cost of building the first, the West India Dock, was estimated at 
£258,345 but, as at Bristol, it went over budget eventually requiring £309,824. It is 
practically impossible to compare costs between ports as the conditions at each 
were incommensurate. A simple example being that at London it was difficult to 
keep up a constant supply of bricks whilst at Bristol they could be made on site.152 
 
Liverpool, like Bristol, had a turbulent estuary and dangerous foreshore but there 
were no real impediments to building wet docks on land as there was at Bristol; 
and a further advantage was that ground owned by the Corporation was 
suitable.153 Costs cannot be compared with Bristol as the wet docks there were 
built piecemeal throughout the eighteenth century. Like Bristol and London, where 
the ports had developed over centuries and could not be easily transformed due to 
structural characteristics and entrenched vested interests, Hull’s obstacle to 
progress was the opposition of merchant wharf owners. Trade was failing due to a 
lack of berths which brought on congestion, delays and damage. A long political 
argument developed before a wet dock was built at a cost of £73,229, funded by a 
private dock company, but it was too successful at attracting shipping and another 
political wrangle started over the building of a second. There were no serious 
environmental complications such as those recorded above at Bristol, and so when 
the political arguments were resolved the same technical solution could be applied 
to build a second dock.154  
 
Glasgow too was faced with an environmental obstacle, but it was the converse of 
Bristol’s, that is the River Clyde was a slow moving, gentle river except at times of 
floods, but as a result was too shallow to allow ships to reach the city. The 
engineers brought in by its Corporation did not have the Avon’s severe elements to 
face, but to a certain extent the problem of deepening the Clyde caused the same 
                                                 
150 For details see the Introductory Chapter, pp, 27-30. 
151 Jackson, The History and Archaeology of Ports, p. 57. 
152 See Appendix 1.006. The Construction of Merchants’ Dock. 
153 For details see Introductory Chapter, pp. 30-33. 
154 For details see Introductory Chapter, pp. 33-35. 
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confused contemplation as their colleagues at Bristol, because they had not had 
the experience of a problem of this type and scale. The result was the failure in the 
eighteenth century to deepen the Clyde enough to take large ships. However, 
eighteenth-century engineers were excellent at building canals and one such was 
constructed between the Clyde estuary and Grangemouth with a spur into the 
centre of Glasgow.155 At Bristol in the late eighteenth century there was the 
possibility of investing in various canals proposed locally but the Society showed 
little interest, and anyway, none of them would have solved its environmental 
problem.156 There were similar conditions to Glasgow at Newcastle, the River Tyne 
being too shallow to allow easy access to the city, but there, unlike Bristol, where 
at least the difficulties were debated and eventually resolved, the problem was 
ignored by its Corporation until well into the nineteenth century and so large, new 
ports developed on the coast in opposition.157  
 
Conclusions. 
 
When the building of the floating harbour is considered from a purely political and 
economical point of view, the historic consensus to date is that in the eighteenth 
century the Corporation and Society at Bristol circumvented and delayed making 
positive decisions because of the substantial opposition to the scheme by a group 
of reactionary sceptics who were mainly concerned about costs, and that this was 
to the detriment of the port’s advancement. Nevertheless, the above analysis of the 
plans put forward in the period, using data from other parts of the thesis and 
primary evidence, clearly shows that none of them would have provided a 
permanent solution to the port’s problems and indeed, if attempted, would have 
failed and the costs encountered strengthened the case of the doubters to the 
extent that no further improvements might have been made at all. The reality was 
that the merchants and citizens of the city may have known the river better than the 
professional engineers. After all, it was a layman who produced the key solution to 
the overall problem, that is, the diversion of the river round the port. 
                                                 
155 For details see Introductory Chapter, pp. 35-37. 
156 McGrath, Merchant Venturers of Bristol, pp. 230-232. 
157 For details see Introductory Chapter p. 39. 
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However, an important outcome of this section’s research and the work done  
throughout the thesis, is that it clearly shows the extent the port suffered from 
being serviced by a fast flowing, tidal river which even after the floatation of the 
harbour remained an obstacle to easy access to the port. The other major ports, 
Liverpool, London and Hull found permanent solutions to their difficulties and could 
repeat them as necessary when trade increased; and whilst Glasgow and 
Newcastle had to wait till the nineteenth century, they were in the process of 
expansion whilst Bristol was in decline. The problems posed by the River Avon 
were never fully overcome.   
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Chapter 5. 
 
Conclusions. 
 
The aim of this thesis was to produce a model of the workings of the port of Bristol 
and its shipping in the eighteenth century, partly to fill a gap in its history, but also 
to provide an information bank from which the efficiency of its infrastructure, 
operational systems and management could be examined. Nationally, the port was 
declining compared to others it had previously surpassed and the overall question 
was whether at the end of the century its resources were adequate and being used 
effectively.  
 
The technical particulars of the port’s physical structure, cargo handling abilities 
and workforce were concentrated upon in Chapter 1, and throughout the thesis the 
operational systems that had developed around them were uncovered and 
analysed. Similarly the processes by which shipowners conducted their maritime 
operations within and without the port were examined and recorded. Together 
these provide a vade mecum for the way this port worked and the backdrop from 
which the wider issue of effectiveness could be assessed.     
 
To return to the questions posed at the outset. The Society was the key 
organisation in running the port although the Corporation could intervene and 
legislative changes needed to go through the Quarter Sessions. So saying, the 
reality was that the port and its river functioned according to the systems the 
Society imposed and can be judged accordingly. Through their Standing 
Committee they maintained a system of centralised control and frugality was at the 
core of all their decisions, which is understandable as large profits were not being 
made and indeed the Society was generally servicing debt. However, penny 
pinching led to a delay in the resolution of mundane matters, which in particular 
reduced the effectiveness of Hungroad as a transit port and the navigation of the 
river by a failure to deal with obstructions as they occurred. 
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Nevertheless, it is difficult to criticise their administration of the city quays because 
although they suffered from congestion, which will be commented on below, there 
were effective systems of ship handling, porterage and goods clearance in place. 
Frugality was practised here as everywhere else, but it did not have the same 
effect. Perhaps the central location meant the Committee, most of whom were 
merchants working in the port area, were able to see the problems as they arose 
and were more willing to intervene.  
 
In the second half of the century the Society bore the cost of completing the city 
quays as part of the agreement over the renewal of the wharfage lease, but income 
from this, though considerable, was over a 99 year period and not in a lump-sum to 
refill their coffers. Their investment at Merchants’ Dock may have been made partly 
for mercenary reasons, but it was considerable and provided the port with a first 
class wet dock which should have relieved pressure on its facilities. However it is 
unlikely that financially it ever broke even. This expenditure must be taken into 
account when judging whether the Society mismanaged the port by failing to lobby 
the Corporation for the floatation of the harbour at the end of the century, 
especially as at no time was there consensus that this would actually solve the 
problems within a reasonable budget. The conclusion reached – with caveats 
regarding frugality and delays caused by centralised control – was that the Society 
was successful in running the port under difficult circumstances. 
 
The second question concerned the structure of the port and its amenities, which 
again was the responsibility of the Society. More berths for shipping would have 
assisted with congestion, but this would have meant developing the Somerset bank 
of the river or the area west of the city quays which would have incurred the 
prohibitive costs of building roads and bridges never mind the actual quaysides. A 
project like this would probably not win support for the same reason the Merchants’ 
Dock was unpopular – the distance the new resources were from the centre of 
activity, the city quays. Research showed that there were adequate cargo handling 
facilities available, except for a few items like sheds, and that it was possible to 
provide a fast turnaround for individual ships, but they could not cope with the 
sheer numbers arriving at peak periods. No fault could be found with the main port 
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officers, Haven Master, Quay Warden, Water Bailiff and Dock Master or the 
systems they implemented.  
 
The third question examined the men who actually used the port, the merchant 
shipowners. Chapter 2 established beyond any doubt that at the end of the century 
the majority of Bristol shipowners were running their ships along traditional lines, 
that is as an appendage to their businesses rather than for income from freight 
charges – a change that was beginning to occur elsewhere. This is important 
because it meant that there had been no alteration to the long-established 
approach by which they used the port and its facilities, yet trade and shipping had 
increased. An analysis of the problems of congestion was carried out in Chapter 4 
and shows that it could have been partially relieved had the shipowners been more 
flexible about the areas they traded to, as this would have removed the effects of 
seasonal shipping allowing a reorganisation of the port. However there is no 
mention in contemporary documents that this was ever considered, and the 
entrenched practices of a less demanding period continued. 
 
The costs of ship operations to the West Indies was examined in Chapter 3 and the 
conclusion was that ships could have been run more profitably if they had been 
operating under a more modern model. Crew wages and provisions were seen as 
a significant expense by shipowners, but for much of a voyage highly skilled 
seamen were involved in what was basically maintenance and labouring work. The 
expenditure on refits could have been reduced as the main expense was for dry-
docking due to the damage caused by ships remaining in polluted waters for long 
periods. Under a time charter there would have been a greater incentive to turn the 
ships around quickly and their owners would have been be able to chose an 
unseasonable refit time best suited to themselves. However, whilst ships continued 
to be run as an adjunct to a merchant owner’s main business rather than as an 
autonomous concern, the efficiency of the port suffered. The reality was that the 
Bristol merchants were operating a system that brought in profits and were content 
to continue as they were.  
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The investigation of the fourth question, however, showed that no amount of 
reorganisation could alter the effect of tides on the port without a fundamental 
alteration to its corporeal structure. Delays to shipping in transit through the port 
were inevitable even for the smallest vessels where a matter of a few hours might 
make a difference to their market day sales, and although the largest might arrive 
when a suitable tide was in place, it could be lost by having to prepare for the river 
passage.  
 
Bristol shipowners had to face additional overheads due to the extraordinary tidal 
conditions faced by their ships during the transit through the port. These expenses 
are examined in Chapter 3 with the conclusion that not only were they reducing 
profits, but they were a factor in the port’s relative decline as they reduced 
competitiveness and thus its ability to attract foreign shipping. Apart from handling 
costs, the tide-table given in Chapter 4 shows that the period when ships could 
manoeuvre, even at high tides, was very short which interrupted cargo handling as 
well as delaying movement to and from their berths. This in turn led to additional 
clutter on the quays and as few sheds were available, goods open to the elements 
could be ruined. Ships lying in close proximity were easily damaged and so at 
Bristol they had to be built stronger than most, again adding to the costs borne by 
shipowners. The same destructive forces damaged port structures whose repair 
was the responsibility of the Society, the prime example being the closure of 
Merchants’ Dock for repairs from time to time due to silt brought by tide.  
 
Chapter 4 showed that in the late eighteenth century the Society had accepted the 
tidal problem and was actively looking for a solution but plans brought forward by 
engineers and others could not be agreed on and the problem continued into the 
nineteenth century. Data obtained whilst researching this problem when compared 
with that in the Introductory Chapter showed that whilst other ports implemented 
permanent solutions to their environmental problems, Bristol could not due to the 
force of its river flow. With hindsight it can be seen that even after floating the 
entire harbour the problems of the tidal river continued and eventually the harbour 
was restricted to smaller vessels and a new port built at the mouth of the river. In 
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the eighteenth century this was not feasible due to the logistics of moving goods 
from there to the city – it had to await the coming of the railways.  
 
Lastly, as mentioned in the Abstract, Acknowledgements and Justification, little 
information is available about the day to day operations of merchant ports and 
shipping in the eighteenth century, so the data that has been accumulated in the 
preparation of this thesis is recorded in the appendices as the only supportive 
evidence of many of the conclusions reached. It has also been made available for 
general research as it could be adapted to any eighteenth-century port because it 
is probable that they all followed the same basic principles, albeit none had 
Bristol’s specific environmental problem. 
 
